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STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE UNLAWFUL CONDUCT  
OF ARMED GROUPS 
 
Tatyana Jane Eatwell 
 
The law of state responsibility codified by the International Law Commission (ILC) in its Articles 
on the Responsibility of States (ARS) is analysed with respect to unlawful acts of an armed group 
where: (i) the state provides substantial support to the group; (ii) the group exercises 
governmental authority over part of the state’s territory; and (iii) a successful insurrection results 
in the establishment of a new government or a new state.  
 
Part One addresses (i) and the control and agency paradigm central to the ARS. The ‘effective 
control’ test applied to identify a state’s agents (article 8 ARS) means that state-sponsors of 
terrorism or international crimes will avoid direct responsibility by holding proxies at arms-length. 
This thesis challenges the arguments that attribution should be based on ‘overall control’ in such 
cases. Instead, this thesis proposes a rule of derivative responsibility for complicity that draws on 
primary obligations under international humanitarian and human rights law that prohibit 
encouragement or facilitation of certain acts. 
 
Part Two addresses (ii) and (iii) and the application of articles 9 and 10(1) and (2) ARS respectively 
– exceptions to the control and agency paradigm that have been generally overlooked in discourse. 
With regard to (ii) this thesis counters recent scholarship that argues that article 9 will apply to the 
‘governmental’ acts of armed opposition groups. Doctrinal analysis shows that article 9 will only 
cover the conduct of an armed group that acts in the interests of, or with the acquiescence of, the 
state’s authorities. A critical approach is taken to the ILC’s codification of articles 10(1) and (2) 
that cover circumstances (iii): Contrary to the ILC’s position, this thesis argues that the ‘peace v. 
justice’ debate should not influence article 10(1)’s application to governments of national 
reconciliation. Further, it is shown that article 10(2) is seriously flawed: the rule requires the new 
state to be bound by international obligations before that state existed in fact, a notion not 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis addresses how state responsibility for the conduct of groups participating in armed 
conflict is regulated by international law, and the extent to which the law of state responsibility is 
applicable to questions of post-conflict justice and reconciliation.1  
 
The International Law Commission’s (ILC) draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARS), adopted by the General Assembly in 2001,2 are the product 
of 40 years of legal analysis and deliberation by the members of the ILC guided by the Special 
Rapporteurs. They are widely considered as a codification of customary international law.3 With 
the exception of Article 10 that specifically applies to the conduct of insurrectional movements, 
the ARS are of general application. Nevertheless, the state practice and jurisprudence relied upon 
by the ILC in the formulation of the rules of attribution draw heavily on scenarios arising from 
armed conflict. However, the ARS and ILC Commentary leave some fundamental questions 
unanswered that I will address in this thesis.  
 
States have often sought to intervene in the internal affairs of other states and to influence the 
strategic outcome of conflicts abroad. As Mumford has observed, “If life is nasty, brutal and short, 
as Thomas Hobbes would have us believe, then it would appear that it is also imbued with a 
perpetual desire to interfere in the affairs of others”.4  In recent internal armed conflicts in the 
Middle East and North Africa a number of third states have financed, trained, armed, advised, and 
provided air support to armed groups fighting on the ground. Several states have conducted joint 
military operations with armed groups seeking to overthrow President Assad’s government and 
defeat ‘radical Islamist’ armed groups such as Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and Jabhat 
al Nusra, the official al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. Russia has been accused of intervening in the 
conflict in eastern Ukraine by arming, financing and otherwise supporting the self-proclaimed 
 
1 The question whether an armed group may be held internationally responsible for its own conduct that violates 
international humanitarian law is beyond the scope of its thesis. For studies concerning the question of secondary 
rules of attribution with regard to armed group responsibility see Zegveld (2002) chpt.4; ILA, Washington 
Conference, 3rd Report (2014) pp.8-11; Verhoeven (2015) pp.300-302; Mastorodimos (2016) pp.123-126. 
2 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the ILC on the work of its 53rd 
session, UN Doc A/56/10, ILC Ybk 2001, Vol. II(2). 
3 Bosnia Genocide, §209 
4 Mumford (2013) p.97. 
 2 
‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ and ‘Luhansk People’s Republic’, armed groups that seek to secede 
from the Ukraine and either establish a new independent state or accede to Russia.  
 
When conflict ends armed groups might succeed in overthrowing the pre-existing regime (with or 
without the assistance of states), or transform themselves into a political party that enters into a 
coalition government pursuant to a power-sharing agreement with the pre-existing government, 
or establish a new state.  
 
These different scenarios all raise questions concerning the extent to which the conduct of an 
armed group is attributable to the state that supports it, or the state to which the armed group 
becomes the new government. These questions are important for two reasons. First, the 
development of international human rights law (IHRL) has meant that individuals can now invoke 
the international obligations of a state in order to seek redress for harm suffered during an armed 
conflict in domestic courts and international human rights tribunals for harm suffered during an 
armed conflict. From a victim’s perspective, the ability to identify whether the conduct that caused 
the harm is attributable to a state will be determinative of a claim for redress under IHRL. Second, 
attribution of conduct and as a consequence the engagement of a state’s international obligations, 
is important in the wider legal, political and international context. A state that seeks to evade its 
international obligations by operating through another actor, in this case an armed group, empties 
those obligations of all substance. The same is true of a state that seeks to evade responsibility by 
diverting the blame to the individual who has, while acting on the state’s behalf, committed 
offences contrary to international and domestic criminal law. 
 
1.2 Structure of the thesis  
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part I (Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5) is concerned with the extent to 
which primary and secondary rules of international law are sufficient to ‘catch’ state participation 
in, or facilitation of, violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and other unlawful acts 
committed by armed groups. In this regard the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) judgments in 
Nicaragua and Bosnia Genocide have framed the debate over the question of how a state’s de facto 
organs or agents should be identified for the purposes of engaging a state’s responsibility for their 
conduct.5 While this debate appears to have been resolved by Bosnia Genocide and the affirmation 
 
5 One issue that has received much attention and is beyond the scope of this thesis is the question of shared 
responsibility between states and other subjects of international law. See generally, SHARES Project on Shared 
Responsibility in International Law, www.sharesproject.nl.  
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of the ‘complete dependence’ and ‘effective control’ tests, the question remains as to whether the 
law of state responsibility, coupled with the primary obligations of states, is sufficient to ‘catch’ 
state participation in or facilitation of violations of international law by armed groups - state 
conduct and policy that often faces political and moral condemnation by other states and the 
public at large. 
 
In Chapter 2 I provide an overview of the current understanding of the control tests applied to 
identify a state’s (de facto) organs and agents for the purposes of attribution of conduct. I show that 
the high threshold tests of ‘complete dependence’ and ‘effective control’ required to identify a 
state’s ‘de facto’ organs or agents (Articles 4 and 8 ARS) means that a state that sponsors a group 
that commits terrorism or war crimes will avoid direct responsibility for those acts by holding the 
group at arms-length. This legal framework provides the foundation for the following chapters 
that address the question of the extent to which a state is, or should be, held responsible for the 
provision to an armed group of financial, military or other support that is used in the commission 
of terrorism, international crimes and other unlawful acts. 
 
In Chapter 3 I challenge the argument that attribution should be based on ‘overall control’ in cases 
where the state and armed group act with a ‘shared unlawful purpose’.6 I argue that to do so would 
undermine the notion of limited state responsibility for private conduct and therefore the very 
foundations on which the modern law of state responsibility is built.  
 
In Chapter 4 I examine the extent to which a state’s primary obligations to prevent certain acts, to 
respect and ensure respect for IHL, and to respect and ensure the enjoyment human rights and 
freedoms of all persons within its jurisdiction, are sufficient to cover state complicity7 in 
international crimes and other unlawful acts committed by armed groups. I will show that in 
situations of armed conflict, a state’s primary obligations to respect and ensure IHL will apply in 
circumstances where a state sponsors an armed group to commit violations of IHL. However, 
outwith situations of armed conflict, and with respect to certain acts committed outside the state’s 
 
6 E.g. Bosnia Genocide, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, §39 and Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad 
hoc Mahiou, §§114-117. Also, Stahn (2003) p.47 and (2004) p.839; Cassese (2007a); Trapp (2011) pp.42-45. 
7 The ILC abandoned of the use of the term ‘complicity’ because of its association with domestic criminal law. The 
use of the term in this thesis is not in order to connote criminal responsibility of states, but as shorthand for aid or 
assistance for the commission of an unlawful act. 
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jurisdiction,8 there exists a ‘responsibility gap’. This responsibility gap exists because of a lack both 
of primary obligations that would prohibit a state from providing support to persons or groups 
that commit unlawful acts and of secondary rules of attribution according to which, by virtue of 
its provision of support, the state is held internationally responsible for those acts. This 
responsibility gap allows states to evade their international obligations by using proxies and 
keeping their proxies at arms-length. 
 
In light of this analysis, in Chapter 5 I suggest that the better approach would be through the 
formulation of general rules of derivative responsibility or ‘complicity’, drawing upon the specific 
primary rules that prohibit complicit conduct and are currently available in IHL and IHRL. 
 
Part II (Chapters 6, 7, and 8) provides a critical analysis of the ILC’s codification of Articles 9 and 
10 ARS, two rules that have received limited attention. Unlike the scenarios considered in Part I, 
Articles 9 and 10 apply in exceptional circumstances where there is no legal or factual link between 
the armed group and the state at the time the relevant conduct is committed. Thus, these rules are 
exceptions to the control and agency paradigm that is central to the identification of a state’s de 
facto organs and agents.  
 
In Chapter 6 I challenge the argument that pursuant to Article 9 a state will be responsible for the 
unlawful conduct of armed groups in the circumstances where the armed group exercises elements 
of governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities. An analysis of 
doctrine and comparative approaches of international tribunals to the question of the validity of 
administrative acts of ‘illegal’ regimes shows that the only circumstances in which Article 9 will 
apply is where the armed group acts in the interests of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, the 
state’s authorities.  
 
In Chapters 7 and 8 I am critical of the ILC’s codification of Articles 10(1) and (2) according to 
which the conduct of an insurrectional movement that succeeds in forming a new government or 
establishing a new state is attributed to a state. In Chapter 7 I question the assertion made by the 
ILC that Article 10(1) should not be ‘pressed too far’ in the case of governments of national 
reconciliation. My analysis demonstrates that there is no persuasive authority or policy upon which 
such an exclusion can be based. In Chapter 8 I argue that Article 10(2) is seriously flawed. 
 
8 Under international human rights law, a state will violate its obligation of non-refoulement if it facilitates the transfer 
of a person out of the state’s jurisdiction and into the control of another state or non-state actor where there is a real 
risk that the person will be subjected to torture. For further discussion of the principle see chapter 4, 4.4.  
 5 
Conceived by the ILC as a rule of attribution, the rule requires a new state to be bound by 
international obligations at a time before that state in fact came into existence, a notion that finds 
no support in state practice or doctrine. Article 10(2) can only operate if designed as rule of 
attribution of responsibility. 
 
 6 
PART I:  
STATE REPONSIBILITY FOR PRIVATE ACTS: CONTROL, AGENCY AND 
COMPLICITY 
 
On 17 July 2014 Malaysian airlines flight MH17 was shot down whilst flying over Ukraine. 
Following a 15-month investigation the Dutch Safety Board concluded that the aircraft had been 
shot down by a Russian-made BUK surface-to-air missile system, fired from eastern Ukraine.9 In 
September 2016, an international team of criminal investigators concluded that the BUK missile 
had been transported from Russia into eastern Ukraine and had been fired by members of a pro-
Russian militia.10 There has been widespread political condemnation of Russia for its alleged role 
in this atrocity. A number of states have called upon Russia to accept responsibility11 and to 
‘account for its role’ in the incident.12 Whether Russia is legally responsible for the conduct of 
those who fired the BUK missile poses one of the more difficult questions addressed by law of 
state responsibility: to what extent is a state responsible for the conduct of an armed group that it 





9 Dutch Safety Board, ‘Buk surface-to-air missile system caused MH17 crash’, 13 October 2015.  
10 The Netherlands Public Prosecution Service, ‘JIT: Flight MH17 was shot down by a BUK missile from a 
farmland near Pervomaiskyi’, 28 September 2016. The investigation subsequently confirmed that it was ‘convinced’ 
that the BUK missile originated from the Russian army’s 53rd Anti-Aircraft Missile brigade.  See ‘Update in criminal 
investigation MH17 disaster’, 28 May 2018.  
11 UN Security Council, 8270th Meeting, ‘As Civilians Bear Brunt of Four-year-old Conflict in Ukraine, Continued 
Ceasefire Violations Test Credibility of Global Community, Officials Warn Security Council’, 29 May 2018.  
12 Global Affairs Canada, ‘G7 Foreign Ministers statement on MH17’, 15 July 2018.  
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Chapter 2. Identifying a State’s De Facto Organs and Agents 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As a general rule, the conduct of private persons or entities is not attributable to the state.13 They 
are not considered to act upon the will or instigation of the state but on their own account.14 This 
rule is tempered by the principle that a state should not escape responsibility for the conduct of a 
person or entity who in fact acts as a mere instrument of that state.15  In this chapter I will examine 
the circumstances in which an armed group will be considered to act as a ‘de facto’ organ or agent 
of the state pursuant to Articles 4 and 8 ARS. This question has been the subject of a well-known 
debate involving the ICJ and the International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY). That debate has now been resolved in Bosnia Genocide in which the ICJ affirmed the tests 
of ‘complete dependence’ and ‘effective control’ to identify a state’s ‘de facto’ organs and agents 
respectively.16 
 
However, the question of the conditions on which the conduct of an armed group should be 
attributed to a state continues to be important. Bosnia Genocide prompted criticism from jurists and 
scholars who argue that the law of state responsibility, as interpreted and applied by the ICJ, is not 
able to deal with contemporary challenges of state-sponsored acts of terrorism17 and international 
crime.18 The tests of ‘complete dependence’ and ‘effective control’ require the exercise of high 
degrees of control by the state over the armed group.19 This means that a state’s responsibility for 
the conduct of armed groups is strictly limited. For example, Iran is accused of supplying ballistic 
missiles to Houthis rebels and other armed groups fighting against the internationally-recognised 
government in Yemen,20 a conflict in which all sides have been accused of committing violations 
 
13 ARS, Article 8, Commentary, §1. Home Frontier and Foreign Missionary Society (1920) p.44. Applied in G.L. Solis 
(1928) pp.361-362. See also Sambaggio (1903) in which Umpire Ralston provides a comprehensive analysis of earlier 
decisions on the issue at p.513 et seq. Also, McNair (1956) pp.244-245. 
14 ARS, Introductory Commentary to Chapter II, §2. 
15 Bosnia Genocide, §392.  
16 Ibid. 
17 Chase (2005) pp.111 & 123; Trapp (2011) pp.42-45. 
18 Bosnia Genocide, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, §§37 & 39. 
19 Or other non-state actor. 
20 Statement of Jonathan Allen, United Kingdom Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Security 
Council, 8190th meeting, 26 February 2018, p.2; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Minister for the Middle East 
statement on Iranian involvement in Yemen’, 9 November 2017.  
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of international law.21 However, Iran will not be internationally responsible for any attacks directed 
at civilians or other violations of IHL, unless it can be shown that at the relevant time the armed 
group was, at the least, acting on Iran’s instructions, or under Iran’s direction or effective control.22  
 
In this chapter I provide a critical analysis of the current understanding of the rules of attribution 
applicable to a state’s ‘de facto’ organs23 and agents. This is the starting point from which in chapters 
3 and 4 I consider first,  whether the strictly limited nature of state responsibility can be exploited  
by states that keep their proxies at arms-length, and second, the extent to which a state’s primary 
obligations to prevent certain acts, and not to encourage or facilitate certain acts, are sufficient 
legally to condemn state complicity in acts of terrorism and international crimes. 
 
The argument is divided into three parts. Section 2.2 examines the codification of Article 4 ARS 
by the ILC and the ‘complete dependence’ test espoused by the ICJ in order to identify a state’s de 
facto organ. Section 2.3 addresses the ILC’s codification of Article 8 ARS and the attribution of 
conduct of a state’s agents. The affirmation of the ‘effective control’ test by the ICJ in Bosnia 
Genocide as the appropriate test to establish agency means that states appear to enjoy considerable 
freedom to pursue foreign policy or other goals by arming, financing and otherwise supporting 
the activities of armed groups. In Section 2.4 the importance of the distinction between a state’s 
‘de facto’ organs and its agents with respect to the attribution of ultra vires acts is considered.  I 
conclude that it is doubtful that the law of state responsibility is sufficient to ensure that states do 
not evade their international obligations by ‘contracting out’ military operations in this way.  
 
2.1.1.  Terminology 
Before engaging in an analysis of the rules of attribution applicable to a state’s de facto organs and 
agents it is first important to clarify what is meant by the two terms. This is because the terms ‘de 
facto organ’ and ‘agent’ have been used interchangeably by some scholars,24 in the judgments of 
 
21 HRC, ‘Situation of human rights in Yemen including violations and abuses since September 2014’, 17 August 
2018.  
22 The same principle applies to states, such as the United Kingdom, that sell arms to state members of the coalition 
fighting in the conflict. According to the Group of Experts that has investigated allegations of violations of 
international law during the Yemen conflict there are reasonable grounds to believe that ‘the Governments of 
Yemen, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are responsible for human rights violations, including unlawful 
deprivation of the right to life...’ See Ibid. p.14. 
23 A state’s ‘de facto’ organ is a person or entity who in fact acts as an organ but has not formal status as such according 
to domestic law or convention. 
24 E.g. Condorelli (1989) pp.237-238; Milanovic (2006) p.583; Griebel & Plucken (2008) pp.614-615; Cf. de Hoogh 
(2002) p.268; Milanovic (2009) pp.312-313. 
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international tribunals25 (even, confusingly, in Bosnia Genocide in which the Court applied Article 8 
ARS to ‘persons other than the State’s own agents’),26 and in statements of opinio juris27 to describe 
persons or entities who in fact act on behalf of the state, suggesting that there is no normative 
difference between the two categories for the purposes of state responsibility. This has led to a 
tendency to conflate organ status and the attribution of conduct, such that ‘de facto’ organ status 
has been ascribed to any private actor whose conduct is attributable to the state.28  
 
However, the distinction between an ‘organ’ and ‘agent’ is important. The terms describe distinct 
relationships between the state and the actor to which different rules of attribution of ultra vires 
conduct apply.29 An ‘organ’ is a person or entity that is part of the organisation of the state, at any 
level. The term ‘agent’ is used to describe a person or entity that, on some occasions, acts on behalf 
of the state but is otherwise independent of the state apparatus. As the ILC explained in its early 
draft commentary to draft Article 5 (now Article 4 ARS) concerning the conduct of a state’s organs, 
 
[I]t was agreed that the article should employ only the term “organ” and not the two terms 
“organ” and “agent”. The term “agent” would seem to denote, especially in English, a 
person acting on behalf of the State, rather than a person having the actual status of an 
organ. Actions or omission on the part of persons of this kind will be dealt with in another 
article of this chapter.30 
 
The term ‘de facto organ’ is used in this thesis to describe a person or entity that is not a de jure 
organ: namely, a person or entity that has no organ status under the internal laws of the state but 
should be treated as a state organ because they ‘in fact act under such strict control’31 of the state.  
 
25 E.g.  Bosnia Genocide; ICTY Tadic. 
26 Bosnia Genocide, p.209 §401. In its determination whether the act of genocide calls for a departure from the 
effective control test formulated in Nicaragua the ICJ confirms that, ‘Genocide will be considered as attributable to a 
State if and to the extent that the physical acts constitutive of genocide that have been committed by organs or 
persons other than the State’s own agents were carried out, wholly or in part, on the instructions or directions of the State, 
or under its effective control.’ [Emphasis added] 
27 See for example the statement of the British, Spanish and United States governments cited by the ILC in its 
commentary to Article 7 ARS (Excess of authority and contravention of instructions) that refer consistently to 
‘agents’ and not ‘organs’. Yet, the principle provided by Article 7 ARS only applies to the conduct of state organs 
(Article 4 ARS), persons authorised to exercise elements of governmental authority (Article 5 ARS), and organs 
placed at the disposal of a state by another state. See ARS, Article 7, Commentary, §§3 & 9. 
28 See for example Griebel & Plucken (2008) pp. 614-615; Milanovic (2006) p. 583. Cf. de Hoogh (2002) p.268; 
Milanovic (2009) pp.312-313. 
29 See section 2.4 below. 
30 Commentary to draft article 5, ILC Ybk 1973, Vol.II, p.193 §13.  
31 Bosnia Genocide, §391. 
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2.2 Article 4 ARS and the concept of ‘de facto’ state organs  
The ‘first principle of attribution’32 is that any acts or omissions committed by a state’s organ will 
be considered to be an act of state.33 According to Article 4 ARS, 
 
1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under 
international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other 
functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its 
character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State. 
 
2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the 
internal law of the State. 
 
Article 4(2) defines a state’s organ as ‘any person or entity which has that status in accordance with 
the internal law of the state’. However, classification as an organ according to the internal law of 
the state is not necessary for the purposes of state responsibility.34 Different states’ internal legal 
systems may employ a different understanding of the meaning of ‘organ’, if state institutions are 
formally characterised as such at all. As Brownlie explains, ‘[t]he formal categories [of the ‘internal 
legal order of a state’] are themselves often very localized and “conventional”. Thus in the United 
Kingdom the police force, apart from the Metropolitan police (in London), are not directly 
subordinate to the Secretary of State for Home Affairs’.35 The Commentary to Article 4 states that 
‘the powers of an entity and its relation to other bodies under internal law will be relevant (but not 
decisive) to its classification as an “organ”, [but] internal law will not itself perform the task of 
clarification’.36 Ultimately, ‘a State cannot avoid responsibility for the conduct of a body which 
does in truth act as one of its organs merely by denying it that status under its own law’.37  
 
However, the Commentary does not elaborate the conditions in which a person or entity should 
be determined to ‘in truth act as’ one of a state’s organs. The Commentary merely advises that 
 
32 ARS, Article 4, Commentary, §1. 
33 Article 4 ARS. The ICJ confirmed the principle that a state will be responsible for the conduct of its organs to be 
of ‘customary character’ in Advisory Opinion of 29 April 1999, §62. 
34 ARS, Article 4, Commentary, §11. 
35 Brownlie (1983) p.136. 
36 ARS, Article 4, Commentary, §11. [Emphasis added]  
37 Ibid. 
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‘organ’ has a ‘very broad meaning’ for the purposes of Article 4,38  and offers two examples of 
cases to which this broad meaning would apply: (i) a legal system in which the term ‘government’ 
has a narrow meaning, applying only to the Head of State and members of the cabinet; and (ii) a 
police force that has a special status, independent of the executive.39  
 
The question then arises whether there are any circumstances in which a person or entity that has 
no formal links to the state will ‘in truth act’ as one of its organs and therefore engage the state’s 
responsibility? The text of Article 4 and the Commentary is wide enough to include such persons 
or entities – the use of the phrase ‘in truth act’ suggests that persons or entities that enjoy no 
formal status whatsoever may be treated as (de facto) organs - yet the examples offered by the 
Commentary concern persons or entities clearly authorised or empowered by the laws of the state 
to act on its behalf, namely a police force.40  
 
In Nicaragua the ICJ determined the issue by asking ‘whether or not the relationship of the contras 
to the United States was so much one of dependence on the one side and control on the other 
that it would be right to equate the contras, for legal purposes, as an organ of the United States 
government, or acting on behalf of the government’.41 The contras had received military aid and 
training from the United States. But there was no suggestion that United States law authorised the 
contras to conduct armed activities on its behalf.42 The ICJ considered the following questions 
important to the determination of whether the contras were de facto organs of the United States: 
whether the United States created the contra force;43 whether all contra operations ‘reflected strategy 
and tactics wholly devised’ by the United States; and whether the contras were wholly dependent 
upon United States military aid in the pursuit of their activities such that the cessation of aid would 
result in the cessation of activities.44 On the evidence before it the Court concluded that the 
 
38 Ibid. 
39 ARS, Article 4, Commentary, §11, citing German Federal Supreme Court Church of Scientology (1978) and England 
& Wales, Court of Appeal, Propend Finance v Sing (1997) in which the acts of members of a police force that enjoys a 
status independent of the executive were held to be sovereign acts and therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of 
the courts of another state. The ILC noted (at fn.122) that, although the cases concern the question of sovereign 
immunity, ‘the same principle applies in the field of State responsibility’.  
40 Ibid. 
41 Nicaragua, §109. 
42 Nicaragua pleaded that the CIA was authorised by the President of the US to carry out ‘covert activities’ directed 
against Nicaragua and that the CIA conducted military and paramilitary activities through existing armed groups. See 
Nicaragua, §§93-94.  
43 The fact that Uganda had not created the MLC, was a decisive factor in the Court’s conclusion that the group did 
not act as an ‘organ’ of Uganda pursuant to Article 4 ARS: See DRC v Uganda, §160. 
44 Nicaragua, §§108-110. 
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necessary criteria for ‘complete dependence’ were not established. The support provided by the 
United States was considered ‘crucial to the pursuit of their activities, but is insufficient to illustrate 
their complete dependence on United States aid’.45 Interestingly, the Court found that there was 
evidence that the contras were completely dependent on United States aid ‘in the initial years’.46 But 
even so, it was unable to determine that the United States ‘devised the strategy and the tactics of 
the contras’ because there was insufficient evidence to reach a finding on ‘the extent to which the 
United States made use of the potential for control inherent in that dependence’.47 Therefore, 
according to the test applied in Nicaragua, not only must the armed group be wholly dependent 
upon the state, the armed group’s operations must reflect a strategy and tactics ‘wholly devised’ by 
the state.48 
 
The Commentary to Article 4 ARS does not cite Nicaragua. The lack of reference to the case has 
caused some scholars to question whether the ILC intended to include prima facie private actors in 
the category of persons who ‘in truth act’ on behalf of the state on the basis of the state’s control 
over that person, rather than limiting the scope of Article 4 to persons ‘officially designated to 
perform certain state functions’.49 Either the ILC did not consider the complete dependence test 
applied in Nicaragua relevant in its work on Article 4, or it interpreted Nicaragua as providing a 
single test for attribution of conduct – ‘effective control’.50 However, if the scope of Article 4 is 
limited to persons or entities officially designated to act on behalf of the state, the question then 
arises as to how these persons should be distinguished from persons or entities ‘empowered by 
the law of that state to exercise elements of governmental authority’, the subject of Article 5 ARS?51  
 
An in-depth examination of Article 5 ARS is beyond the scope of this thesis (being concerned 
with state responsibility for the conduct of armed groups that are not authorised or empowered 
by law to act on behalf of the state). However, the distinction between the persons and entities 
 
45 Ibid, §110. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid.  
48 Ibid. §108. 
49 Griebel & Plucken (2008) pp.613-615. 
50 Milanovic (2009) p.318. Cf. Higgins (1994), p.155; Condorelli (1989) p.239; Meron (1998); Chase (2004) pp.108-
110; Dupuy (2004) p.8; Cassese (2005) p.249. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in Tadic interpreted Nicaragua as 
espousing a single test for attribution. For critical analysis of that decision see chapter 4, 4.4. 
51 The ILC’s Commentary to Articles 4 and 5 does not address the distinction between the two articles other than to 
say that Article 5 ARS ‘deals with the attribution to the State of conduct of bodies which are not State organs in the 
sense of Article 4, but which are nonetheless authorized to exercise governmental authority’. See ARS, Article 5, 
Commentary, §1. 
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covered by Articles 4 and 5 ARS is important to understanding the fundamental characteristics of 
a de facto organ. According to the ILC Commentary, Article 5 is intended to cover the conduct of 
‘parastatal entities’ – a term used by the ILC to describe what it calls ‘autonomous bodies exercising 
public functions of an administrative or legislative character’.52 The Commentary does not define 
‘autonomous’ for the purposes of Article 5, but does explain that the entities that fall within the 
article’s scope may be ‘public corporations, semi-public entities, public agencies of various kinds 
and even… private companies’.53 An important requirement is that the entity is ‘empowered, if 
only to a limited extent or in a specific context, to exercise specified elements of governmental 
authority’.54  Here, ‘empowered’ means ‘empowered by law’, in accordance with the terms of 
Article 5.  Thus, Article 5 will cover the conduct of an airline that is contracted by the state to 
provide immigration services at an airport, or a private security company that is contracted by the 
state to run its prisons,55 or a private military contractor, hired by a state to provide a wide range 
of services in armed conflict zones that would ordinarily be carried out by the state’s armed forces, 
including security, intelligence analysis, and operational coordination.56  
 
There are three important factors that distinguish a ‘parastatal entity’ covered by Article 5 from a 
de facto state organ: (i) the parastatal entity is empowered by law, whereas an entity that is a de facto 
organ is not designated as such by the laws of the state or by convention; (ii) a parastatal entity is 
empowered to exercise governmental authority, whereas the performance of governmental 
authority is not determinative of de facto organ status; (iii) the parastatal entity may retain some 
financial and decision-making autonomy from the state,57 and may engage in other private or 
 
52 ARS, Article 5, Commentary, §4. 
53 Ibid, §2. 
54 Ibid, §3. 
55 Ibid, §2. 
56 See generally, Elsea (2008) p.4; Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs, Employing Private Military 
Companies: A Question of Responsibility, 18 January 2008. There is a growing body of academic literature that addresses 
the question of State responsibility for the conduct of private security companies: Lehnardt ‘Primary military 
companies and state responsibility’, in Chesterman and Lehnardt(eds.), From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and 
Regulation of Private Military Companies (OUP 2007); Beaucillon, Fernandez & Raspail ‘State Responsibility for the 
Conduct of Private Military and Security Companies Violating Ius ad Bellum’ in Franconi & Ronzitti, War by 
Contract: Human Rights, Humanitarian Law, and Private Contractors (OUP 2011); Tonkin, State Control over Private Military 
and Security Companies in Armed Conflict (CUP 2012); Macloed, ‘Private Security Companies and Shared Responsibility’ 
(2015) 62 Netherlands International Law Review 119. See also The Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal 
Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During 
Armed Conflict, Montreux, 17 September 2008 (Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs and ICRC)  
57 ARS, Article 5, Commentary, §7. 
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commercial activities, whereas a de facto state organ is defined by its complete lack of financial and 
decision-making independence from the state.58  
 
2.2.1 Bosnia Genocide  
The importance of the absence of financial and decision-making independence from the state to 
the identification of de facto state organs has been affirmed by the ICJ in Bosnia Genocide. In that 
case the ICJ confirmed that in certain exceptional circumstances persons or entities, including 
armed groups, that do not form part of the organisation of the state should nevertheless be equated 
to state organs if in fact they ‘act in “complete dependence” on the state, of which they are 
ultimately merely an instrument’.59 According to the ICJ,  
 
In such a case it is appropriate to look beyond legal status alone, in order to grasp the reality of 
the relationship between the person taking action, and the State to which he is so closely attached 
as to appear to be nothing more than its agent: any other solution would allow States to escape 
their international responsibility by choosing to act through persons or entities whose supposed 
independence would be purely fictitious’.60  
 
For the ICJ the attribution of conduct on the basis of complete dependence ‘must be exceptional, 
for it requires proof of a particularly great degree of control’.61 The test is not satisfied if, at the 
time of the act in question, the person or group enjoys some measure of real independence from the 
state. Thus, the Court was unable to conclude that the Republika Srpska or its armed forces, the 
Army of the Republika Srpska (VRS) were acting as mere instruments of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY).62 This was despite the Court’s conclusion that the FRY had given ‘very 
important support’ to the Republika Srpska, without which the latter would not have been able to 
 
58 Cf. de Hoogh (2002) p.270 who posits that ‘in order to consider a person or entity to be an organ, the person or 
entity must purport to exercise governmental authority’. De Hoogh draws this conclusion from his analysis of 
Nicaragua, in which he concludes that the Court could easily have held the contras to be de facto organs of the United 
States but observes that the contras did not exercise governmental authority but were intent on attaining it. This 
theory is now undermined by the clarification of the complete dependence test by the ICJ in Bosnia Genocide that 
places no weight on the exercise of governmental authority. The nature of the acts committed by a de facto organ are 
therefore not important to its classification. 
59 Bosnia Genocide, §392 applying Nicaragua, §§109-110. Cf. Griebel & Plucken (2008) p.614 who doubt that the 
complete dependence test falls within Article 4 ARS, arguing that the ILC intended the conduct of prima facie private 
actors to fall within the scope of Article 8 ARS. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Bosnia Genocide, §393. 
62 Ibid., §394. 
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have ‘conducted its crucial and most significant paramilitary activities’.63 For the Court, differences 
over strategic options between the FRY and the Republika Srpska was an indication that ‘the latter 
held some qualified, but real margin of independence’ from the FRY.64 
 
The threshold imposed by the ‘complete dependence’ test is exceptionally high and in practice 
likely to be difficult to meet. The essence of a de facto organ is that it shares all the attributes of a 
de jure organ, but for its lack of legal status. It is ‘a mere instrument’ of the state. This approach is 
understandable given the legal consequences of identifying an entity as a de facto state organ. As 
discussed in section 2.4.1 below, the state is responsible for all conduct of its organs acting in that 
capacity, whether or not the organ acted contrary to instructions or beyond the scope of its 
authority. Thus, had the ICJ found that the VRS was a mere instrument and therefore a de facto 
organ of the FRY, the FRY would have been responsible for the Srebrenica genocide, whether or 
not it directed the VRS to carry it out. It is the armed group’s complete lack of financial, operational 
and decision-making independence from the state that justifies the attribution of its conduct, 
including ultra vires conduct to the state.  
 
2.3 Agents of the State 
2.3.1 Codification by the ILC 
According to the ILC, the conduct of an armed group that holds some ‘qualified, but real margin 
of independence’65 from the state will be attributable to the state if ‘a specific factual relationship’ 
exists between the armed group and the state.66 Article 8 provides that, 
  
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under 
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under 
the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct.  
 
The rule provided by Article 8 is an expression of customary international law.67 But the scope of 






66 ARS, Article 6, Commentary, §1. 




Special Rapporteur Ago first posited the rule in his third report to the ILC in 1971 albeit as the 
more general formula ‘in fact acting on behalf of’.69 That formula was adopted as draft Article 8(a) 
by the ILC at its twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth sessions in 1974.70 The rationale underlying the rule 
is that a state should not escape responsibility by acting through a proxy. As Crawford explains, 
‘the international obligations of the state could easily be evaded if the possibility of private 
delegation was not taken into account’.71 
 
Difficulties have arisen with respect to the application and interpretation of Article 8. In its early 
1974 commentary to draft Article 8 the ILC stated, 
 
… in each specific case in which international responsibility of the State has to be 
established, it must be genuinely proved that the person or group were actually appointed 
by organs of the State to discharge a particular function or carry out a particular duty, that 
they performed a particular task at the instigation of those organs.72 
 
The question that has dominated case law and academic discourse is on what basis a person or 
group should be ‘genuinely proved’ to be acting on behalf of the state? 
 
It appears that Ago, in his capacity as a Judge of the ICJ, considered persons ‘in fact acting on 
behalf of’ to be confined to persons instructed to commit a specific act, or carry out a particular 
task on behalf of that state.73 In his Separate Opinion in Nicaragua Judge Ago considered that the 
commission of ‘atrocities, acts of violence or terrorism and other inhuman actions’ by the contra 
forces could only be attributed to the United States if there was ‘unchallengeable proof’ that 
‘certain members of those forces happened to have been specifically charged by United States 
authorities to commit a particular act, or carry out a particular task of some kind on behalf of the 
United States’.74 Ago criticised the majority’s use of the term ‘control’. For Ago, ‘control’ invoked 
the notion of indirect responsibility that was only relevant to inter-state relations, in cases where 
 
69 Ago, Third Report (1971), p.267. 
70 ILC Report (1974), pp.157-290. 
71 Crawford (2013), p.141. 
72 ILC Report (1974), p.285, §8. 
73 Nicaragua, Separate Opinion of Judge Ago, §16. 
74 Ibid. 
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one state acts under the control of another state,75 and not to the relationship between a private 
person or group and a state.76  
 
To some extent Ago’s view is supported by the case law and state practice relied upon by him in 
his role as Special Rapporteur on the law of state responsibility. Only one authority cited by Ago 
in his reports to the ILC and by the Commentary to Article 8, Zafiro, refers to ‘effective control’ 
as a basis for attribution.77 Nevertheless, following the ICJ’s decision in Nicaragua, and upon the 
recommendation of Special Rapporteur Crawford in his First Report to the ILC,78 the ILC revised 
the formula to the more specific ‘instruction, direction or control’. 
 
The Commentary to Article 8 explains that the terms ‘instruction’, ‘direction’, and ‘control’ are 
disjunctive - it is sufficient to establish any one of them in order to found attribution to the state.79 
However, the terms ‘instruction’ and ‘direction’ have been used interchangeably. In its 
commentary the ILC first refers to ‘direction or control’ as a single standard for attribution, 
alternative to the instruction standard,80  but later surmises that ‘a State may, either by specific 
directions or by exercising control over a group, in effect assume responsibility for their conduct’.81 
In Bosnia Genocide the ICJ referred to the relevant test for attribution as acting ‘in accordance with 
[the] State’s instructions or under its “effective control”.’82 As the following analysis will show, the 
provision of instructions or direction are requisite to the exercise of effective control. Yet, the 
distinction between instruction and control is subtle but important. An armed group may be 
instructed to achieve a specific outcome, irrespective of the means and methods employed to 
achieve it. Effective control requires a lack of decision-making independence of the actor from 
the state for the purposes of a specific operation such that the state commands the means and 
methods that should be used to carry out that operation. ‘Effective control’ is thereby distinguished 
from ‘complete dependence’ on the basis that, outside of the specific operation, the person or 
 
75 As provided by Article 17 ARS (Direction and control exercised over the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act). 
76 Nicaragua, Separate Opinion of Judge Ago, §18, fn.1. 
77 Zafiro (1925). 
78 Crawford, First Report (1998), p.43 §213. 
79 ARS, Article 8, Commentary, §7. Special Rapporteur Crawford had suggested the terms instruction, direction, and 
control should be cumulative. However, the ‘and’ was changed to an ‘or’ during the drafting process. See Crawford, 
First Report (1998), p.43 §213 and p.56 §284. 
80 ARS, Article 8, Commentary, §1. 
81 Ibid., §7. 
82 Bosnia Genocide, §400. 
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entity may enjoy financial and decision-making independence from the state, whereas ‘complete 
dependence’ implies a complete lack of independence from the state at all times. 
 
2.3.2  ‘Instructions’ 
The ILC Commentary describes the conduct of a person or group acting on the instructions of a 
state as conduct in fact ‘authorised’ by the state:83  
 
Most commonly, cases of this kind will arise where State organs supplement their own action by 
recruiting or instigating private persons or groups who act as “auxiliaries” while remaining outside 
the official structure of the State. These include, for example, individuals or groups of private 
individuals who, though not specifically commissioned by the State and not forming part of its 
police or armed forces, are employed as auxiliaries or are sent as “volunteers” to neighbouring 
countries, or who are instructed to carry out particular missions abroad.84  
 
The ‘acting on instructions of’ standard of attribution was approved and applied by the ICJ in 
Tehran Hostages.85 In that case, one of the issues before the ICJ was whether the conduct of militants 
who had occupied the US embassy in Tehran and taken embassy staff hostage was directly 
attributable to Iran. Having found that there was no evidence of a link between the militants and 
any ‘competent’ organ of the state, the ICJ found that, at least under this head of attribution, Iran 
was not responsible for the militants’ conduct.86 The ICJ concluded that general declarations made 
by the Ayatollah condemning the US did not amount to authorisation of the specific operation of 
invading and seizing the US embassy.87  
 
[The militants’] conduct might be considered as itself directly imputable to the Iranian 
State only if it were established that, in fact, on the occasion in question the militants acted 
on behalf of the State, having been charged by some competent organ of the Iranian State 
to carry out a specific operation.88 
 
 
83 ARS, Article 8, Commentary, §§2 & 8. 
84 Ibid., §2. 
85 Tehran Hostages, §58. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid., §59. 
88 Ibid, §58.The Court then moved on to consider whether or not the militants’ conduct was attributable under a 
second head of attribution – acknowledgment and adoption, now codified in Article 11 ARS.  
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In Bosnia Genocide the ICJ attempted to provide further guidance on the application of the 
‘instructions’ standard, observing that for a state to incur responsibility for the conduct of persons 
or groups acting on its instructions it must be shown that instructions were given ‘in respect of 
each operation in which the alleged violations occurred, not generally in respect of the overall 
actions taken by the persons or groups of persons having committed the violations’.89 The question 
then arises as to whether ‘operation’ refers to each specific act, or whether the term should be 
more broadly understood to cover the whole body of operations of the armed group?90 According 
to the ICJ ‘operation’ should be narrowly interpreted, such that the acts constitutive of the 
violation of international law (in that case genocide) must be committed, ‘wholly or in part, on the 
instructions of the State, or under its effective control’.91 Hence the Court concluded that it had 
not been established that the federal authorities of the FRY had instructed members of the VRS 
to carry out the genocide at Srebrenica.92  
 
Further indication by the ILC that for the purposes of attribution the instructions of the state 
should be directed to a specific act are provided by the ILC Commentary concerning the 
attribution of ultra vires acts, or acts beyond the scope of instruction.93 As discussed in section 2.4 
below, according to the ILC, an act committed beyond the scope of the state’s instructions will 
not be attributable to the state.94 This means that a state will only be responsible if it can be proven 
that the state instructed its agent to act unlawfully. There may be little difficulty in proving such 
instructions if the violation of international law is inherent in the instruction, for example if an 
armed group is instructed to launch an armed attack against another state or to torture detainees, 
provided sufficient evidence of the specific instruction is available. However, securing evidence of 
instructions to commit unlawful acts is likely to be extremely difficult if not impossible. States are 
not likely to document orders to their agents to commit such acts. In practice, the practical 
difficulties involved in securing evidence of instructions means that the instruction standard does 




89 Bosnia Genocide, §400. 
90 As argued by Bosnia Herzegovina in Bosnia Genocide, Verbatim Record 2006/10, 6 March 2006 at 3pm, Professor 
Alain Pellet, p.47, §§20-23. See also Crawford (2013), p.145; Tonkin (2011), p.115.  
91 Bosnia Genocide, §400. 
92 Ibid, §413. 
93 ARS, Article 8, Commentary, §8. See also Article 7 ARS. See further section 2.4 below. 
94 See above section 2.1.2. 
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2.3.3 Control  
One issue that has greatly troubled courts and scholars is the question of the degree of control 
required to identify a state’s agents. This issue has given rise to a divergence between the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ in Nicaragua and the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in Tadic that may be 
described as the ‘effective vs overall control debate’. In Nicaragua the ICJ advanced a concept of 
limited state responsibility based upon two high threshold tests of ‘complete dependence’ to 
identify de facto organs and ‘effective control’ to identify state agents.95  According to the ICJ, in 
circumstances where the relationship between an armed group and a state fall short of ‘complete 
dependence’, the conduct of that armed group is only attributable to the state if that armed group 
is proven to have acted on the instructions of, or under the effective control of the state.96  
 
The ‘effective control’ standard means that state responsibility for the conduct of non-state actors 
is strictly limited. For the ICJ, ‘[a state’s] participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the 
financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of [an armed group]’ will not provide a 
sufficient basis for attribution of that armed group’s conduct to the state.97 Thus, on the question 
of Russia’s responsibility for the downing of flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine, the evidence that 
Russia provided the BUK-missile to the group that fired the missile98 is not sufficient to prove that 
the persons who fired the missile were acting as ‘state agents’ for the purposes of engaging Russia’s 
responsibility. 
 
As is well known, the ICTY challenged the authority of the Nicaragua test in Tadic. The ICTY was 
asked to identify the legal criteria for establishing when an armed conflict that is prima facie internal 
in character is in fact an international armed conflict because one (or more) of the parties is ‘acting 
on behalf of’ a foreign power.99 In order to decide the issue, the ICTY considered it necessary to 
establish whether the VRS, of which the accused was a member, was a ‘de iure or de facto organ’ of 
the FRY, and therefore whether the VRS was acting on behalf of the FRY, thus internationalising 
the conflict in Bosnia, and activating the grave breaches provisions of the Geneva Conventions. 
The Trial Chamber had relied upon Nicaragua and the effective control test as the applicable 
standard. 
 
95 Nicaragua, §115.  
96 Bosnia Genocide, §400 applying Nicaragua, §115.   
97 Nicaragua, §115.  
98 The Netherlands Public Prosecution Service, ‘Update in criminal investigation MH17 disaster’, 28 May 2018.  
99 ICTY Tadic, §88 et seq. For further discussion of Tadic see chpt.4. 
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The ICTY interpreted Nicaragua as espousing a single test,100 the effective control test, and sought, 
with respect to organised armed groups,101 to lower this threshold test to ‘overall control’. Rather 
confusingly, the ICTY used the terms ‘de facto organs’ and ‘de facto officials’ to describe all persons 
or entities whose conduct is attributable to a state pursuant to Article 8 ARS.102 For the ICTY, ‘this 
kind of control over a military group and the fact that the State is held responsible for acts 
performed by a group independently of instructions, or even contrary to instructions, to some 
extent equates the group with State organs proper’.103 In direct conflict with Nicaragua, the overall 
control test is satisfied by decisive and preponderant support that, according to the ICJ, falls short 
of effective control. According to the Appeals Chamber,  
 
In order to attribute the acts of a military or paramilitary group to a State, it must be proved that 
the State wields overall control over the group, not only by equipping and financing the group, but 
also by coordinating or helping in the general planning of its activity.  Only then can a State be 
held internationally accountable for any misconduct of the group. However, it is not necessary 
that, in addition, the State should also issue, either to the head or to the members of the group, 
instructions for the commission of specific acts contrary to international law.104 
 
The ILC declined to take a firm view in its commentary to Article 8 ARS. Instead, the Commentary 
offers guidance but does not define the requisite degree of control. Citing cases of the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal105 and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),106 the Commentary 
states that it is ‘a matter for appreciation in each case whether particular conduct was or was not 
 
100 The mistaken interpretation of Nicaragua appears to have stemmed from the ‘less than clear drafting’ of the 
Nicaragua judgment. As Judge Shahabudeen commented in is Separate Opinion in Tadic, ‘Nicaragua is not easy 
reading’. See Tadic, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabudeen, §8.  
101 In the case of individuals and unorganised individuals the Appeals Chamber invoked the instructions standard 
applied by the ICJ in Tehran Hostages. See Tadic, §118.  
102 The ICTY does not mention Article 4 ARS in its reasoning, referring only to Article 8 ARS as reflecting the 
principles of international law concerning the attribution of conduct of private actors to a state. See Tadic, §109 & 
§117. The ILC does not comment on the ICTY’s use of terminology in its summary of the different approaches 
taken by the ICJ and the ICTY in its commentary to Article 8 ARS. See ARS, Article 8, Commentary, §§3-5.  
103 Tadic, §121. 
104 Ibid, §131. 
105 Yeager (1987) (control over the Revolutionary Guard before it was formerly recognised as a State organ); Starrett 
Housing Corp. (1983) (control over a private corporation). 
106 ECtHR Loizidou v Turkey, (Preliminary Objections) (1985) & (Merits) (1986) (control over territory). 
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carried out under the control of a State, to such an extent that the conduct controlled should be 
attributed to it’.107  
 
The adoption of a flexible approach by the ILC in the Commentary leaves open the possibility for 
adjustment of the control test depending on the circumstances of each case.108 Some members of 
the ILC expressed support for this flexible approach before Tadic was decided, suggesting that 
attention should be drawn to ‘the varying degree of sufficient control required in different specific 
legal contexts’.109 This ‘inbuilt ambiguity’ was considered by the government of the Netherlands, 
the only government to have commented on this issue, to be a ‘positive element [that] offers scope 
for progressive development of the legal rules on State responsibility’.110  
 
However, the ‘effective vs overall control’ debate now appears to have been resolved by the ICJ 
in Bosnia Genocide. In that case the ICJ declared that attribution, in any circumstances, on the basis 
of instructions, direction or effective control, is ‘the state of customary international law, as reflected 
in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility’.111 For the ICJ, ‘the “overall control” test is unsuitable 
for it stretches too far, almost to breaking point, the connection which must exist between the 
conduct of a state’s organs and its international responsibility’.112 That connection is based on the 
‘fundamental principle governing the law of international responsibility, that a State is only 
responsible for its own conduct, that is to the say the conduct of persons acting, on whatever basis, 
on its behalf’.113  The Court took the opportunity to clarify its judgment in Nicaragua, to reject the 
Tadic ‘overall control’ test, and to affirm its formulation of two tests of ‘complete dependence’ and 
‘effective control’ to identify a state’s de facto organs and agents respectively.  For the ICJ, ‘[r]ules 
for attributing alleged internationally wrongful conduct to a state do not vary with the nature of 
the wrongful act in question in the absence of a clearly expressed lex specialis’.114  
 
107 ARS, Article 8, Commentary, §5. 
108 Ibid. 
109 ILC Report (1998), p.83 §395. 
110 ILC, Comments and observations received from Governments (2001), Netherlands, p.49. 
111 Bosnia Genocide, §401.  
112 Ibid. §406. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Bosnia Genocide, §401. The ICJ rejected the proposition made by the applicant, Bosnia, that the particular nature of 
genocide, in that it may be composed of a number of specific acts separate in space and time, justified the 
application of the effective control test to the whole body of operations carried out by the perpetrators, rather than 
to each specific act. The Court did so on the ground that, in the absence of lex specialis, the rules for attribution do 
not vary according to the nature of the internationally wrongful act. Cf. Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan ICSID (2009), §13 and §125 in which the ICSID tribunal noted that attribution tests 
developed in factual contexts relating to foreign armed intervention or international criminal responsibility ‘are not 
 23 
 
The ICJ rejected the overall control test on two grounds.115 First, that matters of general 
international law ‘do not lie within the specific purview of [the ICTY’s] jurisdiction and, moreover, 
the resolution of which is not always necessary for deciding the criminal cases before it’.116 Second, 
that the two tests are applied for two distinct purposes – the attribution of conduct and the 
classification of armed conflict:117  
 
…logic does not require the same test to be adopted in resolving the two issues, which are 
very different in nature: the degree and nature of a State’s involvement in an armed conflict 
on another State’s territory which is required for the conflict to be characterized as 
international, can very well, and without logical inconsistency, differ from the degree and 
nature of involvement required to give rise to that State’s responsibility for a specific act 
committed in the course of the conflict.118 
 
Indeed, contrary to the ICTY’s approach in Tadic, the classification of conflicts is generally 
understood to be a matter of primary rules of international law and not secondary rules of state 
responsibility.119 The law of state responsibility is of general application but it does have ‘a distinct 
methodology and purpose’ that is and should remain separate to substantive primary rules of 
international law.120  The ICTY has recognised as much in cases subsequent to Tadic. Soon after 
Tadic and before the ICJ’s decision in Bosnia Genocide the ICTY departed from its own reasoning 
and its use of the general rules on state responsibility as a basis for classification of armed conflict. 




always adapted to the realities of international economic law and that they should not prevent a finding of 
attribution if the specific facts of an investment dispute so warrant’.  Cf. Tulip Real Estate and Development Netherlands 
B.V. v. Republic of Turkey ICSID (2014) §304 et seq. 
115 A third ground not considered by the ICJ is that, and contrary to the ICTY’s analysis the overall control test is not 
supported by case law or state practice. See further chapter 3, 3.4.  
116 Ibid, §403. 
117 Ibid, §§404-405. 
118 Ibid,, §405. 
119 Akande (2012) p.61; Milanovic (2006) p.587; Tadic, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, §§22-24. 
120 Milanovic (2006) p.585. 
121 ICTY Celebici Camp (2001) §20. See also Tadic, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen §§22-24. 
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The situation in which a State, the FRY, resorted to the indirect use of force against another State, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, by supporting one of the parties involved in the conflict, the Bosnian 
Serb forces, may indeed be also characterised as a proxy war of an international character. In this 
context, the “overall control” test is utilised to ascertain the foreign intervention, and consequently, 
to conclude that a conflict which was prima facie internal is internationalised.122 
 
Thus, whilst there is a clear conflict between the approaches taken in Nicaragua and Tadic, it is 
questionable whether there is a conflict between the jurisprudence of the ICJ and of ICTY 
generally. Only the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic has challenged the ICJ. 
 
However, the question still remains as to what kind of relationship amounts to ‘effective control’? 
Nicaragua does not provide a clear definition of ‘effective control’ and the ICJ forewent the 
opportunity to provide a clear definition in Bosnia Genocide. The following section considers the 
ICJ’s approach, the nature of the relationship between a state and an armed group that would 
constitute effective control, and state assistance or support that would fall short of the standard.  
 
2.3.4  Effective Control 
In Nicaragua the ICJ rejected Nicaragua’s claim that the United States was responsible for unlawful 
acts committed by the contras in the course of their military and paramilitary activities in Nicaragua 
despite evidence that the United States’ involvement consisted of ‘financing, organizing, training, 
supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the 
planning of the whole of its operation’.123 In the view of Court it would have to be proved that, at 
the time they committed the acts in question, the contras were under the effective control of the 
United States:  
 
…[the] United States participation, even if preponderant or decisive, in the financing, 
organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras, the selection of its military or 
paramilitary targets, and the planning of the whole of its operation, is still insufficient in 
itself, on the basis of the evidence in the possession of the Court, for the purpose of 
attributing to the United States the acts committed by the contras in the course of their 
military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. All the forms of United States 
participation mentioned above, and even the general control by the respondent State over 
 
122 Ibid. 
123 Nicaragua, §§115-116. 
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a force with a high degree of dependency on it, would not in themselves mean, without 
further evidence, that the United States directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts 
contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by the applicant State. Such acts 
could well be committed by members of the contras without the control of the United 
States. For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in 
principle have to be proved that that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations 
in the course of which the alleged violations were committed.124  
 
No clear definition of ‘effective control’ is provided by Nicaragua or Bosnia Genocide. What can be 
gleaned from the passage quoted above is that effective control sits between complete dependence 
and ‘preponderant and decisive’ support or general control over a force with a ‘high degree of 
dependency’ on the state. The state must be shown to have ‘directed or enforced the perpetration 
of the acts’ contrary to international law. Therefore, the normative distinction between the 
‘instruction’ and ‘effective control’ lies in the freedom enjoyed by the actor to choose what means 
and methods it should adopt to carry out a specific military operation or objective. In order for 
acts to be under the ‘effective control’ of the state, the state must ‘direct and enforce’ those acts. 
Instruction to carry out a military assault on a particular target will not be sufficient to amount to 
‘effective control’. The military assault must be carried out under the operational command of the 
state’s organs. This interpretation is applied by Special Rapporteur Crawford in his first report to 
the ILC: 
 
The text and commentary should make it clear that it is only if the State directed and controlled 
the specific operation and the conduct complained of was a necessary, integral or intended part of 
that operation, that the conduct should be attributable to the State. The principle should not 
extend to conduct which was only incidentally or peripherally associated with an operation, or 
which escaped from the State’s direction or control.125 
 
According to the ICJ in Nicaragua, even the selection of targets and planning of an operation will 
be insufficient to amount to direction or enforcement of a specific act as long as the armed group 
retains some operational control.126 It would appear, therefore, that conduct will only be attributed 
to a state if it is proven that the armed group was in fact ordered by the state to commit it. For 
 
124 Ibid, §115. [Emphasis added] 
125 Crawford, First Report (1998), p.43 §213. 
126 Nicaragua, §115. 
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these reasons, it is arguable that the effective control test is too lenient,127 and, particularly in the 
context of state-sponsored terrorism, has the effect of insulating states ‘that are the authors of 
terrorism from effective reaction, thereby encouraging further state-sponsored terrorism’.128 As 
was argued above, a state is highly unlikely to document unlawful instructions or intentions to 
carry out unlawful military or other operations through the use of a proxy (or at all).  
The difficulties faced by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (‘OHCHR’) 
in gathering sufficient evidence to accurately determine the nature of the relationship or factual 
links between armed groups and Libya in 2016129 illustrate just how insurmountable the effective 
control test can be. The OHCHR had limited access to areas of Libya other than Tripoli due to 
security risks caused by on-going armed conflict and people were reluctant to provide witness 
statements for fear of violent repercussions.130 Although the OHCHR was able to conclude that 
there were ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that abuses and violations of international law 
occurred,131 it had insufficient evidence to attribute the abuses or violations committed by armed 
groups supported by the state to the state.132 The Report does not specify the criteria for attribution 
of conduct that it has applied. But even if it had, the dearth of evidence relating to the relationship 
between the state’s organs and armed groups meant that any consideration of attribution would 
have been futile. The Report is only able to indicate support for armed groups in a generic sense, 
due to a lack of evidence of the exact nature of the relationship between armed groups and the 
state, or between two or more armed groups, including the nature of any command and control 
structures.133 As the Report explains, 
In the current Libyan context, the ability to establish the status of actors as either State or non-
State entities is difficult, given the fragmented nature of State institutions and the inter-linkages 
between certain authorities and armed groups… This report has described where information 
indicating links between actors and the State is available (e.g. financial links or the endorsement of 
 
127 Chase (2005) pp.111 &123. 
128 Reisman (1999) p.37. See also Trapp (2011) pp.42-45. 
129 HRC, ‘Investigation of the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights on Libya: detailed 
findings’ (2016). 
130 Ibid, §§12-14. 
131 Ibid, §11. 
132 Ibid, §54. 
133 Ibid. 
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acts). However, additional investigation of the operation of armed groups, in particular, is crucial 
to attribute responsibility for violations and abuses.134  
 
As the OHCHR experience in Libya shows, obtaining the necessary evidence to prove a 
relationship of effective control will be extremely difficult.  
 
2.4 Ultra vires conduct 
The principles that govern a state’s responsibility for the ultra vires conduct of its organs and agents 
exemplify the strictly limited nature of state responsibility for private conduct. How ultra vires 
conduct is attributed has important implications for the extent to which a state should be directly 
responsible for the conduct of armed groups to which that state provides substantial financial, 
military or other support, and for the suitability of a lower threshold test for agency based on 
‘overall control’, considered in chapter 3.  
 
The ILC Commentary is notable for the absence of any authority or state practice upon which the 
ILC’s position on the attribution of ultra vires acts of a state’s agents is based. The principles 
governing attribution of ultra vires conduct of a state’s agents appear to have been a late addition 
to the Commentary. The reports of the ILC do not reveal any consideration of the issue, either as 
part of the discussion of the formulation of Article 8 ARS, or the general principle governing the 
attribution of ultra vires acts of a state’s organs or persons empowered by law to exercise 
governmental authority as codified by Article 7 ARS.135  
 
2.4.1 State organs 
It is generally accepted that the ultra vires acts of a state’s organ are attributable to the state.136 The 
identification of a person or entity as a state organ is sufficient. This principle is reflected in Article 
7 ARS and is considered to be a general rule of attribution by the ILC in its commentary to Article 
4 ARS.137 The rule has been clearly pronounced by the ICJ in DRC v Uganda in which the Court 
 
134 Ibid, §30. 
135 Draft articles submitted by the Special Rapporteur, ILC Ybk 1974, Vol. I, pp.40; ILC Report (1975), pp.61-70; 
Draft ARS with Commentaries adopted on First Reading, 1997, pp.32-35, 40-49; ILC Report (1998), pp.81-82. 
136 Article 7 ARS; Salvador Commercial Company (1902) p.477; Deférend concernant l’interprétation de l’article 79, par 6. lettre C 
du Traité de Paix (1955) p.438; Crawford, First Report, ILC Ybk 1998, Vol.II(1), p.35 §162. See also ARS, Article 4, 
Commentary, §6. 
137 ARS, Article 4, Commentary, §13. 
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stated that ‘it was irrelevant for the attribution of their conduct to Uganda whether the UPDF 
personnel acted contrary to the instructions given or exceeded their authority’.138  
 
There is some limitation on a state’s responsibility for the conduct of its organs. International law 
distinguishes between the ultra vires conduct of a person or entity acting ‘in an apparently official 
capacity, or under the colour of authority’, and ‘purely private conduct’.139 In the latter case the 
conduct of the state organ is not attributable to that state on the ground that the conduct ‘is so 
removed from the scope of their official functions that it should be assimilated to the conduct of 
private individuals, not attributable to the State’.140 Thus, a police officer who uses lethal force 
against a suspect during the course of an arrest is distinguished from a police officer who, when 
off-duty, is involved in a pub brawl that results in the death or serious injury of his or her adversary. 
In the latter case the officer is clearly acting in a private capacity and his or her conduct will not 
engage the state’s responsibility. 
 
It may not always be easy to determine the distinction between a person acting in an official 
capacity and a person acting in a purely private capacity. In Youmans141 the United States-Mexico 
General Claims Commission held that Mexico was responsible for the conduct of Mexican soldiers 
who participated in a mob they were instructed to quell, resulting in the murder of two United 
States citizens. For the Commission a key consideration was whether the soldiers were on duty at 
the relevant time and acting in the presence of a commanding officer. The Commission stated that 
it could not consider ‘the participation of the soldiers in the murder... as acts of soldiers committed 
in their private capacity when it is clear that at the time of the commission of these acts the men 
were on duty under the immediate supervision and in the presence of a commanding officer’.142  
 
2.4.2  State agents 
In contrast to a state’s responsibility for the ultra vires acts of its organs, the question whether the 
actor is acting in an official capacity is not relevant to the question of attribution of ultra vires 
 
138 DRC v Uganda, §214 citing customary rule provided by Article 3 Hague Convention IV and Article 91 API, 
namely that ‘a party to an armed conflict shall be responsible for all acts by persons forming part of its armed 
forces’. 
139 ARS, Article 4, Commentary, §13. Further ARS, Article 7, Commentary, §§4-7. 
140 ARS, Article 7, Commentary, §7. Also, Estate of Jean-Baptiste Caire (1929) p.531; Petrolane v Iran (1991) §83. 
141 Youmans (1926). 
142 Ibid, §14. See also Eis (US v Soviet Union) (1959) 30 ILR 116, p.117 in which it was held that the Soviet Union was 
responsible for the conduct of soldiers who pillaged neutral property for private gain whilst en route to the front 
line. 
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conduct of state agents. According to the ILC Commentary, the question whether a state is 
responsible for the ultra vires conduct of its agents will turn on whether the state exercised effective 
control over that agent at the relevant time.143  
 
In circumstances where the person or entity is acting on the instructions of the state, but not under 
the state’s effective control, the ultra vires acts of that person or entity – acts that are clearly beyond 
the scope of the state’s instructions - will not be attributable to the state.144 The Commentary 
explains that ‘[i]n general a State, in giving lawful instructions to persons who are not its organs, 
does not assume the risk that the instructions will be carried out in an internationally wrongful 
way’. 145  
 
If the ILC’s approach is correct, unlawful conduct of an armed group delegated by the state to 
carry out a specific military operation or other function will only be attributable to the state if the 
latter instructed the armed group to act unlawfully. Thus, if a state instructs an armed group to use 
chemical weapons against a civilian population, the state will be responsible for the use of chemical 
weapons and the unlawful attack against a civilian population, both violations of international law. 
However, if a state instructs an armed group to undertake an offensive against an adversary’s 
stronghold, and in doing so that armed group, of its own initiative, uses chemical weapons or 
summarily executes captured enemy combatants, the state will not be responsible for the group’s 
wrongful conduct. This means that a state that instructs an armed group to achieve a certain 
objective, but does not exercise effective control over the armed group as the latter carries out this 
objective, can easily evade responsibility. This is because it will be difficult, if not impossible, to 
prove the existence of express instructions to achieve a lawful objective using unlawful means and 
methods. State officials are unlikely to document unlawful instructions. Furthermore, the outcome 
will be the same whether the instructing state organ knew or should have known that the armed 
group had a history of acting contrary to IHL and of rights-violating conduct.146  
 
 
143 ARS, Article 8, Commentary, §8. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid. 
146 However, a state that instructs an armed group to carry out a particular act or military operation, irrespective of 
allegations that the armed group has committed war crimes or other unlawful acts may be responsible for its own 
failure to prevent the ultra vires unlawful acts committed by the armed group, or, if the unlawful acts were committed 
in a situation of armed conflict, for its own failure to ensure respect for international humanitarian law. For further 
discussion see chapter 4. 
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The ILC’s approach to question of the attribution of ultra vires acts of persons or entities acting on 
the instructions of the state appears to be at odds with the statement of principle contained in the 
commentary to the draft articles adopted on first reading. The statement is directed towards the 
attribution of ultra vires acts of state organs, but there is no reason why it should not apply to state 
agents. According to the draft commentary, 
 
In international law, the State must recognize that it acts whenever persons or groups of persons 
exceed the formal limits of their competence according to municipal law or contravene the 
provisions of that law or of administrative ordinances or internal instructions issued by their 
superiors, they are nevertheless acting, even though improperly, within the scope of the discharge 
of their functions. The State cannot take refuge behind the notion that, according to the provisions 
of its legal system, those actions or omissions ought not to have occurred or ought to have taken 
a different form.147 
 
In the same way, a state should not take refuge behind the fact that its agent acted contrary to its 
instructions. There is no authority for the assertion made by the ILC Commentary that a state 
should not bear the risk that its agents will carry out its instructions in an internationally wrongful 
way.148 The risk that instructions will be carried out unlawfully is inherent in the employment of a 
person or entity that has no formal status in the structure of the state and is not bound by legal 
contract to act according to international law. This is particularly so in circumstances where the 
person or entity is instructed to carry out covert activities or a specific military operation, activities 
that often result in violations of international law, whatever the status of the actor. 
 
The ILC’s explanation of the attribution of ultra vires conduct of persons acting under the effective 
control of the state is also problematic. The Commentary states that ultra vires conduct committed 
by persons under the effective control of the state will be attributable because ‘the condition for 
attribution will still be met even if particular instructions may have been ignored’.149 
The ILC’s reasoning, for which no authority is cited, is difficult to reconcile with the ICJ’s 
explanation in Bosnia Genocide of the theory underlying Article 8. The ICJ explained that, for the 
purposes of Article 8, ‘what must be determined is whether the FRY organs… originated the 
genocide by issuing instructions to the perpetrators or exercising direction or control, and whether, 
 
147 Draft ARS with Commentaries adopted on First Reading, 1997, p.46. 
148 ARS, Commentary, Article 8, §8. 
149 Ibid. 
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as a result, the conduct of organs of the Respondent, having been the cause of the commission of acts in 
breach of its international obligations, constituted a violation of those obligations’.150 For the ICJ, 
responsibility is engaged because the instructions given by or the effective control exercised by the 
state’s organs caused the commission of the acts by the state’s agent. However, if the basis for 
attribution to the state is that the exercise of effective control caused the agent to commit the act, 
it is arguable that control can never be effective if the agent acts ultra vires. For Special Rapporteur 
Crawford, in order for acts to be attributed to a state on the basis of its ‘direction and control’, 
those acts must be a ‘necessary, integral or intended part’ of a specific operation.151 It is hard to 
think of any circumstances in which ultra vires acts will be an intended part of a specific operation. 
According to Crawford’s construction, and that of the ICJ in Bosnia Genocide, either the unlawful 
acts are an intended part of the operation – they are caused by the effective control exercised by 
the state organs - or they are not. In the latter case the effective control test would not be satisfied. 
The ILC’s intention may have been to apply the distinction between purely private conduct and 
acting ‘in an official capacity’, as applied to the question of attribution of the ultra vires acts of state 
organs. This would explain why the state is responsible for ultra vires acts of agents acting under 
the effective control of the state. However, this is not made clear in the text.  
Thus, the attribution of ultra vires conduct will depend on whether the conditions are met to identify 
the armed group as a de facto organ of the state, or that the conduct was ultra vires at all, but 
committed on the instructions, direction or under the effective control of the state. 
The significance of the distinction between organs and agents and the principles that, according 
to the ARS, govern the attribution of ultra vires acts in each case is thrown into sharp relief when 
one considers the alleged looting of residential and commercial properties in Afrin, northern Syria 
by members of the TFSA after the TFSA and Turkey claimed to have taken control of the city in 
2018.152 Turkey’s overt involvement with the TFSA has been well documented and extends beyond 
mere logistical support and training to joint military operations in which the TFSA has been 
incorporated into the Turkish military command structure.153 In response to the allegations of 
looting the Turkish Presidential Spokesperson, Ibrahim Kalin, said that Turkey took the allegations 
seriously and would investigate them and that ‘some groups probably did not follow the orders 
 
150 Bosnia Genocide, §397 [Emphasis added]. 
151 Crawford, First Report (1998), p.43 §213. 
152 France 24, ‘Turkey to investigate Afrin looting reports’, 19 March 2018.  
153 Yesiltas et al, Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, ‘Operation Euphrates Shield: 
Implementation and Lessons Learned’ (2017 SETA), pp.22-23.  
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that were given by their commanders’.154 If the TFSA in fact enjoys the status and function of an 
organ of Turkey then regardless of whether the members of the armed group followed their 
commanders’ orders, their conduct is attributable to Turkey. However, if the TFSA acted as 
agents of Turkey, according to the ILC’s approach, in order for their conduct to be attributed to 
Turkey it must be shown that they did so on the specific instructions of Turkey or that they were 
operating under the effective control, namely under the operational command, of Turkey at the 
time the looting took place.  
 
The Turkish government has since been accused of passing off olive oil plundered from olive 
groves in Afrin by members of the Turkish armed forces together with members of militia as the 
produce of Turkey to sell on EU markets.155 The looting by members of the Turkish armed forces 
would be attributable to Turkey. The question whether the conduct of members of the militia 
would be attributable to Turkey would again turn on whether those militia were, at the time of 
the looting, acting on the instructions of or under the effective control of Turkey.156 As the 
discussion of the nature of a relationship between a state and a non-state actor that would satisfy 
the test of effective control above in section 2.3.4 shows, conduct that is peripheral to the specific 
operation, such as looting after the successful completion of a military operation to gain control 
over territory, will not amount to conduct committed under the effective control of the state.157  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The high threshold tests required to identify a state’s de facto organs and agents mean that a state 
that provides substantial financial, military and other support to an armed group will not be directly 
responsible for the conduct of that armed group, even if that group uses the state’s support to 
commit war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and other violations of international law. 
A state’s strictly limited responsibility for private acts is reinforced by the approach suggested by 
the ILC Commentary to the question of attribution of ultra vires conduct of a state’s agents. In 
effect, the state will not be responsible for such acts. It will only be responsible in circumstances 
where it has instructed or directed its agent to carry out the specific act, or the act is committed 
under the effective control of the state. In light of the practical and evidential difficulties that are 
likely to arise for those seeking to prove conduct was committed on the instructions of or under 
 
154 France 24, ‘Turkey to investigate Afrin looting reports’, 19 March 2018.  
155 Badcock, ‘Turkey accused of plundering olive oil from Syria to sell in the EU’, The Telegraph, 14 January 2019.  
156 See section 2.3 above. 
157 Crawford, First report (1998), p.43, §213.  
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the effective control of the state, it is doubtful that the law of state responsibility, as currently 
understood, is sufficient to ensure that states do not evade their international obligations by 
delegation to a proxy.  
 
The question then arises as to how international law should address state complicity in unlawful 
acts of armed groups and upon what terms? Jurists and scholars have tended to answer that 
question in one of two ways. First is the argument that the context-specific approach proposed by 
the ILC Commentary to Article 8 ARS should be adopted, such that the test of ‘overall control’ 
may be applied in cases where the state and armed group share a purpose to commit violations of 
international law.158 This argument has been countered by some scholars who argue that a state’s 
primary obligations to prevent certain acts are sufficient to cover state complicity in terrorism and 
international crime.159  In chapter 3 I examine the argument in favour of a variable control standard 
and the extent to which a broadening of the rules of attribution to address cases of ‘shared unlawful 
purpose’ would be an appropriate way to address state complicity in terrorism and international 
crime. In chapter 4 I then examine the extent to which a state’s primary obligations under 
customary international law, IHL and IHRL are sufficient to cover complicity in terrorism, 




158 E.g. Bosnia Genocide, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, §39.  
159 Milanovic (2009) p.322; Boon (2014) pp.373-375; Crawford (2013) p.158.  
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Chapter 3: Tadic Revisited - Overall Control in Cases of Shared Unlawful Purpose 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Bosnia Genocide has been described as ‘a judicial massacre’.1 News headlines announced that the 
Court had cleared Serbia2 of genocide3 and that Bosnia was ‘dismayed’ by the result.4 Yet Serbia 
was not entirely absolved of responsibility with respect to the genocide at Srebrenica. The Court 
held that Serbia was responsible for failing to prevent the genocide and punish the perpetrators of 
it.5 However, the focus of the state parties to proceedings, the media, campaigners and victims of 
the genocide was on direct responsibility for or complicity in the genocide, or the lack of it.6 The 
case is politically sensitive. But as Jackson notes, the reaction to Bosnia Genocide shows that the 
public isn’t concerned with a finding of responsibility per se.7 What matters is the identification of 
a state’s specific legal responsibility for its active role in the commission of international crimes or 
other unlawful acts. For Cassese, a staunch defender of the Tadic overall control test and critic of 
the ICJ’s approach in Bosnia Genocide, the court ‘absolved’ Serbia and then awarded Bosnia a 
‘consolation prize’ by affirming that there was a genocide at Srebrenica, and that Serbia failed to 
prevent it.8  
 
Notwithstanding the ICJ’s rejection of the overall control test in Tadic, some have expressed 
continued support for the test in cases where the state and armed group share a common purpose 
to commit acts amounting to international crimes9 and specifically in the context of state-
 
1 Cassese (2007b). 
2 As successor state to FRY. 
3 BBC News, ‘Court clears Serbia of genocide’, 26 February 2007.  
4 Bildanzic & Dervisbegovic, ‘Serbs relieved, Bosnia dismayed by genocide ruling’, 26 February 2007.  
5 Bosnia Genocide, §438. 
6 For further discussion of the ICJ’s approach to the question of state complicity in genocide in Bosnia Genocide see 
chapter 5. 
7 Jackson (2017). 
8 Cassese (2007b). 
9 Bosnia Genocide, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, §39 and Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc 
Mahiou, §§114-117. Also, Cassese (2007a). 
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sponsored terrorism.10 In defence of Tadic Cassese – who served on the bench in that case11 - has 
argued that the effective control test is ‘inconsistent with a basic principle underpinning the whole 
body of rules and principles on state responsibility’.12 For Cassese there is a need to rely upon the 
overall control test generally because the effective control test imposes an evidential burden that, 
in practice, can be insurmountable.13  Others have argued for a more context-specific application 
of the overall control test.14 In their Dissenting Opinions in Bosnia Genocide, Vice-President Al 
Khasawneh and Judge ad hoc Mahiou observed that the Court had not considered whether it was 
appropriate to apply the effective control test to circumstances where the shared objective is to 
commit violations of international law, such as acts of terrorism, genocide or war crimes.15 The 
words ‘shared unlawful purpose’ are used to describe this shared objective. 
 
In this chapter I will question whether adopting the context-specific application of the overall 
control test would be an appropriate means of addressing the responsibility of state-sponsors of 
terrorism and international crime. Section 3.2 provides an account of the arguments made in 
favour of a modification of Article 8 ARS to include a test of overall control in cases of shared 
unlawful purpose. Section 3.3 summarises the approach of the Appeals Chamber in Tadic. In 
section 3.4 I argue that there is a third basis, not considered by the ICJ, upon which the overall 
control test should be rejected, namely the ICTY’s misinterpretation and misapplication of case 
law cited in support the overall control test. Furthermore, the case law of international human 
rights courts subsequent to Tadic shows a trend in favour of the effective control test for 
attribution. In section 3.5 I argue that in practice applying ‘overall control’ to cases of ‘shared 
unlawful purpose’ would not resolve the evidential difficulties that result from the application of 
the ‘effective control’ test. I explain that in order to prove a ‘shared unlawful purpose’ it must be 
shown that the state deliberately provided substantial support to an armed group in order that the 
armed group use that support to commit the unlawful act. This fault element is similar to ‘specific 
intent’: acting in the knowledge that a specific outcome is a virtual certainty and with the purpose 
 
10 Trapp (2011), pp.42-45. For argument in favour of a flexible approach before Bosnia Genocide see Chase (2005) 
p.111. Cf. Stahn (2003) p.47 and (2004) p.839. Stahn argues that the effective control test was ‘overturned’ by state 
practice following 9/11 attacks and the use of force against Afghanistan as part of ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’, 
which provided ‘official confirmation’ to Tadic and the overall control test. Stahn does not appear to have returned 
to the issue since the ICJ’s judgment in Bosnia Genocide. 
11 It is suspected that Cassese is the author of the judgment. 
12 Cassese (2007a) p.654. 
13 Ibid, pp.665-666. 
14 Bosnia Genocide, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, §39. See Trapp (2011) pp.42-45. 
15 Ibid. and Dissenting Opinion of Judge ad hoc Mahiou, §§114-117. 
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of achieving that specific outcome. The effect would be to replace one criterion that entails a high 
evidentiary threshold – ‘effective control’, with another, ‘specific intent’.  
 
3.2 ‘Shared unlawful purpose’: A special place for ‘overall control’? 
As a result of the application of the high threshold tests of ‘complete dependence’ and ‘effective 
control’ to identify state organs and agents states seemingly enjoy a substantial amount of freedom 
to provide an armed group with the means to conduct and sustain military operations without 
bearing responsibility for that armed group’s conduct. History is replete with examples of state use 
or co-option of armed groups or other non-state actors in order to conduct operations on the 
state’s own territory or abroad, or to intervene indirectly in conflicts occurring in other states. The 
practice dates back to the 16th century, if not before, with the use of privateers authorised by the 
monarchy to attack enemy vessels and plunder foreign commercial ships.16 During the Cold War, 
interference by ‘superpower’ states such as the United States and Russia in internal armed conflicts 
was commonplace.17 The support given to armed groups during this period was not insignificant. 
As Becker has observed, ‘[w]ithout the State playing a dominant role in facilitating or harnessing 
terrorist activity, non-State actors could not operate easily on the international stage. Without the 
private terrorist group doing its bidding, the State could not easily pursue its foreign policy 
objectives with this degree of efficiency and anonymity’.18  
 
Since 2011 a number of states have sought to influence the outcome of internal armed conflicts 
in the Middle East and North Africa by providing varying degrees of support to armed groups. In 
Syria, opposition armed groups have been provided with ‘lethal’ and ‘non-lethal’ assistance that 
includes military training and the assistance of military advisors on the ground by, amongst others, 
the United Kingdom,19 the United States,20 Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.21 The continued 
appeal of the use of proxy warfare by states to pursue foreign policy goals and the tragic 
inevitability of the commission of serious violations of IHL and human rights in armed conflicts 
has prompted the criticism that, with respect to cases where the state and the person or entity act 
 
16 Sir Francis Drake is one of the better-known English privateers who privateered on the commission of Queen 
Elizabeth I. 
17 Becker, (2006) pp.250-251. For a study of the dynamics and lineage of proxy warfare from the Cold War to the 
so-called ‘War on Terror’ see Mumford (2013). 
18 Becker (2006), p.251. 
19 BBC News, ‘Syria conflict: UK to give extra £5 million to opposition groups’, 10 August 2012.  
20 BBC News, ‘Syria war: A brief guide to who’s fighting whom’, 7 April 2017.  
21 Vela, J., ‘Exclusive: Arab states arm Syrian rebels as UN talks of Syrian civil war’, The Independent, 13 June 2012.  
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with a common unlawful purpose - in particular cases of state-sponsored terrorism – the effective 
control standard raises the evidential bar too high.22 For Trapp,  
 
…it is difficult to argue that material military support… for terrorist activities does not 
necessarily imply support for the offences committed by the terrorists in the course of 
their use of force. There is therefore no need for the added layer of effective control, in 
addition to a more general level of control over the group’s operations (through its support 
thereof), to ensure that a state is only held responsible for that over which it exercised 
sufficient control.23  
 
Scholars have criticised the effective control test for ‘effectively provid[ing] a “script” for a state 
wishing to sponsor terrorism or insurgency while avoiding responsibility’.24 They have suggested 
that if a more flexible approach to Article 8 ARS were to be adopted, the overall control test could 
be included as a basis for attribution ‘and thereby respond to the particularities of the terrorism 
context in a way that rigid adherence to the Nicaragua standard does not.25 For Cassese, 
 
The hidden nature of those groups, their being divided up into small and closely-knit units, the 
secretive contacts of officials of some specific states with terrorist groups, all this would make it 
virtually impossible to prove the issuance of instructions or directions relating to each terrorist operation. 
If one instead relies upon the ‘overall control’ test, it suffices to demonstrate that certain terrorist 
units or groups are not only armed or financed (or also equipped and trained) by a specific state 
or benefit from its strong support, but also that such state generally speaking organizes or 
coordinates or at any rate takes a hand in coordinating or planning its terrorist actions (not 
necessarily each individual terrorist operation). It would then be relatively easy to infer from these 
links that the state at issue bears responsibility for those terrorist activities. In short, on the strength 
of the ‘overall control’ test, it would be less difficult to attribute those actions to the state in 
question. This test would make it possible to attribute to some specific states of the Middle East 
responsibility for the gross violations of human rights perpetrated by terrorist groups on which 
 
22 Chase (2005) p.111; Cassese (2007a) pp.665-667; Trapp (2011) pp.44-45. Cf. Becker (2006) pp.239-282 who argues 
for the rejection of the agency model in the context of establishing State responsibility for terrorism all together. For 
Becker, ‘the agency paradigm not only neglects the subtle relationships between the private and public sphere in the 
perpetration of acts of terrorism, it encourages them’ (at p.259). 
23 Trapp (2011) pp.44-45. 
24 Chase (2005) p.111. 
25 Trapp (2011) pp.44-45. 
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they have exercised a strong influence because, in addition to providing support, financing, training 
and weapons, such states help coordinate and plan their terrorist activities.26 
 
In his Dissenting Opinion in Bosnia Genocide, Vice-President Al-Khasawneh remarked that the 
Court failed to address the crucial issue raised by Tadic, namely that ‘different types of activities, 
particularly in the ever-evolving nature of armed conflict, may call for subtle variations in the rules 
of attribution’.27 In Nicaragua, he observed, the shared objective of the United States and the contras 
was the overthrow of the Nicaraguan government.28 That objective could be achieved without the 
commission of war crimes or crimes against humanity.29  However, when ‘the shared objective is 
the commission of international crimes, to require both control over the non-State actors and the 
specific operations in the context of which international crimes were committed is too high a 
threshold’.30 This argument, and the question whether, in practice, the ‘shared objective’ or ‘shared 
unlawful purpose’ formula would be an effective means of addressing state complicity in terrorism 
and international crimes is discussed below in section 3.5.   
 
For obvious reasons, given the heavy evidential burden imposed by the effective control test, a 
context-specific approach continues to appeal to claimant states. For example, in Georgia v Russia,31 
Georgia argued for the application of a context-specific approach. Georgia instituted proceedings 
against Russia on the ground that Russia, through its organs or agents, had carried out a policy of 
violent discrimination against ethnic Georgians in South Ossetia contrary to the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). Georgia  cited the ILC 
Commentary to Article 8 in support of its submission that ‘[t]he requisite threshold for control in 
any particular case is thus fact-sensitive and requires a careful analysis of the relationship between 
the persons or groups and the State in question and the extent to which control was exercised by 
virtue of that relationship with regards to the conduct said to have breached the State’s 
international obligations’.32 Georgia did not expressly plead ‘overall control’ but submitted that the 
South Ossetian armed groups acted under the direction and control of the separatist government 
ministers who were Russian military and intelligence officials on active duty, that the groups 
 
26 Cassese (2007a) p.666 [original emphasis]. 




31 Georgia v Russia, Preliminary Objections, p.70. 
32 Georgia v Russia, Memorial of Georgia, Vol. I, 2 September 2009, §9.46.  
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received ‘critical financial and military’ support from Russia, and some persons who committed 
violations of CERD were employed by Russia and had Russian citizenship.33 
 
Proceedings in Georgia v Russia were discontinued after the Court held that it had no jurisdiction 
to decide the matter.34 However, had the Court had the opportunity to consider Georgia’s 
application at the merits stage, it may have found the proposed context-specific application of the 
overall control test more palatable than the general application of the test suggested in Tadic. This 
is because the context-specific approach preserves the effective control standard in cases where 
violations of international law are not inherent in the operations carried out by the state agent, for 
example the carrying out of a military operation against the armed forces of a third state or armed 
group.   
 
Yet, contrary to the Appeals Chamber’s assertion in Tadic, there is no support for the application 
of the overall control test in the jurisprudence of international arbitral tribunals or international 
human rights courts. Therefore, the application of overall control in cases of shared unlawful 
purpose would be a progressive development of the law of state responsibility. 
 
3.3 Tadic Revisited 
In Tadic the ICTY Appeals Chamber argued that the jurisprudence of other international tribunals 
supported a test of ‘overall control’ with respect to a state’s relationship with organised and 
hierarchically structured groups.35 With respect to such groups the ICTY concluded that the 
effective control test was not ‘persuasive’.36 For the ICTY, ‘[t]he “effective control” test 
propounded by the ICJ in Nicaragua as an exclusive and all-embracing test is at variance with 
international judicial and state practice: such practice has envisaged state responsibility in 
circumstances where a lower degree of control than that demanded by the Nicaragua test was 
exercised’.37 Instead, the ICTY posited that policy and the jurisprudence of other international 
tribunals supported a test of ‘overall control’.38 A state will exercise overall control over an 
 
33 Ibid.  
34 Georgia v Russia, Preliminary Objections, p. 70. 
35 Tadic, p.49 §120 and p.59 §137. 
36 Ibid., §115. The basis upon which the ICTY distinguished organised groups from individuals and unorganised 
groups is unclear. The ICTY merely observes that an organised group will have a chain of command, its own set of 
rules, and its members operate within that structure, and that because members of the group are subject to the 
authority of the group’s commander, the state need only exercise overall control over the group: §120. 
37 Ibid., §124. 
38 Ibid., §120 & §137. 
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organised armed group when it has financed, trained, equipped and helped the group in the 
planning of its operations.39 Drawing an analogy with draft article 10 ARS40 (now Article 7 ARS), 
the ICTY posited that in these cases the armed group should be treated as if it were a state organ, 
meaning that the state will be responsible for the ultra vires conduct of the group.41 The ICTY 
therefore significantly lowered the evidential threshold required to establish de facto state organs. 
Even if the state does not exercise operational command over the group, the state will be 
responsible for all the acts of that group, whether or not they are incidental to the military 
operation in question. The ICTY justifies its approach on the ground that ‘otherwise, States might 
easily shelter behind, or use as a pretext, their internal legal system or the lack of any specific 
instructions in order to disclaim international responsibility’.42  
 
As explained in chapter 2, the ICJ rejected the overall control test on two grounds: the ICTY’s 
lack of jurisdiction over matters of general international law;43 and the distinct purposes for which 
the effective control test and the overall control test were applied – the attribution of conduct and 
the classification of armed conflict respectively.44 The ICJ did not address the question whether 
the overall control test is in fact supported by the jurisprudence of the United States-Mexico 
General Claims Commission, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, and ECtHR cited by the 
ICTY in Tadic, some of which are also cited by the ILC in its commentary to Article 8 ARS.45 In 
light of continued support for the application of the overall control test to cases of shared unlawful 
purpose, there is therefore a need to consider whether there is force in the ICTY’s assertion that, 
unlike the effective control test, the overall control test is grounded in judicial precedent.  
 
3.4 Tadic: Misinterpretation and misapplication of case law  
The following analysis will show that the ICTY misinterpreted and misapplied the decisions of the 
United States-Mexico General Claims Commission, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, and 
 
39 Ibid. §131. 
40 Draft article 10 adopted on first reading by the ILC provides that: 
‘The conduct of an organ of a State, of a territorial governmental entity or of an entity empowered to 
exercise elements of the governmental authority, such organ having acted in that capacity, shall be 
considered as an act of the State under international law even if, in the particular case, the organ exceeded 
its competence according to internal law or contravened instructions concerning its activity’: ILC Report 
(1980), p.31.  
41 Tadic, §121. See chapter 2.2. 
42 Ibid., §123. 
43 Bosnia Genocide, §403. 
44 Ibid., §§404-405. 
45 ARS, Article 8, Commentary, §2 fn.154, §5 fn.160. 
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the ECtHR authorities cited in support of the overall control test. Moreover, there is no indication 
in the judgments of the ECtHR subsequent to Tadic that the ECtHR will adopt the overall control 
test to attribute the conduct of non-state actors to the state. 
 
3.4.1  United States-Mexico General Claims Commission and the Iran-United States Claims 
Tribunal 
According to the ICTY in Tadic international and judicial practice ‘has envisaged State 
responsibility in cases where a lower degree of control than that demanded by the Nicaragua test 
was exercised’.46 However, the ICTY’s interpretation of the case law treats as express that which 
at most may only be implied by decisions that dealt with the question of attribution soley in general 
terms. The ICTY interprets ‘effective control’ as ‘control that extends to the issuance of specific 
instructions concerning the various activities of the individuals in question’.47 Citing Stephens and 
Yeager, the ICTY concludes that because no enquiry was made in either case as to whether any 
specific instructions were issued, those cases provide evidence of a practice of attributing conduct 
on the basis of overall control.48  
 
Stephens concerned the conduct of a member of an ‘informal municipal guards organisation’ called 
the ‘defensas sociales’ that had ‘sprung up’ in the state of Chihuahua, Mexico, after federal troops 
had withdrawn from the state during the revolution led by Adolfo de la Heurta in Mexico 1923-
1924 ‘partly to defend peaceful citizens, partly to take the field against the rebellion if necessary’.49 
The United States-Mexico General Claims Commission did not draw a firm conclusion as to the 
status of these defensas sociales vis-à-vis the state, but in any event concluded that they were 
‘acting for’ Mexico. According to the Commission, ‘[i]t is difficult to determine with precision the 
status of these guards as an irregular auxiliary of the army, the more so as they lacked both uniforms 
and insignia; but at any rate they were “acting for” Mexico or for its political subdivisions’.50 As a 
consequence, Mexico was held responsible for the conduct of Lorenzo Valenzuela, a member of 
the defensas sociales who, on orders to stop the claimants’ brother at a check point, shot and killed 
him. Mexico contended that the guard was ordered merely to stop the victim and not to shoot 
him. The Commission accepted this position but found the following, 
 
46 Tadic, §124. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Tadic, §§125-127. 




Responsibility of a country for acts of soldiers in cases like the present one, in the presence and 
under the order of a superior, is not doubtful. Taking account of the conditions existing in 
Chihuahua then and there, Valenzuela must be considered as, or assimilated to, a soldier.51 
 
For the ICTY, evidence of specific instruction or authorisation by the state was not required in 
Stephens as it was sufficient to demonstrate that the state had ‘overall control’ in order for that 
state’s responsibility to be engaged.52 However, this interpretation of Stephens is misconceived. The 
United States-Mexico General Claims Commission did not discuss the question of specific 
instructions because it was not relevant to its analysis. There is no suggestion on the facts that the 
Mexican army or any other state organ instructed, directed or controlled the defensas sociales. At 
most, the defensas sociales acted of their own will under the ‘General Ordinance for the Army’ of 
15 June 1897, enacted before the start of the revolution, according to which individuals were 
obligated to stop and answer the questions of sentries.53 But this does not mean that the defensas 
sociales were under the control of the state or instructed by the state to man a check point. As the 
Commission observed, the defensas sociales had ‘sprung up’ in the absence of the state’s armed 
forces. As such, the defensas sociales were more akin to vigilante groups, self-appointed to 
maintain law and order in circumstances where the state could not do so.   
 
The better interpretation of Stephens is that it supports the rule of attribution provided by Article 
9 ARS – the exercise of governmental authority in the absence or default of the official 
authorities.54 Members of the defensas sociales were treated as soldiers of the Mexican army for 
the purposes of state responsibility because they had organised themselves in order to exercise 
governmental authority – maintaining law and order – and it was necessary to do so because of 
the absence of Federal troops. Article 9 is engaged in circumstances where the state apparatus is 
wholly absent or lacking such that non-state actors take it upon themselves to engage in 




52 Tadic, §125. 
53 Stephens (1927) p.267.  
54 Cf. Crawford (2013) p.142 who posits that the actor in the Stephens was found to have ‘at least the status of de facto 
organ’ within the meaning of Article 4 ARS. 
55 See chapter 6. 
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This was also the case in Yeager.56 The ICTY acknowledges the finding by the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunal in that case that the Revolutionary Guards were exercising governmental authority in the 
immediate aftermath of the Iranian Revolution because the official police force had lost control. 
However, the ICTY interprets the findings of the Tribunal as supporting attribution on the basis 
that the Revolutionary Guards were in fact acting on behalf of the state,57 rather than the second 
limb to what was then draft Article 8 (now Article 9) - in fact exercising governmental authority in 
the absence of the official authorities.58  
 
In Yeager the Iran-US Claims Tribunal found that the government did not exercise sufficient 
control to ‘effectively prevent’ the Revolutionary Guard from committing wrongful acts against 
United States nationals, but the government must have known, and did not specifically object to 
the exercise of governmental authority by them.59 However, the Tribunal did not attribute 
responsibility for the particular conduct discussed in Tadic (forced expulsion)60 on the basis of 
Iran’s control over the Revolutionary Guard. Rather, the Tribunal applied the principle that, 
‘[u]nder international law Iran cannot, on the one hand, tolerate the exercise of governmental 
authority by revolutionary “Komitehs” or “Guards” and at the same time deny responsibility for 
wrongful acts committed by them’.61  
 
The cases of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal cited in footnotes of Tadic62(William L. Pereira v Iran,63 
Arthur Young v Iran64 and Schott v Iran65) do not assist any further. The question of the requisite level 
of control over persons or groups for the purposes attribution is not discussed in these cases. 
Moreover, in William L. Pereira Associates the alleged conduct was committed after the 
 
56 Yeager (1987). The Iran-US Claims Tribunal also found responsibility on the basis of what is now Article 10 ARS. 
See chapter 7. 
57 Tadic, §126. 
58 The government formally recognised the Revolutionary Guard as an organ of government in May 1979. The 
conduct that was subject of the Yeager took place in February 1979. 
59 Yeager (1987) §43. See also chapter 6, 6.6. 
60 Tadic, §126. 
61 Yeager (1987) §45. Cf. de Hoogh who posits that, on the basis that the Iran government tolerated the exercise of 
governmental authority by the Revolutionary Guard it could be argued that the latter operated ‘within the organic 
infrastructure of the State’ and could therefore be treated as a de facto organ: de Hoogh (2002) p. 271. 
62 Tadic, p.53 fn.151. 
63 William L. Pereira v Iran (1984). 
64 Arthur Young v Iran (1987). 
65 Schott v Iran (1990). 
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Revolutionary Guard was formally recognised by government decree in May 1979,66 and in Schott 
at around the same time the Revolutionary Guard was declared the ‘protector of the revolution’ 
in an amendment to the Constitution.67 In Arthur Young the Tribunal found that there was 
insufficient evidence of a causal link between the conduct complained of and the alleged violations 
of international law, and therefore did not consider the basis upon which the conduct of the 
Revolutionary Guards may have been attributed to the state.68  
 
These cases do not provide judicial precedent for the overall control test. 
 
3.4.2 Loizidou v Turkey  
With respect to the ECtHR cases, the ICTY conflated principles applied for the purposes of 
determining a state’s exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction with rules of attribution for the 
purposes of engaging a state’s responsibility. Particular focus was placed upon Loizidou v Turkey69 
and the reference to ‘effective overall control’ in that case.70 In its judgment on Preliminary 
Objections the ECtHR held that a state will exercise jurisdiction where, as a consequence of 
military action, that state exercises ‘effective’ control over an area outside its territory.71 Moreover, 
the positive obligation to secure the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) flows from the fact of that control over territory, whether control is 
exercised through the state’s armed forces or by a subordinate local administration.72 However, 
the Court confused matters at the merits stage by introducing the concept of ‘effective overall 
control’ in its analysis of the question of responsibility,73 a formula that appears to have been 
adopted from the claimant’s submissions,74 and the Court’s discussion on jurisdiction.75 Moreover, 
 
66 In William L. Pereira v Iran (1984) the confiscation notice was issued on 5 October 1980: p.23. In Schott the alleged 
expropriate of property occurred in summer – late 1979: §§55 & 59.   
67 Schott v Iran (1990) §17. 
68  Arthur Young v Iran (1987) §§46-59. 
69 ECtHR Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) and (Merits). 
70 Tadic, §128. Loizidou v Turkey is also cited by the ILC in its commentary to Article 8 ARS in support of its 
comment that ‘it is a matter of appreciation in each case whether particular conduct was or was not carried out 
under the control of a State to such an extent that the conduct controlled should be attributed to it’: Commentary to 
Article 8 ARS, §5 fn.160. 
71 ECtHR Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) §62. Also (Merits), §52. 
72 Ibid. 
73 ECtHR Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) §56. 
74 Ibid., §49 
75 The terms ‘effective overall control’ and ‘effective control’ have been used interchangeably in subsequent ECtHR 
cases concerning a state’s jurisdiction over an area outside its territory, suggesting that it was never intended for 
there to be two separate tests and ‘overall’ was used to describe control over the whole of an area, rather than part 
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having decided that, as a result of its military occupation, Turkey exercised jurisdiction over 
Northern Cyprus, the Court stated that the wrongful conduct was ‘thus imputable’ to Turkey, 
without considering the question of attribution of conduct as a separate issue.  The Court 
concluded that ‘the continuous denial of the applicant’s access to her property in Northern Cyprus 
and the ensuing loss of all control over the property is a matter which falls within Turkey’s 
“jurisdiction” within the meaning of Article 1 (art. 1) and is thus imputable to Turkey’.76  
 
The phrase ‘and is thus imputable’ may be interpreted in two ways. First, that the Court found 
Turkey directly responsible for the conduct of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) 
because it exercised effective (overall) control over the territory of Northern Cyprus. Alternatively, 
that the Court found Turkey responsible for the failure to protect Loizidou’s Convention rights, 
in breach of its positive obligations under Article 1 ECHR to secure the rights of persons falling 
within its jurisdiction.77  
 
The ICTY appears to have adopted the first interpretation of Loizidou, observing that the Court 
had found that ‘the restrictions on the right to property complained of by the applicant were 
attributable to Turkey’.78 In defence of the ICTY’s approach Cassese takes this a step further. For 
Cassese, establishing state responsibility is a necessary condition for establishing the application of 
the ECHR.79 Thus, Cassese argues that in order to establish whether or not a state exercised 
jurisdiction over the victim, the Court in Loizidou had to determine to ‘which state or entity the 
violations were to be attributed or, in other words, which state or entity bore responsibility for 
those asserted violations’.80 According to Cassese’s interpretation, state responsibility is a 
prerequisite for jurisdiction. However, this interpretation of Loizidou, and of the ECtHR case law 
generally, is not correct. A State Party’s obligation to secure an individual’s rights, as guaranteed 
by the ECHR, is only engaged if that that person ‘falls within’ the state’s jurisdiction. Therefore, 
the question of jurisdiction must be established before the question of responsibility can be 
addressed. In Loizidou the Court held that Turkey’s exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction over 
Northern Cyprus by virtue of its military occupation of the area triggered Turkey’s positive 
 
of it. E.g. ECtHR Cyprus v Turkey; Bankovic v Belgium (Admissibility), §70; Al-Skeini v United Kingdom, §138; Chiragov v 
Armenia, §§168 and 169. 
76 ECtHR Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) §57. 
77 Milanovic (2006) p.586. 
78 Tadic, §128. 
79 Cassese (2007a) p.658 fn.17. 
80 Ibid. 
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obligation under Article 1 ECHR to secure individual rights and freedoms within the state’s 
jurisdiction.81 The Court’s comment that ‘[i]t is not necessary to determine whether… Turkey 
actually exercises detailed control over the policies and actions of the authorities of the “TRNC”,’82 
should not be understood as an instance of the application of the overall control test to the 
question of attribution.83 Rather, it is an indication by the Court that, having found a basis upon 
which Turkey is responsible, namely for the failure to secure Loizidou’s rights, the Court was 
satisfied that it was not necessary to explore further the question whether the conduct of the 
TRNC was directly attributable to Turkey. As the Court observed in Ilascu and Others v Moldova and 
Russia, decided 8 years after Loizidou, 
 
According to the relevant principles of international law, a State’s responsibility may be engaged 
where, as a consequence of military action – whether lawful or unlawful – it exercises in practice 
effective control of an area situated outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an 
area, the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention derives from the fact of such control, 
whether it be exercised directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local 
administration.84 
 
The key issue in Loizidou was not a state’s control over an armed group, but its control over a 
geographical area outside its territory because of the presence of its organs (its military) in that 
area.85 That case and subsequent cases of the ECtHR ‘do not revolve around the general law on 
state responsibility, but deal with a concept of state jurisdiction which is specific to human rights 
treaties, as it is a prerequisite for their application’.86 Indeed, the ECtHR has since sought to clarify 
its position in Catan and Others v Russia and Moldova,87 in which the Court stressed that ‘the test for 
establishing the existence of “jurisdiction” under Article 1 of the Convention has never been 
 
81 ECtHR Loizidou v Turkey, (Merits), §§52 & 56. See also Al Skeini v United Kingdom, §138; Catan & Ors v Moldova & 
Russia, §106. 
82 Ibid. §56. 
83 Cf. Tadic, §128. 
84 ECtHR Ilascu & Ors v Moldova & Russia, §314 [Emphasis added]. 
85 The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY half-heartedly recognised the distinction as ‘possible control of a sovereign 
State over a State entity, rather than control by a State over armed forces operating in the territory of another State’: 
Tadic, §128. 
86 Milanovic (2006) p.586. 
87 ECtHR Catan & Ors v Moldova & Russia, §115. Re-iterated in Jaloud v The Netherlands, §154. 
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equated with the test for establishing a State’s responsibility for an internationally wrongful act 
under international law’.88  
 
The ECtHR’s jurisprudence on questions of jurisdiction is evolving on a case-by-case basis89 as 
the Court is presented with new factual scenarios. The Court has found a person to fall within the 
state’s jurisdiction where the state exercises effective control over an area,90 or authority and 
control over the person or a detention facility. 91 In these cases the ECtHR has adopted language 
similar, but not identical, to the ICJ’s ‘complete dependence’ and ‘effective control tests’, namely: 
‘effective (overall) control’ of an area, ‘authority and control’ over a person, ‘decisive influence’, 
‘survival by virtue of’ in order to determine the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction by a state.  
 
As the ECtHR has rightly stressed, the question of jurisdiction is separate from that of state 
responsibility.92 There is nothing in the approach of the court to indicate the adoption of a lower 
threshold control test, such as ‘overall control’ to determine the attribution of conduct. It is only 
when the Court has already determined that a state exercises effective control over a local 
administration, and that the administration could not survive without the state’s support that the 
ECtHR will treat the local administration as a de facto organ and therefore not consider it necessary 
to consider whether the state had detailed control over the conduct in question.93 The terminology 
used by the ECtHR may differ from that used by the ICJ but the underlying principles are the 
same.  
 
The ECtHR is yet to consider the situation where an armed group ‘acts on behalf of’ a state in the 
territory of another state in circumstances where the former state has no obvious military presence 
in the territory of the latter state. Ukraine’s applications to the ECtHR concerning the involvement 
of Russia in the activities of armed groups in eastern Ukraine present the Court with the 
opportunity to do so.94 In its applications Ukraine has maintained that by exercising control over 
 
88 Ibid. 
89 For a general overview of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence see Milanovic & Papic (2018). 
90 ECtHR Loizidou v Turkey, (Merits), §§52 & 56. 
91 See ECtHR Al Skeini v United Kingdom §137; Issa & Others v Turkey, §71; Ocalan v Turkey, §91. The ‘authority and 
control’ standard has also been applied by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. See IACiHR Coard et 
al v United States, §38. 
92 ECtHR Catan & Ors v Moldova & Russia, §115.  
93 E.g. ECtHR Ilascu & Ors v Moldova & Russia, §392; Mozer v Moldova & Russia, §157. 
94 Registrar of the ECtHR, Press Release, ‘Grand Chamber to examine four complaints by Ukraine against Russia 
over Crimea and Eastern Ukraine’, 9 May 2018.  
 48 
separatists and armed groups operating in eastern Ukraine, ‘Russia has exercised jurisdiction over 
a situation which has resulted in numerous Convention violations’.95 In its applications concerning 
events occurring in Crimea and eastern Ukraine from September 2014, Ukraine has alleged that 
armed groups controlled by Russia have killed and tortured civilians and members of the Ukrainian 
military.96 Provided that the cases move to the merits stage, it will be necessary for the Court to 
determine whether the conduct of those separatists or armed groups is directly attributable to 
Russia.  
 
In light of the ECtHR’s practice so far and the principles applied in Loizidou and Ilascu it is likely 
that the Court will determine the question of attribution on the basis of effective control.97 Thus, 
Ukraine must first show that the armed groups operating in eastern Ukraine were operating under 
the effective control and ‘decisive influence’ of Russia (to use the language adopted by the Court). 
If jurisdiction is established on the basis that Russia exercises effective control over the armed 
group or groups, it is likely that the Court would also conclude that the conduct complained of is 
attributable to Russia. Russia would then be under an obligation to provide an effective remedy to 
the victims of rights-violating conduct committed by armed groups operating under its effective 
control in Ukraine. 
 
3.4.4  Post-Tadic limited application of overall control by international human rights 
mechanisms 
The overall control standard was applied by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention 
(WGAD) in 1999 in order to determine whether the Southern Lebanese Army was ‘acting on 
behalf of’ Israel in its administration of Al Khiam prison.98 The WGAD considered the applicable 
criterion for attribution of the conduct of non-state actors to a state to be in a state of evolution.99 
For WGAD the first stage in this development was Article 42 of the Hague Regulations 1907 
according to which ‘[t]erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority 
 
95 Ibid, with respect to Ukraine v Russia Applications no. 20958/14 and Ukraine v Russia (V), Application no. 
8019/16.  
96 Ibid., with respect to Ukraine v Russia (IV) Application no. 42410/15 and Ukraine v Russia (VI), Application no. 
70856/16.  
97 See also Solomou & Others v Turkey in which the ECtHR applied an ‘authority and/or effective control’ test to 
determine that (a) the victim was under the authority and/or effective control of Turkey, or its agent, and therefore fell 
within Turkey’s jurisdiction [§§45 & 51] and (b) that the victim was killed by agents of Turkey [§79] in circumstances 
where the state organs were also present. 
98 Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, ‘Handling of communications concerning detention at the 
Al-Khiam prison (southern Lebanon)’, (1999). 
99 Ibid, §14.  
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of the hostile army’; and ‘[t]he occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has 
been established and can be exercised’.100 The second stage was identified as the adoption of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV) that codified the obligations of an occupying power vis-à-vis 
the detention and treatment of protected persons in international armed conflicts.101 The ‘effective 
control’ test applied by Nicaragua was considered by WGAD to be the third stage in this 
evolution.102 The ‘overall control’ test applied by the ICTY in Tadic constituted the fourth and 
latest stage of development.103 
 
However, WGAD has not referred to the overall control test in any of its subsequent reports to 
the Human Rights Council (HRC). When it has addressed questions of control it has been in the 
context of a state’s exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction and recognition of the opinion of the 
UN Human Rights Committee (HRCttee) that ‘a State party must respect and ensure the rights 
laid down in the [ICCPR] to anyone within the power or effective control of that State party, even if 
not situated in the territory of that State party’.104  
 
Other special procedure mechanisms of the HRCttee have simply referred to the ARS without 
adopting or approving a specific control test.  For example, in his latest report the Special 
Rapporteur on Torture, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment has not taken a clear view on the 
requisite level of control required for attribution pursuant to Article 8 ARS, merely stating the 
principle that ‘States are responsible… for territorial and extra-territorial violations committed 
by… non-State actors under their instruction or control’ and referencing articles 4-11 ARS in 
general terms.105 
 
The International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur does cite Tadic in its 2005 report to the 
Security Council in its observations on the question of legal responsibility for the conduct of the 
Janjaweed. However, the Commission does not appear to have a firm grasp of the distinction 
between the effective and overall control tests. Confusingly, the Commission refers to the effective 
 
100 Ibid, §14(a). 
101 Ibid, §14(b). 
102 Ibid, §14(c). 
103 Ibid, §14(d). 
104 HRCttee, General Comment no.31, §10, referred to in Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 10 
January 2008, §11 with respect to the application of the ICCPR to the conduct of the US government outside of US 
territory. 
105 HRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment’, 2018, §58 & fn.88. 
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control standard in its conclusion that in cases where militias conduct joint operations with 
government forces ‘it can be held that they act under the effective control of the Government, 
consistently with the notion of control set out in 1999 in Tadic (Appeal), at paragraphs 98 to 145’.106 
The Commission then goes on to conclude that the militias are therefore ‘acting as de facto State 
officials’.107 
 
3.4.5  Summing-up 
This review of the case law shows that, contrary to the ICTY’s claim, there is no authoritative 
support for the application of overall control to attribute ‘private’ conduct to a state.  Tadic has 
had some influence on the opinions of UN human rights mechanisms. However, that influence 
has not persisted. The question remains whether, in spite of the lack of authoritative support for 
the overall control test, it should nevertheless be applied to specific cases of shared unlawful 
purpose, as suggested by Vice President Al-Khasawneh in his dissenting opinion in Bosnia 
Genocide108 and Trapp in her study on state responsibility for terrorism.109  
 
3.5 Shared unlawful purpose: problems and prospects  
For Vice-President Al-Khasawneh,  
When… the shared objective is the commission of international crimes, to require both 
control over the non-State actors and the specific operations in the context of which 
international crimes were committed is too high a threshold.110  
Therefore, according to Al-Khasawneh, in order for the overall control test to apply, the state and 
armed group must have a shared unlawful purpose. This gives rise to the question how a shared 
unlawful purpose may be proven?  
 
The notion that a purpose is ‘shared’ by the state and the armed group invokes the idea of a 
common plan to commit a specific unlawful act or achieve a particular objective by unlawful 
means. Where a state provides substantial financial, military or other support to an armed group 
that has a well-known history of committing only acts of terrorism it is arguable that a common 
 
106 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General, 2005, §123. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Bosnia Genocide, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, §39.  
109 Trapp (2011) pp.42-45. 
110 Bosnia Genocide, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh, §39. 
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plan to commit terrorist acts may be implied. But generally, proof of a shared unlawful purpose 
would require evidence of an agreement between the state and the armed group that the armed 
group will commit a specific unlawful act. For example, a shared purpose to commit genocide 
cannot be proven by evidence of an agreement that an armed group will kill members of a 
protected group.111 A shared purpose to commit genocide can only be proven by evidence of an 
agreement between the state and the armed group that the latter will kill members of a protected 
group with the intention to destroy that group in whole or in part.112 Likewise, a common plan to 
commit acts of terrorism would be clearly proven in circumstances where the state has selected 
the targets for the armed group to attack. However, in that case it is arguable that the selection of 
targets would amount to an instruction to commit a terrorist attack and would therefore satisfy 
the instruction standard required by Article 8 ARS in any event.113 
 
Thus, the notion of ‘shared unlawful purpose’ introduces a subjective fault element into Article 8 
ARS – a shared intent that the armed group should commit a specific unlawful act or achieve a 
particular objective using unlawful means.  How then, should ‘intent’ be defined? ‘Intent’ in 
English criminal law is defined with reference to whether the person acted knowing that a 
particular result of his or her act was a ‘virtual certainty’.114  International criminal law (ICL) applies 
a similar definition of intent. For the purposes of establishing individual criminal responsibility 
under the Rome Statute a person must commit the particular act with ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’. 
Pursuant to Article 30 of the Rome Statute ‘intent’ is defined as:  
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;  
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware 
that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.115  
‘Knowledge’ means ‘awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence will occur in the 
ordinary course of events’.116  
 
111 Article II Genocide Convention; Bosnia Genocide, §187. 
112 Ibid.  
113 Cf. Trapp (2011), p.44 who includes the selection of targets in the criteria for ‘overall control’ test. 
114 E.g. R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82, p.94: definition of intent in English law. 
115 Rome Statute, Article 30(2). 
116 Ibid. Article 30(3). On the meaning of ‘knowledge’ for the purposes of Article 16 ARS and state responsibility for 
‘complicity’ in the internationally wrongful acts of another state see chapter 5, 5.4. 
 52 
In Bosnia Genocide the ICJ defined ‘intent’ by reference to the terms of Article II of the Genocide 
Convention that defines the offence of genocide and the ILC’s draft Code of Crimes against the 
Peace and Security of Mankind 1996:117 ‘intended’ acts ‘are by their very nature conscious, 
intentional or volitional acts’.118  
Thus, ‘intent’ is more than mere knowledge that something is likely to occur. ‘Intent’ means a 
deliberate act, done with knowledge that the intended consequence of that act will occur or is a 
virtual certainty.  
3.5.1  Ultra vires acts 
The question then arises as to whether, according to the ‘shared unlawful purpose’ formula, a state 
should be responsible for acts of the armed group that go beyond the scope of the agreement? As 
stated above, for the ICTY in Tadic, a state that exercises overall control over an armed group 
should be responsible for the latter’s ultra vires acts.119 However, the answer to this question is not 
straightforward.  
 
In the context of the requisite level of a state’s ‘knowledge’ for the purposes of engaging that state’s 
responsibility for complicity in the internationally wrongful acts of another state, Lowe has argued 
that, 
 
…as a matter of general legal principle States must be supposed to intend the foreseeable 
consequences of their acts. The fact that the unlawful conduct is foreseen, or foreseeable, 
as a sufficiently probable consequence of the assistance must surely suffice’.120 
 
If this reasoning is applied to cases of shared unlawful purpose, a state must be supposed to intend 
the unlawful acts of the armed group that are beyond the scope of the common plan but 
nevertheless foreseeable. As argued in chapter 2 with respect to the attribution of ultra vires acts of 
an armed group acting on the instructions of the state,121 there is an inherent risk in the use of a 
proxy that the proxy will go beyond the scope of the state’s (lawful) instructions. There is little 
reason why a state should not bear responsibility for taking that risk. It may also be argued that 
 
117 ILC Report 1996, Vol.II(2); Bosnia Genocide, §186. 
118 Ibid, p.44 §5. 
119 Definition of ‘overall control’ in Tadic, §121. See above section 3.3. 
120 Lowe (2002) p.8. 
121 Section 2.4.2. 
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the state should not evade responsibility for genocide committed by an armed group under its 
overall control in circumstances where the common plan was that the armed group should 
summarily execute a group of civilians, if the commission of genocide is foreseeable.  
 
But this reasoning is problematic in circumstances where the common plan is to commit a specific 
unlawful act, and not unlawful acts generally. If the state will be responsible for genocide 
committed by an armed group that is beyond the scope of the agreement between the two, but is 
nevertheless foreseeable, then the only normative distinction between state responsibility for the 
ultra vires acts of its agents acting under the state’s ‘effective control’ and state responsibility for 
persons acting under the state’s ‘overall control’ in cases of shared unlawful purpose is the level of 
control exercised over the group. In effect, we return to the application of the test as formulated 
in Tadic and rejected by the ICJ in Bosnia Genocide. 
 
Therefore, the ‘shared unlawful purpose’ formula raises important questions concerning the 
attribution of ultra vires acts to which there is no clear answer. Moreover, it is questionable whether 
applying the overall control test in cases of shared unlawful purpose would in fact provide a less 
rigid approach than the effective control test, as intended by its proponents.122  It is highly unlikely 
that a shared unlawful purpose would be documented. As the facts and determination of the ICJ 
in Bosnia Genocide show, even if a state was in ‘a position of influence over [the armed group]… 
owing to the strength of political, military and financial links’,123 absent documentary evidence of 
the object and purpose of a specific military operation, proving a state’s actual knowledge of the 
armed group’s plan to carry out an unlawful act (in that case genocide) will be difficult, if not 
impossible. Proving a state that exercises overall control over the group intends for that group to 
commit a specific unlawful act will be even more difficult. This is particularly so given the 
likelihood that the ICJ would likely require the same high standard of proof - a ‘beyond any doubt’ 
standard – as it did to prove complicity in genocide.124  In practice one evidentially unattainable 
threshold, effective control, is replaced with another, intent to achieve a specific outcome.  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
The high threshold tests of ‘complete dependence’ and ‘effective control’ mean that a state that 
provides substantial support to an armed group will not incur international responsibility for the 
 
122 Cf. Trapp (2011), pp.44-45. 
123 Bosnia Genocide, §434. 
124 Ibid, §422. 
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conduct of that armed group if the latter retains some measure of decision-making independence. 
However, despite the legitimate concern that the current regime is too lenient on states, or raises 
the evidential bar too high, there is little sign that the ICJ will diverge from these tests. Legal 
arguments in favour of lowering the threshold of control from effective to overall control, such 
as those made by the ICTY in Tadic, are not persuasive and find little support in jurisprudence or 
state practice. As a matter of policy, there is some merit in the argument that lowering the required 
level of state control to overall control would result in the appropriate legal condemnation of state 
sponsorship of terrorism and other unlawful acts. However, the test would introduce a fault 
element to Article 8 ARS - the intention to achieve a shared unlawful purpose - that itself would 
be difficult to satisfy. Thus, it is doubtful that applying the overall control test in cases of shared 
unlawful purpose would in fact respond to the particularities of state-sponsored terrorism, 
genocide, or other unlawful acts. 
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Chapter 4. Primary Obligations of States: Certain Prohibitions of Complicit Conduct 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In response to the argument, considered in chapter 3, that the rules of attribution should be 
modified, some have questioned whether this is necessary in light of customary and treaty-based 
norms that prohibit states from encouraging or facilitating non-state actors from committing 
certain acts. It is argued that these primary obligations of states are sufficient to cover state 
complicity in terrorism and international crime.1 These arguments, and the extent to which a state’s 
primary obligations are sufficient to ‘catch’ the wrong committed by states that use proxies in order 
to evade their international obligations are the subject of this chapter. 
 
As the following analysis will show, the answer to the question whether a state’s primary 
obligations are sufficient to address state complicity in unlawful acts will depend on the 
circumstances in which the specific act is committed, the applicable international legal framework, 
and the nature of the obligation. Section 4.2 considers the nature of a state’s obligations to prevent 
and punish unlawful acts by non-state actors. It is argued that a state’s obligations to prevent and 
punish the crime of genocide and terrorist acts do not provide an adequate or appropriate basis 
for the legal condemnation of the provision of substantial support and assistance to armed groups 
that falls short of the exercise of effective control over the specific operation in which the unlawful 
act is committed. However, a different conclusion is drawn when the question is framed in terms 
of a state’s primary obligations under IHL and IHRL. In section 4.3 it is argued that the findings 
of the ICJ in Nicaragua and DRC v Uganda support an interpretation of a state’s obligation to respect 
and ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions, as provided by Article 1 common to the 
Conventions (CA1), to include an obligation not to encourage, aid or assist violations of IHL by 
an armed group participating in an armed conflict.2 Similarly, in section 4.4 it is shown that 
international human rights tribunals and UN human rights monitoring mechanisms have 
developed lex specialis rules that prohibit a state from facilitating the commission of human rights 
abuses by non-state actors.  Thus, state complicity in the commission of violations of IHL and 
 
1 Boon (2014) pp.373-375; Crawford (2013), p.158; Milanovic (2009) p. 322.  
2 Nicaragua, §256. See also Rule 144, ICRC Customary IHL Database states that ‘States may not encourage violations 
of international humanitarian law by parties to an armed conflict. They must exert their influence, to the degree 
possible, to stop violations of international humanitarian law’; ICRC Commentary to Geneva Conventions (2016), 
Common Article 1, §154. 
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IHRL, as opposed to specific international crimes or terrorist acts, may be covered by these lex 
specialis primary obligations of states. However, these rules do not provide a comprehensive 
approach to state complicity in the unlawful acts of armed groups. For example, a state’s 
obligations under IHRL are only engaged with respect to territory or persons within the state’s 
jurisdiction. Therefore, these rules will not apply to cases where a state is complicit in human rights 
violations committed by armed groups in areas outside the state’s jurisdiction, for example a third 
state.3 Nevertheless, these lex specialis rules provide the seed for a more general rule of state 
responsibility for complicity in unlawful acts committed by armed groups. The case for the 
formulation of this general rule is considered in chapter 5. 
 
4.2  The Obligation to Prevent the Commission of Certain Unlawful Acts 
States are subject to a number of customary and treaty-based norms that require them to take 
measures to prevent the commission of certain unlawful acts by non-state actors. As a rule of 
customary international law, a state is under a duty to prevent injury to aliens within its jurisdiction,4 
and to not knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states.5 
 
Similar obligations arise out of a number of international instruments according to which states 
undertake to prevent the commission of certain acts within the state’s jurisdiction. Such acts 
include, inter alia, acts of torture,6 financing of terrorism,7 the bombing or attempted bombing of 
public spaces and infrastructure, state or governmental facilities,8  the possession of radioactive 
material with the intent to cause serious injury or death,9 hostage taking,10 and the hijacking of 
ships.11 The treaty provisions providing for the obligation to prevent apartheid,12 genocide,13 and 
 
3 The principle of non-refoulement is an exception. A state that transfers or allows the transfer of a person into 
another jurisdiction where there is a real risk that the person will be subjected to torture or a flagrant violation of 
other specific human rights will violate its obligation to respect and ensure the right in question. For further 
discussion see section 3.4 below.  
4 British Claims in Spanish Morocco, p.642. 
5 Island of Palmas, p.839; Corfu Channel, p.22. 
6 Articles 2 CAT. 
7 Articles 18 Financing Convention. 
8 Articles 15 Bombing Convention. 
9 Articles 7 Nuclear Terrorism Convention. 
10 Articles 4 Hostages Convention. 
11 Article 13 SUA Convention. 
12 Article IV Apartheid Convention. 
13 Article 1 Genocide Convention. 
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the hijacking of civilian aircraft14 do not expressly limit the obligation to acts committed within the 
state’s jurisdiction.  These specific obligations to prevent certain acts are in addition to a state’s 
obligations under IHL15 and IHRL16 that require the state to prevent acts that violate the rights 
and protections guaranteed to individuals under those legal regimes.  
 
There is no general legal framework that governs when the obligation to prevent will arise and the 
content of that obligation.17 The content of the obligation may vary depending on the specific 
treaty or legal regime applicable to the facts of any given situation.18 It is generally considered to 
be a due diligence obligation, compliance with which is to be assessed in light of the circumstances 
existing at the relevant time. Thus, the HRCttee has stated that a state must ‘take appropriate 
measures [and] exercise due diligence’ to prevent violations of the ICCPR.19  The ICRC’s 2016 
Commentary to CA1 advises that states ‘must take all appropriate measures to prevent’ violations 
of the Conventions, and that states ‘have some latitude in choosing the measures by which to 
ensure respect for the Conventions, as long as these are adequate to achieve the desired result’.20   
In Tehran Hostages, in the context of Iran’s failure to protect the US Embassy in Tehran from 
intrusion by militants and the resulting hostage-taking of the embassy staff by those militants, the 
ICJ held that Iran was in violation of the obligation to protect under the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations 196121 in circumstances where (i) it was aware of its obligations and of the 
urgent need for action, (ii) had the means at its disposal to take ‘appropriate steps’,22 to protect 
persons from harm, and (iii) ‘completely failed’ to do so.23 
 
In Bosnia Genocide the ICJ took a strict approach, holding that ‘it is irrelevant whether the State 
whose responsibility is in issue claims, or even proves, that even if it had employed all means 
 
14 Article 9 Hague Hijacking Convention. 
15 E.g. Common Article 1 to GCs; Article 1(1) API; Article 38(1) CRC: “State Parties undertake to respect and 
ensure respect for the rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in armed conflicts which are 
relevant to the child”; Article 1(1) APIII. 
16 Article 2(1) ICCPR; Article 1 ECHR; Article 1(1) ACHR; Article 1 ACHPR; Article 3(1) Arab Charter.  
17 Hakimi (2010) p.344. 
18 Ibid. Bosnia Genocide, §429. 
19 HRCttee, General Comment no.31, §8.   
20 ICRC Commentary of 2016, common Article 1, §§145-146. See generally Kalshoven (1999); Geiss (2015). 
21 Articles 22(2), 25-27 & 29. 
22 Article 22(2) Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations requires the receiving state to “take all appropriate steps” 
to protect the premises of the mission and prevent attacks on the mission. 
23 Tehran Hostages, §68. 
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reasonably at its disposal, they would not have sufficed to prevent the commission of genocide.’24 
This strict approach is tempered by the requirement that it must be shown that the state ‘manifestly 
failed to take all measures to prevent genocide that were within its power’.25   Nevertheless, a state 
is required to take any and every measure available to it, however small, taking into consideration 
the measures that other states might employ in their best efforts to prevent the genocide.26  
4.2.1 Exercise of Jurisdiction  
With the exception of the obligation to prevent genocide,27 a state’s obligation to take appropriate 
measures to prevent the commission of harmful acts by non-state actors is generally understood 
to be limited to persons or entities acting within the state’s jurisdiction.28 Jurisdiction is understood 
to be primarily territorial, but a state may also exercise jurisdiction over an area outside its own 
territory over which it exercises effective control.29 Therefore, as a general rule, a state’s obligation 
to prevent is not an open-ended obligation to prevent the particular act wherever it may occur. 
The obligation tends to be focused on areas in which the state has the ability to act because of its 
effective control over the area by virtue of the presence of its organs or agents in that area.30 Thus, 
in DRC v Uganda having concluded that Uganda was the occupying power in Ituri, the ICJ held 
that, ‘Uganda’s responsibility is engaged… for any lack of vigilance in preventing violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law by other actors present in the occupied territory, 
including rebel groups acting on their own account’.31 However, in areas of DRC not occupied by 
Uganda the latter’s obligation to prevent violations of IHL was not engaged with respect to armed 
groups not acting on its behalf. In these areas Uganda was only responsible for acts and omissions 
of its own military forces.32  
 
 
24 Bosnia Genocide, §430. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 See section 3.2.4. 
28 DRC v Uganda, §179: ‘The Court, having concluded that Uganda was an occupying power in Ituri, finds that 
Uganda’s responsibility its engaged… for any lack of vigilance in preventing violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law by other actors present in the occupied territory, including rebel groups acting on 
their own account’. 
29 Wall Advisory Opinion, §109. For discussion of the meaning of ‘jurisdiction’ for the purposes of IHRL see below 
section 4.4.  
30 The importance of control over territory by a State as a basis for triggering that State’s international obligations 
with respect to acts committed or occurring in that territory was stressed by the ICJ in Namibia, p.54 §118: ‘Physical 
control of a territory and not sovereignty or legitimacy of title is the basis of State liability for acts affecting other 
States’. Also, ILC Report (1975), p.92 §4. 
31 DRC v Uganda, §179. 
32 Ibid, §180. 
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4.2.2 Obligation to Prevent Genocide: ‘Capacity to Influence’  
Unlike the treaty obligations cited above33 Article I of the Genocide Convention does not expressly 
provide any territorial or jurisdictional limit on the scope of the obligation,34 and the ICJ did not 
choose to imply one.  Instead the ICJ formulated the vague ‘capacity to influence’ criterion to 
determine whether a state has fulfilled its obligation to prevent genocide.35 The state’s capacity to 
influence will depend upon the geographical distance of the state from the place where the 
genocide is taking place or will take place, and the strength of political and other links between the 
state and the main actors in events.36 As Milanovic has observed, this makes the obligation to 
prevent genocide ‘vastly different from other due diligence obligations’ that are generally 
considered to be dependent upon the exercise of jurisdiction.37  
The ICJ’s introduction of the ‘capacity to influence’ criterion is controversial. Judge Skotnikov 
criticised the majority for its introduction of ‘a politically appealing, but legally vague, indeed, 
hardly measurable at all in legal terms, concept of a duty to prevent with the essential element of 
control being replaced with a highly subjective notion of influence’.38 Judge Tomka referred to the 
arguments of FRY and Bosnia39 that, respectively: (i) the obligation will only be engaged where the 
state has territorial jurisdiction or control over the areas in which the genocide is said to have taken 
place,40 or (ii) that the obligation is not territorially limited, but the state at the least must ‘exercise 
powers, functions, or activities’ in the territory concerned.41 For Judge Tomka, the dictum of the 
Court in its judgment on Preliminary Objections, that the obligation to prevent ‘is not territorially 
limited by the Convention’42 ‘has to be interpreted in a reasonable way’:43  
The State does have an obligation to prevent genocide outside its territory to the extent that it 
exercises jurisdiction outside its territory, or exercises control over certain persons in their activities 
 
33 Section 3.2, fn.19-25. 
34 Pursuant to Article I Genocide Convention the Contracting Parties ‘confirm that genocide… is a crime under 
international law, which they undertake to prevent and to punish’. 
35 Bosnia Genocide, §430. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Milanovic (2007) p.685.  
38 Bosnia Genocide, Declaration of Judge Skotnikov, p.340. 
39 Ibid, Separate Opinion of Judge Tomka, §§63-64. 
40 Ibid, CR 2006/16, pp.15&19. 
41 Ibid, CR 2006/34, p.7. 
42 Bosnia Genocide, Preliminary Objections (1996), §31 referring to the erga omnes nature of the rights and obligations 
enshrined by the Genocide Convention. 
43 Bosnia Genocide, Separate Opinion of Judge Tomka, §65 
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abroad. This obligation exists in addition to the unequivocal duty to prevent the commission of 
genocide within its territory.44 
The scope of the ‘capacity to influence’ criterion, that may be triggered by a state’s ‘political or 
other links’ to the perpetrators of genocide,45 is potentially far-reaching. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that the Court stressed that it did not purport to establish general jurisprudence 
applicable to the obligation to prevent arising out of specific treaty regimes or legally binding 
norms.46 Nevertheless, the Court’s order granting provisional measures in Georgia v Russia that 
‘both Parties… shall do all in their power, whenever and wherever possible, to ensure’ the rights 
of individuals under Article 5 CERD indicates that the Court may be willing to apply the criterion 
to other specific obligations that are not territorially or jurisdictionally limited by express treaty 
provision.47  
 
Moreover, the dicta of the ICJ in Bosnia Genocide with respect to the nature and content of the 
obligation to prevent genocide has been drawn upon by the ICRC in its 2016 Commentary to the 
Geneva Conventions to explain the nature and content of a state’s due diligence obligations 
pursuant to CA1.48 In the ICRC’s view, a due diligence obligation similar to that provided by 
Article 1 of the Genocide Convention exists in IHL. For the ICRC, the extent to which a state has 
fulfilled its duty to exercise due diligence to bring violations of IHL to an end and to prevent the 
occurrence of violations of IHL by a party to the conflict will depend on the circumstances 
including (i) the gravity of the breach, (ii) the means reasonably available to the state, and (iii) the 
degree of influence it exercises over those responsible for the breach.49 Thus, the ICRC’s 
interpretation of the scope of a state’s due diligence obligations untethers the obligation to prevent 
violations of IHL from the existence of jurisdiction over territory. 
 
However, it remains unclear as to how and when a state’s obligation to exercise due diligence to 
prevent violations of IHL, or the commission of genocide, will be engaged. One interpretation of 
the context-specific approach adopted by the ICRC is that a state that has extensive global military, 
economic and political influence might incur greater obligations pursuant to CA1 than a state that 
 
44 Ibid, §67. 
45 Bosnia Genocide, §430. 
46 Ibid, §429. 
47 Georgia v Russia, Provisional Measures, §149. 
48 ICRC Commentary to Geneva Conventions (2016), Common Article 1, §§164-166.  
49 Ibid, §164. Also, Geiss (2015), p.123; Hathaway et al (2017) pp.573-574. 
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does not.50 The same interpretation applies to a state’s due diligence obligations pursuant to the 
Genocide Convention.51 At the least a state’s due diligence obligations pursuant to CA1 and the 
Genocide Convention will be engaged if that state provides military, financial or other support to 
an armed group that is participating in an armed conflict in another state. The provision of such 
support in and of itself suggests a capacity to influence.52  In this way, the obligation to prevent 
genocide requires a state to employ all its available resources, ‘within the limits permitted by 
international law’.53 What amounts to ‘available resources’ will depend upon the circumstances of 
each case. Moreover, the nature of available resources will differ according to the political, 
diplomatic and economic capacity of the state.54  
 
4.2.3 Distinction between failing to prevent and complicity 
A state’s obligation to prevent the commission of harmful acts by non-state actors is not adequate 
to address the problem of state complicity in the unlawful acts of armed groups. A state that fails 
to prevent an act is not responsible for the act of the armed group or for any deliberate 
involvement it had in the commission of the act. The question whether or not the state’s own acts 
or omissions in fact contributed to the violation of international law is not determinative of a 
finding that a state failed to exercise due diligence. With respect to the obligation to prevent 
genocide, the question is whether ‘the State manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent 
genocide which were within its power, and which might have contributed to preventing genocide’.55  
Thus, the activities of the armed group merely provide the objective circumstances which give rise 
to the state’s international obligations and the breach thereof by the state’s organs. What is 
important is whether the state did all it could, in the circumstances existing at the time, to prevent 
or ensure respect for the rule of international law in question.56 A state that, in full knowledge of 
an armed group’s plans to commit violations of international law, deliberately does nothing to try 
 
50 Hathaway et al (2017) p.573. 
51 Milanovic (2007) p.686. 
52 E.g. Bosnia Genocide, §434: ‘The Court would first note that, during the period under consideration, the FRY was in 
a position of influence over the Bosnian Serbs who devised and implemented the genocide in Srebrenica, unlike that 
of any of the other States parties to the Genocide Convention owing to the strength of the political, military and 
financial links between the FRY on the one hand and the Republika Srpska and the VRS on the other, which, 
though somewhat weaker than in the preceding period, none- the less remained very close.’ See also Corten & 
Koutroulis (2013), pp86-87. 
53 Bosnia Genocide, §430. 
54 Milanovic (2007) p.686 who compares the obligation to that which arise under treaties providing for socio-
economic rights, ‘which are supposed to be realized gradually, to the maximum of a state’s available resources’. 
55 Bosnia Genocide, §430. 
56 E.g. DRC v Uganda, §211; Bosnia Genocide, §430. 
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to prevent the armed group from doing so is held responsible on the same terms as a state that 
negligently failed to employ all means at its disposal to prevent such acts. Yet, it is highly likely that 
the provision of lethal, financial or other support to an armed group or the deliberate failure to 
prevent an armed group from carrying out certain operations in an area under the state’s 
jurisdiction, will contribute to the commission of international crimes and other violations of 
international law by that group.  
 
In Bosnia Genocide the ICJ determined that ‘the obligation to prevent genocide necessarily implies 
the prohibition of the commission of genocide’, including complicity in genocide.57 The Court 
reasoned that such a prohibition flowed from the designation of genocide as ‘a crime under 
international law’,58 and the obligation to prevent acts of genocide.59 For the Court, ‘by agreeing to 
such a categorization [as an international crime], the States parties must logically be undertaking 
not to commit the act so described’.60 Moreover,  
It would be paradoxical if States were thus under an obligation to prevent, so far as within their 
power, commission of genocide by persons over whom they have a certain influence, but were not 
forbidden to commit such acts through their own organs, or persons over whom they have such 
firm control that their conduct is attributable to the State concerned under international law. In 
short, the obligation to prevent genocide necessarily implies the prohibition of the commission of 
genocide.61  
Accordingly, the Court held that States Parties to the Genocide Convention are ‘bound not to 
commit genocide, through the actions of their organs or persons or groups whose acts are 
attributable to them, and any other acts enumerated in Article III’, namely: conspiracy to commit 
genocide; incitement of genocide; attempted genocide; and complicity in genocide.62  
 
The ICJ’s conclusion that the obligation to prevent genocide ‘necessarily implies’ the prohibition 
on the commission of acts of genocide, including the prohibition of state complicity in genocide, 
should be not interpreted to mean that the requirements for finding a state responsible for violating 
 
57 Bosnia Genocide, p§166. For further discussion see chapter 5, 5.6.1. Crawford (2013), p.158; Cf. Boon (2014) 
pp.373-375. 
58 Article 1 Genocide Convention. 
59 Bosnia Genocide, §166. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Bosnia Genocide, §167. Also §179; Article III(a)-(e) Genocide Convention. 
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the respective obligations are the same. The Court stressed that the differences between a failure 
to prevent genocide and complicity in genocide ‘are so significant as to make it impossible to treat 
the two types of violation in the same way’.63 First, 
 
…complicity always requires that some positive action has been taken to furnish aid or 
assistance to the perpetrators of the genocide, while a violation of the obligation to prevent 
results from mere failure to adopt and implement suitable measures to prevent genocide 
from being committed.64 
 
Second, the notion of complicity in the commission of genocide requires a deliberate act:65  
 
…there cannot be a finding of complicity against a State unless at the least its organs were 
aware that genocide was about to be committed or was under way, and if the aid and 
assistance supplied, from the moment they became so aware onwards, to the perpetrators 
of the criminal acts or to those who were on the point of committing them, enabled or 
facilitated the commission of the acts. In other words, an accomplice must have given 
support in perpetrating the genocide with full knowledge of the facts. By contrast, a State 
may be found to have violated its obligation to prevent even though it had no certainty, at 
the time when it should have acted, but failed to do so, that genocide was about to be 
committed or was under way; for it to incur responsibility on this basis it is enough that 
the State was aware, or should normally have been aware, of the serious danger that acts 
of genocide would be committed.66 
 
Thus, the ICJ identified the key normative difference between the failure to prevent genocide and 
complicity in genocide – the level of knowledge of the state. In order to prove state complicity in 
genocide it must be shown that the state provided military, financial or other support, in the 
knowledge that that support would ‘enable or facilitate’ the perpetration of genocide. The Court’s 
 
63 Ibid, §432. 
64 Ibid. For the approach of human rights courts to a state’s obligation to prevent violations of the rights guaranteed 
under the relevant human rights treaty see for example: IACtHR, Velasquez Rodriguez Case, §172; Gonzalez et al 
(‘Cotton Field’) v Mexico, §243; ACiHPR Association of Victims of Post Electoral Violence and INTERIGHTS v Cameroon, 25 
November 2009, §115; ECtHR, Ilascu & Ors v Moldova and Russia, §313. Also, HRCttee, General Comment no. 31, 
§8. 
65 See chapter 5, 5.3.2 for discussion of the dicta of the ICJ in Bosnia Genocide that failing to prevent entails an omission 
whereas complicity requires a positive act. 
66 Bosnia Genocide, §432. 
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approach to the question of state complicity in genocide, and the issues that arise out of requiring 
proof of a state’s ‘knowledge’, will be considered in chapter 5. By contrast, the test for engaging a 
state’s responsibility for its failure to prevent genocide is less strict and is therefore easier to prove: 
it only requires proof that, in the circumstances existing at the time, the state should have been 
aware that there was a danger the armed group would commit genocide.  
 
As noted above, the Court was not purporting to pronounce on a general rule of international law. 
It is therefore not certain whether the Court would also find the obligation to prevent a specific 
act that arises out of other treaty provision will ‘necessarily imply’ a prohibition of the commission 
of that act by the state.67 On the other hand, given the Court’s adoption of a common-sense 
interpretation of the obligation to prevent genocide, it is difficult to see on what basis the 
obligation to prevent genocide and the obligation to prevent acts of terrorism or other offences 
may be interpreted differently. Thus, in its application instituting proceedings in the ICJ against 
Russia, Ukraine relies upon the obligation to prevent the financing of terrorism under Article 18 
of the Terrorist Financing Convention to argue that ‘in defiance of its international obligations, 
the Russian Federation actively finances terrorist acts on the territory of Ukraine’.68 
 
4.3  Obligation to Respect and Ensure Respect for International Humanitarian Law 
Pursuant to CA1, and as a general principle of IHL,69 State Parties to the Geneva Conventions are 
under an obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL in all circumstances.70 The obligation 
consists of positive and negative obligations. The state must refrain from violating IHL, and must 
take positive steps to prevent violations where there is a foreseeable risk that they will be 
committed71  and to ensure that other parties to an armed conflict comply with the Geneva 
Conventions.72 Pursuant to CA1, a state is required to ensure respect for IHL by all persons within 
the state’s jurisdiction, including armed groups.73 Accordingly, the obligation ‘applies to and is 
activated by any private activity that impairs the enjoyment of the protections granted by the 
 
67 For further discussion see chapter 5, 5.6.1 
68 Ukraine v Russia, Application instituting proceedings, 16 January 2017, §125. 
69 Nicaragua, §220. 
70 The obligation is reaffirmed by Article 1(1) API; Article 38(1) CRC: “State Parties undertake to respect and ensure 
respect for the rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in armed conflicts which are relevant to 
the child”; and Article 1(1) APIII. 
71 ICRC Commentary to Geneva Conventions (2016), Common Article 1, §164. 
72 Ibid, §§153-156. 
73 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference at Geneva, 1949, Vol II-B, p.53. 
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Geneva Conventions’.74 Importantly, a state is under the obligation to ensure respect for IHL ‘in 
all circumstances’. ‘In all circumstances’ is intended to reinforce the principle that the obligation 
applies in peacetime and not only in armed conflict.75 
 
This section will focus on a state’s negative obligations arising out of the requirement to ensure 
respect for IHL by other parties to an armed conflict and the extent to which, pursuant to this 
obligation, states are prohibited from ‘encouraging’, ‘aiding or assisting’ in the commission of 
violations of IHL by parties to a conflict.76  
 
4.3.1  The ‘external dimension’  
The ‘unique nature’ of CA1 is its ‘external dimension’ that extends a state’s obligation to ensure 
respect for the Geneva Conventions beyond persons within the state’s jurisdiction to other states 
and parties participating in armed conflicts to which the state is not a party.77 This external 
dimension means that the obligation to ‘ensure respect’ for the Conventions not only applies to 
persons in the state’s jurisdiction, but extends to armed forces of other parties, including non-state 
armed groups.78 Thus, Boutruche and Sassoli claim that CA1 ‘serves as a basis for third States to 
adopt measures to induce compliance by Parties to an armed conflict in which the third States are 
not involved’.79  
 
It is generally accepted that the drafters of the Geneva Conventions did not intend this external 
dimension to CA1.80  The record of the Diplomatic Conference in 1949 indicates that the intention 
was to extend the undertaking to ensure respect for the Conventions to all persons within the 
state’s jurisdiction so as to cover parties to an internal armed conflict.81 However the principle has 
 
74 Geiss (2015) p.118. 
75 Kalshoven (1999) p.9; ICRC Commentary to Geneva Conventions (2016), Common Article 1, §127. 
76 ICRC Commentary to Geneva Conventions (2016), Common Article 1, §154. 
77 Geiss (2015) p.121; Boutruche & Sassoli (2016) p.9.  
78 ICRC Commentary to Geneva Conventions (2016), Common Article 1, §120. Also, Pictet (ed.), Commentary of 
1952, p.26. Also, Nicaragua, §220. 
79 Boutruche & Sassoli (2016) p.2. 
80 Geiss (2015) p.121; Boutruche & Sassoli (2016) p.9.  
81 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference at Geneva, 1949, Vol II-B, p.53; Wall Advisory Opinion, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Koojimans, §47. 
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been developed through practice82 and the jurisprudence of the ICJ83 subsequent to the 
Conventions coming into force.84 The external dimension to CA1 was recognised by the ICJ in 
Nicaragua,85 with respect to the duty to ensure respect for IHL by armed groups, and in Wall 
Advisory Opinion with respect to the duty to ensure respect for IHL by other states.86   
 
According to the ICRC’s 2016 Commentary to CA1, the obligation to ensure respect for IHL 
includes a negative obligation not to encourage, aid or assist in violations of IHL.87 This obligation 
is additional to specific treaty obligations according to which states undertake not to use the 
weapons prohibited by the treaty and to never assist, encourage or induce any person to engage in 
activities act contrary to the particular treaty.88 The ‘external dimension’ to CA1 means that the 
obligation not to encourage, aid or assist in violations of IHL will apply to conduct committed 
outside the state’s jurisdiction.  
 
4.3.2  Encouragement 
The ICRC bases its analysis on the approach of the ICJ in Nicaragua in which the Court held the 
United States responsible for encouraging violations of IHL by the contras. According to the ICJ, 
a state will encourage violations of IHL if ‘the encouragement was offered to persons in 
circumstances where the commission of such acts was likely or foreseeable.’89 In that case the 
 
82 E.g. Resolution XXIII, ‘Human Rights in Armed Conflicts’, adopted by the International Conference on Human 
Rights, Tehran, 1968 in which the conference confirms the principle with respect to confirmation extends to 
obligation to ensure respect of IHL by other states; 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and the Red 
Crescent, Geneva, 2007, Resolution III, ‘Reaffirmation and implementation of international humanitarian law: 
Preserving Human Life and Dignity in Armed Conflict’, §2. 
83 Nicaragua, §220; Wall Advisory Opinion, §159. 
84 Geiss (2015) p.121; Boutruche & Sassoli (2016) p.9.  
85 Nicaragua, §220.  
86 Wall Advisory Opinion, §159. That CA1 requires states to ensure respect for the Conventions by another state was 
doubted by Judges Koojimans and Higgins in Separate Opinions in the Advisory Opinion. For Judge Koojimans the 
obligation on extended to the population under the state’s jurisdiction, and so to internal armed conflicts, and not to 
third states:  Separate Opinion of Judge Koojimans, §47; Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, §39. See also General 
Assembly Resolutions 58/97 (2003) §3 and 59/122 (2004) §3. Security Council Resolution 681(1990) ‘On the 
Question of Palestine’, §5 calling upon all High Contracting Parties to GCIV ‘to continue to exert all efforts to 
ensure respect for its provisions by Israel’ 
87 ICRC Commentary to Geneva Conventions (2016), Article 1 Common to GCs, §158. Also, Geiss (2015) p.121. 
This is a new addition to the Commentary to CA1. ICRC’s 1956 Commentary does not consider the content of CA1 
in any detail.  
88 E.g. Article 1(1)(c) Anti-Personnel Mines Convention; Article 1(c) Cluster Munitions Convention; Article 1(d) 
Chemical Weapons Convention. 
89 Nicaragua, §256. See also Rule 144, ICRC Customary IHL Database which states that ‘States may not encourage 
violations of international humanitarian law by parties to an armed conflict. They must exert their influence, to the 
degree possible, to stop violations of international humanitarian law’; ICRC Commentary to Geneva Conventions 
(2016), Common Article 1, §154. 
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publication and supply to the contras of a manual titled ‘Psychological Operations in Guerrilla 
Warfare’90 by the CIA was held to amount to ‘encouragement’ to commit violations of IHL 
contrary to CA1 and common Article 3 (CA3) of the Geneva Conventions.91 The manual provided 
advice on how to neutralise ‘carefully selected and planned’ civilian targets in order to ‘take part in 
the act and formulate accusations against the oppressor’.92  The Court did not determine that the 
publication and dissemination of the manual was unlawful per se, despite its content being in clear 
contradiction to the rules of IHL. However, finding that those responsible for distributing the 
manual were aware of accusations that the contras had violated IHL, the Court held that,  
 
[t]he publication and dissemination of a manual in fact containing the advice quoted above 
must therefore be regarded as an encouragement, which is likely to be effective, to commit 
acts contrary to general principles of international humanitarian law reflected in treaties.93  
 
Thus, for the purposes IHL, ‘encouragement’ will only be proven if it is established that (i) the act 
of the state is capable of encouraging violations of IHL and (ii) the encouragement is likely to be 
effective. Importantly, it appears that there is no requirement that the state in fact encourages 
violations of IHL.  
 
4.3.3  Aid or assistance  
The ICRC 2016 Commentary states that ‘it would be contradictory if common Article 1 obliged 
the High Contracting Parties to ‘respect and ensure respect’ by their own armed forces while 
allowing them to contribute to violations by other parties to a conflict’.94 Thus, for the ICRC, the 
prohibition of aid or assistance of violations of IHL is inherent in the negative obligation to refrain 
from certain conduct arising out of CA1. This common-sense interpretation of CA1 is similar to 
the interpretation of the obligation to prevent genocide adopted by the ICJ in Bosnia Genocide95that 
it would be ‘paradoxical’ if the obligation to prevent genocide did not necessarily imply a 
prohibition on states not to commit such acts.96  
 
90 This is despite the fact that Nicaragua had framed its claim in terms of international human rights law and not the 
laws of armed conflict. 
91 Nicaragua, §§255-256. This was followed by the ICJ in DRC v Uganda, §§209-211. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. Also DRC v Uganda, Mémoire de La Republique Démocratique du Congo, 6 Juillet 2000, 4.74 where the 
DRC uses the test in Nicaragua to submit that Uganda is responsible for encouragement where the encouragement 
was likely to be effective. 
94 ICRC Commentary to Geneva Conventions (2016), Article 1 Common to GCs, §158. 
95 Bosnia Genocide, §166. See above section 4.2.3.  
96 Ibid.  
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The ICRC’s interpretation of CA1 to include a prohibition of aid or assistance does not appear to 
be controversial.97 However, there is a lack of judicial consideration of the exact scope and content 
of the prohibition. In Nicaragua the ICJ found that ‘various forms of assistance provided to the 
contras by the United States have been crucial to the pursuit of their activities’.98 However, the 
Court confined its considerations to the United States’ responsibility for ‘encouragement’99 based 
on the state’s provision of the CIA manual, and not ‘aid or assistance’ by virtue of the provision 
of military, financial and other support to the contras more generally. In DRC v Uganda the ICJ again 
declined the opportunity to consider the content of the obligation not to aid or assistance in 
violations of IHL. The Court observed that there was persuasive evidence that land was seized 
from the Lendu with ‘the encouragement and military support of’ Ugandan soldiers.100 However, 
the Court did not address whether Uganda was in violation of a specific obligation not to aid or 
assist in violations of IHL.  
 
Therefore, questions remain as to scope and content of the obligation not to aid or assist violations 
of IHL. In particular, as the following analysis will show, questions arise as to the requisite degree 
of knowledge the state must have in order for it to be responsible for aiding or assisting in 
violations of IHL contrary to CA1.  
 
4.3.4  ‘Knowledge’ of the state  
According to the standard formulated by the ICJ in Nicaragua, a state’s responsibility for 
encouragement will turn on whether the violations of IHL by the armed group were likely or 
foreseeable. Knowledge of allegations that an armed group had previously committed violations 
of IHL would be sufficient to conclude that future violations of IHL by that group are foreseeable. 
The standard is one of constructive knowledge. The state must know, or should have known, that 
its conduct would encourage violations of IHL.  
 
However, with respect to the provision of aid or assistance, the ICRC 2016 Commentary states 
that proof of a state’s actual knowledge that its aid or assistance will be used in the commissions 
of violations of IHL is required. This is a higher standard of knowledge required than the 
 
97 Geiss (2015), p.130 referring to the principle as ‘widely accepted’ and ‘undisputed’. 
98 Ibid, §110. 
99 Nicaragua, §220. The ICRC Customary IHL Database also refers only to the prohibition of encouragement: See Rule 
144.  
100 Ibid, §209. 
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constructive knowledge standard required to prove ‘encouragement’. In the ICRC’s view, a state 
need not ‘intend’ its aid or assistance to facilitate in the commission of violations of IHL, provided 
that the state acted knowingly.101 The 2016 Commentary then states that CA1 will be violated if a 
state provides ‘[f]inancial, material or other support in the knowledge that such support will be 
used to commit violations of humanitarian law’.102 Therefore, the ICRC appears to define 
‘intention’ as acting in the knowledge that a particular outcome is virtually certain – violations of 
IHL. The ICRC Commentary seems contradictory. If a state, provides aid or assistance knowing 
it will be used by an armed group to commit violations of IHL, it is doubtful that there will be any 
circumstances in which a state will give that aid or assistance without ‘intending’ for it to be so 
used.103  
 
Certain international instruments and regulations that govern the transfer of arms require different 
levels of knowledge. For example, the Preamble to Arms Trade Treaty 2013 (ATT) expressly refers 
to the obligation to ensure respect for IHL and applies the same knowledge standard as the ICRC 
2016 Commentary. The Treaty, although not widely ratified,104 prohibits states from authorising 
the transfer of arms if the state ‘has knowledge at the time of authorization that those arms or 
items would be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as 
such, or other war crimes defined by international agreements to which it is a party’.105  
 
However, the EU Common Position governing control of exports of military technology and 
equipment applies a lower knowledge standard than that required by the ATT. EU Member States 
must deny an application for an export licence if approval would be inconsistent with the Member 
State’s international obligations. In particular, Member States should deny an export licence if there 
is a ‘clear risk that the military technology or equipment might be used for internal repression’.106 
 
101 ICRC Commentary to Geneva Conventions (2016), Common Article 1, §159. 
102 Ibid, §160. 
103 Crawford (2013), p.407. See chapter 5, 5,4 for further discussion of a state’s ‘knowledge’ for the purposes of state 
complicity in violations of international law. 
104 ATT is ratified by 95 and signed by 130 States (status on 21 February 2019). 
105 Article 6(3) ATT.  
106 Article 2, EU Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 on defining common rules 
governing control of exports of military technology and equipment.  For the purposes of the EU Common Position 
the definition of “internal repression” is focused on the conduct of the third state. ‘Internal repression’ includes inter 
alia torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, summary or arbitrary executions, 
disappearances, arbitrary detentions and other major violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set 
out in relevant international human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’: Ibid, Criterion 2(2)(b). 
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Thus, the state need not know that the arms will be used, only that there is a ‘clear risk’ the arms 
might be used for internal repression. This is a due diligence obligation. The reference to ‘clear 
risk’ requires the state to undertake a thorough inquiry into the recipient’s past and present record 
of violations of IHL and IHRL.107 States must also take into account the risk of the military 
technology or equipment being diverted to ‘terrorist organisations and to individual terrorists’.108 
 
The vetting by the United States of armed groups for the purposes of arming, training and 
deploying those groups to fight in the conflict in Syria indicates an acceptance, at least on the part 
of this state, of the obligation to ensure that such support is not provided to armed groups where 
there is a risk that the support will be used to violate IHL and IHRL.109 However, it is arguable 
that the United States’ policy is driven by political considerations rather than an understanding of 
the content of its obligation to ensure respect for IHL. In 2014 the Obama administration 
submitted a request to the US Congress to approve the training and equipping of vetted Syrian 
armed opposition groups in order to defend the Syrian people from attacks by the Syrian regime; 
facilitate the provision of essential services and stabilise territory controlled by the opposition; 
defend the US, its friends and allies, and Syrian people from the threats posed by terrorists in Syria; 
and promote the conditions for a negotiated settlement to end the conflict in Syria.110 In September 
2014 the request was amended to reflect the administration’s goal of combatting and defeating 
ISIL in the region.111 Congress approved the request to make funds available to provide training 
and equipment to ‘appropriately vetted’ persons with the aim of combatting ISIL and other 
terrorist organisations in Syria.112 According to the vetting requirements, the beneficiaries (a) must 
not be associated with terrorist groups or aligned with or support the Government of Syria and 
Iran, and (b) must have demonstrated a commitment to human rights, rule of law and ‘a peaceful 
and democratic Syria’.113  
 
107 User’s Guide to EU Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, §2.7. See also, R (Campaign on Arms Trade) v 
Secretary of State for International Trade [2017] H.R.L.R. 8, §27 in which the High Court of England and Wales held that 
the nature of the decision requires a ‘rigorous and intensive’ standard of review. 
108 Ibid, Criterion 7(e). 
109 Blanchard & Belasco (2015). See also with respect to the United Kingdom’s policy and practice: House of 
Commons Defence Committee, ‘UK military operations in Syria and Iraq: Second Report of 2016-17’ (2016) §95 
and ‘UK military operations in Syria and Iraq: Government Response to the Committee’s Second Report’ (2017) 
pp.5-6. 
110 Ibid, p.2. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid, p3. Sections 1209, 1510, and 1534, FY2015 National Defense Authorisation Act and Section 9016, FY2015 
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015. 
113 Ibid, Table 1; Section 1209 FY2015 National Defense Authorisation Act. 
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Thus, the principal concern appears to be that the beneficiary should not have any association with 
‘terrorist groups’ and armed groups whose purpose is contrary to the interests of the United States. 
The requirement that the beneficiaries must show a commitment to promoting human rights and 
the rule of law also suggests a concern that the United States should not assist, or be seen to assist, 
in violations of IHL and IHRL. In practice the programme was not deemed a success and resulted 
in the successful deployment of only ‘4 or 5’ of its graduates.114  In September 2015 it was reported 
that the second unit deployed by the United States into Syria of approximately 70 vetted fighters 
had immediately handed their weapons over to al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat Al-Nusra.115  
 
The United States’ experience shows the risk that a state’s assistance will be used for a purpose 
contrary to that for which it is intended is inherent in the use of a proxy. The United States appears 
to have acknowledged this risk and a requirement that, at the least, it must ensure that the 
beneficiaries of its train and equip programme are instructed in rules of engagement that comply 
with IHL. Despite the failure of the train and equip programme to in fact prevent the transfer of 
weapons to al-Qaeda affiliated armed groups, the United States can argue that it did everything it 
could to ensure respect for IHL by the programme’s beneficiaries and there was no foreseeable 
risk that its support would contribute to violations of IHL.  
 
Applying a constructive knowledge standard to the CA1 prohibition of aid or assistance will deter 
states from providing financing, military or other support to armed groups that have committed, 
and are likely to commit, violations of IHL, and thus ensure that states do not evade their 
obligations under IHL through use of a proxy. 
 
4.4  Obligation to Respect and Ensure Human Rights  
 
4.4.1  Jurisdiction and the Obligation to Prevent Rights-Violating Conduct 
A common feature to human rights treaties is the provision that a state’s obligation to refrain from 
committing violations of IHRL and to take measures to prevent human rights abuses by private 
actors will only be engaged with respect to acts occurring within the state’s jurisdiction.116 The 
 
114 Bulos, ‘US-trained Division 30 rebels ‘betray US and hand weapons over to al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria’, The 
Telegraph, 22 September 2015.  
115 Ibid.  
116 E.g. Article 2(1) ICCPR. See also Article 1 ECHR; Article 1(1) ACHR; and article 3(1) Arab Charter. The 
ACHPR is an exception. Article 1 ACHPR, pursuant to which State parties ‘shall recognize’ the rights and duties 
guaranteed by the Charter, and give effect to those rights, does not mention ‘jurisdiction’. In practice the ACiHPR 
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meaning of ‘jurisdiction’ for the purposes of IHRL, and in particular the circumstances under 
which a state will exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over an area or person, has occupied human 
rights bodies and tribunals, and the ECtHR in particular. However, the principles applied by the 
ECtHR to determine a state’s jurisdiction have not always been clear. This is in part due to the 
fact that the court has progressively developed its jurisprudence on a case-by-case basis.  However, 
it is possible to identify two models for jurisdiction adopted by the court, and by other human 
rights bodies: (i) the spatial model, based on a state’s effective control over an area; and (ii) the 
personal model, based on a state’s authority and control over the victim by the state organ or 
agent.117 A victim will not fall within the jurisdiction of the state simply by virtue of the fact that 
the rights-violating conduct is attributable to the state.118 
The HRCttee and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) have applied an 
additional model for jurisdiction, a functional or causation-based model, to the question of state 
responsibility for the failure to prevent significant transboundary environmental damage by 
corporations operating in the state’s jurisdiction that impacts on the rights of individuals outside 
of the state’s jurisdiction.119 According to the functional model, the scope of a state’s obligation to 
prevent rights-violating conduct is potentially very broad. The IACtHR has found that a state will 
be responsible where: (i) the authorities knew or should of known of a real and immediate risk to 
the life of individuals outside its jurisdiction; (ii) the state failed to take all appropriate measures 
within its power that could reasonably be expected to avoid that risk; and (ii) there is a causal link 
between the significant environmental damage and the violation of human rights outside the state’s 
jurisdiction.120 It is not clear whether the functional model will only apply in circumstances where 
an entity’s activities impact directly on certain fundamental rights, such as the right to life, or 
whether it is intended to apply to a broad range of human rights. Thus far, the HRCttee has 
 
has applied a State’s obligations under the ACHPR extra-territorially to areas under a state’s effective control. See 
ACiHPR Democratic Republic of Congo v Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. 
117 ECtHR Cyprus v Turkey, §81; Al Skeini v United Kingdom, §§133-140; HRCttee, General Comment No.31, §10. See 
generally Milanovic (2011), p.19; Milanovic and Papic (2018), p781.  
118 ECtHR Bankovic v Belgium, §75.  
119 HRCttee, General Comment no.36, §22 with respect to the right to life. The functional model is advocated for by 
Yuval Shany, Vice-Chair of the Human Rights Committee until 2020, in Shany (2013); Advisory Opinion Requested 
by Colombia, 15 November 2017 (IACtHR) with respect to environmental protection, the right to life and personal 
integrity. Also Brilman (2018).  
120 Advisory Opinion Requested by Colombia, 15 November, §120: [Author’s own translation] 
Para que surja esta obligación positiva, debe establecerse que: (i) al momento de los hechos las autoridades 
sabían o debían saber de la existencia de una situación de riesgo real e inmediato para la vida de un 
individuo o grupo de individuos determinados, y no tomaron las medidas necesarias dentro del ámbito de 
sus atribuciones que razonablemente podían esperarse para prevenir o evitar ese riesgo, y (ii) que existe una 
relación de causalidad entre la afectación a la vida o a la integridad y el daño significativo causado al medio 
ambiente.  
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confined its application to activities that have that have ‘a direct and reasonably foreseeable impact 
on the right to life’121 of persons outside of the state’s jurisdiction.122  
However, the content of the obligation to prevent engaged under the functional model is unclear. 
According to the HRCttee,  the question whether the state has fulfilled its obligation to prevent 
the activities of a corporation operating in the state’s jurisdiction from directly impacting on the 
enjoyment of the right to life extraterritorially will be determined according to whether the state 
has implemented effective measures to ensure that the corporation respects human rights 
standards when operating abroad, and the capacity of the state to effectively regulate the activities 
of the corporation.123  
The functional model has only been invoked with respect to transboundary environmental harm. 
However, it is arguable that the functional model should apply in circumstances where the state 
allows its territory to be used by an armed group to host training camps, the latter then crossing 
into another state’s territory to commit acts of terrorism or other violent acts that result in the 
killing of civilians and therefore the violation of the right to life.124 The armed group must be 
within the state’s jurisdiction in order for the state’s obligation to take appropriate measures to 
prevent the armed group from conducting activities abroad that are likely to impact on the 
enjoyment of human rights to be engaged. Such measures might include inter alia taking measures 
to suppress the activities of the armed group and to prevent the transfer of arms to the armed 
group.  
If the functional model defines the state’s obligation to prevent the harmful activities of armed 
groups, the implications for the state are potentially far-reaching. According to IHRL principles, 
if found responsible for failing to prevent the activities of armed groups on its territory from 
directly impacting on the violation of the rights of persons present in the territory of another state, 
 
121 HRCttee, General Comment no.36, §22. 
122 See also HRCttee, Yassin et al. v Canada, §6.5 concerning the responsibility of Canada ‘to ensure rights under the 
Covenant are not impaired by extraterritorial activities conducted by enterprises under its jurisdiction’ with respect to 
the Canadian-domiciled corporations’ participation in the building of Israeli settlements in Palestinian occupied 
territory. 
123 Ibid. The Committee considered that Canada was not in violation of its obligation to protect the rights of persons 
in Palestine’s occupied territories from the rights-violating activities of two corporations incorporated in Canada for 
tax reasons but holding no assets in the state’s jurisdiction.  
124 Milanovic (2019), pp23-24 for brief comment on the application of the functional model for jurisdiction with 
respect to the killing of the journalist Jamal Khashoggi on the premises of Saudi Arabia’s consulate in Istanbul, Turkey. 
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the state will be under an obligation to provide the victims with an effective remedy,125 which may 
include compensation. 
Nevertheless, the engagement of the state’s human rights obligations will still require a 
jurisdictional link, namely the effective control over territory in which the armed group is based. 
A state’s provision of financial, military or other support to an armed group operating outside its 
territory would not engage that state’s obligation to prevent the commission of rights-violating 
conduct by that group. 
4.4.2  Obligation not to facilitate or acquiesce in rights-violating conduct 
A state’s obligation to take measures to prevent the commission of rights-violating conduct by 
armed groups is complemented by the obligation to refrain from facilitating or acquiescing in 
rights-violating conduct of armed groups within the state’s jurisdiction. As the ECtHR noted in 
Cyprus v Turkey,   
 
…the acquiescence or connivance of the authorities of a Contracting State in the acts of 
private individuals which violate the Convention rights of other individuals within its 
jurisdiction may engage that State's responsibility under the Convention. Any different 
conclusion would be at variance with the obligation contained in Article 1 of the 
Convention.126 
 
The ECtHR has interpreted a state’s obligation to respect human rights and to protect individuals 
against specific rights-violating conduct to entail an obligation not to deport, expel, extradite or 
otherwise remove a person from the state’s jurisdiction, including into the control of non-state 
actors,127 where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk that the person 
will be subjected to a flagrant violation of the right to freedom from torture (non-refoulement),128 
to freedom from arbitrary detention,129 or a flagrant denial of justice contrary to the right to a fair 
trial.130 In these cases, the obligation not to expose an individual to the real risk of ill treatment 
arises out of the state’s obligation to ensure the enjoyment of the substantive rights guaranteed by 
 
125 Article 3 ICCPR; Article 13 ECHR. 
126 ECtHR Cyprus v Turkey, §81. 
127 ECtHR Ilascu & Ors v Moldova & Russia, §§317 & 384 
128 ECtHR Soering v United Kingdom, §§90-91; Saadi v Italy, §125; Othman (Abu Qatada) v United Kingdom, §185. 
129 ECtHR Othman (Abu Qatada) v United Kingdom, §233. 
130 Ibid., §258. 
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the ECHR and is triggered by the state’s own acts and not the acts of the third party. As the 
ECtHR held in Soering with the respect to the principle of non-refoulement, the state’s 
responsibility is engaged ‘by reason of its having taken action which has as a direct consequence 
the exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment’.131 
 
4.4.3  An emerging lex specialis rule of attribution based on complicity? 
Some have argued that the ECtHR and IACtHR have developed a lex specialis rule of attribution 
based on the state’s ‘complicity’ in violations of specific human rights by a third state or non-state 
entity.132 However, this argument misunderstands the basis upon which a state is found responsible 
when it is found to have been complicit in rights-violating conduct. The acts of the perpetrator 
are not attributed to the state. Rather, the state is held responsible for its own conduct that 
facilitates the rights-violating conduct of the third party, and thereby violates the state’s obligation 
to ensure the rights and freedoms of all individuals in its jurisdiction.133 The notion of complicity 
is drawn on by the ECtHR to interpret the nature of a state’s obligations under Article 1 ECHR.   
 
In support of his thesis that there is an emerging rule of attribution based on complicity Lanovoy 
cites decisions of the IACtHR in Maripian Massacre,134 Ituago Massacres135 and Rochela Massacre136 in 
which the state was held responsible for violations of the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR) on the ground that harmful acts committed by paramilitary groups were committed with 
the ‘support, acquiescence, involvement, and cooperation of State security forces’;137 and decisions 
of the ECtHR concerning the transfer of persons into the custody of a separatist authority;138 and 
extraordinary rendition cases.139  
 
 
131 ECtHR Soering v United Kingdom, §91. 
132 Nollkaemper (2015), p.180. Lanovoy, (2017a) pp.582-583. Seibert-Fohr (2017). Cf. Jackson (2015) pp.196-200; 
Plakokefalos (2017). 
133 ECtHR Cyprus v Turkey, §81. 
134 IACtHR Mapiripán Massacre v Colombia (Preliminary Objections). 
135 IACtHR Ituango Massacres v Colombia. 
136 IACtHR Rochela Massacre v Colombia. 
137 Ibid citing IACtHR Rochela Massacre v Colombia, §78; Ituango Massacres v Colombia, §§125 & 133; Mapiripán Massacre v 
Colombia, (Preliminary Objections), §§121–123. 
138 ECtHR Ilascu & Ors v Moldova & Russia, §384. 
139 Lanovoy (2017), p.583; Seibert-Fohr (2017) citing El-Masri v Macedonia, §206, 212–222, 235 & 240; Al Nashiri v 
Poland §§452 & 517; Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v Poland, §§449 & 512. ‘Extraordinary rendition’ is defined as ‘an extra-
judicial transfer of persons from one jurisdiction or State to another, for the purposes of detention and interrogation 
outside the normal legal system, where there was a real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’: Al 
Nashiri v Poland, §453. 
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Lanovoy’s argument is problematic for three reasons. First, in the IACtHR cases, Colombia 
acknowledged and accepted responsibility for the violation of the victims’ rights on the basis of 
uncontested evidence that state agents took part in the criminal acts and the state’s failure to 
prevent those acts.140 Although not explicit in the judgments, Colombia’s responsibility for the 
massacres may be engaged pursuant to Article 11 ARS, the state’s acknowledgement and adoption 
of conduct as its own.  
 
Second, although the IACtHR uses the language of complicity, referring to state agents’ 
collaboration, acquiescence and toleration of activities of non-state actors, Colombia is found 
responsible on the basis of its own failure to adopt suitable measures necessary to guarantee the 
enjoyment of and to protect the human rights of the victims, and not on the basis of attribution 
of the wrongful act to the state.141 It was established that Colombia’s legislation allowed for the 
creation of ‘self-defence’ groups that then transformed into paramilitary groups with criminal 
objectives, that the state was ‘fully aware of the terrorist activities perpetrated by these paramilitary 
groups’, had failed to adopt appropriate measures to protect the civilian population in light of the 
paramilitary activities, and at times collaborated and took part in those activities.142 It follows that 
Colombia was found responsible for its own acts and omissions that facilitated the paramilitaries 
operations, and not for the acts of the paramilitary groups themselves.143  
 
Third, the language used by the ECtHR in the extraordinary rendition cases, and previous 
authorities upon which the Court relies, is confusing at best. In these cases, the Court appears to 
conflate the test to determine whether or not a state exercises jurisdiction, and therefore whether 
its obligation to respect and ensure the rights guaranteed by the Convention is engaged, with the 
rules governing attribution of conduct. Nevertheless, the state is found responsible in these cases 
for its own acts of complicity that are contrary to its obligations under Articles 1 and 3 ECHR, 
and not for the acts of the foreign officials.  In order to demonstrate the point it is helpful to 
consider the approach of the ECtHR in these cases in more detail. 
 
 
140 IACtHR Ituango Massacres v Colombia, §64. 
141 IACtHR Mapiripán Massacre v Colombia (Preliminary Objections), §123; Rochela Massacre v Colombia, §102; Ituango 
Massacres v Colombia, §§137-138. Similarly, Plakokefalos (2017) p.593. 
142 E.g. IACtHR Ituango Massacres v Colombia, §§125 & 133. Also, Mapiripán Massacre v Colombia, (Preliminary 
Objections), §121. 
143 Cf. Jackson (2015) p.196: ‘[f]aced with a mountain of evidence of the state’s involvement, the court refused to 
rule that Columbia was responsible only for failing to protect against harm by private actors… Rather it was complicit, 
the State’s participation constituting a particular way of contributing to the principal wrong’.  
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A starting point is Ilascu and Others v Moldova and Russia cited in the rendition cases as authority for 
the principle that a ‘State must be regarded as responsible under the Convention for acts 
performed by foreign officials on its territory with the acquiescence or connivance of its 
authorities’.144 In that case, in its determination of ‘the concept of jurisdiction’ pursuant to Article 
1 ECHR, the Court states that,  
 
…the acquiescence or connivance of the authorities of a Contracting State in the acts of 
private individuals which violate the Convention rights of other individuals within its 
jurisdiction may engage the State’s responsibility under the Convention.145  
 
The use of the world ‘may’ and not the word ‘will’ is important. In Ilascu the Court was considering 
the consequences of one state’s exercise of jurisdiction over part of the territory of another state.146 
Having determined that the applicants came within Russia’s jurisdiction the Court then had to 
decide whether Russia could be held responsible for the alleged violations. The applicants had 
been arrested and detained, and in some cases suffered ill treatment, by the 14th Army of the 
Russian Federation that was stationed in the self-proclaimed Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria 
(MRT) and fought with MRT separatists against the Moldovan army in the Moldovan conflict 
1991-1992. The applicants were transferred by the 14th Army into the custody of MRT police and 
subsequently suffered ill treatment at the hands of members of that police force contrary to Article 
3 ECHR.147 The Court held that the events fell within Russia’s jurisdiction, 
 
… because the events which gave rise to the responsibility of the Russian Federation must 
be considered to include not only the acts in which the agents of that State participated, 
like the applicants’ arrest and detention, but also their transfer into the hands of the 
Transdniestrian police and regime, and the subsequent ill-treatment inflicted on them by 
those police, since in acting in that way the agents of the Russian Federation were fully 
aware that they were handing them over to an illegal and unconstitutional regime.148 
 
 
144 ECtHR El-Masri v Macedonia, §206. 
145 ECtHR Ilascu & Ors v Moldova & Russia, §318 applying Cyprus v Turkey, §81 [Emphasis added]. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid, §384. 
148 Ibid. 
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The language used by the ECtHR is confusing. The Court states that Russia’s responsibility is 
‘engaged’ by virtue of the applicants falling within its jurisdiction, and that the acts that violate the 
applicants’ substantive rights are ‘imputable’ to Russia.149   However, the Court held Russia 
responsible on the basis of its continued exercise of effective authority or decisive influence over 
MRT, and the fact that it had ‘made no attempt to put an end to the applicants’ situation brought 
about by its agents, and did not act to prevent the violations allegedly committed after [it ratified 
the ECHR]’.150 In other words, Russia had failed to meet its positive obligations to take all available 
measures to prevent violations of the applicants’ rights by the separatist authorities. It is not at all 
clear, as Lanovoy argues,151 that the Court’s approach in Ilascu supports attribution of conduct on 
the basis of acquiescence or connivance.152 
 
El-Masri concerns the involvement of Macedonia in the rendition and torture, inhuman and 
degrading treatment of a German citizen, Khaled El-Masri by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) of the United States. El-Masri had been detained and suffered ill treatment by the 
Macedonian authorities before he was handed into the custody of CIA agents at Skopje Airport 
where he was tortured.153 He was then rendered by the CIA to Afghanistan where he was detained 
for four months.154 The question of Macedonia’s responsibility for his ill treatment while in the 
custody of the Macedonian authorities and for his transfer into the custody of the CIA entailed a 
straightforward application of Macedonia’s obligations pursuant to Articles 3 ECHR,155 and the 
principle of non-refoulement.156  
 
However, the Court did not confine itself to the question of Macedonia’s responsibility for the 
conduct of its own authorities. The Court also considered the question of Macedonia’s 
responsibility for torture and ill treatment committed by the CIA agents at Skopje Airport. The 
Court set out the approach it must take to the question of Macedonia’s responsibility for torture 
committed by the CIA agents at Skopje Airport as follows, 
 
 
149 Ibid, §442. 
150 Ibid, §§393-394, 441, 448, 453 & 464. 
151 Lanovoy (2017) p.583. 
152 Plakokefalos (2017) p.591. 
153 ECtHR El-Masri v Macedonia, §§17-22. 
154 Ibid, §§23-31. 
155 Ibid, §§200-204. 
156 Ibid, §§212-214. 
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The Court must firstly assess whether the treatment suffered by the applicant at Skopje Airport at 
the hands of the special CIA rendition team is imputable to the respondent State. In this 
connection it emphasises that the acts complained of were carried out in the presence of officials 
of the respondent State and within its jurisdiction. Consequently, the respondent State must be 
regarded as responsible under the Convention for acts performed by foreign officials on its territory 
with the acquiescence or connivance of its authorities.157 
 
In the subsequent cases of Al-Nashiri v Poland and Husayn v Poland the Court applied the latter 
statement, ‘in accordance with settled case law’,158 as a general principle of state responsibility for 
an applicant’s treatment and detention by foreign officials on its territory. It is important to note 
here that the definition of torture, as provided by Article 1 of the Convention against Torture, and 
as adopted by the ECtHR,159 includes pain or suffering inflicted ‘at the instigation of, or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official’.160 Accordingly, inherent in the definition of torture is 
the negative obligation of a state to refrain from consenting or acquiescing in the commission of 
torture by third state or non-state actors that corresponds to the state’s positive obligation to take 
all available and appropriate measures to prevent and punish such acts.161 According to the UN 
Committee against Torture, a state will be considered to ‘consent or acquiesce’ in torture if that 
state fails to implement measures to prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish acts of torture or 
ill-treatment committed by non-state actors.162 In these circumstances, ‘the State bears 
responsibility and its officials should be considered as authors, complicit or otherwise responsible 
under the Convention for consenting to or acquiescing in such impermissible acts’.163 It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the ECtHR uses the language of complicity when addressing the 
question of state responsibility for torture by third state actors, not as a rule of attribution, but as 
an inherent element of a state’s primary obligation not to commit torture.  
 
The respondent states in El Masri, Al-Nashiri and Husayn were not held responsible for the 
violation of the applicants’ Convention rights because the acts of the CIA agents were attributable 
 
157 Ibid, §206 applying Ilascu v Moldova & Russia, §318. [Emphasis added] 
158 ECtHR Al Nashiri v Poland, §452 and Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v Poland, §449 citing Ilascu v Moldova & Russia, §318 
and El-Masri v Macedonia, §206. 
159 See ECtHR Selmouni v France, §97. 
160 Article 1 CAT.  
161 Article 2 CAT. 
162 UNCAT, General Comment No.2, §18. 
163 Ibid. 
 80 
to them.  In El Masri, Macedonia was held responsible for violating the ECHR because ‘its agents 
actively facilitated the treatment and then failed to take any measures that might have been 
necessary in the circumstances of the case to prevent it from occurring’.164 It was the acts of the 
state’s organs, and not of the foreign officials, that violated the state’s obligations pursuant to 
Articles 1 and 3 ECHR to ensure individuals are not put at risk of torture.165 
 
Thus, the ECtHR has developed rules of derivative responsibility according to which the state is 
responsible for its own acts that facilitate the commission of rights-violating conduct by state or 
non-state actors. The ECtHR has not developed rules of attribution of conduct based upon 
notions of complicity.166  
 
4.4.4  Foreseeability and real risk of harm 
According to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence the act of removing a person from the state’s jurisdiction 
may engage that state’s responsibility ‘if this action has as a direct consequence the exposure of an 
individual to a foreseeable violation of his Convention rights in the country of his destination’.167 
It follows that a State Party will be in violation of its obligations under the ECHR if there are 
substantial grounds for believing that a person would, if transferred from its jurisdiction, face a 
real risk of torture and ill treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR,168 or there is a real risk of a 
flagrant breach of Articles 5 (liberty of the person) or 6 ECHR (right to a fair trial).169 
 
Similarly, the Court of Appeal of The Netherlands held in Association of Mothers of Srebrenica and 
Others  v The Netherlands that the Dutchbat’s facilitation of the separation of male refugees by Bosnia 
Serbs during their evacuation from the ‘mini safe area’ at Srebrenica was wrongful pursuant to 
Articles 2 and 3 ECHR and Articles 6 and 7 ICCPR170 because at the time the Dutchbat knew or 
should reasonably have understood that this separation was not for the purpose of screening for 
war crimes, and that there was a real risk that the separated men would be subjected to an 
 
164 ECtHR El-Masri v Macedonia, §211. 
165 Ibid; Al Nashiri v Poland, §517; Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v Poland, §517. 
166 The question whether there an emerging general rule of state responsibility for complicity in the unlawful acts of 
an armed group is considered in chapter 5. 
167 ECtHR Al Nashiri v Poland, §453. 
168 ECtHR Othman (Abu Qatada) v United Kingdom, §185. 
169 Ibid, §§233 & 258. 
170 Court of Appeal Den Haag (The Netherlands) Association of Mothers of Srebrenica & Ors v The Netherlands (2017), §§ 
46 & 50.1. 
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inhumane or humiliating treatment or executed.171 The Court held that by putting the refugees 
together in groups and requiring them to walk through a human corridor formed of Dutchbat 
soldiers to the evacuation buses, the Dutchbat in fact facilitated the separation of male refugees 
from the larger group by the Bosnian Serbs before they boarded the buses.172  
 
The application of a constructive knowledge standard by the ECtHR suggests that a state must 
conduct due diligence to acquire knowledge of the intentions of the receiving state or non-state 
entity, or to satisfy itself that there is no risk of a violation of the persons Convention rights as 
guaranteed by Articles 3, 5 and 6 ECHR. In cases where the sending state ‘knew or ought to have 
known’ that the removed person was subjected to extraordinary rendition173, the ECtHR has held 
that ‘the possibility of a breach of Article 3 ECHR is particularly strong and must be considered 
intrinsic in the transfer’.174 Furthermore, as the Court has observed, the risk of a flagrant breach 
of Article 5 is inherent in extraordinary rendition that constitutes the deliberate circumvention of 
due process.175 
 
However, it remains the case that the engagement of a state’s human rights obligations not to 
facilitate or acquiesce in rights-violating conduct is dependent upon the existence of jurisdiction, 
whether territorial, by virtue of the state’s effective control over territory or authority over the 
victim.176 It follows that a state’s obligation not to facilitate violations of IHRL will not be engaged 
where the state arms, finances, trains or otherwise assists an armed group that is active in a third 
state and commits human rights abuses outside that state’s jurisdiction. 
 
4.5  Conclusion: Identifying Responsibility Gap 
In the absence of secondary rules of attribution, states that finance and otherwise support armed 
groups that commit inter alia terrorist acts, torture or genocide may be in breach of certain primary 
obligations to prevent those acts. However, the reach of these primary obligations is limited. State 
 
171 Ibid, §§46 & 51.5-51.6. 
172 Ibid., §61.3 & 61.5. The Court did not determine whether the same standard should be applied to complicity in 
genocide, on the basis that it this was not required to prove wrongful conduct pursuant to the ECHR or ICCPR [see 
§50.1 & 51.6]. 
173 Extraordinary rendition has been defined by the ECtHR as ‘an extra-judicial transfer of persons from one 
jurisdiction or State to another, for the purposes of detention and interrogation outside the normal legal system, 
where there was a real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’: ECtHR Al Nashiri v Poland, §453. 
174 Ibid, citing El-Masri v Macedonia, §§218-221. 
175 ECtHR Othman (Abu Qatada) v United Kingdom, §233. 
176 Ibid. Also, Milanovic (2011) p.19. 
 82 
responsibility for failing to prevent the commission of crimes by non-state actors is legally and 
conceptually distinct from responsibility for positive acts that contribute to the harm itself. In the 
former case, the state is not responsible for the acts the armed group or for its positive contribution 
to the commission of those acts. The activities of the armed group merely provide the objective 
circumstances which give rise to the state’s international obligations, and the breach thereof by the 
state’s organs. What is important is whether the state did all it could, in the circumstances existing 
at the time, to prevent or ensure respect for the rule of international law in question.177 Therefore, 
a state’s responsibility for failing to prevent certain acts fails to capture the wrong committed by a 
state that deliberately supports the commission of those acts.  
 
Therein exists a normative gap in responsibility (‘the responsibility gap’) that sits between a state’s 
primary obligations to prevent certain acts and a state’s direct responsibility for violations of 
international law committed by armed groups acting on the instructions of, or under the effective 
control of, the state. A state is able to exploit this gap in order to evade responsibility for complicity 
in terrorism and international crimes committed by its proxy by virtue of its encouragement, 
instigation or facilitation through the provision of aid or assistance, of those acts. 
 
This responsibility gap is addressed to some extent by the primary obligations of states to ensure 
respect for IHL pursuant to CA1, and to respect and ensure IHRL, that provide a more 
comprehensive framework of legal rules that govern state responsibility for acts that contribute to 
the commission of violations of international law by armed groups. However, a responsibility gap 
still exists in circumstances where a state facilitates the commission of terrorist acts or other rights-
violating acts in situations outside armed conflict (and therefore not governed by IHL) and, rights-
violating conduct in territory outside the state’s jurisdiction.  In the next chapter I explore an 
alternative approach to lowering the threshold test for attribution of conduct from ‘effective’ to 
‘overall control’ to address state complicity in acts of terrorism, international crimes and unlawful 
acts: namely the formulation of a general rule of derivative responsibility for complicity within the 






177 E.g. DRC v Uganda, §211; Bosnia Genocide, §430. 
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Chapter 5. State Complicity in the Unlawful Acts of Armed Groups 
 
5.1  Introduction 
In this chapter I consider the case for the formulation of a general rule of state responsibility for 
complicity in the unlawful conduct of armed groups and the extent to which such a rule will 
address the responsibility gap identified in chapter 4.  
States have long condemned other states for complicity in the commission of unlawful acts by 
armed groups. For example, in Aerial Incident at Lockerbie under the heading ‘The Issue of State 
Complicity in Acts of Unlawful Seizure and Acts of Unlawful Interference Against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation’ the United Kingdom submitted that in addition to prosecution of alleged 
perpetrators of certain offences pursuant to the Montreal Convention, ‘action should be taken 
against the States concerned’.1  Parallel to the legal proceedings before the ICJ the United Kingdom 
brought its complaint that Libya sponsored terrorism to the Security Council.2 There the United 
Kingdom and the United States had asserted that the Lockerbie bombing was a case of state-
sponsored terrorism.3 The United Kingdom further stressed that it was ‘the exceptional 
circumstances of government involvement in the destruction of the two flights that made it 
appropriate for the Council to adopt a resolution urging the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to comply 
with the requests that the accused be made available for trial in Scotland or the United States and 
cooperate with the French judicial authorities’.4 By Resolution 748 (1992) the Security Council 
decided that Libya ‘must commit itself definitively to cease all forms of terrorist action and all 
 
1 Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, Counter-Memorial of the United Kingdom, §3.38. 
2 This may have been a tactical decision based upon the evidential burden required by legal proceedings in order to 
prove that Libyan organs or persons acting on the instructions, direction or control of Libya, in fact carried out the 
bombing. At that time the trial of the suspected bombers, Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa 
Fhimah, that heard evidence that Al Megrahi was a Libyan intelligene officer and resulted in Al Megrahi’s 
conviction, had not yet taken place As Judge Bedjaoui observed,  
The second dispute, concerning the international responsibility of Libya, has been resolved in a strictly 
political way, the chief elements of the solution being the finding that Libya is responsible, a demand of 
compensation for the families of the victims and the imposition of an obligation concretely to renounce 
terrorism, whereas a judicial solution, which necessarily sets higher procedural standards, would have 
required, as a preliminary, the production of evidence, adversary proceedings and respect for due pro- cess 
of law. [Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge Bedjaoui, §5.] 
3 Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council: Supplement 1989-1993, p.213. 
4 Ibid. Pursuant to Resolutions 731 and 748 (1992) the Security Council condemned terrorism in all its forms, 
including acts in which states were directly or indirectly involved and urged, and then demanded, Libya to cooperate 
to the requests of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
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assistance to terrorist groups’,5 and imposed sanctions and an arms embargo on Libya for such time as 
Libya refused to meet the demands of France, the United Kingdom and the United States to 
surrender the suspects.6  
Similarly, following the hijacking of an Indian Airlines passenger flight in February 1971, India 
lodged a formal protest against Pakistan for ‘extending assistance and support to, and even 
encouraging, these two criminals and for their failure to protect the aircraft and the cargo, baggage 
and mail’ and held Pakistan ‘wholly responsible for any consequences that may follow from this 
deplorable incident’.7  The hijackers had diverted the aircraft to Lahore, Pakistan and, after 
releasing the passengers, had blown up the aircraft. The incident led to proceedings before the ICJ 
relating to the jurisdiction of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Council over 
the dispute.8 Pakistan rejected India’s allegations that it had assisted the hijackers and in response 
counter-claimed that the Commission of Inquiry constituted by the President of Pakistan had 
concluded that the hijacking would not have been possible ‘without the active complicity, 
encouragement and assistance of the Indian Intelligence Service personnel and other 
Governmental authorities in the Indian held Kashmir’.9 India’s apparent motive was to create 
tension between the political parties in Pakistan, financially weaken Pakistan, and ‘to create a 
situation under which India could interfere actively in the internal affairs of Pakistan’.10  
 
Likewise, in February 2019 India accused Pakistan of having ‘a direct hand’ in a terrorist bombing 
in Kashmir, for which the Pakistan-based group Jaish-e-Mohammed claimed responsibility.11 The 
United States joined India in condemning Pakistan’s alleged role in the bombing and urged 
Pakistan to ‘end immediately the support and safe haven provided to all terrorist groups operating 
on its soil’.12 Shortly thereafter India conducted airstrikes in Pakistan’s territory.13 In retaliation, 
 
5 Security Council Resolution 748(1992), §2. 
6 Ibid, §§3-7. 
7 Note of 3 February 1971 from the Indian High Commission in Islamabad to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Pakistan, Memorial of India, Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council, p.77. 
8 Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council. 
9 Reply of the Government of Pakistan to the Preliminary Objections Raised by the Government of India under 
Article 5 of the Rules of Settlement of Differences, before the Council of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization, Annex to Memorial of India, Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council, p.126. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Safi & Farooq, ‘Indian PM: Pakistan will pay ‘heavy price’ for Kashmir bombing’, The Guardian, 15 February 2019. 
12 The White House, ‘Statement from the Press Secretary on the Terrorist Attack in India’, 14 February 2019.  
13 India Ministry of External Affairs, ‘Statement by Foreign Secretary on 26 February 2019 on the Strike on JeM 
training camp at Balakot’ 26 February 2019. 
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Pakistan shot down two Indian fighter jets flying over the disputed border region.14 India accused 
Pakistan of failing to take measures to prevent ‘jihadis’ from being trained in its territory and 
stressed that the group ‘could not have functioned without the knowledge of the Pakistan 
authorities’.15 Pakistan condemned India’s actions as an act of aggression, and the ‘baseless 
allegation’ that Pakistan was involved in the terrorist bombing.16  
 
Before the completion of the ARS in 2001 the principle of state responsibility for complicity in 
international law received limited attention.17 In the period following the attack on the World 
Trade Centre on 11 September 2001 that has seen state collaboration in counter-terrorism policies, 
including the extraordinary rendition of suspected terrorists, targeted killings, and the invasion of 
Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, one state’s complicity in another state’s internationally 
wrongful act has received more detailed consideration.18  However, notwithstanding the examples 
summarised above, state responsibility for complicity in the unlawful acts of non-state actors has 
received limited attention from scholars.19  
 
Article 16 ARS provides a general rule of state responsibility for ‘aid or assistance in the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act’ by another state’. However, the ARS are marked 
by the absence of a rule of attribution covering state complicity in the unlawful acts of private 
persons or entities. This absence appears to be the result of a conscious decision by the ILC to 
leave examination of this issue to a future study, as was the case with respect to state responsibility 
for complicity in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by an international 
organisation.20 As Special Rapporteur Ago explained, 
 
 
14 Regan et al, ‘Pakistan says it shot down two India jets as Kashmir border crises deepens’, CNN, 28 February 2019. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Pakistan strongly protests Indian aggression, violation of its airspace and 
promises a befitting response’, Press Release, 26 February 2019.  For discussion of the issues raised concerning the 
law on the use of force see Maheshwari (2019). See also chapter 6, 6.5.1 on the application of Article 9 ARS to the 
question of state responsibility for the commission of cross-border attacks by armed groups operating in the state’s 
territory. 
17 Quigley (1986); Graefrath (1996); Brownlie (1983) p.191.  
18 Nolte & Aust (2009); Aust (2011); Jackson (2015); Lanovoy (2016).  
19 With exception of de Frouville (2010), p.277; Jackson (2015), chpt. 9; Lanovoy (2017a); Mackenzie-Gray Scott 
(2019).  
20 ARS, Article 57. State responsibility for aiding and assisting an international organisation in the commission of an 
international wrongful act was later codified as Article 58 of the draft Articles on Responsibility of International 
Organisations, ILC Ybk 2011, Vol. II(2).   
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[W]e shall take into consideration only the case of complicity of a State in an international offence 
committed by another State, even though it may well be presumed that the same principles would 
apply if one of the protagonists were a subject of international law other than a State.21 
 
The absence of a rule on state complicity in violations committed by non-state actors in the ARS 
may also be a legacy of the positivist school of the early 20th century that contended that only states 
could be subjects of international law.22 One feature of state responsibility for complicity in the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act by another state is the dual obligation requirement 
- the complicit state must itself be bound by the international obligation that has been breached.23 
This condition is a manifestation of the principle that ‘a State cannot do by another what it cannot 
do by itself’.24 Accordingly, if only states can be subjects of international law and therefore be 
bound by international law, the dual obligation requirement can only be satisfied between two 
states. Thus, legal theory that has contributed to the development of the principles that underpin 
the law of state responsibility has tended to concentrate on the circumstances in which the conduct 
of private actors may be attributed to a state, rather than notions of accessorial liability of the 
state.25 However, the contention that only states can be subjects of international law is now 
undermined by a general acceptance that private actors can be and are subjects of international 
law, particularly IHL. It is argued below that in light of this development of international law the 
dual obligation requirement is no longer an obstacle to state responsibility for complicity in the 
unlawful acts of non-state actors. Against this background, I examine whether Article 16 ARS is 
an appropriate analogue for a general rule on state complicity in the unlawful acts of armed groups.  
 
This chapter is divided into seven parts. Section 5.2 provides an overview of Article 16 ARS. The 
sections that follow examine the requisite criteria for Article 16 in more detail, namely: the conduct 
element (section 5.3); the knowledge of the state (section 5.4); the causal nexus between the 
assistance provided and the internationally wrongful act (section 5.5); and the dual obligation 
requirement (section 5.6). Finally, in section 5.7 I propose a general rule of state responsibility for 
complicity in violations of international law by armed groups.26 I argue that it is not appropriate to 
 
21 Ago, Seventh Report (1978), §76. 
22 E.g. Anzilotti (1906). 
23 ARS, Article 16, Commentary, §6. 
24 Ibid. 
25 E.g. Anzilotti (1906); Eagleton (1928). For a comprehensive study of the development of legal theory of State 
responsibility from the Roman law doctrine of jus gentium, to Grotius to Anzillotti see Hessbruegge (2004). 
26 The focus on this thesis is on the conduct of armed groups, but the proposed rule may apply to non-state actors 
generally. 
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apply Article 16 by analogy. Instead, the proposed rule builds on the principles that govern the 
prohibition of complicity in violations IHL and IHRL, and encouragement of violations of IHL.  
The proposed rule is not a rule of attribution of conduct, but a rule of derivate responsibility. Thus, 
the rule would preserve the notion of limited state responsibility for private conduct that is central 
to the ARS but at the same time would condemn appropriately a state’s active involvement in 
unlawful acts that, if committed by a state organ or agent would constitute a violation of an 
international obligation of the state.  
 
5.2  Article 16 ARS: State Complicity in Internationally Wrongful Acts of Another State 
 
Article 16 ARS provides that, 
 
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful 
act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: 
 
(a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful 
act; and 
 
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State. 
 
Article 16 sits together with Articles 17 and 18 in Chapter IV ARS that covers responsibility of a 
state in connection with the act of another state.  However, there is an important difference in the 
nature of a state’s responsibility under Article 16 and that arising under Articles 17 and 18. Articles 
17 and 18 cover cases of a state’s direction or control over another state and coercion of another 
state respectively. Pursuant to Articles 17 and 18 a state that directs, controls or coerces another 
state to commit an internationally wrongful act will be responsible for that act. By contrast, state 
responsibility pursuant to Article 16 is derivative: the assisting state is only responsible for its own 
conduct to the extent that it has caused or contributed to the breach, and not for the unlawful act 
of the principal perpetrator. 27  
Pursuant to Article 16, a state may be held responsible for aiding and assisting in the internationally 
wrongful act of another state on the basis of conduct that is not unlawful per se. As such, Article 
16 arguably blurs the distinction between primary and secondary rules as it defines the substance 
 
27 ARS, Article 16, Commentary, §§1 & 10. 
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of the state’s obligation.28 On this point the ILC Commentary merely states that this is justified 
because responsibility is ‘in a sense derivative’ and refers by analogy to domestic legal systems in 
which offences like ‘conspiracy, complicity and inducing breach of contract’ forms part of ‘general 
law’.29  
In addition, there is a policy justification for blurring the distinction between primary and 
secondary rules in cases of complicity. If only unlawful acts fell within the scope of Article 16 then 
the rule would be unduly narrow. Conduct that is not unlawful per se, such as allowing a state to 
refuel its aeroplanes that are used in the unlawful rendition of terrorism suspects to ‘black sites’ 
for interrogation, or the provision of military assistance to states known to carry out human rights 
violations, would not be caught by the rule. Yet, if the purpose of the rule is to ensure greater 
compliance with international law30 then it can only achieve that purpose if it condemns otherwise 
lawful conduct that facilitates another in the violation of international law.  
 
In Bosnia Genocide the ICJ drew on Article 16 by analogy in order to determine the content of state 
complicity in the crime of genocide.31 Therefore, it is helpful to consider Article 16, and the ICJ’s 
application of the rule in Bosnia Genocide, in order to establish whether there is evidence of an 
emerging rule of state responsibility for complicity in unlawful acts by armed groups, what the 
content of that rule might be, and whether such a rule would close the responsibility gap.  
 
 
5.3  Required Conduct 
 
5.3.1  Aid or Assistance 
Article 16 ARS limits the modes of participation that amount to complicity to ‘aid or assistance’. 
The ILC initially used the term ‘complicity’ in its draft articles32 but abandoned the use of the term 
because of its association with criminal law under which it can have a far broader meaning than 
that applied under public international law.33 For example, the Commentary states that ‘incitement 
of wrongful conduct is generally not regarded as sufficient to give rise to responsibility of the 
 
28 ARS, Introductory Commentary to Part IV, §7. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Lowe (2002) p.15.  
31 Bosnia Genocide, §419. 
32 Ago, Seventh Report (1978), draft Article 25, p.60. 
33 Commentary to draft Article 27 ASR, ILC Ybk 1978, Vol. II(2), pp.100-102; Quigley (1986). 
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inciting State’.34 It is presumed that a state will act with ‘complete freedom of decision and choice’, 
whether incited or not.35  The only real case of ‘participation’ by a state in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act of another state is where the former ‘actively assists’ the latter in the 
commission of the act.36  
 
However, state responsibility for aiding or assisting in the commission of violations of 
international law by non-state actors will inevitably relate to the commission of a crime. The 
question then arises whether, when applied in this context, ‘aiding or assisting’ should be equated 
to broader notions of ‘complicity’ in criminal law or should be restricted to ‘aid or assistance’?37 In 
domestic criminal law the term ‘complicity’ is often used as an umbrella term to cover various 
types of accessorial liability that can include encouragement or incitement of a criminal offence, 
as well as conduct that assists in the commission of a criminal office.38 In ICL, the term ‘complicity’ 
is also used as a general term denoting a number of different modes of participation in an offence,39 
including encouragement or moral support that has a significant effect on the perpetrator.40 
However, different ways in which a person may be complicit in the commission of an offence are 
distinguished. For example, Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute distinguishes between the criminal 
responsibility of a person who ‘orders, solicits, or induces’ the commission of a crime41 and a 
person who ‘aids, abets or otherwise assists in the commission or attempted commission’ of a 
 
34 ARS, Introductory Commentary to Chapter IV ARS §9. Ago, Seventh Report (1978), p.54 §61; Quigley (1986) 
fn.15. Cf. Nicaragua, §220 and DRC v Uganda, §§209-211 on encouraging non-state actors to commit violations of 
IHL contrary as a breach of the state’s obligations under Articles 1 and 3 Common to GCs. See chapter 4. 
35 Ago, Seventh Report (1978), p.55 §63.  
36 Ibid. The meaning and scope of ‘aid or assistance’ is arguably unclear. Cf. Aust (2011) pp.195-230. Aust argues 
that ‘aid or assistance’ in Article 16 is ‘a normative and case-specific concept, meaning that its content will always 
have to be determined in the specific situation, with a view to the relation between supportive conduct to the 
neighbouring normative environment and the enabling function it played in the case in hand’. See also Gaja, Seventh 
Report on the responsibility of international organisations, (2009) §75. 
37 Cassese (2005) pp.882-883 who argues that once the ICJ in Bosnia Genocide adopted the criminal law notion of 
complicity in order to determine state responsibility pursuant to the Genocide Convention the Court should have 
adopted ‘a rigorous criminal approach’ with regard to the mens rea and actus reus requirements required for an 
accomplice to incur responsibility under international criminal law.   
38 Commentary to draft article 27 ARS, Ybk ILC 1978 vol II(2), p.102 §12; Quigley (1986) fn10; Ago, Seventh 
Report (1978), p.55 §62; Milanovic, (2007) p.682; Jackson (2015), pp.32-33. E.g. Section 8, Accessories and Abettors 
Act 1861 (England & Wales) provides that it is an offence to ‘aid, abet, counsel or procure’ the commission of any 
indictable offence. ‘Incitement’ of a criminal offence constitutes an offence under English common law if 
committed before 1 October 2008. From that date forward, Section 44 Serious Crime Act 2007 provides that a 
person commits an offence if he ‘does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence; and 
he intends to encourage or assist its commission’. See generally Law Commission of England and Wales, Assisting 
and Encouraging Crime (1993) and Participating in Crime (2007).  
39 ICTY Blagojevic & Jokic, (Trial Chamber) §§776-777; Krstic (Appeals Chamber) §139. 
40 ICTY Furundzija (Trial Chamber), §233. 
41 Article 25(3)(b) Rome Statute. 
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crime’.42 ‘Aiding and abetting’ refers to acts that are ‘specifically directed to assist, encourage or 
lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime… [and have] a substantial effect 
upon the perpetration of a certain specific crime’.43 According to the ICTY in Tadic, the aider and 
abetter must know that his or her acts will assist in the commission of the specific crime by the 
principal.44 Tacit encouragement or approval of the principal’s acts by a person in authority will 
amount to aiding and abetting.45  
 
 
In Bosnia Genocide the ICJ seems to have confined state complicity in genocide to acts of ‘aid or 
assistance’, and therefore excluded the possibility of the wider definition of complicity applied in 
criminal law. However, the notion of encouragement is not confined to criminal law. As the 
analysis of a state’s primary obligations in chapter 4 shows, pursuant to CA1 states are prohibited 
from encouraging violations of IHL. Moreover, the principle that a state should not encourage 
non-state actors to commit terrorist acts is inherent in the principle of non-intervention. According 
to the Friendly Relations Declaration states should not aid, assist or encourage the commission of 
terrorism or armed activities by non-state actors against the government of another State.46  
 
5.3.2  Acts and Omissions 
In Bosnia Genocide the ICJ distinguished between a failure to prevent genocide by an omission (a 
state’s failure to act) and complicity in genocide that ‘always requires that some positive action has 
been taken to furnish aid or assistance to the perpetrators’ of the unlawful act.47 According to the 
Court’s approach, ‘a violation of the obligation to prevent arises from mere failure to adopt suitable 
measures to prevent [the harmful act] from being committed’48 in its own territory or territory 
under its occupation,49 or, in case of genocide, by persons that the state has the ‘capacity to 
influence’.50 Therefore, for the ICJ the notion of ‘complicity’ implies some deliberate act directed 
at assisting the other party in the commission of the unlawful act.51 
 
 
42 Ibid. Article 25(3)(c). 
43 Tadic, §229. Also ICTY Aleksovski, §162; Celebici Camp, §352; and ICTR Akayesu,  §447. O’Keefe (2016), 5.69. 
44 Ibid. 
45 ICTY Brdanin, §§273 & §277 in which the Court refers to the ‘silent spectator’. 
46 Resolution 2625 (XXV) (1970), Third principle, §2. 
47 Bosnia Genocide, §432. 
48 Ibid. 
49 DRC v Uganda, §179. 
50 Bosnia Genocide, §430. 
51 See also chapter 4, 4.2.3. 
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Some scholars have questioned the validity of the Court’s distinction between complicity and the 
failure to prevent based on act or omission.52 For Aust, where the failure to act is closely connected 
with the obligation breached, it would be justifiable to consider this as falling within the scope of 
aid or assistance.53 This will be the case where a state’s armed forces have deliberately stood by 
and failed to prevent violations of IHL being perpetrated in front of them.54 As Latty asks, ‘should 
not a State which permits transit of its territory by armed groups, being aware of their genocidal 
intention, be recognized as complicit in their acts as a result of its knowing failure to act?’55  
 
There is some force in these arguments. A failure to prevent a wrongful act may be considered 
less serious than participation in the commission of the wrongful act, even if the consequences are 
the same. Complicity implies a deliberate contribution to the wrongful act, whereas a failure to 
prevent a wrongful act may arise out of an incapacity to do so because of a lack of resources, in 
which case the state may be exonerated,56 or because of negligence.57 The distinction between 
complicity in the wrongful act and a failure to prevent the wrongful act lies in the intention58 of 
the state to assist, by doing nothing to stop the armed group, in the commission of the unlawful 
act by the armed group.59  
 
If, contrary to the ICJ’s conclusion in Bosnia Genocide, a state can facilitate the commission of an 
unlawful act by act or by omission, the question then arises as to whether all acts or omissions of 
a state that facilitate the commission of an unlawful act by a non-state actor will engage that state’s 
responsibility for complicity? The ILC Commentary advises that the scope of Article 16 is limited 
by the following four requirements:60 first, the state providing the aid or assistance must be aware 
of the circumstances of the unlawful act;61 second, the aid or assistance must be provided ‘with a 
view to facilitating’ the commission of that unlawful act; third, the aid or assistance must actually 
 
52 Latty (2010) p.359; Aust (2011) pp.226-227. 
53 Aust (2011) pp.229-230. 
54 DRC v Uganda, §209. 
55 Latty (2010) p.359. Also, Jackson (2015) pp.156-157. 
56 DRC v Uganda, §301; Cahin (2010b) p.337. 
57 E.g. Bosnia Genocide, §§422 & 438 in which the ICJ held that Serbia was responsible for its failure to prevent 
genocide in Srebrenica, but that there was insufficient evidence of Serbia’s knowledge of the intention of the 
perpetrators to commit genocide to establish complicity.  
58 See chapter 3, 3.1 & 3.5 on the meaning of ‘intention’ with respect to proving a shared purpose to commit unlawful 
acts. 
59 Cf. Mackenzie-Gray Scott (2019), p.15. 
60 ARS, Article 16, Commentary, §3. 
61 Ibid, §3. 
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facilitate the commission of the unlawful act; and fourth, the unlawful act must breach an 
international obligation by which the assisting state is also bound (the ‘double obligation rule’).62  
 
Each of these requirements, and how the ICJ applied them to the question of state responsibility 
for complicity in genocide, are considered in turn in the sections below.  
 
5.4  Knowledge of the assisting state 
Article 16 ARS requires that the state must provide aid or assistance ‘with knowledge of the 
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act’.63 The inclusion of a mental element to Article 
16 provides an exception to the otherwise ‘objective’ approach of the ARS. Generally, the rules 
do not require any fault element to be established in order for a state’s responsibility to be engaged.  
 
The objective approach to the ARS reflects the influence of early 20th century scholars such as 
Anzilotti on the development of principles embodied in ARS. Anzilotti rejected the notion of 
culpability or fault of the State, commonly attributed to Grotius,64 as an essential requirement for 
responsibility.65 He argued, 
 
Attribution, from the point of view of international law, is nothing other than the 
consequences of the relationship of causality that exists between an act contrary to the law 
of nations and the conduct of the State that is the author of the act.66 
 
However, the exclusion of fault in the majority of rules in the ARS does not equate to its 
irrelevance. As Special Rapporteur Crawford stated, ‘it is an error to think that it is possible to 
eliminate the significance of fault from the articles’.67 The Commentary to Article 2 ARS explains 
that notions of fault and culpability are dependent on the relevant primary obligation of the state 
 
62 Ibid. 
63 Article 16(a) ARS. 
64 Grotius developed the idea of fault-based responsibility of the State. According to Grotius the sovereign incurred 
responsibility as a natural person, including for the acts of individuals, where fault of the sovereign was established: 
Grotius (1625), pp.436-437. 
65 Dupuy (1992) p.143. 
66 Anzilotti, (1906) p.291: ‘L’imputabilité, au point de vue du droit international, n’est donc pas autre chose que la 
conséquence du rapport de causalité qui existe entre un fait contraire au droit des gens et l’activité de l’État dont ce 
fait émane.’ 
67 Crawford (2002) p.13. See also Gattini (1999). 
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and the standard of conduct that amounts to a breach in particular circumstances.68 Generally, the 
question of fault is left to be resolved in each individual case according to the specific violation.69 
 
According to the Commentary, first, ‘the relevant State organ or agency providing the aid or 
assistance must be aware of the circumstances making the conduct of the assisted State 
internationally wrongful’.70 Second, the aid or assistance must be given ‘with a view to facilitating’ 
in the commission of the wrongful act by the other state, and must actually do so.71 The words 
‘with a view to’ are elaborated upon to mean an ‘intention to facilitate’ in the commission of the 
internationally wrongful act.72  
 
The notion that intent is a necessary requirement of complicity was recognized early in the drafting 
process by Special Rapporteur Ago who commented in his seventh report to the ILC (1978) that, 
 
The very idea of ‘complicity’ in the internationally wrongful act of another necessarily 
presupposes an intent to collaborate in the commission of an act of this kind, and hence… 
knowledge of the specific purpose for which the State receiving certain supplies intends to 
use them. Without this condition there can be no question of complicity.73 
 
This strict characterisation of the knowledge requirement by the ILC, has been interpreted by Aust 
to mean ‘something more akin to wrongful intent’.74 However, this interpretation of ‘knowledge’ 
is rather imprecise. Either a state acts with intent to facilitate the commission of an internationally 
wrongful act by another state or it does not.  
 
The requirement that the state must act with ‘knowledge’ and ‘intention’  has been criticised for 
raising the threshold too high thus making ‘the whole construction of complicity unworkable’.75 
For Quigley, the purpose of a state complicity rule is to require states to be cautious about how 
 
68 ARS, Article 2, Commentary, §4. 
69 Crawford (2002) pp.13-14. 
70 ARS, Article 16, Commentary, §3. Also, Crawford (2013) p.407. 
71 Ibid, §§3&5. 
72 ARS, Article 16, Commentary, §5. This formula is rather vague. For the purposes of this thesis the definition of 
intent considered in chapter 3, 3.5 is preferred. To act with ‘intent’ to achieve a particular result means to act 
deliberately   
73 Ago, Seventh Report (1978) p.58 §72.  
74 Aust, (2011) p.235. 
75 Graefrath (1996) p.375. See also Quigley (1986) p.109; Lanovoy (2016) pp.101 & 103. 
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their aid or assistance is used by another state.76 Thus, Quigley posits that knowledge and 
awareness of harm should be sufficient to define complicit conduct.77 However, the suggestion 
that the words ‘or should have known’ should be added to the text of Article 16(a),78 so as to 
introduce a requirement of constructive knowledge on the part of the assisting state, was rejected 
by the ILC’s Drafting Committee. For the Drafting Committee, ‘the knowledge requirement was 
essential, as a narrow formulation of the chapter was the only approach acceptable to many 
States’.79 
 
Some have suggested that intent may be presumed by the existence of actual knowledge of the 
circumstances in which the aid or assistance is to be used.80 According to Lowe, proof of the 
assisting state’s knowledge does not require proof that the assisting state ‘desires or intends’ the 
unlawful use of the aid or assistance: ‘States must be supposed to intend the foreseeable 
consequences of their acts’.81 The existence of a mere possibility that the aid or assistance may be 
used unlawfully will not be sufficient to establish knowledge and an intention to collaborate.82 
However, the unlawful conduct must be foreseeable. Lowe’s reference to foreseeability in his 
interpretation of ‘knowledge’ suggests that constructive knowledge would be sufficient.  Thus, the 
knowledge standard favoured by Lowe is lower than the ‘actual knowledge’ standard favoured by 
the ILC. The ILC’s standard suggests that the assisting state must have actual knowledge of the 
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act and must intend its aid or assistance to be used 
for that purpose.83  
 
Thus, the ILC’s standard is similar to that required in order to prove the existence of a common 
unlawful purpose, as examined in chapter 3.84 It is a strict standard that requires proof of 
knowledge that the commission of the internationally wrongful act by the other state is virtually 
certain, and thus preserves the principle that ‘[a] State providing material or financial assistance or 
 
76 Quigley (1986) p.116. 
77 Ibid. 
78 ILC, Comments of the Government, The Netherlands, (2001), p.52. 
79 First Statement of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee (Peter Tomka), 2681st to 2683rd meetings of the ILC, 
2001, p.19. E.g. Comments of Germany, United Kingdom, United States, 50th Session of the ILC (1998), pp.128-
129; Comments of the United Kingdom & United States, 53rd Session of the ILC (2001), p.52. 
80 Crawford (2013) p.407; Melzer (2013) p.38; Jackson (2015) pp.160-161. 
81 Lowe (2002) p.8. 
82 Ibid, p6. 
83 Nolte & Aust (2009) p.12; Dominicé (2010) p.286; Crawford (2013) p.407; Moynihan (2016) p11. 
84 Section 3.5. 
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aid to another State does not normally assume the risk that its assistance or aid may be used to 
carry out an internationally wrongful act’.85 A state is therefore shielded from responsibility for 
inadvertently aiding or assisting the commission of an internationally wrongful act. This gives rise 
to the question whether a state has a duty to inquire or to obtain knowledge of the circumstances 
in which its aid or assistance will be used. This question is discussed below in section 5.4.2. First, 
the next section considers the following: if the state must have actual knowledge of the 
circumstances of the internationally wrongful act, what exactly must the state know?  
 
5.4.1  Knowledge of the intentions of the principal 
In Bosnia Genocide the ICJ held that ‘at the least’ the assisting state must have knowledge of the 
specific intent of the perpetrator to commit genocide in order to categorise a state’s aid or 
assistance in genocide as complicity.86 Despite finding that substantial military and financial aid 
was provided by the FRY to the VRS that committed the genocide at Srebrenica before and during 
the genocide, there was insufficient proof upon which the Court could be certain that the FRY 
knew that a genocide would or was taking place.87 The Court’s finding suggests that general 
knowledge of the circumstances giving rise to the unlawful act will not be sufficient. What is 
required is knowledge of the facts that make the act unlawful,88 meaning that the state must (a) 
know that the principal intends to commit a certain act; and (b) that all the necessary criteria that 
make that act internationally wrongful will be fulfilled.  
 
The ICJ has been criticised for its failure in Bosnia Genocide to resolve the issue whether the assisting 
state must itself have the specific intent to commit genocide.89 As Milanovic has observed, even if 
one accepts the Court’s finding that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Serbia knew 
genocide would be or was being carried out by Republika Srpska at Srebrenica, that does not justify 
the Court’s failure to answer a legal question put before it.90  It therefore remains to be clarified 
whether the state should share specific intent of the principal to commit genocide in order to 
satisfy the requirements for complicity.91  
 
85 ARS, Article 16, Commentary, §4. 
86 Bosnia Genocide, §421. 
87 Ibid, §422. 
88 Crawford (2013), p.407. Cf. Jackson (2015), p.160. 
89 Milanovic (2007) p.681.  
90 Ibid. 
91 See section 3.5 in which it is argued that a shared specific intent to commit genocide is required in order to prove a 
‘shared unlawful purpose’ and the consequences of this with respect to Vice-President Al-Khasawneh’s argument that 
in this cases ‘overall control’ over the armed group should provide a sufficient basis for attribution of conduct. 
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In his Separate Declaration in Bosnia Genocide Judge Keith held the view that knowledge of the 
specific intent of the principal actor should be sufficient.92 This would bring the fault requirement 
for complicity in genocide into line with the jurisprudence of the ICTY according to which proof 
of knowledge of the genocidal intent of the perpetrator is required.93 Thus, a state that knows that 
the principal intends to commit genocide and continues to provide assistance to the principal 
should not escape responsibility because it only intends to facilitate mass killing without the 
intention to exterminate a particular group.  
 
For Judge Bennouna a state’s knowledge of the perpetrator’s intent to commit genocide will be 
proven if ‘the aid or assistance continued even though the [state] knew or should have known that 
the recipients were preparing to commit an act of genocide and the [state] thus supported them in 
the pursuit of their aims’.94  On this basis a state would be responsible for complicity in genocide 
(or any other crime of specific intent) if the commission of the crime is foreseeable, based upon a 
history of abuse or upon information available to the state at the time, and state nevertheless 
provides support or continues to provide support.95  
 
The knowledge standard proposed by Judge Bennouna is similar to the principles underlying the 
rules developed in IHL and IHRL that prohibit encouragement, aid or assistance of violations of 
IHL and the facilitation of human rights violations committed by third states or non-state actors. 
As explained in chapter 4, these primary rules tend to rely upon constructive knowledge of the 
state and the foreseeability of the risk of harm.96 Therefore, it is arguable that state complicity in 
the crime of genocide should require the same constructive knowledge standard. Actual knowledge 
of specific intent to commit genocide, the standard set as a baseline by the ICJ and proposed by 
Judge Keith as the correct standard, is overly restrictive.  
 
There are persuasive reasons why constructive knowledge should be sufficient to show state 
complicity in the unlawful acts of non-state actors. First, for the purposes of Article 16, the ILC 
 
92 Bosnia Genocide, Declaration of Judge Keith, §§5-7. Also, Declaration of Judge Bennouna, p.361 who posits that a 
state must have ‘actual or constructive knowledge of the nature of the crime which the principal is preparing to 
commit’. 
93 E.g. ICTY Krstic, §140. 
94 Bosnia Genocide, Separate Declaration of Judge Bennouna, p.363. 
95 Becker (2006), p.345 with respect to complicity in terrorism. 
96 Sections 4.3.2 & 4.4.1. The ICRC’s interpretation of the degree of knowledge required to prove aid or assistance in 
violations of IHL is an exception. 
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has posited that a state that provides aid or assistance to another state ‘should not be required to 
assume the risk that the latter will divert the aid for purposes which may be internationally 
unlawful’.97 A state is presumed to carry out its international obligations in good faith. The 
knowledge standard required by Article 16, together with the requirement of a causal nexus, 
ensures that there is a close connection between the aid or assistance provided and the commission 
of the internationally wrongful act.98 However, a state cannot presume a non-state actor, whether 
a person or an entity, will act in good faith or comply with international law if that non-state actor 
has not itself undertaken to be bound by international law.   
 
Second, the requirement of actual knowledge may encourage ‘wilful blindness’ on the part of the 
state. A state will be wilfully blind if that state, knowing what the answer is likely to be, does not 
ask any questions of the purpose to which its aid or assistance will be put. As a matter of policy, 
and the integrity of international law, this not acceptable. Moreover, it is unlikely that a tribunal 
would allow a state to evade responsibility if that state deliberately failed to make the necessary 
inquiries as to the nature and purpose of the assisted act in circumstances where there are clear 
indications that the state’s aid or assistance will be put to an unlawful purpose.99  
 
5.4.2  A duty to acquire knowledge? 
The question then arises as to whether the assisting state is under a general duty to acquire 
knowledge of the purpose for which its assistance will be used.100 For Quigley, in the context of 
the question of state complicity in the internationally wrongful acts of another state, the assisting 
state should be under a duty to inquire whether the assisted state will violate international law using 
the aid or assistance, ‘if [the assisting state] has information about the plans but does not know 
their extent’.101 The requirement that a state should carry out due diligence implies a constructive 
knowledge standard that the ILC did not accept for the purposes of Article 16 ARS. However, 
there is little reason why states should not be held to a higher standard when it comes to the 
provision of aid or assistance to armed groups, unless it is accepted that an armed group should 
be presumed to act in compliance with international law. In the face of overwhelming evidence to 
the contrary, it is highly unlikely that such a presumption will be accepted as principle. 
 
97 ARS, Introductory Commentary to Chapter IV, §8. 
98 Ibid. On causation see section 5.5 below. 
99 Lowe (2002), p.10. See also Jackson (2015), p.162. 




The ICJ did not consider whether the FRY was wilfully blind to the VRS’ intention to commit 
genocide. Had the Court done so it may well have found the FRY complicit, notwithstanding the 
requirement that knowledge must be proven ‘beyond any doubt’.102 The Court’s conclusion that 
the FRY did not actually know of the VRS leaders’ specific intent to commit genocide at Srebrenica 
was based on its determination that the necessary intent to commit genocide was not established 
until on or about 12 or 13 July.103 The decision to commit genocide ‘was not brought’ to the FRY 
authorities when it was taken, the decision was taken shortly before it was carried out, and the 
genocide took place over a short time - only three days.104 However, the Court also held that the 
FRY gave substantial financial, military and political aid to Republika Srpska and VRS before and 
during the genocide at Srebrenica.105 Even if the FRY would not have had time to make the 
necessary inquiries before the VRS began to commit the genocide, it would have had the 
opportunity to do so while the genocide was being carried out and therefore to withdraw its 
support. Thus, the question should not have been whether the decision to commit genocide ‘was 
brought to the attention’ of the FRY, but whether the FRY, in the face of clear evidence of a 
massacre, inquired as to the purpose of that massacre. 
 
5.5  Causal Nexus 
Complicity requires the existence of a causal nexus between the provision of aid or assistance and 
the commission of the specific act.106 The existence of a causal nexus is a question of fact, left to 
be considered on a case-by-case basis.107 According to the ILC Commentary, the aid or assistance 
must actually facilitate the commission of the wrongful act;108 but,  ‘[t]here is no requirement that 
the aid or assistance should have been essential to the performance of the internationally wrongful 
act; it is sufficient if it contributed significantly to that act’.109 The Commentary is not entirely clear 
on the extent to which the aid or assistance must contribute to the commission of the principal’s 
act. With respect to the assisting state’s liability to pay compensation, the Commentary later states 
that assistance ‘may only have been an incidental factor in the commission of the primary act, and 
 
102 Bosnia Genocide, §422. Also §§209. 
103 Ibid, §295. 
104 Ibid, §423. 
105 Ibid, §422. 
106 Lowe (2002), p.5; Jackson (2015), p.158. See further Gardner (2001). 
107 Aust (2011) p.210; Crawford (2013), p.407. 
108 ARS, Article 16, Commentary, §§3 & 5. 
109 Ibid, §5. 
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may have only contributed to a minor degree, if at all, to the injury suffered’.110 This suggests that 
a state may be held responsible even if its aid or assistance was only ‘incidental’ to the commission 
of the unlawful act by the principal.111  
 
However, some scholars have argued that founding a state’s responsibility for complicity on the 
basis of aid or assistance that provided some indirect or remote contribution to the commission 
of the unlawful act is not advisable.112  Without a causal nexus that as a minimum requires that the 
aid or assistance significantly contributed to the commission of the unlawful act, the scope of 
Article 16 could be extremely wide.113 However, there will be circumstances in which assistance 
‘incidental’ to the unlawful act may nevertheless be an important contribution to its commission. 
For example, the transfer of a surface-to-air missile by Russia to an armed group may be ‘incidental’ 
to the armed group’s decision to use that missile to shoot down flight MH-17, but the armed group 
could not have shot down the aircraft without the missile. By contrast, if the aiding state’s 
contribution is significant and essential to the commission of the unlawful act the state may exceed 
the complicit role and in fact be a co-principal.114 The contribution required for complicity will sit 
somewhere in between these two thresholds. Whether or not the contribution was more than 
incidental but less than that of co-perpetrator will depend on the circumstances of each case. For 
example, a state that provides an armed group with the facilities to develop chemical weapons will 
make a significant contribution to a chemical attack by that armed group. However, a state that 
provides chemical weapons to the armed group and the training on how to use them will make a 
significant and essential contribution to the attack and may be treated as a co-principal. 
 
 
5.6  The Dual Obligation Requirement 
According to Article 16 ARS, a state will only be responsible for aiding and assisting the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act by another state if the act would be internationally 
wrongful if committed by the former state.115 Underlying this limitation on the scope of Article 16 
is the principle that ‘a state cannot do by another what it cannot do by itself’.116 Therefore, where 
 
110 Ibid, §10. [Emphasis added] 
111 Jackson (2015), p.158. 
112 Aust (2011) p.197; Jackson (2015), p.158. 
113 Lowe (2002), p.5; Jackson (2015), p.158. 
114 A state’s responsibility as a co-perpetrator is governed by Article 47 ASR (Plurality of Responsibility of States).  
115 Article 16(b) ARS. 
116 ARS, Article 16, Commentary, §6. 
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the principal state has acted in violation of a treaty obligation, the aiding state’s responsibility will 
only be engaged if it is also party to the particular treaty. In this way the dual obligation requirement 
is an expression of the pacta tertiis rule, according to which a treaty cannot bind a third state without 
that state’s consent.117 As the Commentary explains,  
…a State is free to act for itself in a way which is inconsistent with the obligations of 
another State vis-a ̀-vis third States. Any question of responsibility in such cases will be a 
matter for the State to whom assistance is provided vis-a ̀-vis the injured State’.118  
In circumstances where the principal has acted in violation of an obligation under customary 
international law, both states will be bound by the obligation, and the assisting state may be held 
responsible under Article 16. The question then arises whether, in order for a state to be complicit 
in a violation of international law by a non-state actor, the latter must be bound by the same 
obligation as a state? 
 
Historically, only states could have international personality, and therefore only states were capable 
of committing internationally wrongful acts and of incurring international responsibility for those 
acts.119 It followed that as there was no rule of international law that recognised individuals as 
‘subjects’ of international law.120 An individual did not hold obligations under international law, an 
individual could not breach international law, and thus a state could not be an accomplice or 
complicit in a breach of international law by an individual.121 
 
States continue to be the primary holders of rights and obligations under international law. 
However, the notion that only states are subjects of international law is no longer sustainable. 
International law has developed such that it is now recognised that other entities, such as 
individuals, corporations and international organisations, may possess international personality.122 
The notion that non-state actors hold obligations under IHRL remains controversial,123 but it is 
 
117 Ibid. The pacta tertiis rule is reflected in Articles 34 & 35 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. 
118 Ibid. 
119 E.g. Anzilotti (1906) p.286; Pellet (2010) p.6; de Frouville (2010) p.276. 
120 Ibid. For a comprehensive study of the development of legal theory of State responsibility from the Roman law 
doctrine of jus gentium, to Grotius to Anzillotti see Hessbruegge (2004); See also Becker (2006) pp.13-38 & pp.43-66, 
Pellet (2010) pp.5-6. 
121 de Frouville (2010), p.276. 
122 Pellet (2010) pp.6-7; Schwarzenberger (1976) p.42; de Frouville (2010) p.277; Clapham (2006).  
123 Rodley (2013) pp.524-526. 
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now accepted that that armed groups participating in armed conflicts hold obligations under IHL. 
Individuals may also be held responsible for committing acts contrary to ICL.124  As Crawford 
posits, ‘any person or aggregate of persons has the capacity to be given rights and duties by states, 
and in an era of human rights, investment protection and international criminal law, everyone is at 
some level ‘the bearer of rights and duties’ under international law’.125  
 
The acceptance, as a matter of principle, that international law may bind non-state actors appears 
to remove the conceptual obstacle to a general rule on state complicity in the unlawful acts of a 
non-state actor. If non-state actors can hold international obligations then it follows that a non-
state actor may commit an internationally wrongful act by acting in breach of that obligation. The 
question then arises whether, in order for a state to be complicit in that breach, the non-state actor 
must be bound by the same obligation as the state. 
 
The dual obligation requirement, as provided by Article 16, can be satisfied if state complicity in 
the unlawful acts of armed groups is approached within the framework of IHL. First, an 
international armed conflict is not necessarily a conflict between two states. It may also be a 
conflict between a state and a non-state armed group that is recognised as a ‘national liberation 
movement’, or peoples ‘fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against 
racist regimes in exercise of their right of self-determination’.126 In these circumstances the armed 
group will be bound by the same obligations as the state. Second, it is well-established that IHL 
will bind the parties to a non-international armed conflict.127 The obligations of states and armed 
groups that are parties to non-international armed conflict are provided by CA1 and CA3, 
Additional Protocol II (APII), and customary IHL, as well as written agreements entered into 
during the course of the conflict by the parties to the conflict.128 Pursuant to CA3, all parties to 
the conflict should undertake obligations to ensure the humane treatment of persons not taking 
active part in hostilities.129 All parties are prohibited from directly targeting civilians,130 
 
124 Articles 1, 2, 8(2)(c) & (e) Rome Statute. 
125 Crawford (2007) p.28. Also, Higgins (1994) p.49. 
126 Article 1(4) API. 
127 ICRC Customary IHL Database, Introduction; Sivakumaran, (2012) pp.181-182. 
128 On the practice of ad hoc written agreements on commitments to IHL and human rights law see Sivakumaran 
(2012) pp.124-139. 
129 Common Article 3 to GCs. 
130 This is a rule of customary IHL and Article 13(2) APII. See further the ICRC Customary IHL Database, rule 1. 
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indiscriminate attacks,131 hostage-taking,132 acts of terrorism,133 torture,134 inhuman and degrading 
treatment,135 rape,136 slavery137 and pillage,138 or threatening to commit any of those acts.139 
Moreover, as the ICRC Study on Customary IHL demonstrates, state practice has gone beyond 
the regulatory framework provided by treaty law and has extended rules applicable to international 
armed conflicts to non-international armed conflicts.140 Accordingly, the dual obligation 
requirement will often be satisfied in circumstances where a state is complicit in the commission 
of a violation of IHL by an armed group that is party to an armed conflict. 
 
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the limitation on the scope of state responsibility for 
complicity that results from the dual obligation requirement is necessary or desirable. For Jackson, 
the requirement places ‘undue limitation on the operation of a prohibition on complicity in 
international law’.141 A general rule that prohibits complicity in any unlawful act, whether or not 
the complicit state would be in breach of its own international obligations if it committed the act, 
would go some way to ensuring that states respect the rule of law. Moreover, the dual obligation 
rule fails to recognise the wider interests of the international community in states’ compliance with 
international law.142  
 
The concern that the dual obligation requirement fails to recognise the wider community interests 
arises with respect to the formulation of a rule on state complicity in international crimes. 
Questions of individual criminal responsibility and state responsibility under international law are 
distinct.143 For example, only natural persons may be prosecuted for genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes under the Rome Statute,144 and thereby incur individual criminal 
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143 ARS, Article 58, Commentary, §3. 
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responsibility for those acts. The Rome Statute does not define ‘state crimes’ or state responsibility 
for crimes committed by individuals.145 In addition there are a number of treaties according to 
which states agree that certain acts constitute crimes under international law146 or ‘offences of 
grave concern in the international community’,147 whether or not those acts are committed in times 
of peace or war. The underlying purpose of this body of treaties is to enhance international 
cooperation in efforts to prevent the commission of such acts.148 In order to achieve this aim, the 
treaties oblige states to criminalise these acts in domestic law149 and to establish jurisdiction to 
prosecute those offences in the domestic courts.150  
 
Thus, these treaties do not conceive the acts as ‘state crimes’, nor do the terms of these treaties 
expressly prohibit states from committing those acts. The obligation of states is to prevent the 
commission of such acts by individuals, whether those individuals are state or non-state actors, by 
implementing the appropriate domestic legislation to criminalise such acts under domestic criminal 
law, and to prosecute and punish individual offenders.151  Thus, de Frouville has argued that ‘if the 
individual cannot be an ‘accomplice’ to a wrongful act of the State, the State can conversely not 
be the accomplice of an international crime within the meaning of international criminal law’.152 
However the ICJ’s interpretation of a state’s obligations pursuant to the Genocide Convention in 
Bosnia Genocide has opened up the possibility that a state may be complicit in an international crime 
committed by an individual or group of individuals. As the following section will show, the ICJ 
applied the notion of dual responsibility rather than dual obligation. I argue that the former does 
not require that the obligation of the state and the non-state actor arise out of the same 
international instrument but a shared origin in an underlying principle of international law. 
 
145 Article 25(4) Rome Statute states that ‘No provision of this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility 
shall affect the responsibility of States under international law’. Similarly, Article 58 ARS provides that the ARS are 
without prejudice to the question of individual responsibility under international law. 
146 E.g. Article I Genocide Convention. 
147 E.g. Hostages Convention. 
148 Also, Cassese (2005) pp.876-877. 
149 E.g. Article III Genocide Convention; Article 1 Hague Hijacking Convention; Article 1(2)(b) Hostages 
Convention; Article 2(3) Bombings Convention; Article 2 Financing Convention. 
150 E.g. Article 4 Hague Hijacking Convention; Article 5 Hostages Convention; Article 6 Bombings Convention; 
Article 7 Financing Convention. 
151 Gaeta (2007). 
152 de Frouville (2010) p.277. This theory may be tested by the Dutch municipal court in The Hague that in February 
2019 heard preliminary arguments on the court’s jurisdiction to determine a claim against the oil company Royal 
Dutch Shell on the basis of its alleged complicity in the state execution of nine protesters following a manifestly 
unfair trial and human rights abuses committed by Nigeria during the 1990s. The Court is due to give its ruling on 
jurisdiction in May 2019. See Austin, R., ‘Ogoni widows testify at The Hague over Shell’s alleged complicity in 
killings’, The Guardian, 12 February 2019. 
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Understood in this way, the notion of dual responsibility surmounts the once perceived conceptual 
obstacle to state complicity in the unlawful acts of non-state actors generally. 
 
5.6.1  ICJ’s approach in Bosnia Genocide and the notion of dual responsibility 
Bosnia Genocide suggests that, rather than a duality of obligation, a duality of responsibility will be 
required in order for a state to be complicit in an international crime. 153 The notion, described by 
the Court as ‘a constant feature of international law’,154 is reflected in Article 58 ARS and Article 
25(4) of the Rome Statute, that provide that a finding of state responsibility is without prejudice 
to any question of individual responsibility and vice versa.155 According to the ICJ’s approach, 
duality of responsibility differs from the notion of duality of obligation as expressed in Article 16 
ARS. Duality of responsibility requires that the obligation of the state and of the individual must 
derive from the same source, in the immediate case the Genocide Convention, but state 
responsibility and individual responsibility may be engaged on different terms.156 According to the 
ICJ, 
The Court sees nothing in the wording or the structure of the provisions of the Convention 
relating to individual criminal liability which would displace the meaning of Article I, read with 
paragraphs (a) to (e) of Article III, so far as these provisions impose obligations on States distinct 
from the obligations which the Convention requires them to place on individuals.157  
However, it must be remembered that the ICJ was constrained by its limited competence that 
meant it could only consider Serbia’s obligations under the Convention and not customary 
international law. It is therefore open to question whether duality of responsibility requires the 
prohibition of conduct to arise out of the same source or instrument of international law, or 
whether it is sufficient for the prohibitions to originate from the same underlying principle of 
international law. 
In Bosnia Genocide Serbia had submitted in reply to allegations that it was responsible for acts of 
genocide committed in Bosnia during the Balkans conflict that the Genocide Convention was 
merely intended to enhance international cooperation on the prosecution and punishment of 
 
153 Bosnia Genocide §173. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid.  
156 Ibid, §163 & §§173-174. 
157 Ibid, §174. 
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individuals for the crime of genocide. As such, the Convention did not prohibit States Parties from 
committing genocide, and therefore the Court did not have jurisdiction ratione materiae to consider 
state responsibility for acts of genocide, and only had jurisdiction to consider state responsibility 
for the failure to prevent and punish genocide.158  
The Court disposed of Serbia’s argument by adopting an expansive interpretation of Article I, and 
the Convention as a whole, according to which States Parties ‘undertake to prevent and punish’ 
genocide, in light of  the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention, and the status of 
genocide as ‘a crime under international law’.159 The Court concluded that the effect of the 
obligation to prevent and punish genocide necessarily implies the obligation not to commit 
genocide.160 According to the Court’s interpretation of Article I of the Convention, the Article 
imposes positive and negative obligations on States Parties that are distinct: the obligation to 
prevent genocide and the obligation not to commit genocide.161  
It follows that States Parties to the Convention can be held responsible for the commission of all 
acts that constitute the offences listed in Article III that are attributable to them. Those acts include 
complicity in genocide.162 In effect, the Court interpreted Article I by analogy to the undertaking 
common to human rights treaties whereby state undertake to ‘respect and ensure’ individual 
human rights and freedoms of all individuals in the state’s jurisdiction.163 As explained in chapter 
4, that undertaking has been interpreted by international human rights courts to entail an obligation 
not to acquiesce in or assist the commission of violations of the human rights by another state or 
non-state actor.164 
The ICJ noted that the term ‘complicity’ refers to a well-known category of criminal conduct and 
therefore appears particularly well adapted to penal sanction against individuals’.165 However, the 
ICJ considered that ‘[i]t would however not be in keeping with the object and purpose of the 
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Convention to deny that the international responsibility of a State — even though quite different 
in nature from criminal responsibility — can be engaged through one of the acts, other than 
genocide itself, enumerated in Article III’.166  
The Court’s interpretation of the Genocide Convention has been criticised. Cassese agrees with 
the Court’s interpretation of Article I so as to include the obligation not to commit genocide, but 
questions whether the Court’s extension of the obligations of States Parties not to commit the acts 
enumerated in Article III on the basis of the object and purpose of the Convention alone was 
justified.167 For Cassese, the Court’s extension of state obligations not to commit inter alia 
complicity in genocide ‘is in stark contrast’ to the Court’s rejection of the Tadic overall control test 
on the basis that it ‘stretches too far, almost to breaking point, the connection that must exist 
between the conduct of a State’s organs and its international responsibility’.168 Accordingly, Cassese 
questions, without offering an answer, whether it is ‘not also excessive unduly to widen state 
responsibility for genocide, without any support to this effect in state practice and opinio juris, or at 
least in general principles?’.169 However, Cassese’s critique fails to consider that the Court’s 
approach does not widen state responsibility for genocide itself, as the application of the overall 
control test as a rule of attribution would, but engages state responsibility for certain acts related 
to the commission of genocide, namely conspiracy, incitement, complicity, and attempts to 
commit genocide. 
Some judges criticised the Court’s focus on the purposive approach to the interpretation of Article 
I and its conclusion that the obligation not to commit genocide is inherent in the obligation to 
prevent genocide. In a Joint Declaration Judges Shi and Koroma rejected this finding of the 
majority.170 For them the object and purpose of the Convention is to prevent and punish genocide, 
and the Convention is therefore directed at individuals and not at states.171 Accordingly, the state’s 
obligation to prevent genocide ‘has to be interpreted in the light of Article VI [the obligation to 
prosecute] and the attempt in the Judgment to sever Article I of the Convention from Articles IV, 
 
166 Ibid. 
167 Cassese (2005) p.878. 
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V, VI, VII and VIII, in order to reach the outcome stated in the Judgment, is to us legally 
unsustainable’.172  
Judge Owada agreed with the majority that international law recognises the principle of duality of 
responsibility but stressed that the question for the Court in the immediate case was whether the 
Genocide Convention recognised duality of responsibility for genocide.173 For Judge Owada, the 
question of state responsibility for acts of genocide was a separate question to the state’s obligation 
to prevent genocide.174 The former question may be determined by the terms of the 
compromissory clause of the Convention that defines the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court.175 
The adding of the words, ‘including those [disputes] relating to the responsibility of a State for 
genocide’ to the standard formula used for such clauses that ordinarily refer simply to disputes 
relating to the interpretation and application of the treaty, brings, ‘albeit through the jurisdictional 
backdoor… the justiciability of the question of State responsibility under general international law 
for an internationally wrongful act of genocide… within the scope of the jurisdiction of the 
Convention’.176  
The criticism of Judges Shi, Koroma and Owada has some merit. Although as a matter of logic it 
is arguable that inherent to an obligation to prevent an act is the obligation not to commit that act, 
the absence of any express provision in the operative clauses of the Genocide Convention 
providing for state responsibility for the commission of genocide suggests that the Contracting 
Parties did not envisage such a broad interpretation of Article I, or that state responsibility for 
genocide would be engaged on the same terms as individual criminal responsibility for genocide.177 
Treaties, such as the Genocide Convention, that require States Parties to prevent the commission 
of certain acts by individuals and to ensure that the acts constitute offences under domestic 
criminal law are a manifestation of the state’s general obligation to take positive measures to 
prevent and punish such acts, with the specific purpose of enhancing international cooperation in 
the suppression of such acts. The acknowledgment that a specific act constitutes a crime that the 
state must punish and take steps to prevent is evidence that the act is prohibited under international 
 
172 Ibid, §4. 
173 Bosnia Genocide, Separate Opinion of Judge Owada, §56. 
174 Ibid, §58. 
175 Ibid, §60. 
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law.178 However, the obligation to prevent an act is not the source of the prohibition of that act. 
The treaty obliges states to make the specific act offences in domestic law. The international 
prohibition, upon which state responsibility and international criminal responsibility is based, is 
provided by a separate body of rules provided by customary international law.179  
It is overly formalistic to require that the state’s obligation not to commit a specific act and the 
obligation to prevent that act derive from the same international instrument. The question should 
instead be whether state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility flow from a common 
underlying principle of international law.180 As noted above, it should be appreciated that in Bosnia 
Genocide the Court was constrained by its limited jurisdiction to consider only state responsibility 
under the Genocide Convention. However, questions whether a court has jurisdiction to consider 
a particular issue should not dictate questions of a state’s responsibility generally. As the 
commentary to Article 16 ARS states,  
States are entitled to assert complicity in the wrongful conduct of another State even though no 
international court may have jurisdiction to rule on the charge, at all or in the absence of the other 
State.181  
Thus, it is not necessary to tether the dual responsibility requirement to the question whether the 
specific instrument recognises the duality of responsibility in order to invoke state responsibility 
for acts that also engage individual criminal responsibility. The provisions of treaties that require 
states to penalise certain offences in domestic law are expressions of general principles of 
international law. These treaties are manifestations of an agreement amongst State Parties that the 
acts proscribed therein are prohibited by international law, and that the suppression of those acts, 
including those in which states are directly or indirectly involved, is essential for the maintenance 
of international peace and security.182 Gaeta argues that ‘[t]he state can incur international 
responsibility for [an international crime] only if, alongside the international criminal rule, there 
exists a corresponding rule that is addressed to states and has exactly the same content as the criminal 
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one, i.e., an international rule that provides in the same terms for the criminal responsibility of 
individuals and the international responsibility of states’.183 If this view is accepted, the duality 
responsibility requirement is satisfied even if corresponding rules that give rise to international 
crimes and the internationally wrongful acts of states are expressed in separate instruments. 
In Bosnia Genocide the ICJ was careful to confine its reasoning to the provisions of the Genocide 
Convention, stressing that the Court did not ‘purport to establish a general jurisprudence 
applicable to all cases where a treaty instrument, or other binding legal norm, includes an obligation 
on States to prevent certain acts’.184 Nevertheless, the ICJ’s interpretation of the Genocide 
Convention may have important implications for the interpretation of a state’s obligations 
pursuant to other ‘criminal law’ treaties, particularly in future cases in which the competence of 
the court is limited to determination of a state’s obligations under a specific treaty. For example, 
the ICJ’s approach in Bosnia Genocide has clearly influenced the submissions of Ukraine in its 
Application Instituting Proceedings against Russia before the ICJ. Ukraine has submitted that 
Russia’s active support for certain terrorist acts, combined with its failure to prevent or investigate 
financing that contributed to those acts, is a violation of its obligation to prevent the financing of 
terrorism.185 According to Ukraine’s Application, ‘Far from preventing the financing of terrorism, 
the Russian Federation has financed terrorism as a matter of state policy. These actions are blatant 
violations of Article 18 of the Terrorism Financing Convention’.186 There is strength in this 
argument. It is difficult to argue that a state that has financed terrorism has fulfilled its obligation 
to prevent the financing of terrorism.187  
In light of the ICJ’s statement in Bosnia Genocide that it was not purporting to establish general 
jurisprudence in relation the obligation to prevent,188 it is not surprising that Russia has argued that 
the Financing Convention ‘does not cover matters of State responsibility for the financing of such 
activities by the State itself’, and therefore ‘purported instances of a State itself allegedly financing 
acts of terrorism as defined by the Convention do not fall within the jurisdiction provided for in 
Article 24 of the Convention’.189 It is likely that Russia will seize on arguments made by Judges 
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Owada and Tomka in Bosnia Genocide and seek to distinguish the compromissory clause of the 
Financing Convention from its equivalent in the Genocide Convention on the basis that the 
former only refers to disputes relating to the ‘interpretation and application of th[e] Convention’ 
and not to state responsibility for any of the acts enumerated in the Convention.190 Yet, the ICJ’s 
emphasis in Bosnia Genocide was on the nature of a state’s obligations pursuant to Article I of the 
Genocide Convention, rather than on the jurisdiction clause. It is open to the Court to adopt the 
same approach in Ukraine v Russia. If it does, then the Court’s interpretation of the obligation to 
prevent may be applied in future cases to support claims of state responsibility for complicity in 
the commission of other international crimes. Most treaties that place obligations on states to 
prevent the commission of certain acts by individuals identify acting as an accomplice as a criminal 
offence.191 For example, pursuant to the Hague Hijacking Convention, states are under an 
obligation to make being an accomplice to the hijacking of aircraft, as defined by the Convention, 
a criminal offence under domestic law.192 Applying the approach of the ICJ in Bosnia Genocide, a 
state that provides financial, logistical and other support could be held internationally responsible 
for complicity by acting as ‘an accomplice’ in the hijacking.  
5.7  An emerging general rule?  
The general acceptance of the notion that international law can and does impose obligations on 
non-state actors raises the prospect that states may be held responsibility for complicity in 
violations of IHL and IHRL by armed groups, and the commission of offences under ICL by 
individuals. Bosnia Genocide held the door open to the possibility of state responsibility for 
complicity in international crimes. Moreover, as shown in chapter 4, states are prohibited from 
encouraging violations of IHL by armed groups and, under IHRL, prohibited from transferring 
individuals into the jurisdiction of another state or control of a non-state entity where there is a 
real risk of a flagrant violation of that individual’s rights and freedoms. The development of these 
lex specialis rules of IHL and IHRL is a clear acknowledgement of the need for international law to 
address state involvement and participation in the unlawful acts of non-state actors that stand 
alone as crimes.  
 
 
190 Article 24(1) Financing Convention. 
191 E.g. Article 1 Hague Hijacking Convention requires states to make acting as ‘an accomplice to’ a person who 
hijacks or attempts to hijack an aircraft a criminal offence. See also Article 1(2)(b) Hostages Convention; Article 2(3) 
Bombing Convention; Article 2 Financing Convention. 
192 Articles 1, 2 & 4 Hague Hijacking Convention. 
 111 
The already existing primary obligations of states are sufficient to address state participation in a 
number of violations of international law. However, the existence of specific substantive rules 
prohibiting state complicity in certain unlawful acts by non-state actors, and requiring states to 
take measures to prevent the commission of those acts does not preclude the existence of a general 
rule.193 A general rule of derivative responsibility of states for complicity in violations of 
international law by non-state actors would close the responsibility gap that exists in instances 
where the state’s obligation to respect and ensure respect for IHL pursuant to CA1, and obligation 
to respect and ensure IHRL do not apply. For example, the general rule would cover circumstances 
where a state provides aid or assistance to an armed group that uses that aid or assistance to 
commit a terrorist bombing on the territory of another state, or a crime against humanity, 
prohibited conduct that is not necessarily committed in situations of armed conflict.  
 
Thus, a general rule of derivative responsibility for complicity in violations of international law by 
non-state actors would be an important contribution to the progressive development of the law 
of state responsibility and would complement the primary obligations of states. A rule of derivative 
responsibility would preserve the current control-agency paradigm that is central to the ARS by 
ensuring that a state is only responsible for its own acts.194 Importantly, a general rule of derivative 
responsibility would provide legal foundation to the political condemnation of states that are 
complicit in violations of international law by non-state actors but currently evade international 
responsibility by keeping those non-state actors at arms-length.  
 
The question then arises as to what a general rule should look like? One approach may be to follow 
the approach of ICJ in Bosnia Genocide and apply Article 16 ARS by analogy.195 In the absence of a 
general rule on state complicity in the unlawful acts of non-state actors in the ARS, Article 16 has 
been drawn on by analogy by states and human rights mechanisms to warn states that provide 
military and other support to armed groups of the possibility that their responsibility may be 
engaged. In 2013 Austria drew on Article 16 by way of analogy in order to warn states that had 
supplied arms to armed opposition groups in Syria that they might incur responsibility for 
complicity in the commission of internationally wrongful acts by those groups.196 The Austrian 
paper draws attention to the conclusions of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry 
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on the Syrian Arab Republic that armed opposition groups in Syria had committed war crimes and 
other unlawful acts. According to Austria, ‘[s]hould supplied arms be used by armed opposition 
groups in the commission of internationally wrongful acts, the States who had supplied these arms 
and had knowledge of these acts would incur State responsibility for their aid and assistance in the 
commission of such acts’.197  
 
However, it is questionable whether a general rule of derivative responsibility for complicity in the 
unlawful acts of armed groups should adopt the same strict knowledge standard – ‘knowledge and 
the intention to facilitate’ - as Article 16 ARS. As explained in chapter 4, primary rules that prohibit 
state complicity in violations of IHL and IHRL tend to apply a constructive knowledge standard.198  
According to these rules the relevant question is whether the state knew or should to have known 
that its conduct would encourage, or its assistance would be used in, the commission of the 
violation of IHL or IHRL.199 The constructive knowledge standard is favoured by the Independent 
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic that, citing Article 16 ARS in 
support of its determination that ‘in addition to the specific obligations’ of the parties to the Syrian 
conflict to respect and ensure respect for IHL, concludes:200  
In addition to the specific obligations under international humanitarian law of all parties engaged 
in the Syrian conflict, the Commission reiterates that every state providing arms, funding, and 
other forms of support is required to refrain from providing such support if there is an expectation 
based on past conduct of the recipients that it will encourage the commission of violations of 
international humanitarian law.201 
Thus, with respect to a general rule on state responsibility for complicity in the unlawful conduct 
of armed groups (and other non-state actors), there is support for view that the application of a 
constructive knowledge standard is appropriate. Such a standard would mean that states are 
required to conduct due diligence to acquire knowledge of the circumstances in which the armed 
group proposes to use the state’s financial, military or other support. Accordingly, a state that 
supplies an armed group with weapons, in circumstances where a state should have known that 
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those weapons may be used in the commission of acts contrary to IHL or for other unlawful 
purposes, would be responsible for complicity in such acts.  
 
Moreover, the application of such a rule should not be conditional upon the fulfilment of the ‘dual 
obligation’ criterion required by Article 16 ARS such that the state and the armed group must be 
bound by the same obligation arising out of the same treaty instrument or international law. As 
argued in section 5.6, such a criterion would be overly restrictive. The purpose of a general rule of 
state responsibility for complicity is to ensure that states do not evade their international 
obligations by delegating warfare or other conduct to a proxy. Therefore, the existence of ‘dual 
responsibility’ should be sufficient. In other words, the rule should apply in circumstances where 
members of an armed group are individually responsible for the commission of acts that constitute 
offences as defined by international law, and if those acts would, if attributable to the state, 
constitute an internationally wrongful act of the state arising out of any customary or treaty-based 
norm binding on the state.  
 
5.8  Conclusion 
The ICJ’s treatment of state responsibility for violations of international law committed by non-
state actors in Bosnia Genocide, Nicaragua and DRC v Uganda demonstrates a gap in the current law 
of state responsibility. This gap exists between direct attribution for the acts of groups under the 
effective control of a state and the failure to prevent the crimes and other violations of non-state 
actors. In some instances that gap may be filled by a state’s obligation to ensure respect for the 
IHL pursuant to CA1, that includes the negative obligation to refrain from encouraging violations 
of IHL. However, there will still be cases where the CA1 principles, or a state’s human rights 
obligations, will not apply, as where the state is accused of complicity in crimes against humanity 
or terrorist acts that are not necessarily committed in situations of armed conflict.  
 
In practice, according to the rules of attribution as codified by the ARS, a state that provides 
sometimes substantial, military and financial support to an armed group that commits unlawful 
acts is likely evade international responsibility for any contribution that support made to the 
commission of those acts. This is the case even if it was foreseeable that the armed group would 
use the state’s support in the commission of the particular act. In circumstances where a state 
intends for its support to be use in the commission of unlawful acts, that state is able to escape 
liability for its contribution to injury that it would otherwise be liable for if the aid or assistance 
were provided to another state. States show no sign of abandoning the practice of proxy warfare. 
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A general rule of derivative responsibility for complicity in the unlawful acts of armed groups will 
go some way to closing the responsibility gap. Moreover, this rule would act as a deterrent to states 
that are reckless as to the methods used by their proxies and ensure that states are not able to 
evade their obligations under international law by use of a proxy.  
 115 
PART II: REBEL GOVERNORS AND SUCCESSFUL INSURRECTIONS 
 
Part II of this thesis considers Articles 9 and 10 ARS that are exceptions to the control-agency 
paradigm that is otherwise central to the ARS and the identification of a state’s de facto organs or 
agents. The rules of attribution of conduct provided by Articles 9 and 10 cover the conduct of 
‘persons or entities that exercise elements of the governmental authority in the absence or default 
of the official authorities’ and of insurrectional movements that succeed in forming a new 
government or a new state respectively. Articles 9 and 10 have been generally overshadowed by 
the ‘effective control vs overall control’ debate considered in Part I, and therefore have received 
limited attention. Nevertheless, these rules of attribution raise important questions concerning the 
extent to which a state is, and should be, responsible for the conduct of armed groups that exercise 
control and governmental authority over part of a state’s territory, and those that succeed in 
establishing a new government or a new state by using means and methods of warfare contrary to 
international law. 
 
In chapter 6, I challenge recent scholarship that argues that Article 9 will apply to ‘governmental’ 
acts of armed opposition groups.1 I show that Article 9 will only cover the conduct of an armed 
group that acts in the interests of, or with the acquiescence of, the state’s authorities. In chapters 
7 and 8 a critical approach is taken to the ILC’s codification of Articles 10(1) and (2) that cover 
circumstances in which the conduct of a ‘successful’ insurrectional movement will be attributable 
to the state. I argue that the ILC’s position that Article 10(1) ‘should not be pressed too far in the 
case of  Governments of national reconciliation’ is not persuasive’.2 To the contrary, provided that 
a new government meets the requirements of Article 10(1), invoking the state’s responsibility for 
the unlawful conduct of all parties to an internal conflict provides an important legal basis upon 
which individual victims may seek reparation from the state. Further, I demonstrate that Article 
10(2) is seriously flawed: the rule requires the new state to be bound by international obligations 
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Chapter 6. State Responsibility for the Conduct of Armed Group ‘Governors’ 
 
6.1  Introduction 
During an armed conflict between a government and an armed opposition group or groups, one 
or more of those armed groups may take control over part of the state’s territory. Examples from 
the recent past include the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk People’s Republic’ and ‘Luhansk People’s 
Republic’3 that, since 2014, have asserted control over parts of the Donbas region in eastern 
Ukraine, and the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (‘ISIL’) that until 2017 controlled 
vast swathes of the territories of Iraq and Syria.4 Other examples include the Taliban in 
Afghanistan;5 the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka;6 Hezbollah in southern 
Lebanon;7 the Naxalites in Chhattisgarh State, India;8 the Mouvement National de Libération de 
l’Azawad (MNLA) and successive Islamist groups in northern Mali;9 the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army (SPLA) in (former) southern Sudan,10 and competing armed groups in Libya.11   
 
As a consequence of its loss of effective control over part of its own territory the state’s ability to 
exercise domestic sovereignty over that territory will be limited. The ability to provide essential 
services, to maintain law and order, or to exploit natural resources will be precluded by the 
destruction, expulsion or usurpation of state institutions by the armed group. The state will have 
little influence or authority over the population living in that area. Of course, an armed group may 
operate in an area of a state that is so remote or inaccessible that there is in any event a complete 
 
3 Wedel (undated); HRC, ‘Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine (2018); OSCE Special Monitoring 
Mission to Ukraine, ‘Findings on Formerly State-Funded Institutions in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions’ (2015). 
4 Callimachi, ‘The ISIS Files’, The New York Times, 4 April 2018.  
5 Rashid (2002); International Crisis Group, ‘The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland’ (2011), p.8. 
6 Mamphilly (2011), pp.111-113. 
7 UN Secretary-General, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, 
delivered to the Security Council’, (2006), §§27-28. 
8 HRW, ‘Being Neutral is Our Biggest Crime’: Government, Vigilante and Naxalite Abusies in India’s Chhattisgarh 
States’ (2008), pp.21-22. 
9 Branson & Wilkinson (2013); UN Security Council, ‘Final Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to 
Security Council resolution 2374 (2017) on Mali’, (2018), §§15-17. 
10 Mamphilly (2011), pp.148-150. 
11 UN Security Council, ‘Final Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 
1973 (2011) concerning Libya’ (2014) pp.10-14; Lacher & al-Idrissi, ‘Capital of Militias: Tripoli’s Armed Groups 
Capture the Libyan State’, Small Arms Survey Briefing Paper (2018). 
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absence of state institutions.12 In these circumstances one might argue that the armed group has 
not so much ‘seized’ control of the area in which it operates, but rather taken advantage of the 
geography of the region that limits the state’s ability to assert its authority. Nevertheless, in the 
absence of government, and in circumstances where civilians live under the armed group’s control, 
the armed group may establish its own administration in order to ensure the provision of law and 
order and essential services, such as water, electricity, and medical care to the local population. As 
Sivakumaran has observed, this is ‘a conscious effort on the part of the armed group to afford 
services that are traditionally provided by the state in an attempt to normalize the situation, to 
present the image of a stable and functioning regime, and to create a quasi-state’.13 The most 
striking example is that of ISIL that took control of vast swathes of Iraq and Syria. ISIL established 
a pseudo-state that micromanaged the everyday lives of the population under its control and ran a 
self-sustaining economy based on the trade in key oil assets seized from Syria, taxation, extortion 
and selling plundered antiquities on the black market.14 This is not a new phenomenon. For more 
than two decades, between 1983 and 2009, the LTTE exercised effective control over large parts 
of northern and eastern Sri Lanka where it established local administrative bodies that carried out 
functions ordinarily mandated to government such as revenue collection, courts and policing, 
public services and economic development initiatives.15  
 
The international legal dilemmas raised by a state’s loss of control over its territory are often 
framed in terms of the threat to international security posed by the state’s inability to prevent 
terrorism, drug trafficking and other organized crime committed by armed groups, and whether 
current rules of international law are adequate to deal with that threat.16 For example, the debate 
concerning ISIL has revolved around the question whether a third state may use force against ISIL 
on Syrian territory without the consent of the Syrian government.17  
 
In this chapter I consider the issues raised by a state’s loss of control over territory within the 
framework of the law of state responsibility. This is important in relation to questions concerning 
 
12 E.g. DRC v Uganda, §300 in which Uganda had submitted that armed groups were able to operate ‘unimpeded’ in 
the DRC-Uganda border region because of ‘its mountainous terrain, its remoteness from Kinshasa (more than 
1,500km), and the almost complete absence of central government presence and authority in the region’.  
13 Sivakumaran (2012) p.559. 
14 Cronin, ‘ISIS is not a Terrorist Group’, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2015; Callimachi, ‘The ISIS Files’, The New 
York Times, 4 April 2018.  
15 Stokke (2006) p.1022. 
16 Crawford & Miscik, ‘The Rise of Mezzanine Rulers’, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2010. 
17 Akande & Milanovic (2015); Gray (2018) pp.237-248. See below section 6.5. 
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international responsibility for acts committed by armed group ‘governors’. Unlike the scenarios 
considered in Part I of this thesis, in these circumstances there is no question of control by the 
state over the armed group. However, the capacity of some armed groups to create a ‘quasi-state’ 
or ‘quasi-government’ and to govern territory under their control effectively raises the question 
whether these armed groups are or should be considered as ‘quasi-organs’ of the state for the 
purposes of the law of state responsibility. In such cases the armed group will be the de facto 
government of the territory that it controls. Organisationally, there may appear to be little 
difference between an armed group’s authorities and the official authorities, as the armed group 
may emulate or take over existing state structures. Moreover, the policies and ‘laws’ of an armed 
group’s administration may have equivalent impact on everyday life in the area under the armed 
group’s control.18 Civilians continue to live and work in these areas. Children are born, people fall 
ill or die, property is sold or transferred, businesses continue to operate, people may commit 
criminal offences unrelated to the conflict, and individuals may enter or leave the armed group-
controlled territory through check-points controlled by the group.19 Individuals may also be subject 
to abuse, intimidation and violence at the hands of the armed group, particularly but not exclusively 
with regard to the provision of law and order.  
 
The question of the extent to which the acts of an armed group that exercises governmental 
authority may be attributed to the state is distinct from that of state responsibility for the conduct 
of a successful insurrectional movement.20 In the latter case the attribution of acts of the successful 
insurrectional movement are covered by Article 10 ARS.21 By contrast, it is the question of state 
responsibility for the conduct of an ‘unsuccessful’ armed group or ‘insurrectional movement’ that 
is considered here. For the purposes of this study an ‘unsuccessful’ armed group is one that has 
been defeated by the incumbent government or one that is not yet successful or defeated, in the 
sense that the conflict is still on-going and the eventual outcome unknown. Writers have described 
armed groups that exercise governmental functions but are not, or not yet, ‘successful’ in different 
ways: for example as ‘de facto revolutionary governments’ or ‘local de facto governments’,22 
 
18 Fortin (2017) pp.27-32. 
19 E.g. The LTTE erected check points between LTTE and Sri Lankan government-controlled areas. See Mampilly, 
(2011). The self-proclaimed Donesk People’s Republic has also erected and manned check points between the area 
under its control and the rest of Ukraine: Losh, ‘Checkpoints Block Civilians, Aid Traffic in Eastern Ukraine’. Vice 
News, 8 July 2015.  
20 See chapter 7 for discussion of the ILC’s definition of ‘insurrectional movement’. 
21 See chapters 7 & 8. 
22 O’Connell, (1970) p.970. 
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‘unsuccessful revolutionaries’,23  ‘unsuccessful insurgent governments’,24 or simply ‘armed bands’.25 
Similarly, the term ‘de facto government’ can be used to describe the central authorities of a state 
that are not recognised as the de jure government.26  In this study the term ‘armed group governor’ 
is used. Reference to an ‘armed group’ should be understood to include any administrative 
authority established by that group. 
 
The law of state responsibility is rarely invoked with regard to the conduct of armed group 
governors. This is not surprising. As a general rule the state is not responsible for the conduct of 
private or non-state actors.27 However, the question of state responsibility for the conduct of 
armed group governors does appear to be addressed by Article 9 ARS. Article 9 covers the conduct 
of ‘a person or group of persons’ that exercises ‘elements of the governmental authority in the 
absence or default of the official authorities’. Article 9 ARS provides, 
 
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under 
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact exercising elements of the 
governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and in 
circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements of authority. 
 
As with Article 8 ARS, Article 9 refers to the conduct of ‘a person or group of persons’. It would 
seem, therefore, to apply to any person or group of persons, including ‘armed opposition groups’ 
- groups engaged in an armed conflict with the incumbent government. The proposition that 
Article 9 covers the conduct of armed opposition groups is supported by references to Article 9 
in the ILC Commentary to Articles 5 and 10 ARS.28 Article 5 covers the conduct of persons or 
entities empowered by the law of the state to exercise elements of governmental authority. The 
Commentary to Article 5 states, 
 
The formulation of article 5 clearly limits it to entities which are empowered by internal law to 
exercise governmental authority. This is to be distinguished from situations where... an entity or 
 
23 Schwarzenberger (1957) p.629. 
24 Silvanie, (1939a) p.87 & (1939b) p.95. 
25 Cahin (2010) pp.334-335. 
26 ILC Report (1974), p.286 §12. See further below, section 6.3. 
27 ARS, Article 8, Commentary, §1.  
28 Fortin (2018) p.373 & fn.10. 
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group seizes power in the absence of State organs but in situations where the exercise of 
governmental authority is called for: these are dealt with in article 9.29 
  
Further, Commentary to Article 10 states, 
 
The general principle in respect of the conduct of [insurrectional] movements, committed 
during the continuing struggle with the constituted authority, is that it is not attributable 
to the State under international law. In other words, the acts of unsuccessful insurrectional 
movements are not attributable to the State, unless under some other article of chapter II, 
for example in the special circumstances envisaged by article 9.30 
 
The reference to Article 9 and the conduct of ‘insurrectional movements’ committed during a 
continuing struggle with the constituted authority in the commentary to Article 10 is interesting 
for two reasons. First, the ILC Commentary to Article 9 does not refer explicitly to ‘insurrectional 
movements’ or armed groups, or to any legal precedent or state practice that would support Article 
9’s application to unsuccessful ‘insurrectional movements’. Second, it is extremely unlikely that 
states and their governments would accept any suggestion that a state may be held directly 
responsible for the internationally wrongful conduct of an armed group that seeks to overthrow 
the state’s government or establish a new state, unless and until that movement is successful.31 For 
example, in response to the establishment of a separate legal system by the LTTE in areas under 
the latter’s control, the Chief Justice of Sri Lanka, Sarath N. de Silva said,  
 
The LTTE can have a conciliation mechanism if they want, like if two neighbors are at dispute 
then settling such a dispute in an amicable matter is all right. But they have no judicial authority. 
Judicial power is part of the sovereignty of the people and it cannot be exercised by any other 
person than those who are vested with it. If someone else is administering justice then he is doing 
it on his own accord.32 
 
The ILC presents a confusing picture and raises the following questions: First, did the ILC intend 
Article 9 ‘in special circumstances’ to be applicable to ‘unsuccessful’ armed groups? Second, if so, 
 
29 ARS, Article 5, Commentary, §7. [Emphasis added] 
30 Emphasis added. ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §2. The question how ‘success’ is defined by the ILC for the 
purposes of Article 10 ARS is addressed in chapter 7. See also Fortin (2018) p.373 & fn.10.  
31 As provided by Article 10 ARS. 
32 Kamalendran, ‘The inside story of ‘Eelam Courts’, 14 November 2004, The Sunday Times (Sri Lanka).  
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is there any legal precedent or state practice to support the application of Article 9 to the conduct 
of such ‘unsuccessful’ armed groups?  
 
Article 9 has received limited detailed attention.33  The scholars who have considered whether 
Article 9 applies to the conduct of armed opposition groups have drawn conflicting conclusions. 
Crawford states that it does not.34 Rather, the conduct of an armed opposition group is only 
attributed to the state upon the movement’s success in establishing a new government or state, 
pursuant to Article 10 ARS.35 Some take the opposite view, namely that Article 9 covers any 
conduct of any armed group that falls within the terms of the article.36 Others take the view that 
the principle’s application may be limited to more ‘traditional’ governmental functions exercised 
by armed groups related to customs, taxation, immigration control and the administration of law 
and order.37 These conflicting interpretations of Article 9 and its application to the conduct of 
armed groups calls for a re-consideration of the case law and state practice drawn upon by the ILC 
in support of the rule. In order to do so, it is necessary to venture back to the debates both within 
the ILC and between others during the 1970s when the rule was first introduced to the draft ARS 
by Special Rapporteur Ago who did the majority of the work on Article 9.  As the Commentary 
to Article 9 offers little assistance, it is only by understanding the origins of the rule that one can 
determine whether there is any support for its application to the conduct of armed groups.  
 
I will argue that there is support for the notion that certain administrative acts committed by an 
armed group that give rise to private law rights, such as the entering into commercial contracts, 
and the registration of births, deaths and marriages, should be treated as valid. The approach of 
the ICJ and the ECtHR to the question of the validity of the acts of an administration declared 
‘illegal’ by the Security Council supports the principle that conduct of a person or entity that, in 
the absence or default of the official authorities, exercises elements of governmental authority that 
benefit the local population should also be treated as ‘valid’. However, the question of the validity 
of certain acts is distinct from the question of the attribution of conduct to a state, thereby 
 
33 With the exception of Fortin (2018). In this chapter I argue that Fortin’s analysis of authority and state practice in 
support of the application of the rule to armed opposition groups that exercise ‘traditional’ functions of government 
is not persuasive.  
34 Crawford (2013) p.168. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Becker (2006), p.77 fn.170 and pp.222-223.; Ruys (2007); Cahin (2010b) p.334.  
37 Verhoeven (2015) p.295; Fortin (2018) pp.379-380. Cf. Bílková (2015) pp.269-270 who posits that Article 9 ARS 
will only apply in circumstances where there is a ‘bona fide’ need for the exercise of governmental authority i.e. the 
absence of State institutions is not the result of the activities of the armed group itself. 
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engaging that state’s responsibility for an act that violates its international obligations. With respect 
to the latter question, there is no support in case law or state practice for the proposition that a 
state will be responsible for internationally wrongful acts committed by an armed opposition group 
in the exercise of ‘governmental authority’ unless the state knew and did not specifically object to 
the performance of those acts. 
 
The argument that follows is constructed in five stages.  In section 6.2 I map out the requirements 
that must be met in order for Article 9 to apply.   In section 6.3 I consider the personal scope of 
Article 9 and the rule’s application to armed groups. ‘Personal’ is used to refer to all legal and 
physical persons. Specifically, I address the issue of the extent to which, if at all, Article 9 applies 
to the conduct of armed groups. First, I consider the ILC Commentary to Article 9. As a result of 
this analysis it is concluded that the answers cannot be found in the Commentary itself, which 
raises more issues than it resolves. Accordingly, I go on to consider the analysis provided by Special 
Rapporteur Ago upon the introduction of the rule in his third report in 197138 and later as draft 
Article 8 submitted to the ILC for discussion in 197439 in order to determine the intended personal 
scope of the rule. In this section I consider the arguments, rejected by Special Rapporteur Ago, 
posited by Silvanie in 1939 and D. P. O’Connell in 1970 in favour of the rule’s application to 
armed groups, based on the decisions of the Mexican Commissions concerning claims arising out 
of the Mexican revolutions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  
 
In section 6.4 I consider the state practice and jurisprudence of the ICJ and the ECtHR that 
supports the principle that certain administrative acts committed by armed opposition groups 
should be recognised as valid, and the extent to which this assists in the interpretation of the scope 
of Article 9.   
 
In section 6.5 I draw a distinction between the situation in which an armed group seeks to 
overthrow a government and that in which a government acquiesces to the exercise of 
governmental authority by an armed group on its territory. In doing so, I consider Article 9’s 
application to the exercise of governmental authority by armed groups acting against a third state, 
but not necessarily contrary to the interests of the host state. In this part of the study I question 
the suggestion that Article 9 may be used to justify the use of force by states against the state that 
 
38 Ago, Third Report (1971), pp.262-263.  
39 Draft Articles submitted by the Special Rapporteur, ILC Ybk 1974, Vol.I, p32, §1. It later became draft article 8(b) 
in the draft articles provisionally adopted by the ILC on first reading in 1996, before becoming Article 9 in the 
articles adopted by the ILC in 2001. 
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is ‘harbouring’ or passively supports the group.40 I will argue that Article 9 does not provide a legal 
justification for the use of force against a state in response to cross-border attacks by armed 
groups. This question is governed by the law on the use of force.  However, this analysis gives rise 
to the question explored in Part 6.6, namely whether notions of state toleration of or acquiescence 
in the exercise of governmental authority by armed groups may play a role in the operation of 
Article 9 in circumstances other than those governed by lex specialis rules of international law. I 
conclude that Article 9 will only apply to the conduct of an armed group in the very exceptional 
circumstances that the armed group implements the directives of the de jure government of a state, 
with the cooperation or acquiescence of that government. 
 
6.2  Requirements of Article 9 ARS 
The ILC Commentary on Article 9 identifies three conditions for the operation of the rule: the 
exercise of the governmental authority; the absence of or default of official authorities; and 
circumstances such as to call for the exercise of elements of governmental authority. The following 
sections will look at each of these conditions in turn. 
 
6.2.1  Exercise of the governmental authority 
The nature of the activity performed by the ‘person or group of persons’ is essential to the 
operation of Article 9. This distinguishes the rule from Article 8 ARS that requires a factual link 
between the state and the person or group of persons on the basis that the person or group is 
‘acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of’ the State’.41 Instead, Article 9 
gives more weight to the fact that the person or group of persons ‘must be performing 
governmental functions, though they are doing so on their own initiative’42 and may do so without 
the knowledge of the official authorities.43 Thus, Article 9 attributes to the state the conduct of 
persons or groups of persons that have no prior or formal link to ‘the machinery of the State’. 
With this in mind, the ILC has stressed in its commentary to the draft articles adopted at its 26th 
session in 1974 that the rule applies ‘only in genuinely exceptional cases’.44  
 
 
40 Ruys (2007) p.289; Murphy (2002) p.50. In a footnote Becker briefly suggests that Article 9 may apply to the use 
of force following 9/11: Becker (2006) p.77 fn.170. 
41 Cahin (2010b) p.334. See chapter 2. 
42 ARS, Article 9, Commentary, §4. 
43 ILC Report (1974), Commentary to draft article 8(b), p.285 §10. 
44 Ibid, §12. 
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The ILC Commentary does not stipulate what acts would constitute an ‘exercise of the 
governmental authority’ for the purposes of Article 9. This is consistent with the approach taken 
by the ILC to the definition of ‘governmental authority’ for the purposes of Article 5 ARS in which 
the ILC expressly states that ‘it does not attempt to define precisely the scope of “governmental 
authority” for the purposes of attribution of conduct to the state’.45 The ILC Commentary explains 
that ‘beyond a certain limit, what is regarded as “governmental” depends on the particular society, 
its history and traditions’.46 In its commentary on Article 9 the ILC merely refers to the exercise 
of ‘police or other functions’, without defining what those ‘other functions’ might be.47 However, 
the Commentary does cite Yeager as an example of the exercise of ‘governmental authority’.48 In 
this case the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal concluded that immigration and customs duties 
carried out by the Revolutionary Guard at Tehran Airport in the immediate aftermath of the 
revolution in the Islamic Republic of Iran would fall within the meaning of ‘governmental 
authority’.49 Beyond a reference to Yeager the Commentary does not provide any other examples 
of acts that would constitute the exercise of ‘governmental authority’. However, the ILC’s draft 
commentary to draft articles 1-9 adopted in 1974 provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of 
‘acts of governmental authority’, drawn from instances during the Second World War. The draft 
commentary to draft Article 8(b),50 states, 
 
During the Second World War, for example, in belligerent countries and any other country 
invaded, local administrations fled before the invader, or, later, before the armies of liberation. It 
then sometimes happened that persons acting on their own initiative provisionally took over, in 
the interests of the community, the management of certain public concerns or that committees of 
private persons provisionally took charge of the administration, issued ordinances, performed legal 
acts, administered property, pronounced judgements, etc., in other words exercised elements of 
governmental authority. In such circumstances it may also happen that private persons acting on 
their own initiative assume functions of a military nature; for example, when the civilian population 
of a threatened city takes up arms and organizes its defence.51  
 
45 ARS, Article 5, Commentary §6. 
46 Ibid. 
47 ARS, Article 9, Commentary, §6. 
48 Ibid, §2. 
49 Yeager (1987) §43. 
50 That was to become Article 9 ARS. 
51 ILC Report (1974), Commentary to draft article 8(b), p.285 §9. Also, Ago, Third Report (1971), p.263, §189. 
George Hopkins (1926), §4. 
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With regard to the assumption of ‘functions of a military nature’, the ILC drew support from 
Article 2 of the Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Hague 
Convention (IV) 190752 and Article 4A(6) of the Third Geneva Convention on the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War 1949 (GCIII).53 The two provisions, similarly worded, extend prisoner of war 
status to civilians who, living in unoccupied territory, spontaneously take up arms to resist an 
invading enemy army.54 
 
Similarly, as explained in chapter 3,55 in Stephens the US-Mexico General Claims Commission 
concluded that Mexico was responsible for the conduct of a member of an ‘informal municipal 
guards organisation’ called the ‘defensas sociales’ that manned security check points after federal 
troops had withdrawn from the state during the revolution in Mexico 1923-1924.56 Valenzuela’s 
conduct was attributed to Mexico on the basis that he must be considered as a soldier, in spite of 
the fact that the defensas sociales were essentially vigilante groups. Attribution of Valenzuela’s 
conduct was not based on any formal organ status afforded to the defensas sociales, or on any 
evidence of control exercised over the defensas sociales by the state, of which there was none.57  
Valenzuela was treated as if he was a soldier, a state organ, because of the nature of the conduct – 
the administration of law and order – in the absence of Federal troops that had withdrawn from 
the state of Chihuahua. 
 
Thus, for the purposes of Article 9, functions that constitute ‘governmental authority’ may be 
defined as functions ordinarily the prerogative of government, such as the administration of law 
and order, border security, and other functions that usually may only be performed by a private 
 
52 Article 2, 1907 Hague Regulations. Article 2 extends belligerent status to ‘inhabitants of a territory that has not 
been occupied, who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops 
without having had time to organize themselves’. 
53 Article 4A(6) GCIII provides that, ‘Prisoners of war... are persons belonging to one of the following categories, 
who have into the power of the enemy:... (6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the 
enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into 
regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war’. 
54 ILC Report (1974), Commentary to draft article 8(b), p.285 fn.593.  
55 Section 3.4.1. 
56 Stephens (1927) §§4 & 7. For a summary of facts of this case see chapter 3, 3.4.1. Stephens is cited by the 
commentary to Article 8 ARS as support for the attribution of conduct of persons or entities acting under the 
instruction, direction or control, of the State. However, as argued in chapter 3 on close reading the facts of the case 
are more aligned to Article 9 ARS. 
57 Cf. Crawford (2013), p.142. 
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actor if that actor is vested with the authority of the state.58  Such functions will include: the exercise 
of police and judicial functions; the administration of property; the issue of ordinances; the use of 
force in self-defence against an invading foreign army; entering into contracts that give rise to 
private law rights; the registration of births, deaths, and marriages; the collection of taxes; the 
operation of public transport systems; and immigration and customs control. 
 
6.2.2  In absence or default of the official authorities 
The second condition for the operation of Article 9 is that the person or group of persons is acting 
in ‘the absence or default of the official authorities’. According to the ILC Commentary this may 
be in cases where the state apparatus has collapsed in its entirety, or where the state is unable to 
exercise its functions because its apparatus has failed in part or it has lost control over part of the 
state’s territory. The Commentary states that this requirement,  
 
. ..is intended to cover both situations of a total collapse of the State apparatus as well as 
cases where the official authorities are not exercising their functions in some specific 
respect, for instance, in the case of a partial collapse of the State or its loss of control over 
a certain locality.59  
 
Situations that may satisfy the condition of ‘absence or default’ of the official authorities will arise 
where the government’s infrastructure has been physically destroyed as a result of armed conflict, 
or in the immediate aftermath of an armed conflict where a new government is not yet fully 
established such that it is able to carry out all the duties expect of government. Thus, in Yeager the 
Iran-US Claims tribunal considered that the principle provided by Article 9 applied to the exercise 
of immigration and customs duties at Tehran Airport by members of the local revolutionary 
committee, loyal to the new government, despite the fact that they were not authorised to carry 
out such duties by the government at the relevant time.60  
 
Although the Commentary refers to ‘situations of a total collapse of the State apparatus’, Article 9 
is not intended to apply to ‘de facto governments’ – a government that ‘is itself an apparatus of the 
 
58 Ibid. p.169. Cf. Fortin (2017) pp.268-269; (2018) p.383. The attribution of conduct of persons or entities 
authorised to exercise elements of governmental authority is covered by Article 5 ARS. 
59 ARS, Article 9, Commentary, §5. 
60 The government formally recognised the Revolutionary Guard as an organ of government in May 1979. The 
conduct that was subject of the Yeager took place in February 1979. 
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State, replacing that which existed previously’.61 One might assume, although it is not made entirely 
clear by the Commentary, that ‘total collapse’ refers to a post-apocalyptic scenario caused by 
conflict or natural disaster where the citizens of a state are left without government and therefore 
take it upon themselves to re-build the administrative structures but do not claim to be the 
government. 
 
There is no indication in the Commentary that Article 9 would not cover circumstances where 
part of a state’s territory is governed or administered by an armed group that directs its acts against 
the government. This question is examined in section 6.3 of this chapter. Before doing so, it is 
important to consider the third condition of Article 9 ARS, that the circumstances must ‘call for’ 
the exercise of governmental authority. The interpretation of this requirement is important to the 
question of Article 9’s application to the conduct of armed opposition groups: in particular, 
whether circumstances in which the total or partial collapse of a state’s authorities results from the 
activities of an armed opposition group can ‘call for’ the exercise of governmental authority by 
that group. 
 
6.2.3 ‘Circumstances such as to call for it’ 
The third condition to Article 9 introduces the notion of necessity. As the Commentary explains 
‘[t]he principle underlying article 9 owes something to the old idea of levée en masse, the self-defence 
of the citizenry in the absence of regular forces: in effect it is a form of agency of necessity’.62 
‘Necessity’ here is not a ‘circumstance precluding wrongfulness’ as it is understood by Article 25 
ARS. As Special Rapporteur Crawford explained the phrase ‘such as to call for’ is used to 
emphasise that it is the exercise of governmental functions that is required in the circumstances 
and not necessarily the particular conduct.63  
 
Article 9 appears to cover the conduct of any ‘person or group of persons’, including armed 
opposition groups, whatever their political or ideological ambitions. After the discussion of the 
meaning of the term ‘call for’ the Commentary concludes, 
 
 
61 ARS, Article 9, Commentary, §4. For a more detailed discussion of the definition of ‘de facto government’ see 
section 6.3 below. 
62 ARS, Article 9, Commentary, §1. Pursuant to Article 2, 1907 Hague Regulations and Article 4A(6) GCIII this 
conduct is lawful and belligerent status is afforded to participants in a levée en masse. In effect, the acts of individuals 
are transformed into public acts and participants in a levée en masse are treated as if they were agents of the State. 
63 Crawford, First Report (1998), p.44 §§217-218. 
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There is thus a normative element in the form of agency entailed by article 9, and this distinguishes 
these situations from the normal principle that conduct of private parties, including insurrectionary 
forces, is not attributable to the State. 
 
It is not clear what is meant by ‘normative element in the form of agency’. The ILC appears to be 
trying to convey the idea that it is the nature of the conduct and not a factual link between the 
person and the state that is important to the operation of the rule. Nevertheless, this sentence is 
interesting because it seems to suggest that Article 9 applies to the conduct of ‘insurrectionary 
forces’. Yet it is highly likely that states and their governments would reject outright any suggestion 
that the state may be held directly responsible for the internationally wrongful acts of an armed 
opposition group that controls and governs part of that state’s territory and seeks to overthrow 
that state’s government or establish a new state. 
 
There is some suggestion in the Commentary that Article 9 would not apply to the conduct of a 
person or group of persons that has created or contributed to the circumstances surrounding the 
exercise of elements of governmental authority. This is hinted at by the condition that,  
 
... the circumstances surrounding the exercise of elements of the governmental authority 
by private persons must have justified the attempt to exercise police or other functions in the 
absence of any constituted authority.64 
 
‘Must have justified’ may be understood in two ways. On the one hand, it may be understood to 
mean that because of the absence or default of the official authorities and lack of intervention 
from the state machinery due to its destruction in full or in part, the individuals concerned are 
justified to take it upon themselves to fill the shoes of government in order to forestall the 
complete breakdown of public order and protect the essential interests of the population – such 
as security, access to clean water, sanitation, food, electricity and fuel.65 This is the interpretation 
offered by Fortin, the only contemporary scholar thus far to have considered in depth the scope 
and application of Article 9 to armed groups generally.66 In Fortin’s view, ‘[i]n circumstances where 
 
64 ARS, Article 9, Commentary, §6. 
65 Fortin (2018) p.385. 
66 Cf. Ruys (2007) considers the application of Article 9 ARS to the question of attribution of cross-border attacks 
by an armed group in the context of the victim’s State’s right to use force in self-defence against the State on whose 
territory the armed group is operating pursuant to Article 51 UN Charter. 
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the de jure government is absent, there will be a good argument that the acts in question were ‘called 
for’’.67 
 
Alternatively, ‘must have justified’ may be understood to mean that the initial reason for the 
absence or default of state machinery must justify the exercise of governmental functions. Thus, 
the absence of ‘constituted authority’ would not in and of itself create the circumstances to justify 
the ‘attempt to exercise police or other functions’. If the state of affairs is of the person or group 
of person’s own creation, for example where an armed opposition group has successfully driven 
out or destroyed the official authorities and taken control of part of the territory of a state, the 
exercise of governmental functions may be necessary in order to maintain law and order, but it 
may not be ‘justified’ in the sense that the group cannot take advantage of disorder and pending 
humanitarian disaster of its own creation.68  
 
The ILC’s intended meaning of the phrase ‘the circumstances surrounding [the conduct] must 
have justified’ the exercise of elements of the governmental authority is not clear from the 
Commentary. Therefore, in order to determine whether and if so, to what extent Article 9 covers 
the conduct of armed opposition groups it is helpful to look at the drafting history of the rule. In 
particular, it is helpful to consider the work of the ILC under the supervision of Special Rapporteur 
Ago during the 1970s, who made the most substantial contribution to the rules of attribution of 
the conduct of non-state actors, and arguments made by some scholars in favour of Article 9’s 
application to armed opposition groups that were considered and rejected by Ago. 
 
6.3  Armed opposition groups 
The Commentary to Article 9 defines ‘person or group of persons’ to some degree by stating what 
category of ‘private persons’ the rule does not apply to. The Commentary stresses that ‘the private 
persons covered by Article 9 are not equivalent to a general de facto government’.69 As stated above, 
the conduct of the organs of a ‘general de facto’ government’ are covered by Article 4 ARS, and not 
Article 9.70 However, the use of the term ‘general de facto government’ is problematic. The 
Commentary does not explain what it means by the term other than to say that a ‘general de facto 
 
67 Fortin (2018) p.385. 
68 Bílková (2015) p.269. Cf. Cahin (2010b) p335. 
69 ARS, Article 9, Commentary, §4.  
70 Ibid. Article 4 covers ‘the conduct of any State organ’... ‘whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial 
or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an 
organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State’. 
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government’ ‘is itself an apparatus of the State, replacing that which existed previously’.71 Moreover 
neither Article 4 nor the commentary thereto refer to a ‘general de facto government’. This raises 
difficulties because the term ‘de facto’ is used to describe a number of different types of government 
of different legal status (in internal and international law) and different degrees of control over 
territory. Talmon has helpfully summarised these as follows:  
 
...the term de facto government has been used to describe (1) an effective government, i.e.  
a government wielding effective control over people and territory, (2) an unconstitutional 
government, (3) a government fulfilling some but not all the conditions of a government 
in international law, (4) a partially successful government, i.e. a belligerent community or 
a military occupant, (5) a government without sovereign authority, and (6) an illegal 
government under international law.72 
 
In order to determine exactly what the ILC intended to mean by ‘general de facto government’ it is 
necessary to look back at its commentary on the draft articles in 1974, and to the award by 
Arbitrator Taft in the Tinoco Case, cited by the ILC in a footnote.73 It can be deduced from these 
two sources that for the ILC ‘general de facto government’ means a government as understood by 
international law that is firmly established as the government of the state, but is unconstitutional 
according to the internal laws of the state. The commentary to draft Article 8(b) of 1974 explains 
that, 
 
[t]he term “de facto government”, or “general de facto government”, is sometimes used to 
denote a government which, though not invested with power in accordance with the 
previously established constitutional forms, has fully and finally taken power, the previous 
government having disappeared. The adjective in question then merely reflects the 
existence of a problem of legitimacy concerning the origin of the new government... All 
this is without relevance to the problems of international responsibility, in which no 
distinction may be made between a State ruled by a de facto government and one ruled by a 
de jure government... The State organization exists in the one case as in the other; and the 
 
71 ARS, Article 9, Commentary, §4. 
72 Talmon (1998) p60. 
73 ARS, Article 9, Commentary, §4 fn.169; Tinoco Case (1923).  
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persons who are part of it are no less “organs” – true organs – of the State because the 
Government has a de facto rather than a de jure origin.74 
 
In the Tinoco Case Arbitrator Taft considered what constitutes a government in international law. 
He concluded:  
 
To hold that a government which establishes itself and maintains a peaceful administration, with 
the acquiescence of the people for a substantial period of time, does not become a de facto 
government unless it conforms to a previous constitution would be to hold that within the rules 
of international law a revolution contrary to the fundamental law of the existing government 
cannot establish a new government. This cannot be, and is not, true... The issue is not whether the 
new government assumes power or conducts its administration under constitutional limitations 
established by the people during the incumbency of the government it has overthrown. The 
question is, has it really established itself in such a way that all within its influence recognize its 
control, and that there is no opposing force assuming to be a government in its place? Is it 
discharging its functions as a government usually does, respected within its own jurisdiction?75  
 
Except for the ILC’s efforts to distinguish what it calls ‘general de facto governments’ from the 
‘private persons’ covered by Article 9, the Commentary defines the personal scope of application 
of the article in general terms, referring to what it calls ‘irregulars’:  
 
The cases envisaged by article 9 presuppose the existence of a Government in office and 
of State machinery whose place is taken by irregulars or whose action is supplemented in 
certain cases.76 
 
This raises the question whether Article 9 would apply to the conduct of all ‘irregulars’, including 
an armed opposition group. The Commentary’s explanation of the meaning of the phrase ‘in the 
absence or default of’ suggests that it may. As noted, the Commentary states that the ILC envisaged 
Article 9 would cover situations of ‘total collapse of the State apparatus’ and situations of ‘partial 
collapse’, where the state has lost control ‘over a certain locality’.77 This explanation, read together 
 
74 ILC Report (1974), p.286 §12. 
75 Tinoco Case (1923) p.382.  
76 ARS, Article 9, Commentary, §4. 
77 Ibid, §5. 
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with the 1974 draft commentary reproduced above, suggests that the scope of Article 9 would 
include the conduct of members of an armed opposition group who have replaced the official 
authorities, either by appropriating already established administrative apparatus or by replacing 
elements of the ‘state machinery’ with its own administrative infrastructure as, for example, the 
establishment of tribunals by the LTTE in areas under its control in Sri Lanka, enforcing its own 
penal and civil codes in order to try disciplinary, criminal and civil cases.78 However, as argued 
above, one interpretation of the requirement that circumstances must ‘call for’ the exercise of 
governmental authority would mean that ‘irregulars’ who are the cause of the circumstances would 
be excluded from Article 9’s scope. If that is the case, the conduct of the LTTE’s civil 
administration would not be attributable to Sri Lanka pursuant to Article 9. 
 
As noted above, there is no agreement in the literature on whether Article 9 applies to the conduct 
of armed opposition groups. This lack of consensus demonstrates a need for a clear understanding 
of the intended scope of Article 9.  The following section attempts to achieve this clarity by first 
considering the ILC’s early rejection of the application of Article 9 to armed opposition groups. 
This is important, because the arguments made in favour of the attribution of the conduct of 
armed opposition groups pursuant to Article 9, and the case law upon which these arguments rely, 
have been resurrected since the adoption of the ARS in 2001,79 and those who reject the view that 
Article 9 would apply to armed opposition groups have not provided any detailed argument.80 My 
analysis challenges the view that there is legal precedent to support the attribution of the conduct 
of armed opposition groups to a state. I will show that there is some authoritative support for the 
proposition that a state may recognise, as a matter of policy, certain administrative acts committed 
by ‘unsuccessful’ armed groups as ‘valid’, provided that: (i) those acts do not further the insurgency 
– for example the registration of births, deaths and marriages, and (ii) if to treat them otherwise 
would be to the detriment of the population that was subject to that government’s control.81 
However, these cases do not provide support for a general rule that routine administrative acts 
committed by an armed opposition group in the absence or default of the official authorities will 




78 Sivakumaran (2009) pp.493-495. 
79 E.g. Fortin (2018). 
80 Crawford (2013) p.168. 
81 Namibia, §125. 
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6.3.1 ILC’s early rejection of the application of Article 9 to armed opposition groups 
When Article 9 was first discussed by the ILC international practice of the rule was ‘very limited’.82 
In its draft commentary to draft Article 8, 1974, the ILC only pointed to generalised examples 
taken from the Second World War where members of the local population took it upon themselves 
to carry out governmental functions in circumstances where the official authorities had fled.83 No 
specific state practice was identified by the ILC in 1974. The ILC found support for the rule in 
unspecified ‘national laws [that] often regard such conduct as conduct of the State under internal 
law and even hold the State responsible for such acts’.84 The commissioners broadly accepted this 
thesis as a general principle of international law.85 Rather unfortunately, given the number of 
questions raised by the Commentary to Article 9, the rule appears to have been discussed only 
briefly.86  
 
However, an examination of the draft commentary in the ILC’s 1975 report to the General 
Assembly reveals an early intention that armed opposition groups would be excluded from the 
scope of Article 9.87 The ILC Commentary on draft article 14 states that once an ‘insurrectional 
movement’ takes shape it exists, 
 
... side-by-side with the State, an organization which has its own machinery and whose 
organs may act on behalf of the insurrectional movement itself in a portion of the territory 
under the sovereignty or administration of the State. The organs which form part of the 
structures of the insurrectional movement and which act on its behalf are in no sense organs 
of the State...88 
 
Draft article 14 provided the general rule that a state should not be considered responsible for the 
internationally wrongful acts of an ‘insurrectional movement’ established in its territory or in 
 
82 ILC Report (1974), Commentary to draft article 8(b), p.285 §11. 
83 Ibid, §9. Also, Ago, Third Report (1971), p.263 §189. 
84 Ibid. 
85 See comments of the Commissioners upon the introduction of draft article 8 to the draft articles ILC Ybk 1974 
Vol.I, pp.33-40. 
86 Commissioner Reuter, supported by Commissioners Elias and Hambro commented that he hoped the draft 
article ‘would be only very briefly discussed before being referred to the Drafting Committee’ as he was ‘somewhat 
concerned at the slow progress the Commission was making.’ Reuter, ILC Ybk 1974, Vol.I, p.34 §40. See also 
Hambro, ibid, p.41 §27; Elias, ibid, p.41 §28. 
87 ILC Report (1975), p.98 §26. 
88 Ibid, p.91 §3. [Emphasis added] 
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territory under the State’s administration.89 In a footnote to the commentary on draft article 14 the 
ILC added that, 
 
... persons or groups of persons who act as organs of an insurrectional movement directed 
against a State or against a particular government in no way intend... to be “in fact exercising 
elements of governmental authority” of that State or Government for such time as certain 
exceptional circumstances persist. On the contrary, their aim is to overthrow the structures 
of the State in question and take their place as the new Government of that State or as the 
Government of a new State which has separated from the pre-existing State.90 
 
The only state to comment on the scope of draft articles 8(b)91 (now Article 9) and 1492 and the 
draft commentary was Austria. For Austria, recognition of what it called a ‘local de facto 
government’ was an important factor in the determination of the scope of draft article 8(b).  In 
Austria’s view, 
 
When reading... the commentary to article 8 in conjunction with... the commentary to 
article 14, it is not clear whether article 14, paragraph 1, includes the case of an 
insurrectional movement, recognized by foreign States as a local de facto government, which in the 
end does not establish itself in any of the modes covered by article 15 but is defeated by 
the central authorities. Again, uncertainty may engender unnecessary disputes.93   
 
The use of the term ‘local’ suggests a government that only controls part of the state’s territory, in 
direct challenge to the official authorities. 
 
The ILC does not appear to have agreed that there was a need to clarify whether draft article 8(b)) 
would apply to an insurrectional movement recognised by foreign States as the ‘local de facto 
 
89 Ibid, p91.  
90 Ibid, pp.91-92 fn.205. [Emphasis added] 
91 Draft article 8(b) provided, ‘The conduct of a person or group of persons shall also be considered as an act of the 
State under international law if... (b) such person or group of persons was in fact exercising elements of the 
governmental authority in the absence of the official authorities and in circumstances which justified the exercise of 
those elements of authority’. ILC Ybk 1975, Vol.II, p.60. 
92 Draft article 14 was deleted from the ARS following the recommendation of Special Rapporteur Crawford in his 
first report 1998. Crawford, First Report (1998), p.54 §277 & p.57. 
93 Written Comments by Austria, ILC YBk 1980/II(1), p.92 §38 [Original emphasis]. 
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government’.94 The Commentary to Article 9 is silent on the matter. This silence is consistent with 
the ILC’s position that the ARS do not make a ‘distinction between movements on the basis of 
any international “legitimacy” or of any illegality in respect of their establishment as a Government, 
despite the potential importance of such distinctions in other contexts’.95 Moreover, the 
recognition by a third state of a government or state as the ‘de facto’ or ‘de jure’ government is 
primarily a matter of domestic policy and not international law. International tribunals tend to 
view the recognition of governments ‘as a political act grounded on political considerations’ rather 
than ‘as an admission of the effective status of a regime’.96 
 
Draft article 14 was subsequently removed from the ARS upon the recommendation of Special 
Rapporteur Crawford in his first report in 1998.97 Regrettably, the Commentary to draft article 14 
cited above98 was not inserted into the Commentary to Article 9. The Commentary’s silence as to 
any exclusion of the conduct of armed groups from the personal scope of Article 9, has been 
understood by some scholars to imply that the article would be applicable to them.99  
 
However, the draft commentary to article 14 indicates that the ILC intended to limit Article 9’s 
personal scope of application to armed groups that act in the interests of the ‘de jure’ government 
of the state. How then, can the draft commentary be reconciled with the Commentary to Article 
10 adopted in 2001 that suggests that the conduct of ‘unsuccessful insurrectional movements’ 
would be attributable to the state ‘in the special circumstances envisaged by article 9’?100 Does this 
mean that an armed group’s ambition to overthrow the official authorities of a state does not 
necessarily preclude the exercise of elements of governmental authority by that group? In other 
words, are there certain acts that will fall within the definition of ‘the governmental authority’ 
regardless of the identity of the actor, in the exceptional circumstances envisaged by Article 9? 
Further, does the exclusion of armed opposition groups from the scope of Article 9 extend to 
armed groups that direct their activities against a state other than the state in which they are based?  
 
94 In his first report to the ILC in 1998 Special Rapporteur Crawford made express reference to Austria’s remarks. 
However, in paraphrasing these remarks the Special Rapporteur removed any reference to draft article 8(b) and his 
commentary does not address the specific issue raised by Austria. See Crawford, First Report (1998), p.54 §277. 
95 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §11. 
96 Cheng (1987), p.147.  
97 Crawford, First Report (1998), p.54 §277 & p.57. 
98 ILC Report (1975), pp.91-92 §3 & fn.205. 
99 E.g. Becker (2006) p.77 fn.170 and pp.222-223; Ruys (2007); Cahin (2010b) p.334; Verhoeven (2015) p.295; Fortin 
(2018) pp.379-380. Cf. Crawford (2013) p.168; Bílková (2015) pp.269-270. 
100 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §2. 
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In an attempt to answer these questions, I first consider the argument in favour of state 
responsibility for ‘routine administrative acts’ committed by armed opposition groups in the 
exercise of governmental authority. This argument, rejected by Special Rapporteur Ago in his 1972 
report,101 was based on the case law of the US Supreme Court following the American Civil War 
and the US-Mexico General Claims Commission.102  
 
6.3.2   ‘Routine administrative acts’ performed by armed opposition groups 
In his Fourth Report (1972) Special Rapporteur Ago dismissed the suggestion made by writers 
Silvanie,103 Reuter,104 Schwarzenberger105 and O’Connell106 that a state ought to be held responsible 
for ‘any routine administrative acts performed by the organs of the insurrectional movement in 
that part of the State territory that is under their control.’107  Ago accepted that a state might 
acknowledge that it is bound by ‘lawful routine acts of administration performed’ by an 
insurrectional government but rejected any notion that a state would be responsible for the 
internationally wrongful acts of that government.108 For Ago, 
 
...while a State might conceivably acknowledge that it is bound by certain obligations 
deriving from lawful routine acts of administration performed by the organs of an 
insurrectional government in territory formerly under its administration, it is much harder 
to conceive that it would do likewise in the case of obligations arising out of wrongful acts 
by the same organs.109 
 
In Ago’s view, even if a state agreed in some cases to be bound ‘in proprio’ by obligations incurred 
by an ‘insurrectional government’ ‘this would be done by virtue of succession of one subject of 
 
101 Ago, Fourth Report (1972), p142 §186; ILC Report (1975), p98, §26. 
102 Silvanie (1939a) pp.84-103 & (1939b) p.95; Schwarzenberger (1957) pp.629-630; O’Connell (1970) pp.969-970. 
Also Reuter (1973) p.204. Reuter posits that the attribution of routine administrative acts is an accepted principle of 
international law, without reference to precedent or further analysis. 
103 Silvanie (1939a) pp.84-103 & (1939b) p.95. 
104 Reuter (1973) p.204.  
105 Schwarzenberger (1957) pp.629-630. 
106 O’Connell (1970) pp.969-970. 




international law to the obligations of another subject and not by virtue of attribution to the former 
of the actions of the latter’.110  
 
Ago found that ‘there is not a single case to be cited in practice’, that would support the attribution 
of the international wrongful acts of armed groups exercising governmental authority to the 
state.111 This is at first surprising given that the argument, developed primarily by Silvanie in 1939112 
and later by O’Connell in 1970,113 that a state is responsible for the conduct of armed groups 
exercising governmental authority rests on case law of the US-Mexico General Claims 
Commission of 1923, specifically George Hopkins that dealt with the conduct of the Huerta 
administration that governed a large part of Mexico from February 1913 to July 1914.114 This 
argument has been resurrected by Fortin who argues that the case law of the US-Mexico General 
Claims Commission, United States Supreme Court, and the Italian Conciliation Commission 
following the Second World War support the attribution to the state of acts performed by an 
armed group (including an armed opposition group) relating to the ‘continuance of daily life in 
armed conflict’.115 However, as I will show, these authorities do not support the attribution of 
‘routine administrative acts’ performed by armed oppositions groups to the territorial state, let 
alone conduct that would violate the state’s obligations under international law. At most, these 
separate lines of case law support the principle that certain administrative acts that give rise to 
private law rights of persons living under the control of an ‘illegal’ administration should be 








112 Silvanie (1939a) pp.84-103. 
113 O’Connell (1970) pp.969-970. 
114 George Hopkins (1926).  
115 Fortin (2017) pp.268-269 & pp.273-274 & (2018) p.383. Fortin uses the argument that certain routine 
administrative acts of an armed group are attributable to a State pursuant to Article 9, to explain why armed groups 
that control territory, and are not acting for or on behalf of a third state, may be bound by obligations under 
international human rights law. Fortin draws on the principle of effectiveness and the proposition that State organs 
are themselves directly bound by international obligations of the State because it is through the State’s organs that 
those obligations are enforced to argue that: ‘(i) armed groups exercising governmental functions in default of the de 
jure government are performing acts of State; (ii) with respect to those acts international law is prepared to treat the 
armed groups as unofficial and unsanctioned agents of the State whose actions can incur State responsibility; and 
(iii) the principle of effectiveness, and some recent judicial authority, supports the fact that in respect to those 
functions, the armed groups are bound by the international obligations of the State, i.e. human rights law.’  
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6.3.3  George Hopkins, US-Mexico General Claims Commission of 1923 
The proposition that Article 9 ARS would cover acts of ‘government routine’ or acts ‘related to 
the continuance of daily life’ committed by armed opposition groups116 should be met with caution.  
As the following analysis shows, there is no indication that the Commission in George Hopkins 
intended its decision to be applied to all armed groups that exercise control over and govern part 
of a state’s territory, including an armed group that acts in opposition to the official authorities.117 
The issue in George Hopkins was ‘the validity or nullity’118 of certain administrative acts and contracts 
entered into by the Huerta administration that seized control of the Government by coup d’état. 
The Commission found that the Huerta regime was an ‘administration of illegal origin’.119 The 
Commission then drew a distinction between the ‘Government itself’ – what one might call the 
civil service - and the ‘administration of that Government’120 - the Executive. ‘Unpersonal acts’, or 
‘acts of government routine’121 would be performed by the ‘Government itself’ and be attributable 
to the state.122 However, the ‘administration of that government’ assumes ‘a personal character’: 
its acts are directed at maintaining in power the individuals who had, in this case, usurped the 
government machinery.123 According to the Commission, the administration’s ‘personal’ acts 
would only be binding upon the state for such time as it was in fact ‘the real master of the nation’.124 
The Commission accepted that a ‘large doubtful zone’ exists between the two extremes of 
‘personal’ and ‘unpersonal’ acts, ‘in which each case must be judged on its merits’.125  
 
The Commission’s definition of ‘unpersonal’ acts is vague. It’s dicta suggests that this category 
would apply to everyday matters such as the registration of births, deaths and marriages, the 
 
116 Silvanie (1939a) pp84-103; Schwarzenberger, (1957) p.630; O’Connell (1970), p.970; Fortin (2017) pp.268-269 & 
(2018), p.383. 
117 Cf. Fortin (2018) p.386. 
118 This distinction is important when one considers the case’s relevance (or lack thereof) to the question whether 
Article 9 ARS is intended to apply to the conduct of armed opposition groups. This question is addressed below in 
section 6.3. On the practice of non-recognition of an ‘illegal’ situation in international law see generally Ronen (2011) 
chpt.3; Crawford (2012) pp.155-156. 
119 George Hopkins (1926), §12 
120 Ibid, §§5 & 10. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid, §12. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid, §6. 
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collection of taxes and ‘even many rulings by the police’.126 Generally, one might describe these 
acts as day-to-day acts that are necessary for the functioning of a society. 
  
The Commission held that the sale and purchase of postal money orders fell ‘within the category 
of purely government routine having no connection with or relation to the individuals 
administering the Government for the time being’ and therefore Mexico was bound to honour the 
contract.127 Important to the Commission’s decision was its finding that in seizing power Huerta 
did not change the ‘government machinery’ that had been set up by the ousted President Maduro 
and that government agencies functioning under the Huerta administration continued to honour 
pre-existing contracts made under the former regime.128  
 
For Silvanie, writing in 1939, George Hopkins supports the argument that a revolutionary 
government ‘is not alien to the state nor are its acts necessarily meant to destroy the state’129 and 
may co-exist with the government of the state and perform administrative functions that are ‘very 
largely in the interest of the state’.130 The important question is ‘whether such acts, or any of them, 
accrue to the benefit of the state’.131 Thus, Silvanie concludes, the US-Mexico General Claims 
Commission ‘extended the rule of state liability for the acts of unsuccessful insurgents to include 
certain categories of contractual and tortious acts... and held the state liable for insurgent contracts 
benefiting the state and for insurgent acts of governmental routine’.132  
 
However, Silvanie attributes broader meaning to the decision than is justified. The Commission 
was concerned with the conduct of a group that has seized control of the Government.133 It never 
envisaged its approach to apply to the conduct of unsuccessful armed groups as Silvanie seems to 
suggest.134 The Commission expressly stated that the acts of an armed group that controls part of 
the territory of the state, and co-exists with the incumbent government of the state, will only be 
 
126 Ibid., p.43 §4. See the discussion in section 6.2.1 above with respect to the ILC’s approach and the definition of 
‘governmental authority’. 
127 Ibid., p.44 §10. 
128 Ibid., p.45 §11. 
129 Silvanie (1939a) p.103. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Silvanie (1939b) p.95.  
133 Cf. Cheng (1987) p.191. 
134 Also Fortin (2018), p.383. 
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attributable to the state if that armed group is ultimately successful.135 This reflects the principle 
now provided by Article 10 ARS: the conduct of a successful insurrectional movement is attributed 
to the state.136 Thus, the Commission expressly excluded from its reasoning armed groups that co-
exist with the official authorities.137  
 
At its highest George Hopkins is an example of an attempt to give some legal credibility to what was, 
in fact, a policy-based decision. This is made clear in the Commission’s reasons quoted above. The 
Commission acknowledged the generally accepted principle of international law that that the 
legality of a government is not determinative of its existence in fact as the government of a state138 
or capacity to represent the state in international relations.139 But the Commission then added that 
once that administration had lost control over of the affairs of government, even if it maintained 
control over key ministries and diplomatic relations with foreign states and had not in fact been 
overthrown, ‘it would be no more than one among two or more factions wrestling for power’.140 
Had it not said this the Commission would have had to have accepted that all acts of the Huerta 
administration were attributable to the state, as it was the government of the state until completely 
overthrown in July 1914. Thus, the Commission appears to place undue weight on the ‘legitimacy’ 
and ‘legality’ of a government with regard to its status as an organ of the state, despite its 
recognition of the rule that the legality of a government’s origins is not determinative of that 
government’s existence in fact. The Commission does so without reference to any legal precedent 
or state practice, or any explanation as to why an entity, previously categorised as an ‘insurrectional 
movement’ that obtains control over central government would not be considered an organ of the 
state in the event that another insurrectional movement challenges its authority.  
 
It may be that the Commission intended to identify a category of ‘revolutionary’ government that 
does not achieve a degree of permanence. After all, the Huerta administration only lasted 17 
months.141 On the Commission’s findings of fact the administration only controlled the northern, 
central and southern regions of Mexico for 3 of those 17 months.142 But this is speculative. 
 
135 George Hopkins (1926) §12. 
136 See chapters 7 & 8. 
137 George Hopkins (1926) §12. 
138 Cheng (1987) p.147; Crawford (2012) p.152. Tinoco Case (1923) p.381; Dreyfus Case p.350. 
139 Dreyfus Case, p.350. 





A more persuasive explanation of George Hopkins is that the Commission did not apply legal 
principle or seek to establish new principle, but instead applied notions of ‘justice and equity’.143 
O’Connell144 and Brownlie145 have noted that Mexico denied liability for any acts of the successive 
‘revolutionary’ governments that controlled Mexico during a period of protracted unrest between 
1910 and 1920. Nevertheless, Mexico agreed to indemnify claimants on an ex-gratia basis.146 
Accordingly, O’Connell posits, the commissioners were mandated to decide the claims on the 
basis of justice and equity ‘as distinct from the law’.147  
 
Finally, even if is accepted that George Hopkins does support the attribution of the ‘unpersonal’ or 
‘governmental’ acts of an armed group’s civil administration to the state, the case does not support 
the attribution of internationally wrongful acts. The cases of the US-Mexico General Claims 
Commission that followed and applied George Hopkins concerned issues relating to the 
performance of commercial contracts entered into by the Huerta government of Mexico with third 
parties for the purchase of postal orders and other various goods, such as ambulances,148 school 
benches,149 and office and household furniture.150 None of these cases concerned the attribution 
of internationally wrongful acts. Even Silvanie recognised that no cases of the Mexican 
Commissions concerned the ‘personal’ or ‘revolutionary’ acts of the Huerta administration.151  
 
6.3.4  Italian Conciliation Commission 
Fortin draws on a series of cases considered by the Italian Conciliation Commission following the 
Second World War in support of her argument that legislative acts enacted by an armed opposition 
group would be attributable to the state on the ground that the Commission determined the laws 
 
143 Cf. Fortin (2017) pp.256-258. 
144 O’Connell (1970) p.970. 
145 Brownlie (1983), p176.  
146 Mexico’s intention to indemnify on an ex gratia basis is only expressed in article II of the Convention of 10 
September 1923 that established the Mexican Special Claims Commission. The Special Claims Commission was to 
deal with cases concerning arising out of the revolutions and ‘disturbed conditions’ existing between November 
1910 and May 1920, including acts ‘(1) By forces of a Government de jure or de facto’. George Hopkins was not 
determined by the Special Claims Commission, rather the case was determined by the General Claims Commission. 
147 O’Connell (1970) p.970. 
148 Peerless Motor Car Co. (1927). 
149 George W. Cook (1929). 
150 George W. Cook (1930).  
151 Silvanie (1930b) p100. 
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of the Italian Social Republic (otherwise known as the Salò Republic)152 constituted the ‘laws in 
force in Italy’ at the relevant time.153 However, as I will show, the decisions of the Commission in 
these cases were not based on general principles governing the law of state responsibility, but on 
the interpretation of the treaty provisions that expressly provided for the liability of Italy for the 
conduct of authorities during the war.   
 
The Italian Conciliation Commission cases concerned the question whether Italy was liable to pay 
compensation to Italian citizens whose property had been confiscated or damaged by the 
authorities of the Salò Republic and whether individuals were exempt from an Extraordinary 
Progressive Patrimonial Tax on property enforced by the post-war Italian government154 according 
to the provisions of the Treaty of Peace 1943. The issue common to these cases was whether the 
claimants should be treated as ‘enemy aliens’ for the purposes of ‘the laws in force in Italy during 
the war’. The laws in question were the discriminatory laws enacted by the Salò Republic.  
 
Mussolini had established the Salò Republic in the north of Italy following his dismissal from 
government, and the subsequent signing of an Armistice between Italy and the Allies in 1943. For 
the 19 months that the Salò Republic existed155 ‘there was thus, de facto, two Italys, each claiming 
to be the only lawful one’.156 The main issue for the Commission was whether the discriminatory 
laws of the Salò Republic constituted the ‘laws in force in Italy’ for the purposes of articles 78(4)157 
and 78(6)158 of the Treaty of Peace, 1947 and whether, therefore, the claimants who had been living 
in the Salò Republic, established after the Armistice, could avail themselves of the privileges 
afforded to ‘United Nations nationals’ by the Treaty.159 Italy argued that the laws enacted by the 
 
152 Baer (1959); Falco Claim (1959). 
153 Fortin (2018), p.382. 
154 Treves Case (1956); Levi (1956); Fubini (1959); Baer Case (1959); Falco Claim (1959). 
155 The Republic ceased to exist in April 1945 after Mussolini was shot whilst attempting to escape capture by allied 
troops and upon the unconditional surrender of German forces in Italy. 
156 Treves Case (1956) p.266. 
157 Article 78(4)(a) Treaty of Peace 1947 provided that the Italian Government would pay compensation ‘[i]n cases 
where property cannot be returned or where, as a result of the war, a United Nations national has suffered a loss by 
reason of injury or damage to property in Italy’. 
158 Ibid., Article 78(6) provided that, ‘United Nations nationals and their property shall be exempted from any 
exceptional taxes, levies or imports imposed on their capital assets in Italy by the Italian Government or any Italian 
authority between September 3, 1943 and the coming into force of the present Treaty for the specific purpose of 
meeting the charges arising out of the war or of meeting the costs of the occupying forces or of reparation payable 
to any of the United Nations.’ 
159 Ibid., Article 78(9)(a) provided that, ‘United Nations nationals’ were either those who had the relevant citizenship 
before 3 September 1943, or those who had been treated as enemy ‘under the laws in force in Italy during the war’. 
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Salò Republic were not ‘laws in force in Italy’ for the purposes of the Treaty as only a state may 
legislate and the Salò Republic was not a state but an insurrectional government. 
 
In Baer,160 the Falco Claim,161 Treves,162 and Fubini,163 the Commission concluded that the Salò 
Republic was an ‘insurrectional government’, that co-existed with the legal government of Italy, 
such that ‘each of which denied the power of the other’.164 However, the Commission held the 
laws of the Salò Republic constituted the ‘laws in force in Italy during the War’ on the basis of the 
‘principle of effectiveness’: the ‘laws in force’ were the ‘actual powers’ exercised by each of the two 
governments over the territory each controlled.165 Thus, the Commission concluded that the 
claimants were exempt from the Progressive Tax on Property and the Italian government was 
liable to pay compensation for damage to property caused by the Salò Republic. 
 
The Commission’s decisions do not establish a general rule of attribution of conduct.166 Rather, 
the decisions of the Commission turned heavily on the interpretation of the treaty provisions that 
expressly provided for the liability of Italy for the conduct of the authorities during the war. The 
Commission’s approach differs slightly in each case, but ultimately it draws the same conclusion, 
namely that the laws in force in Italy must include the laws of the Salò Republic. In Treves the 
Commission concluded that the drafters of the Treaty could not have considered the legality of 
the laws of the Republic, or the fate that the former would suffer in post-war Italy.167 In Baer, the 
Commission gave weight to the proposition that the Contracting Parties did not indicate which 
Italian authority should have enacted the laws.168 Thus the Commission concluded that the text of 
the Treaty did not justify the exclusion of the laws of the Salò Republic that were only directed at 
Italian nationals and not enemy nationals, and therefore the claimants should be compensated for 
the loss of their property that was confiscated by the Salò Republic.169 Moreover, the Commission 
 
160 Baer (1959). 
161 Falco Claim (1959). 
162 Treves Case (1956). 
163 Fubini (1959). 
164 Ibid, p.428, Baer (1959) p.402, Falco Claim (1959) pp.31-2, Treves Case (1956) p.266. 
165 Baer (1959) p.406. 
166 Cf. Jennings & Watts (2008) p.553 citing the Italian Commission cases as support for the proposition that 
‘...although a state is not generally responsible for the acts of insurrectional forces it may, even in the case of an 
unsuccessful insurrection, still be committed by certain governmental acts of insurrectional authorities in the area 
which was temporarily under their control’. 
167 Treves Case (1956) p.266. 
168 Baer (1959) p.407. 
169 Ibid. 
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was clearly influenced by the fact that the Salò Republic’s discriminatory laws were linked to the 
legal provisions enacted by the pre-Armistice Italian government of the National Fascist Party 
headed by Mussolini and allied to Germany.170  
 
Therefore, these cases do not assist on the identification of general principles governing the 
attribution of conduct of armed groups to a state pursuant to Article 9 ARS. 
 
6.4  Recognition of ‘validity’, but not attribution, of certain administrative acts 
 
6.4.1  Distinction between recognition of ‘validity’ of acts and attribution of conduct  
Insofar as armed opposition groups are concerned, the argument by Silvanie, O’Connell and Fortin 
that the case law of the US-Mexico General Claims Commission, and for Fortin, the Italian 
Conciliation Commissions, provide precedent for the principle that a state will be responsible for 
certain routine administrative acts carried out by an armed opposition group on its territory 
ascribes a broader meaning to the case law than is justified. The better interpretation of these two 
lines of case law is that they are manifestations of exception to the ‘doctrine of non-recognition’, 
that provides that certain administrative acts committed by an ‘unlawful’ authority should be 
recognised as ‘valid’, if a failure to do so would disadvantage those persons living under that 
authority’s control. Fortin appears to have conflated the recognition of acts as ‘valid’ with 
attribution of conduct.171 However, the distinction between the principle that certain acts should 
be recognised as ‘valid’ and principles governing attribution of conduct to a state is important. As 
I will show, the doctrine that certain acts of an ‘illegal administration’ should be recognised as valid 
only applies to acts of ‘routine administration’ that create private law rights for the population 
under the armed group administrator’s control. The doctrine does not support the attribution of 
acts of an ‘illegal administration’ that, if attributed, would constitute internationally wrongful acts 
of the state. 
 
6.4.2 Taxation 
There is early precedent to support the recognition of the collection of taxes by an armed 
opposition group from the population living under its control as legally valid, provided that those 
 
170 Ibid., p.407 
171 Fortin (2018), p.381. 
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taxes are in fact used for a public purpose and not to further the insurrection.172 However, it is 
important to note that this principle is based upon a prohibition placed on the state rather than 
the exercise of governmental authority by the armed group. The state is precluded from its right 
to collect taxes for a period during which it was unable to its discharge public functions to the 
benefit of the taxpayers. As the tribunal explained in the Santa Clara Estates Case:173   
 
It is incontestably true that with the duty to pay public taxes flows the right of protection and the 
conscientious and careful discharge of all imposed public duties by the Government to which this 
tribute is made; that with the right to demand and exact revenue for the support of government 
stands the correlative duty to be competent and willing to discharge its public functions and 
conserve the welfare of the taxpayer, and that one can not rightfully or lawfully exist in the absence 
of the other. 
 
Hence, a state is prohibited from enforcing a second payment of taxes in circumstances where 
those taxes had already been collected by an armed group, provided that those taxes would have 
been payable to the legitimate authorities.174 This rule is subject to the qualification that the 
voluntary payment of taxes to an armed opposition group may be seen as support for the 
insurgency, in which case a government is entitled to collect the taxes again.175  
 
6.4.3  ‘Validity’ of certain administrative acts of an ‘illegal’ authority 
As contended above, contrary to Fortin’s argument, George Hopkins cannot be relied upon as 
precedent to support the application of Article 9 ARS to armed opposition groups. However, the 
decision is an example of how courts will give legal effect to certain administrative acts carried out 
by an ‘illegal’ authority.176 The distinction between ‘acts of government routine’ and acts that 
further the insurrection made by the US-Mexico General Claims Commission reflects the 
approach taken by the US Supreme Court in a series of cases following the American Civil War. 
In these cases, the US Supreme Court held that certain acts of the Confederate state governments 
would be ‘valid and binding’,177 if to treat them otherwise would disadvantage the population. 
 




175 Guastini Case (1903) p.580; British Shareholders of the Mariposa Co (1931). 
176 Texas v White (1869) §16. 
177 Horn v Lockhart (1873) p.580. 
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These acts were restricted to matters of ‘routine administration’, such as the registration of births, 
deaths and marriages. The Court distinguished acts that aided the insurgency or impaired the ‘just 
rights of citizens’ afforded by the Constitution, which were void, from those that did not, which 
were to be treated as valid. Thus, in Texas v White the US Supreme Court applied the following 
general rule without devising an exhaustive list of the kinds of acts that should be treated as ‘valid’ 
if the acts ‘would be valid if emanating from a lawful government’: 
 
It may be said... that acts necessary to peace and good order among citizens, such, for 
example, as acts sanctioning and protecting marriage and the domestic relations, governing 
the course of descents regulating the conveyance and transfer of property, real and 
personal, and providing remedies for injuries to person and estate, and other similar acts, 
which would be valid if emanating from a lawful government, must be regarded in general 
as valid when proceeding from an actual, though unlawful, government, and that acts in 
furtherance or support of rebellion against the United States, or intended to defeat the just 
rights of citizens, and other acts of like nature, must, in general, be regarded as invalid and 
void.178 
  
On this basis the Supreme Court in Horn v Lockhart reasoned that, 
 
...the acts of the several States in their individual capacities, and of their different 
departments of government, executive, judicial, and legislative, during the war, so far as 
they did not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the National authority, or the just 
rights of citizens under the Constitution, are, in general, to be treated as valid and binding. 
The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do 
away with civil government, or the regular administration of the laws. Order was to be 
preserved, police regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property protected, contracts 
enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the transfer and descent of property 
regulated precisely as in time of peace.179  
 
The US Supreme Court held that the Confederate government was ‘simply the military 
representative of the insurrection against the authority of the United States’.180 As such the 
 
178 Texas v White (1869) §16. 
179 Horn v Lockhart (1873) p.580. See also Baldy v Hunter (1898); Texas v White (1869) §16. Lord Wilberforce stated his 
approval of this doctrine obiter dicta in Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No2) [1967] AC 853, p.954. 
180 Williams v Bruffy (1877) §8. 
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Confederate government only carried out acts that furthered the rebellion and had no role in ‘civil 
government’ or the ‘regular administration of laws’.181 Thus, none of the Confederate 
government’s acts were considered valid. However, the Confederate state governments continued 
to carry out acts of ‘civil government or the regular administration of the laws’, including the 
preservation of law and order, as they had done before their purported secession from the United 
States. According to the US Supreme Court, the acts of the state governments that violated a 
citizen’s constitutional rights or furthered the insurgency would not be considered valid.  
 
Sivakumaran has posited that the reasoning in Horn v Lockhart suggests that trials of violations of 
IHL conducted by insurgent courts ‘would equally be regarded as valid whereas politically 
motivated prosecutions would not’.182 This interpretation is partly correct. However, the US 
Supreme Court goes further. The reference by the US Supreme Court to the exclusion of acts that 
impaired the just rights of citizens, whether or not those acts were committed by the Confederate 
government or the state governments, implies that any act that violated an individual’s 
constitutional rights would not be considered as valid, even if it that act was committed in the 
(otherwise legitimate) administration of law and order. Thus, if the US Supreme Court’s approach 
were applied to trials for violations IHL by armed groups generally, those trials would only be 
regarded as valid if the trial process itself was in accordance with principles governing the right to 
a fair trial under international law.183  
 
Important to the question whether the US Supreme Court’s doctrine may be applied generally to 
armed opposition groups is the US Supreme Court’s clear exclusion of the acts of what it refers to 
as a ‘de facto’ government ‘such as exists where a portion of the inhabitants of a country have 
separated themselves from the parent state and established an independent government’ from its 
scope.184 This type of ‘de facto’ government was distinguished from the state governments that were 
not established by an armed opposition group but had been established according to the US 
 
181 Ibid. 
182 Sivakumaran (2012), p.560. 
183 According to customary international humanitarian law and international human rights law, the basic guarantees 
to a right to a fair trial may not be derogated from under any circumstances. See HRCttee General Comment no.29, 
§11 and General Comment no.32 and ICRC, Customary IHL Database, Rule 100: Fair Trial Guarantees’ and 
Commentary.  
184 Williams v Bruffy (1877), §7. This definition of ‘de facto government’ is different to that adopted by the ILC in its 
Commentary to Article 9. For the purposes of Article 9, the term ‘de facto governments’ means a government that 
has established itself as the only government of the State but is not recognised as legitimate.  
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Constitution.185 The validity of the acts of the category of ‘de facto’ government was dependent 
upon the insurrection’s ultimate success.186 Hence, as in George Hopkins, the US Supreme Court did 
not intend its doctrine to apply to all armed groups. Rather, the US Supreme Court formulated its 
doctrine to address a specific situation, unique to the circumstances of the American Civil War. 
The United States had never accepted the secession of the Confederate state governments. Thus, 
the state governments were lawfully established according to the Constitution. The issue was 
whether those governments had exceeded their constitutional powers to the extent that they 
supported the insurgency.187  
 
Nevertheless, the US Supreme Court cases reflect a concern, shared by the US-Mexico General 
Claims Commission, that there should be some regulation of the relationship between a governing 
authority and the population under its control, which is not affected by the ‘legitimacy’ or ‘legality’ 
of the governing authority. In other words, life goes on in spite of the upheaval of armed conflict 
and a population should not be wholly prejudiced because it has the ‘misfortune’ of finding itself 
governed by an unlawful entity.  
 
A similar doctrine has been developed by the ICJ, and applied by the ECtHR, in the related context 
of a UN Member State’s duty not to recognise the acts of a government that has been declared 
‘illegal and invalid’ by the UN Security Council,188 known as ‘the doctrine of non-recognition’.189 
This doctrine of non-recognition is not a rule of attribution. Rather, it is a manifestation of the 
principle that states should not recognise as lawful a situation declared ‘illegal’ by the UN Security 
Council.190 As the ICJ explained in Namibia, ‘it would be an untenable interpretation [of the UN 
Charter] to maintain that, once a declaration had been made by the Security Council under Article 
24 of the Charter, on behalf of all member States, those Members would be free to act in disregard 
of such illegality or even to recognize violations of law such as to rise from it’.191 
 
185 The state governments were not ‘unlawful’, but their acts that furthered the insurgency were as they went beyond 
the state governments’ constitutional powers: Ronen (2011) p.86. 
186 Williams v Bruffy (1877) §7. 
187 Ronen (2011) p.86. 
188 E.g. Security Council Resolution 276(1970), The Situation in Namibia, §2; Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) 
& 550 (1984) Cyprus. Ronen (2011) pp.1-2. 
189 Namibia, Separate Opinion of Judge Onyeama, p.149. 
190 See generally Crawford, (2012), p.155. This principle is codified by Article 41 ARS with respect to serious 
breaches of peremptory norms which provides that, ‘no State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a 
serious breach [of an obligation arising under peremptory norm of general international law],… nor render aid or 
assistance in maintaining that situation’. See Dawidowicz (2010).  
191 Namibia, §112. 
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6.4.4  Namibia Advisory Opinion 
In response to South Africa’s continued occupation of Namibia following the termination of its 
Mandate by the Security Council in 1966,192 the UN Security Council declared South Africa’s 
presence in Namibia to be ‘illegal’ and that as a consequence ‘all acts taken by the Government of 
South Africa on behalf of Namibia after the termination of the Mandate are illegal and invalid’.193 
The Security Council called upon all states ‘to refrain from any dealings with the Government of 
South Africa that are inconsistent with’ its declaration that acts done on behalf of Namibia are 
illegal and invalid. Consequently states were under the obligation not to ‘recognise’ South Africa’s 
continued presence in Namibia, to refrain from giving any support or assistance to South Africa 
in that capacity, not to enter into treaty obligations with South Africa insofar as it purported to act 
on behalf of Namibia, and to abstain from entering into diplomatic or economic relations as to do 
so ‘may entrench its authority over the Territory’194 and amount to recognition of the situation as 
legal.195  The obligation of states not to deal with an ‘illegal’ government arises out of a concern 
not to lend any legitimacy or to entrench the regime. As Ronen explains, ‘[b]y non-recognition 
states deny the competence of the governing apparatus to act on behalf of the territory and its 
people, and thus prevent the acts of the illegal regime from producing valid consequences’.196 Thus, 
like an armed group’s civil administration, an ‘unrecognised’ government is not considered to 
exercise the sovereign authority of the state in which it operates, although it may claim to. In these 
cases, the test applied is whether the failure to recognise the act as valid would be ‘to the detriment 
of the inhabitants of the Territory’.197  
 
In Namibia the ICJ held that the obligation of non-recognition was not absolute. In a similar 
approach to that of the US Supreme Court towards the acts of the Confederate states, the ICJ was 
of the opinion that non-recognition of an ‘illegal’ administration should not deprive the population 
‘of any advantages derived from international cooperation’.198 In the opinion of the ICJ, whereas 
generally the official acts of the South African government in Namibia were illegal and invalid, 
certain official acts, such as the registration of births, deaths and marriages, should be recognised 
 
192 Security Council Resolution 2145 (XXI) (1966). 
193 Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), The Situation in Namibia, §1. 
194 Namibia, §124. 
195 Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), §§2 & 5; Namibia, pp54-56 §§119-125. 
196 Ronen (2011) p5. 
197 Namibia, §125 applied by the ECtHR in Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) §45. 
198 Ibid. 
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as legitimate as the effect of ignoring these arrangements would only be ‘to the detriment of the 
inhabitants of the Territory’.199  
 
6.4.5 Loizidou v Turkey and Cyprus v Turkey 
In the case of Loizidou v Turkey the ECtHR considered whether the confiscation of property 
belonging to Greek Cypriots by the TRNC in order to provide housing for Turkish Cypriots 
fleeing southern Cyprus was a violation of the ECHR. The UN Security Council had declared the 
purported cessation of northern Cyprus from the Republic of Cyprus and establishment of the 
TRNC as ‘legally invalid’ and had called upon all Member States not to recognise any Cypriot state 
other than the Republic of Cyprus.200 Turkey had contended that the expropriation of property 
was irreversible by virtue of Article 159 of the TRNC’s constitution, that it submitted was a 
manifestation of the international law doctrine of necessity. Article 159 of the TRNC Constitution 
provided for the confiscation of property that was ‘abandoned or ownerless’ on 13 February 1975, 
the date of the proclamation of the establishment of the TRNC.201 The ECtHR considered that, 
because ‘the international community does not regard the “TRNC” as a state under international 
law’, and because the Republic of Cyprus was the sole legitimate government of Cyprus (including 
northern Cyprus), it ‘[could] not attribute legal validity… to such provisions as Article 159 of the 
fundamental law on which the Turkish Government rely’.202 
 
The Court noted the principle in Namibia, stating that ‘international law recognises the legitimacy 
of certain legal arrangements and transactions in such a situation, for instance as regards the 
registration of births, deaths and marriages, “the effects of which can be ignored only to the 
detriment of the inhabitants of the Territory”.’203  Implied in the ECtHR’s decision is the finding 
that Article 159 of the TRNC Constitution was not a ‘legal arrangement’, the non-recognition of 
which would be to the detriment of the local population. In this case Article 159 was of clear 
detriment to the former inhabitants of Northern Cyprus who had been prevented from returning 
to their property by the TRNC administration and the Turkish military guarding the delineation 




200 Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) & 550 (1984). 
201 Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) §18. 
202 Ibid, §44. 
203 Ibid, §45. The Court added that it did not ‘consider it desirable, let alone necessary, in the present context to 
elaborate a general theory concerning the lawfulness of legislative and administrative acts of the “TRNC”.’ 
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The ECtHR drew a different conclusion in the related inter-state case, Cyprus v Turkey.204 In that 
case the Court was concerned with the question whether the court system established by the 
TRNC could provide effective remedies to persons living in Northern Cyprus, for the purposes 
of satisfying the requirement that an applicant to the Court must have exhausted all available 
domestic remedies in order for their complaint to be admissible.205 For the Court, Namibia clearly 
shows that ‘the obligation to disregard the acts of de facto entities is far from absolute’.206 Thus, the 
Court reasoned in terms similar to those used by the ICJ in Namibia and the US Supreme Court, 
 
Life goes on in the territory concerned for its inhabitants. That life must be made tolerable 
and be protected by the de facto authorities, including their courts; and, in the very interest 
of the inhabitants, the acts of these authorities related thereto cannot be simply ignored by 
third States or by international institutions, especially courts, including this one. To hold 
otherwise would amount to stripping the inhabitants of the territory of all their rights 
whenever they are discussed in an international context, which would amount to depriving 
them even of the minimum standard of rights to which they are entitled.207 
 
Despite its clear approval and application of the Namibia principle, the ECtHR stressed that its 
application of Namibia was ‘judged solely from the standpoint of the Convention’,208 and the 
requirements of former Article 26 ECHR relating to the exhaustion of domestic remedies. Thus, 
for the Court, the Namibia principle affirmed that ‘if remedies exist to the advantage of individuals and 
offer them reasonable prospects of success in preventing violations of the Convention, use should be 
made of such remedies’.209 
 
Fortin argues that these cases give ‘further support for the principle that the acts of a subject of 
international law, usurping the de jure government, may be given limited recognition if they are the 
impersonal acts of a State and ensure that life can continue when the government is unable to 
exercise its usual functions’.210 For Fortin, the case law of the US-Mexico General Claims 
 
204 Cyprus v Turkey, p.96. The ECHR has not applied the Namibia principle in similar cases concerning the acts of the 
self-proclaimed Moldavan Republic of Transdniestria. E.g. Catan & Ors v Moldova & Russia, §109; Ilascu & Ors v 
Moldova & Russia. 
205 Cyprus v Turkey, §§56 & 82-102. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid, §96. 
208 Ibid, §91. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Fortin (2017) p.262.  
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Commission, the US Supreme Court, the ICJ and the ECtHR, provide assistance in the 
determination of whether certain acts are ‘impersonal’ and therefore ‘governmental’ in nature for 
the purposes of attributing those acts to the state pursuant to Article 9 ARS.211  
 
However, this interpretation of the case law conflates the notion of an entity’s ‘impersonal’ acts, 
as applied by the US-Mexico General Claims Commission and the US Supreme Court, with acts 
that benefit the local population living under that entity’s control. Namibia, Loizidou and Cyprus v 
Turkey provide authority for the principle that the duty of non-recognition is not absolute. 
Accordingly, certain acts of an ‘illegal’ administrative authority should be recognised as ‘valid’, if 
those acts are to the advantage of the persons living under that authority’s control, and to do 
otherwise would be to the detriment of those persons. The question whether the acts further the 
interests of the governing authority is not relevant to the determination of whether the acts benefit 
the local population or not. As the ECtHR found in Cyprus v Turkey, the provision of domestic 
remedies by the TRNC through the institution of its own court system in order to adjudicate 
complaints concerning the violations of Convention rights by TRNC organs was to the advantage 
of the inhabitants of northern Cyprus, and ‘the absence of such institutions would work to the 
detriment of the members of that community’.212 
 
The acceptance of an exception to the duty of non-recognition of illegal acts by the ICJ in Namibia, 
and the ECtHR’s application of Namibia in the context of the protection of an individual’s human 
rights and freedoms under the ECHR, suggests that where there is a tension between the interests 
of the population and states’ concerns regarding the recognition of the acts of ‘unlawful’ entities, 
the interests of the population ought to prevail. There are strong policy reasons that support 
treating the administrative acts of an armed opposition group as valid and binding upon the state 
in these circumstances, even if ultimately the armed group is not successful. It is clear from the 
case law relating to the similar context of ‘illegal’ governments that there is a real concern that the 
population of a territory that is beyond the control of the official authorities should not be 
disadvantaged by political upheaval. Like ‘illegal’ or ‘de facto’ governments, an armed group’s civil 
administration may exist for a long period of time and may firmly establish itself on the territory 
of a state to the exclusion of the state’s apparatus. Thus, it is arguable that the Namibia principle 
should also apply to acts of an armed group’s civil administration that benefit the population living 
 
211 Ibid, p.269. 
212 Cyprus v Turkey, §92. 
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under its control. However, this principle is not a rule of attribution and should not be relied upon 
to support the inclusion of armed opposition group in the personal scope of Article 9 ARS.  
 
6.5  Exercise of ‘governmental authority’ by armed groups acting against a third state 
The exclusion of armed opposition groups from the personal scope of Article 9 ARS raises the 
question whether this exclusion applies to all armed groups. In its 1975 commentary on the draft 
articles, the ILC contended that an armed opposition group cannot exercise governmental 
authority because its purpose is to overthrow the government of the state.213 The question then 
arises whether the personal scope of Article 9 ARS extends to an armed group whose activities are 
directed against a third state. This question has been approached by some scholars in the context 
of the commission of cross-border attacks by armed groups.214 They argue that attribution of cross-
border attacks to the host state in circumstances where that state tolerates the presence of the 
armed group on its territory may provide a legal basis upon which the victim state may invoke its 
right to use force in self-defence pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter. I will show that this 
argument should be rejected for two reasons: first, it is questionable that cross-border attacks will 
ever by ‘called for’; and second, the argument conflates secondary rules of attribution with primary 
rules that govern the use of force. 
 
6.5.1  Attribution of cross-border attacks by armed groups  
Ruys215 and Murphy216 have suggested that Article 9 ARS may be a means of justifying one state’s 
use of force in self-defence against another state, from whose territory an armed group has 
launched the attack against the former state. Ruys has done so in the context of the Lebanon-Israel 
Conflict 2006 that was ignited by an attack on Israel by Hezbollah,217 and Murphy with regard to 
the United States-led invasion of Afghanistan following the attacks of 11 September 2001 by Al-
Qaeda, although Murphy merely suggests that Article 9 would apply without developing the 
argument further.218 Drawing on the law of state responsibility, Murphy suggests that Article 9 may 
be invoked as a basis for attribution of responsibility for the 9/11 attacks to the Taliban 
government, and therefore provide a legal basis upon which the United States could justify the use 
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214 Becker (2006), p.77 fn.170 & pp.222-223; Ruys (2007) p.289; Murphy (2002) p.50. 
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216 Murphy, (2002) p.50. 
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of force in self-defence against Afghanistan.219 For Murphy, ‘depending on the facts,’ one might 
find that the Taliban ‘by default essentially allowed al-Qaeda to exercise governmental functions 
in projecting force abroad’.220  
 
Murphy’s argument gives rise to two observations.  First, the facts of this case do not satisfy the 
condition of Article 9 ARS that the person or group of persons act in absence or default of the 
official authorities. Evidence suggests that the Taliban maintained effective control over the areas 
in which al-Qaeda was operating.221 Security Council resolutions addressing the Taliban expressed 
concern that terrorist organisations operated in areas under Taliban control.222 There is no 
suggestion that the Taliban authorities were absent at that time. Second, it is doubtful that the 
condition that circumstances ‘called for’ the exercise of governmental authority is satisfied in the 
case of the 9/11 attacks, or any terrorist attack. It is hard to imagine any circumstances in which 
the hijacking of civilian aircraft and use of those aircraft to destroy buildings and kill civilians in 
another State would be ‘called for’.223 
 
6.5.2  Israel - Lebanon (Hezbollah) Conflict (2006) 
Ruys applies a similar argument to the question whether Israel was justified in its use of force 
against Lebanon in response to cross-border attacks by Hezbollah against an Israeli border control 
along the ‘Blue Line’,224 that resulted in the kidnapping of two IDF soldiers and killing of three 
others.225  Hezbollah justified its actions as ‘legitimate resistance to Israeli occupation of Lebanese 
territory and as a necessary response to the relative weakness of Lebanese state security 
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 155 
institutions’.226 Israel notified the General Assembly and the Security Council that it considered 
the attack to be ‘a clear declaration of war’ and reserved its right to use force against Lebanon in 
self-defence pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter.227 In the Security Council Israel made clear 
that its actions ‘were in direct response to an act of war by Lebanon’ and that it held Lebanon 
responsible.228 In letters sent to the General Assembly and the Security Council, the Lebanese 
Government stated that it had ‘not been aware of the events that occurred and are occurring on 
the international Lebanese border’.229 Despite the Lebanese government’s denial of responsibility 
for the Hezbollah attacks and express statement that it did not endorse them,230 Israel launched 
attacks against Hezbollah positions and against Lebanese military and civilian infrastructure.231 
Lebanon condemned Israel’s actions as ‘aggressions’ against ‘vital and civil Lebanese 
infrastructure’.232 
 
The initial attack by Hezbollah was widely condemned.233 Most states supported Israel’s right to 
self-defence generally, but did not hold Lebanon responsible for Hezbollah’s acts.234 However, in 
light of Israel’s attacks on Lebanese civilians and civilian infrastructure, some states criticised Israel 
for the disproportionate use of force,235 or at least urged Israel to ensure that its actions were 
proportionate.236 Russia strongly condemned the actions of Hezbollah, but viewed ‘Israel’s military 
action as a disproportionate and inappropriate use of force that threatens the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Lebanon and peace and security throughout the region’.237 The United States 
focused its comments on the need for the Lebanese government to ‘extend and exercise its sole 
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exclusive control over all Lebanese territory’,238 and called on Syria and Iran to be ‘held to account’ 
for supporting terrorism and for their role in the crisis.239 
 
In its letters to the Secretary-General and the Security Council, Israel held Lebanon responsible 
for Hezbollah’s attacks on the ground that the attacks emanated from the latter’s territory, and on 
the ‘ineptitude and inaction of the Government of Lebanon that has led to a situation in which it 
has not exercised jurisdiction over its territory for many years’.240   Becker and Ruys have argued 
separately that because of Lebanon’s inability to exercise effective control over southern Lebanon, 
Hezbollah’s attacks may be attributed to Lebanon pursuant to Article 9 ARS. For Becker, ‘one 
could argue that the conduct of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon constitutes the exercise of 
governmental security functions in the absence of effectively deployed forces of the Lebanese 
army’.241 In support of the proposition, Becker notes the fact that the UN Security Council had 
repeatedly called on Lebanon to assume effective control over South Lebanon following Israel’s 
withdrawal from the area in May 2000, and referred to Lebanon’s obligation to take over security 
responsibilities from Hezbollah.242  
 
Ruys considers the application of Article 9 ARS to Hezbollah’s attacks against Israel in more detail. 
He argues that although there was ‘no complete absence’ of the official authorities, in some areas 
Hezbollah ‘exercised a range of functions traditionally exercised by the government’ and ‘was in 
fact policing parts of Lebanese territory’.243 Ruys points to evidence that at the time of the attack 
the Lebanese authorities did not exercise effective control over the border area of southern 
Lebanon.244 The Security Council had made repeated calls for Lebanon to disband and disarm 
Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias and restore fully the government’s control over ‘all Lebanese 
territory’.245 According to a report of the Secretary-General on the situation in southern Lebanon 
preceding the attacks in July 2006,  
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The Lebanese Government’s authority and security control remained limited, especially in 
the areas close to the Blue Line. The Lebanese Army maintained a presence in some of the 
areas vacated by Israel in May 2000, but at a distance from the Blue Line... 
 
In letters to the Foreign Minister, dated 23 March, 27 June and 5 July 2006, the [UNIFIL]246 
Commander, General Pellegrini, expressed grave concern about the Hizbollah 
construction works in close proximity to the United Nations positions and requested that 
the Government of Lebanon take necessary actions to rectify the situation. However the 
situation remained unchanged despite repeated objections expressed by UNIFIL to the 
Lebanese authorities.247 
 
In addition to the implementation of security measures along the Blue Line by Hezbollah, the 
organisation’s political wing is reported to have provided public services to areas of southern 
Lebanon, including rubbish collection, health and education services,248 and traffic policing.249 As 
a result this area has been popularly described as Hezbollah’s ‘state within a state’.250 Ruys argues 
that, given ‘the preponderant role of Hezbollah as a social and military security provider, and the 
near absence of the official Lebanese authorities, one might say that Hezbollah exercised, 
“elements of governmental authority in the default of the official authorities”.’251  
 
The argument that Article 9 provides a basis for the attribution of cross-border attacks by armed 
groups ‘tolerated’ by a state is problematic. First, it is questionable whether there will ever be 
circumstances that ‘call for’ an attack against another state that is not an act of self-defence. Even 
if it is accepted that Hezbollah’s presence and organisation along the Blue Line fulfilled the first 
two conditions of Article 9 – that the group exercises elements of the governmental authority and 
this is done in the absence or default of the official authorities – fulfilment of the third condition, 
that circumstances call for the exercise of governmental authority, remains. Ruys attempts to 
address this issue, arguing that the presence of ‘circumstances such as to call for’ ‘is arguably the 
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 158 
vaguest of the three criteria’.252 According to Ruys, the repeated calls from the Security Council 
for the Lebanese government to re-establish its governmental authority over the area, combined 
with the fact that the use of military force ‘normally’ falls within the scope of governmental 
authority satisfies this third condition of article 9.253 Ruys concludes, 
  
It thus seems fair to conclude that the July 12 attack could be attributed to Lebanon on 
the basis of Draft Article 9 and that, from the legal point of view, the attack constituted 
an armed attack by a state, triggering Israel’s right to self-defence. 
 
Becker argues that, from the point of view of the victim state, it may be preferable in these 
scenarios ‘to regard the private actors as agents of necessity, rather than renegade terrorist 
operatives, so as to justify the direct attribution of the wrongful private conduct to the State’, and 
therefore justify the use of force in self-defence against that state.254 But whilst this interpretation 
may be preferable to the victim state, it most cases it is not likely to be justified. The fact that 
military force ‘normally’ falls within the scope of governmental authority, and that an armed group 
exercises governmental functions within part of the territory of a state, does not give rise to 
circumstances that would ‘call for’ an armed attack against another state. Something more is 
required in order that the exercise of governmental authority is justified. Thus, it is difficult to 
conclude that Hezbollah’s attack against Israel was ‘called for’, and therefore attributable to 
Lebanon pursuant to Article 9 ARS.  
 
Second, the argument that Article 9 provides a basis for the attribution of cross-border attacks to 
the territorial state relies upon secondary rules of attribution to determine whether or not an 
‘armed attack’, for the purposes of the Definition of Aggression, has been committed by the host 
state, thereby engaging the victim state’s right to use force in self-defence against the host state. 
However, the definition of ‘armed attack’ is governed by primary rules of international law on the 
use of force. It is not the function of the secondary rules of attribution to define the content of a 
state’s obligations under international law, a point stressed by the ILC in its General Commentary 
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Ruys’ argument that a state’s unwillingness to re-establish authority and control over its territory 
constitutes ‘circumstances such as to call for’ is similar to the submission of Uganda in DRC v 
Uganda, that ‘toleration of armed bands by the territorial state generates responsibility and therefore 
constitute armed attacks for the purpose of article 51’.256 The assertion is that a state’s toleration 
of the activities of an armed group on its territory is sufficient to attribute cross-border attacks 
committed by that armed group to the state and therefore the cross-border attack will fall within 
the definition of an aggression by one State against another.257 According to the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations between States, ‘every State has the duty to refrain from . . . acquiescing in 
organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of [terrorist acts or acts 
of civil strife involving the threat or use of force]’ and  ‘no State shall . . . tolerate subversive, 
terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another 
State’.258 Uganda had submitted that armed groups were able to operate ‘unimpeded’ in the DRC-
Uganda border region because of ‘its mountainous terrain, its remoteness from Kinshasa (more 
than 1,500km), and the almost complete absence of central government presence and authority in 
the region’.259 However, the ICJ implicitly rejected Uganda’s submission, finding that a state’s 
failure to exercise control over territory, thereby allowing an armed group to operate in the area, 
does not amount to ‘toleration’ of that group and therefore to a violation of a state’s duty of 
vigilance.260 The Court noted that neither the DRC nor Uganda was in a position to put an end to 
the activities of armed groups in the area, and thus could not conclude that the absence of action 
was ‘tantamount to “tolerating” or “acquiescing”’ in those activities.261  
 
6.5.3  Summing-up  
The arguments of Murphy, Ruys and Becker, that Article 9 ARS may be applicable to cross-border 
attacks by armed groups ‘tolerated’ by a state should be rejected. These arguments are reflective 
of the view that the UN Security Council’s apparent acceptance of the US and its allies’ right to 
exercise individual and collective self-defence against Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks is 
evidence that the threshold of attribution of an armed attack has been lowered such that a state 
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that tolerates or harbours the armed group that perpetrated the attack is responsible for it.262 
However, as Judge Koojimans stated in his Separate Opinion in DRC v Uganda, the ‘mere failure 
to control the activities of armed bands cannot in itself be attributed to the territorial State as an 
unlawful act’.263  
 
Moreover, in the years that have followed 9/11 states have not sought to attribute attacks by armed 
groups to the state on whose territory the armed group is operating. Rather, states have sought to 
justify military action against an armed group on another state’s territory, without that state’s 
consent, as the exercise of the right to individual or collective self-defence against the armed 
group.264 The core principle of self-defence is that the use of force must be necessary and 
proportionate.265 For the purposes of self-defence, ‘necessity’ has been understood to require that 
there are no other means to respond to an armed attack.266  ‘Necessity’ has been narrowly 
interpreted by the ICJ. According to the Court, ‘the requirement of international law that measures 
taken avowedly in self-defence must have been necessary for that purpose is strict and objective, 
leaving no room for any “measure of discretion”’.267  
 
Different formulae have been used to assert that exceptional circumstances exist in which the 
defensive use of force is justified and necessary, such that the consent of the host state is not 
required.268 None of the justifications put forward address the question of the violation of the host 
state’s sovereignty or territorial integrity, and therefore compatibility of the ‘unwilling and unable’ 
test with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. State practice is most evident in the deployment of 
‘targeted’ military operations against armed groups or individuals, or facilities run by terrorist 
organisations on the territory of another state. In exercising this policy of ‘targeted killing’ or 
targeted military operations states have tended to stress that the use of force is against the armed 
group or specified individual ‘known to be actively engaged in planning and directing imminent 
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armed attacks’ against the state.269 Some states, the United States in particular, have sought to 
justify the use of force against ISIL in Syria on the basis that the use of force is necessary because 
the latter state is ‘unwilling or unable’ to suppress the threat emanating from its one territory.270 
Other states have alluded to a state’s lack of effective control, or the armed group’s control, over 
territory.271 Other states have not referred to either test and have instead referred to the inherent 
right to individual and collective self-defence in general terms.272 
 
However, it would be unjustified to conclude on this basis that states have accepted that the use 
of force against an armed group on its territory without its consent will always be justified. For 
example, Iraq condemned Turkey’s military incursion into its territory and the establishment in 
2015 of a military camp outside Mosul, then subject to ISIL control, without prior consultation or 
coordination with the Iraqi government as ‘an act of aggression under the Charter of the United 
Nations and the relevant provisions of international law’.273 
 
This emerging state practice, which does not rely upon the attribution of such attacks to a state in 
order to justify the defensive use of force, does not support the argument that Article 9 ARS 
provides an alternative basis for holding a state responsible for cross-border attacks committed by 
armed groups operating on that state’s territory. Nevertheless, as explained in section 6.2, an armed 
group may exercise elements of the governmental authority in a number of ways, such as the 
administration of law and order, state responsibility for which are not governed by lex specialis rules 
of primary rules of international law. The next section examines the extent to which a state’s 
toleration of or acquiescence in the exercise of the governmental authority by an armed group is 
important to the application of Article 9 ARS and the identification of an armed group generally 
as an ‘agent of necessity’ of the state. 
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6.6 A state’s ‘acquiescence’ in the exercise of governmental authority by armed groups 
According to the ICJ’s conclusions in DRC v Uganda, a state’s inability to suppress the harmful 
acts of armed groups will not be sufficient to amount to ‘toleration’ or ‘acquiescence’ in those acts 
for the purposes of a state’s duty of vigilance.274 This gives rise to the question whether notions of 
‘tolerance’ and ‘acquiescence’, as applied by the ICJ, can inform the application of Article 9 ARS 
to armed groups and explain the ILC Commentary that ‘the acts of unsuccessful insurrectional 
movements are not attributable to the State, unless under some other article of chapter II, for 
example in the special circumstances envisaged by article 9.275 
Yeager suggests that conduct will be attributable to the state pursuant to Article 9 in circumstances 
where the state ‘must have had knowledge and to which it did not specifically object’.276  The 
requirement of knowledge and lack of specific objection implies that in order for conduct to be 
attributable pursuant to Article 9 the official authorities must consent or acquiesce in the exercise 
of governmental authority. This gives rise to the question of how this consent or acquiescence 
might be demonstrated. Must consent or acquiescence be express or may it be implied? The test 
applied in Yeager suggests that consent or acquiescence may be implied by a lack of specific 
objection, however this criterion is particularly vague. Moreover, the criterion will only be met in 
circumstances where the armed group exercises governmental authority for a prolonged period, 
or at least for long enough to draw the reasonable conclusion that the official authorities must 
have had knowledge of it.  
It is important to note that ‘consent or acquiescence’ is not generally sufficient for attribution. The 
ILC Commentary to Article 11 ARS (acknowledgment and adoption of conduct) states that ‘as a 
general matter, conduct will not be attributable to a State under article 11 where a State merely 
acknowledges the factual existence of conduct or expresses its verbal approval of it’.277 ‘Mere 
acknowledgment’ must be combined with the express adoption of the conduct by the state as its 
own.278 The ILC emphasises that the state must clearly indicate its acceptance of responsibility for 
the specific conduct.279  
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Thus, the ILC has clearly rejected the notion that a state will ‘acknowledge and adopt’ conduct by 
virtue of acquiescence per se. As Crawford warns, ‘the adoption required by ARSIWA Article 11 is 
not to be lightly inferred’.280 For Crawford, ‘care should be exercised when considering the 
possibility that using ARSIWA Article 11 to ‘entrap’ other states by deeming them to have adopted 
conduct which is merely tolerated or not disowned’.281 Crawford’s concern is that Article 11 ARS 
should not be misapplied in order to attribute armed attacks by armed groups to a state in that 
harbours those groups. As argued above, the notion that Article 9 ARS may also apply in these 
circumstances should be rejected. 
The circumstances envisaged by Article 9 are exceptional. As explained above, the exercise of 
governmental authority by an armed group will only be covered by Article 9 in circumstances 
where the official administration is absent or partially destroyed. In these circumstances there may 
be a need for the exercise of governmental authority by the armed group. As argued above, that 
‘need’ is not the need of the armed group itself, but the need of the local population. In the case 
of the use of armed force by an armed group against the invading army of another state the consent 
of the host state is implied on the basis that the armed group’s acts were necessary for the 
preservation or protection of the state and its population. This is envisaged by the ILC 
Commentary and its reference to ‘self-defence of the citizenry in the absence of regular forces’.282 
It is the need to defend the territorial integrity of the state in response to an invading army that 
justifies taking up arms against that enemy. 
Yeager, the only case cited by the ILC Commentary in support of Article 9, supports the notion 
that in other cases, where there is no immediate threat to the nation or civilian population, 
acquiescence may be implied in circumstances where the official authorities should know, and do 
not specifically object, to the exercise of governmental authority.  
However, the distinction between an armed opposition group and an armed group that acts in the 
interests of the state is not always clear. For example, the LTTE’s civil administration did not 
function to the absolute exclusion of Government of Sri Lanka. Some governmental functions, 
namely law and order, were exercised beyond the control of the Government. However, somewhat 
surprisingly, the Government continued to provide education and health services.283 The 
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Government even assigned government agents to work in LTTE-controlled territory and ensure 
the implementation of government directives in these provinces.284 The extent to which the 
Government maintained effective control over the delivery of services is not clear. According to 
Mampilly,  
...in the conflict zone, the LTTE’s civil administration was the only structure capable of 
determining the direction of [funds allocated to reconstruction by the government]. In 
effect, the government knowingly ceded control over state fiscal appropriations to the 
insurgents.285  
 
This complex interface between the state and armed opposition group’s civil administration does 
not sit easily with a distinction made between armed opposition groups and other groups with 
regard to the operation of Article 9 ARS. This symbiotic relationship was in the interests of both 
parties. By appropriating the government machinery in order to facilitate the provision of public 
services (paid for by the Government), the LTTE was able to entrench its rule of the civilian 
population and achieve legitimacy. Moreover, the LTTE taxed civil servants paid by the 
Government, providing LTTE with an important source of revenue.286 As Mampilly concludes, 
‘in rebel-held areas, most civilians came to view the LTTE political regime as the sovereign 
authority itself, despite its continued reliance on the incumbent for support’.287 For the 
Government, the provision of services to the region provided a tenuous link to the Tamil 
population in order to ‘wean the population away from the insurgents by providing public 
goods’.288 
 
However, a state’s provision of support for education and other essential services in an area under 
armed group control is not necessarily a manifestation of a state’s consent to the exercise of 
governmental authority by the armed group, or an acceptance that the armed group is acting in 
the interests of the state. A state may be required to continue to pay civil servant salaries or to 
finance education or health services in areas under armed group control in order to fulfil its 
 
284 Ibid. 
285 Ibid, p.113. 
286 Ibid, p.115. The Iraqi government continued to pay its civil servants who lived in ISIL-controlled territory for up 
to a year, eventually cutting off wages and pensions in July 2015 in order to cut off what had become a source of 
income to ISIL itself. See Coles, ‘Despair, hardship as Iraq cuts off wages in Islamic State cities’, Reuters, 2 October 
2015.  
287 Mamphilly (2011) p.128. 
288 Ibid, p.114. 
 165 
positive obligations to ensure the rights and freedoms of all persons within its jurisdiction.289 For 
the purposes of IHRL, a state’s jurisdiction is presumed to be primarily territorial. However, this 
presumption of jurisdiction will persist but may be ‘limited’ in circumstances where that state has 
lost control over part of its territory.290 In these circumstances a state will only be considered to 
exercise jurisdiction in so far as its positive obligations to take legislative, diplomatic, judicial or 
other measures to ensure the enjoyment of the rights of all persons within its (territorial) 
jurisdiction, even those living under the authority and control of another subject of international 
law. According to the ECtHR,  
 
… [a state] must endeavour, with all the legal and diplomatic means available to it vis-à-vis 
foreign States and international organisations, to continue to guarantee the enjoyment of 
rights and freedoms defined in the Convention.291 
 
These legal and diplomatic means will include taking measures needed to re-establish the state’s 
control over its territory, as well as measures needed to protect and ensure the rights and freedoms 
of persons within that territory.292 Accordingly, the ECtHR held in Ilascu that with respect to 
measures taken by Moldova to restore control over Transdniestria, administered by the MRT, 
 
The obligation to re-establish control over Transdniestria required Moldova, firstly, to 
refrain from supporting the separatist regime of the “MRT”, and secondly to act by taking 
all the political, judicial and other measures at its disposal to re-establish its control over 
that territory.293 
 
It is not clear from the ECtHR case law what acts would cross the line between fulfilling a state’s 
positive obligations to ensure the enjoyment of rights of persons living on their territory under 
armed group control and supporting the armed group or separatist regime. In Catan the ECtHR 
found that Moldova had taken all measures within its power to re-establish control over 
 
289 Article 2(1) ICCPR states that ‘Each State Party… undertake to respect and ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’. The list of bases of 
discrimination is non-exhaustive. Other human rights treaties contain similar non-discrimination clauses. Article 1 
ACHR refers to ‘economic status’ and ‘other social condition’ instead of ‘property’ and ‘other status’. Article 14 
ECtHR adds ‘association with a national minority’. Article 2 ACHPR refers to ‘fortune’ instead of ‘property’. 
290 E.g. Wall Advisory Opinion, §109. 
291 Ilascu & Ors v Moldova & Russia, §333. 
292 Ibid, §339. 
293 Ibid, §340 applied in Catan & Ors v Moldova & Russia, §145. 
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Transdniestria, and to protect children’s right to education in the national language as guaranteed 
by Article 2, Protocol 1 ECHR.294 Measures taken by Moldova included the payment of staff 
salaries, and for rent and refurbishment of school buildings that had been closed down by the 
MRT authorities, in order that children could continue to access education in Latin script, and not, 
as MRT ‘language laws’ required, in Cyrillic script.295  
 
Thus, the question whether Article 9 ARS would cover the armed opposition group’s conduct will 
turn on the particular facts of each case. Whatever the political ambition of a group, it may be 
argued that the implementation of government directives would fall within the reasoning of the 
Iran-US Claims Tribunal in Yeager. In other words, if an armed opposition group implements a 
government directive, in “cooperation” with the government, then the state will be responsible 
for any conduct of the armed opposition group relating to the implementation of that directive, 
including internationally wrongful acts.  
 
However, if the armed opposition group were to use government funds in order to implement its 
own policies and directives it is arguable that the armed opposition group is not ‘exercising the 
governmental authority’ within the meaning of Article 9 and therefore the state would not be 
responsible for any internationally wrongful acts that arise out of that conduct. Following the case 
law of the ECtHR, a state that provides services in the area under an armed group’s civil 
administration that undermine the administration’s own policies, in an effort to comply with its 
international obligations, will not ‘support’ that administration or consent to the exercise of 
governmental authority by the latter. The state will still be responsible for its own conduct with 
respect to the persons living in the area under the armed group’s control, insofar as it violates the 
state’s primary obligations under international law. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
References to Article 9 ARS in the ILC Commentary on Articles 5 and 10 ARS that suggest that 
Article 9 would cover the conduct committed by any armed group in any exercise of 
“governmental authority” are misleading. As the above analysis shows, there is no case law or state 
practice that supports the attribution of any conduct of an armed opposition group to the state, 
 
294 Catan & Ors v Moldova & Russia §§136-137. Article 2, Protocol 1 ECHR provides that: ‘No person shall be denied 
the right to education’. ‘The right to education would be meaningless if it did not imply… the right to be educated 
in the national language or one of the national languages: Case ‘relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in 
education in Belgium’ v Belgium, §3. 
295 Ibid, §141-144. 
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although Article 9 may cover certain governmental acts of armed groups that operate with the 
consent of or acquiescence of the state. A state’s inability to control the area in which the armed 
group is operating, or implementation of measures in fulfilment of its positive obligations to 
guarantee the human rights of all persons within its jurisdiction, including those under an armed 
group’s authority and control, will not amount to ‘acquiescence’.  
 
Thus, circumstances in which Article 9 ARS will apply to the exercise of governmental authority 
by armed groups are extremely limited. Unless it can be shown that by an express act the state 
acquiesces in the exercise of governmental functions by an armed opposition group or, as in Yeager, 
the state must have known and did not specifically object to the exercise of the governmental 
function by the armed group, Article 9 does not provide a basis upon which the unlawful acts of 
armed groups that ‘govern’ part of a state’s territory may be attributed to the state.  
 
However, there are strong policy reasons that support treating the administrative acts of an armed 
group’s civil administration as valid and binding upon the state. The population of a territory 
controlled by an armed group should not be wholly prejudiced because it has the ‘misfortune’ of 
finding itself governed by an unlawful entity. As such, the legal relationship between a governing 
authority and the population under its control should not be affected by the ‘legitimacy’ or ‘legality’ 
of that authority. A similar doctrine has been developed by the ICJ in the cases of ‘illegal’ 
governments in Namibia, and the ECtHR.296 In these cases the courts have held that the duty of 
states not to recognize the conduct of ‘illegal’ governments as valid should not deprive the 
population ‘of any advantages derived from international cooperation.’297 
 
296 Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) §45. 
297 Namibia, §125. 
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Chapter 7. Successful Insurrectional Movement: Establishment of a New Government 
 
7.1 Introduction  
There are two possible final outcomes to revolution: the armed group that struggles against the 
constituent authorities of a state will either be successfully suppressed by the state, or it will succeed 
in its objective of to overthrow the government or to establish a new state. In these circumstances 
Article 10 ARS provides an additional exception to the general principle that the conduct of an 
armed group ‘committed during the continuing struggle with the constituted authority, … is not 
attributable to the State under international law’.1 This is based upon the success of an 
‘insurrectional movement’. According to the two rules of attribution provided by Article 10, the 
conduct of an insurrectional movement becomes attributable to the state if and when that 
movement succeeds in overthrowing the pre-existing government and becomes the new 
Government or establishes a new state. Article 10 has been described as ‘a negative attribution 
clause to which is attached to a curious form of secondary, contingent responsibility based on the 
successful outcome of the insurgency’.2 For Crawford, ‘it is as if the state represented by the 
successful insurgents is precluded from denying the attribution to it of their conduct in the course 
of the insurgency’.3  
In this chapter I will focus on the application of the first rule of attribution provided by Article 
10(1): attribution to the state of the conduct of an insurrectional movement that becomes the new 
government of a state to that state. The second rule, applicable in circumstances where an 
insurrectional or other movement succeeds in establishing a new state, will be considered in 
chapter 8.  
Pursuant to Article 10(1) ARS: 
The conduct of an insurrectional movement which becomes the new Government of a 
State shall be considered an act of that State under international law. 
 
1 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, p.50, §1. 
2 Crawford (2013) p.171. 
3 Ibid.  
 169 
The rule is based on the idea of structural continuity between the organisation of the insurrectional 
movement and the new government.4 According to the commentary to Article 10,  
The continuity which … exists between the new organization of the State and that of the 
insurrectional movement leads naturally to the attribution to the State of conduct which 
the insurrectional movement may have committed during the struggle.5  
Article 10(1) was adopted with little opposition from states6 and appears to be uncontroversial.7 
As the ILC observed in its 1975 report, ‘there is no divergence of views, no doubt whatsoever, as 
to the validity of the principle in question’.8 Yet, with the exception of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
established following the Iranian Islamic Revolution 1979,9 state practice or case law addressing 
the rule is limited to the case law of arbitral tribunals of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.10 Since 
the adoption of the ARS in 2001 there has been limited discussion of Article 10(1) and its 
application,11 and there appear to be no examples of judicial application of the rule.   
 
There have been insurrections in recent years to which Article 10(1) will apply. For example, the 
application of Article 10(1) to the situation in the Central African Republic has been mentioned 
by the then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay, in her report to the 
General Assembly on human rights in the Central African Republic, 2013.12 In March 2013 the 
Séléka, led by Michel Djotodia, successfully seized power and forced President Bozizé of the 
Central African Republic into exile. As noted in the report,  
 
 
4 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §§4-6; Dumberry (2006) p.608; Crawford (2013) p.178. 
5 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §5. 
6 ‘Comments and Observations received from Governments’, A/CN.4/515, 19 March 2001. 
7 Cahin (2010a) p.249; Jack Rankin (1987) p.143: Citing draft Article 15 ARS, ‘it is an accepted principle of 
international law that acts of an insurrectional or revolutionary movement which becomes the new government of a 
State are attributable to the State’. Cf. d’Aspremont (2009) p.432. 
8 ILC Report (1975), Commentary to draft article 15, p.102, §9 referring to the ‘less numerous’ statements of 
international arbitral tribunals that expressly recognise the principle. See also ibid, p.104 §16 on the replies of States 
to the Preparatory Committee of the Hague Conference 1930’s questionnaire on the issue confirming recognition of 
the rule and §18 on the affirmation of the rule by international jurists.  
9 E.g. Jack Rankin (1987) §25.  
10 E.g. French Company of Venezuelan Railroads (1902) p.354; The Bolivar Railway Case (1905); Dix Case (1903). 
11 See generally Zegveld (2002) chpt.5; Dumberry (2006); d’Aspremont (2009); Cahin (2010a) p.247 and Crawford 
(2013) chpt.6. For consideration of the rule before the ARS were adopted see Atlam (1987) pp.35-56; Akehurst 
(1969). 
12 OHCHR, ‘Situation of human rights in the Central African Republic’ (2013) §25. 
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… in accordance with article 10 of the draft articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, the Séléka, after it seized power, engaged the State 
responsibility of the Central African Republic for all violations committed by Séléka 
members in the country during the armed conflict.13  
 
Similarly, it is arguable that Article 10(1) would cover the conduct of Maoist rebels that succeeded 
in establishing a new government in 2006 in Nepal following ten years of armed conflict. As a 
resolution to the conflict, the government of Nepal and the rebels agreed to the Kathmandu 
Comprehensive Peace Accord 2006 (CPA).14 According to the terms of the CPA the monarchy 
was stripped of its rights of state administration, and an interim government was established by a 
coalition of the existing political parties and the Maoist political wing, the Communist Party of 
Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M).15 The post-conflict political transformation in Nepal, governed by the 
terms of the CPA and an interim Constitution, led to the eventual election of the former Maoist 
leader and chairman of the CPN-M, Puspa Kamal Dahal, as Prime Minister in 2008 and a CPN-
M majority government.16  
 
In some cases, whether the insurrectional movement has in fact succeeded in establishing a 
government may be less clear. This is particularly so in situations involving a number of armed 
groups with competing interests that all seek to overthrow the pre-existing government. For 
example, by late February 2011, mass demonstrations in Libya had escalated into a non-
international armed conflict.17 The National Transitional Council (NTC), a civilian political 
organisation with no ‘military wing’, chaired by former justice minister Mustafa Abdul Jalil, was 
established as early as February 2011 and in March 2011 declared itself as the sole legitimate 
representative of the people of Libya.18 The NTC eventually assumed power following six months 
of armed conflict fought by a number of armed groups and the death of former President Gaddafi 
 
13 Ibid. However, the 2013 report does not go beyond this mere mention of Article 10 ARS.   
14 Kathmandu CPA 2006. 
15 Report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for United Nations assistance in support of its peace 
process (2007) §3. 
16 Report of the Secretary-General on the request of Nepal for United Nations assistance in support of its peace 
process (2008) §§6-7. 
17 See OHCHR, ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to Investigate all alleged violations of 
international human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ (2012) §30.  
18 In the months that followed and before Gaddafi was toppled, a number of states including France, Germany, the 
UK, Australia, Gambia, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates announced their ‘recognition’ of the NTC as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Libyan people. For discussion of whether these statements constitute ‘recognition’ 
for the purposes of international law, and what ‘recognition’ means, see Talmon (2011).  
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in August 2011.19 Similarly, there may be cases where civilian representatives, who may or may not 
be members of an armed group, establish a civilian authority that challenges the government’s 
authority and eventually takes control of government. For example, over a period of eleven 
months from the end of December 2010 governments of Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen, that had 
been established in the Middle East and North Africa for between 23 and 42 years were toppled 
as the result of mass demonstrations.20 This raises the question whether a civilian political 
opposition that is born out of popular revolution will constitute an ‘insurrectional movement’ for 
the purposes of Article 10(1)?  
 
With the exception of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ 2013 report on the situation 
in the Central African Republic, the question of Article 10’s applicability to these situations has 
been notably absent from discussions of these conflicts and of state responsibility for human rights 
violations and war crimes committed by armed groups that have successfully overthrown the pre-
existing government.21 The lack of discussion or application of Article 10 may be due to a 
prevailing focus on individual criminal responsibility for violations of international law by human 
rights advocates and the Security Council.22 In the cases of Nepal and of Libya serious violations 
of IHL and IHRL were documented by the OHCHR23 and the International Commission of 
Inquiry into Libya.24 These included unlawful killings, arbitrary detention and enforced 
disappearances, torture and attacks on civilians (in the case of Libya on both Libyan and foreign 
citizens). The emphasis of both reports is on individual criminal responsibility25 and the state’s 
responsibility to ensure the appropriate mechanisms are in place to ensure individual accountability 
for crimes and human rights violations.26 Neither report refers to Article 10 ARS. Yet, these 
situations are precisely those that Article 10 ARS seeks to address. 
 
 
19 In July 2012 the NTC handed over power to the General National Congress following elections. Libya has since 
descended into a prolonged internal armed conflict between rival armed group factions and political crisis following 
elections in 2014 and the GNC’s refusal to concede control to an elected House of Representatives. See Reports of 
the Secretary General, on the United Nations Support Mission to Libya, S/2014/653, 5 September 2014; 
S/2015/144, 26 February 2015; S/2016/182, 26 February 2016; S/2016/1011, 1 December 2016; S/2017/726, 27 
August 2017; S/2018/870, 24 August 2018. 
20 ‘Arab Uprising – BBC News, ‘Arab Uprising- Country by Country’, last updated 16 December 2013.  
21 E.g. OHCHR, Nepal Conflict Report 2012.  
22 E.g. Security Council Resolution 2040 (2012) §3. 
23 OHCHR, Nepal Conflict Report 2012. 
24 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry into Libya (2012).  
25 Ibid, Annex 1, p.188, §758; OHCHR Nepal Conflict Report 2012, p.176 & pp.179-181. 
26 Ibid, p.21 & Annex 1, p.189, §§763, 765-769; OHCHR Nepal Conflict Report 2012, pp.192-200. 
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The focus of this chapter is on two key issues that arise out of the ILC’s approach to scope of 
Article 10(1) and evidentiary issues that arise from its judicial application: (i) whether the rule will 
or should apply to a government formed as the result of a negotiated power-sharing agreement 
between the pre-existing authorities and one or more insurrectional movements, or between one 
or more insurrectional movements; and (ii) the evidential difficulties that relate to the identification 
of conduct attributable to the insurrectional movement. The argument is divided into five parts.  
Section 7.2 provides an overview of the basic elements of the rule that the conduct of a successful 
insurrectional movement is attributable to the State and considers the approach of the ILC. In 
section 7.3 the definition of the terms ‘insurrectional movement’ for the purposes of Article 10 
ARS is considered. In section 7.4 the evidential difficulties that are likely to arise in the practical 
application of Article 10 and in the identification of conduct that is attributable to the 
insurrectional movement will be examined.  Section 7.5 provides an in-depth examination of the 
policy and legal justification for ILC’s proposed exclusion of governments of national 
reconciliation. This issue raises the question of the nature of the political outcome that will 
constitute ‘success’ for the purposes of Article 10(1). The ILC Commentary suggests that the 
application of Article 10(1) ‘should not be pressed too far’ in cases of governments of national 
reconciliation formed by the pre-existing government and the insurrectional movement.27 This 
proposition has received limited attention.28 Of those who have considered Article 10(1), some 
have simply reiterated the ILC’s commentary without further examination of the basis for 
proposed exclusion.29 Others have observed that, to the extent that the exclusion of governments 
of national reconciliation from the scope of Article 10(1) is accompanied by the provision of 
amnesty in peace agreements, ‘impunity and irresponsibility will go hand-in-hand’.30 I will argue 
that the idea that peace and justice are irreconcilable is outdated. The development of 
jurisprudence in IHRL, according to which any amnesty that protects an individual from 
prosecution for grave crimes and human rights violations is invalid, shows that the tide is turning 
towards justice as an essential component to long-term peace and stability.  
 
 
27 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §7. 
28 An exception is d’Aspremont (2009). See section 7.5.5 for a critique of d’Aspremont’s argument concerning the 
application of article 10(1) to governments of national reconciliation. For a brief discussion of the application of the 
rule provided by Article 10(1) ARS to coalition governments before the adoption of the ARS in 2001 see Akehurst, 
(1969) p.60. 
29 E.g Zegveld (2002) p.157; Crawford (2013) p.176. 
30 Cahin (2010a) p.250. 
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I then examine whether Article 10(1) would apply in situations where the downfall of a government 
has been brought about by the actions of a number of separate insurrectional movements, each 
with its own organisational structure and political and/or ideological mandate. This issue was not 
addressed by the ILC and has only received limited academic attention.31 In these circumstances 
one group, or a coalition of groups, may succeed in forming the new government. It may be 
questioned whether such a coalition government could satisfy the real and substantial continuity 
requirement. Further, are the wrongful acts of all insurrectional movements that were fighting the 
previous government attributable to the state or only the wrongful acts of the insurrectional 
movements that have attained governmental authority? In section 7.6 I make the case for the 
application of Article 10(1) to coalition governments where the parties to the conflict achieve a 
substantial share of authority. It follows that in situations where the pre-existing government is 
overthrown as the result of the activities of several insurrectional movements, the conduct of the 
insurrectional movements that draw together to form a coalition government may be attributable 
to the state.  
 
7.2  Article 10(1) ARS  
As a general rule a state is not responsible for the conduct of non-state actors that act entirely 
independent of it, for example persons who take part in insurrections, riots, or mass 
demonstrations, unless there is a failure to exercise due diligence in the prevention or punishment 
of a violation of international law.32 Thus, the conduct of an unsuccessful insurrectional movement 
not covered by Articles 4-9 ARS33 will not be attributable to the state. The insurrectional 
movement is considered to be an adversary of the established government, its acts are directed 
against the government and, once established, it operates beyond the government’s effective 
control.34 As the Umpire in Home Frontier and Foreign Missionary Society of the United Brethren in Christ 
v Great Britain said, 
 
It is a well-established principle of international law that no government can be held 
responsible for the act of rebellious bodies of men committed in violation of its authority, 
 
31 See Dumberry, (2006) p.612 and Crawford, (2013) p.179. 
32 See chapter 4. ILC Report (1975), pp.95-96 §§19-20; Brownlie (1983) p.172. Another exception to this general 
rule is where a State assumes responsibility for the actions of private actors, as provided by Article 11 ARS.  
33 Article 10(3) provides that ‘This article is without prejudice to the attribution to a State of any conduct, however 
related to that of the movement concerned, which is to be considered an act of that State by virtue of articles 4 to 9’. 
For discussion of Articles 4, 8 and 9 ARS see chapters 2 and 6. 
34 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §2. 
 174 
where it is itself guilty of no breach of good faith, or of no negligence in suppressing 
insurrection. 35 
 
Article 10(1) provides an exception to the general rule in situations where an insurrectional 
movement succeeds in establishing a new government. According to Article 10(1) the conduct of 
an insurrectional movement that succeeds in establishing a new government will be attributable to 
the state. This rule of attribution is drawn from the jurisprudence of early international arbitral 
decisions, in particular the Mixed Claims Commissions instituted between a number of states and 
Venezuela (1902-1903) and Mexico (1910-1930). For example, in French Company of Venezuelan 
Railroads the Umpire said, 
 
When revolution laid waste both country and village, or seized the railroad and its material, 
or placed its hands upon the boats and wrought serious injury to all, it is regrettable, 
deplorable, but it is not chargeable upon the respondent Government, unless the 
revolution was successful and unless the acts were such as to charge responsibility under 
the well-recognized rules of public law.36 
 
An injured state may seek to make a claim against an insurrectional movement itself. However, in 
many cases this will not be practical. Insurrectional movements enjoy only a temporary existence 
– a movement will cease to exist either because it succeeds and becomes the new government or 
the government of a new state, or it fails and disintegrates.37 Ago argued that this temporary 
existence creates practical difficulties that would frustrate the making of a claim while the conflict 
is ongoing.38 The claims process is unlikely to be concluded before the conflict ends and the 
insurrectional movement ceases to exist.39 The prospects of obtaining reparation are further 
hindered by the fact that an insurrectional movement may not hold sufficient property or resources 
 
35 Home Frontier and Foreign Missionary Society (1920) p.44 applied in G. L. Solis (1928) p.361.  
36 French Company of Venezuelan Railroads (1902) p.354.   
37 Some movements may last for decades, for example Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), a paramilitary group seeking 
the independence of the Basque Region of Spain has existed since 1959. ETA announced a definitive ceasefire in 
2011 and its dissolution in April 2018: Burgen, ‘Basque terrorist group Eta to be dissolved in week says mediator’, 
The Guardian, 2 April 2018.  
 The Irish Republican Army (IRA) was founded in 1913 and operated in various forms until it called a ceasefire in 
1994 and the signing of the Good Friday Agreement 1998 (the Real IRA, opposed to the peace agreement continues 
to operate). 
38 Ago, Fourth Report (1972), pp.129-130 §154. 
39 Ibid. 
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to pay compensation.40 Moreover, there are no established rules of attribution according to which 
members of an insurrectional movement may be identified. Identification, particularly in the 
movement’s ‘embryonic stages’ will be difficult.41  
 
All this creates uncertain and unattractive conditions for a state to present a claim against an 
insurrectional movement while the conflict is on-going. Article 10(1) envisages situations where 
an injured state waits until the end of the conflict to make its claim, presenting them to the new 
government created by the successful insurgency.   
 
7.2.1 Real and substantial continuity requirement 
Early case law sought to explain the attribution of conduct of the successful insurrectional 
movement to the state on the ground that the movement constituted an expression of the ‘national 
will’. In The Bolivar Railway Case the Umpire said, 
 
Responsibility comes because it is the same nation. Nations do not die when there is a 
change of their rules or in their forms of government. These are but expressions of a 
change of national will... The nation is responsible for the obligations of a successful 
revolution from its beginning, because in theory, it represented ab initio a changing 
national will, crystallizing in the finally successful result.42 
 
However, the notion that a state will be responsible for the conduct of an insurrectional movement 
because the latter represents the ‘national will’ should be approached with caution. As the ILC 
warned in its 1975 report, 
The idea has also been put forward that, where the action of the insurgents was successful, 
they would be regarded as having represented the true national will ever since their uprising 
against the constituted power. But the very concept of “national will” is to be treated with 
caution, quite apart from the fact that, in general, international law is not greatly concerned 
with whether a given government is or is not the representative of the “true” national will. 
Even leaving that aside, it is difficult to maintain that the outcome of fighting should, like 
 
40 Ibid.  
41 See section 7.4. 
42 The Bolivar Railway Case (1905), pp.452-453. 
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a judgement of God, establish retrospectively that the victors, from the outset of the civil 
war, were more representative of the true national will than the defeated.43  
The ILC adopted the alternative theory of structural continuity between the organisational 
structures of the insurrectional movement and the new government,44 generally supported in 
recent case law.45  The Commentary explains, 
Where the insurrectional movement, as a new Government, replaces the previous 
Government of the State, the ruling organization of the insurrectional movement becomes 
the ruling organization of that State. The continuity which thus exists between the new 
organization of the State and that of the insurrectional movement leads naturally to the 
attribution to the State of conduct which the insurrectional movement may have 
committed during the struggle.46  
The ILC has been criticised for failing to give any guidance in its commentary as to the point at 
which acts of the insurrectional movement become attributable to the state.47 According to The 
Bolivar Railway Case, the state will be responsible for all wrongful conduct committed by the 
insurrectional movement throughout the revolution, from its inception until its eventual success.48 
However, the Tribunal did not expand upon how the point at which a revolution ‘begins’ might 
be determined. For the ILC, ‘the acts of organs of the organization which grew up during the 
insurrection and then became the organization of the State itself’ are attributable to the state.49 
This approach suggests that conduct will only be attributable to the state from the point at which 
the insurrectional movement is sufficiently organised such that its organs are identifiable. As will 
be discussed below in section 7.4, identifying what acts are those of organs of the insurrectional 
movement, rather than supporters of it or individuals acting in favour of it, particularly during the 
nascent stages of a revolution, is not an easy task in practice and can place a high burden of proof 
on claimants that can be difficult to overcome.  
 
 
43 ILC Report (1975) p.100, §3. 
44 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §§4-6; Dumberry, (2006) p.608; Crawford (2013) p.178. 
45 Starrett Housing Corp v Iran (1983), fn.4; Short v Iran (1987) §28 and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Brower, §28. See 
also ILC Report (1975) p.102 §9; ARS, Article 10, Commentary §§3-12 and accompanying footnotes. 
46 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §5. See also §4. 
47 D’Aspremont (2009). 
48 Bolivar Railway Case (1905), pp.452-453. 
49 ILC Report (1975), Commentary to draft article 15, p.101 §5. 
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Nonetheless, in order for Article 10(1) to operate as an effective rule of attribution, it is necessary 
to define ‘insurrectional movement’ in precise terms.  
 
7.3 Definition of ‘Insurrectional Movement’ 
The term ‘insurrectional movement’ is left undefined by the ILC. Importantly, no distinction is 
made between an insurrectional movement that may be considered to be ‘legitimate’50 and one that 
would not. This lack of distinction was a source of controversy during the drafting of the ARS. 
The ILC received criticism from states such as the German Democratic Republic, Tanzania, 
Czechoslovakia, Oman, Madagascar, Syria, Swaziland, Ghana and Zambia on the grounds that a 
general approach failed to take into consideration the legitimacy of national liberation 
movements.51 However, the notion that an ‘insurrectional movement’, for the purposes of 
attribution, might be defined according to its perceived legitimacy was rejected by the ILC. As the 
ILC explains in its commentary to Article 10,  
…it is unnecessary and undesirable to exonerate a new Government or a new State from 
responsibility for the conduct of its personnel by reference to considerations of legitimacy 
or illegitimacy of its origin. Rather, the focus must be on the particular conduct in question, 
and on its lawfulness or otherwise under the applicable rules of international law.52  
Moreover, relying upon the recognition of the international legal personality of an insurrectional 
movement, or recognition of belligerency, is impractical for the purposes of Article 10. Except for 
situations of peoples under alien subjugation53 or the now rare situations of decolonisation,54 the 
recognition of the international legal personality of insurrectional movements appears to have 
fallen into disuse.55  
 
Rather than providing a comprehensive definition of ‘insurrectional movement’, the ILC suggests 
that the criteria laid down in Article 1 APII should be used as a guide to the ‘essential idea’ of an 
 
50 Article 1(4) API. 
51 See Atlam (1987) p.39. 
52 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §11.  
53 E.g. the recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Authority as the ‘sole and legitimate representative’ of the 
Palestinian people by the General Assembly in 1982 (GA Res 37/43 (3 December 1982) §23).  
54 According to the United Nations, as of 10 January 2019, 17 non-self-governing territories remain to be 
decolonised: United Nations and Decolonization: Non-Self-Governing Territories.  
55 Clapham (2006) pp.271-2; Sivukumaran, (2012) p.19; Crawford (2013) p.171. 
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‘insurrectional movement’.56 As a minimum, therefore, Article 10 will apply to ‘dissident armed 
forces or other organized groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over 
a part of [the state’s] territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military 
operations and to implement this Protocol’, as opposed to groups taking part in ‘internal 
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a 
similar character’.57 As ‘insurrectional movements’ also include national liberation movements,58 
Article 10 would also operate with regard these groups as defined by API as ‘peoples...fighting 
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their 
right of self-determination’.59  
 
The ILC’s approach seeks to recognise the different forms an insurrectional movement can take 
according to the situation it is operating in, whether that be ‘limited internal unrest, a genuine civil 
war situations, an anti-colonial struggle, the action of a national liberation front, revolutionary or 
counter-revolutionary movements... [that] may be based in the territory of a State against which 
the movement’s actions are directed, or in the territory of a third State’.60 However, the use of 
Article 1 APII as guidance for the threshold of application of Article 10 would ‘seem to limit the 
envisaged situations to those of a large-scale civil war’,61 despite the inclusion of ‘limited internal 
unrest’ as an example of one situation in which an insurrectional movement may exist.62 
Accordingly, Article 1 APII should be taken only as a guide to the key elements of the 
insurrectional movement’s organisational structure necessary for Article 10 to apply in order that 
a ‘dissident armed force’ that succeeds in taking over a government by a short, sharp insurrection, 
rather than an enduring civil war is included within the scope of the article.63  
 
It would appear from the Commentary that the conduct of political opposition groups in Tunisia, 
Egypt and Yemen that successfully deposed the former governments through mass 
demonstrations in 2010 and 2011 in circumstances that did not cross the threshold of armed 
 
56 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §§9 & 11. 
57 Article 1(2) APII. 
58 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §§9 & 11. 
59 Article 1(4) API. 
60 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §9. 
61 Cahin (2010a) p.252. 
62 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §9. 
63 E.g. the February Revolution in Russia 1917 lasted one week, resulting in the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II and 
the installation of a provisional government in his place. 
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conflict would not be attributable to the state. In each of these cases, an identifiable political group 
took over government. However, that group’s success rode on the wave of the masses. This gives 
rise to the question whether the organisation that succeeds to government as a result of revolution, 
whatever the form that revolution may take, should fall within the definition of insurrectional 
movement. The reliance by the Commentary on APII as a guide would appear to exclude the 
possibility that mass demonstrations, even ones that entail the commission acts of violence or 
damage to property by participants in those demonstrations will fall within the definition of 
‘insurrectional movement’. 
 
Nevertheless, in all cases the question arises as to how to identify the acts of an insurrectional 
movement. Do the supporters of a movement constitute its ‘organs’ or ‘agents’ for the purposes 
of Article 10(1)?  
 
7.4 Identification of Acts Attributable to the Insurrectional Movement  
The cases of Short,64 Arthur Young & Co,65 and Yeager66 decided by the Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
demonstrate that in practice the identification of acts that are attributable to an insurrectional 
movement can prove difficult.   
 
In Short the claimant was unable to prove that his wrongful expulsion was due to the acts of the 
Revolutionary Guard rather than pro-Khomeini activists. The Tribunal stated in clear terms that,  
 
The acts of supporters of a revolution cannot be attributed to the government following 
the success of the revolution just as the acts of the supporters of an existing government 
are not attributable to the government.67  
 
Similarly in Arthur Young & Co the claim of wrongful expulsion by agents of the Iranian 
government was denied as the claimants had failed to prove ‘who these “agents” were and how 
they were associated with the Government of Iran’.68 The Tribunal held that ‘attribution of acts to 
 
64 Short v Iran (1987).  
65 Arthur Young & Co v Iran (1987). 
66 Yeager (1987). 
67 Short v Iran (1987) §34, referring to the statement of the ICJ in Tehran Hostages, p.29, §58 that only conduct of 
militants that was directed by an organ of the State to carry out a specific task could be attributable by way of 
analogy.  
68 Arthur Young & Co v Iran (1987) §48.  
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the State is justified only when the identity of acting persons and their association with the State is 
established with reasonable certainty’.69  
 
In Yeager the claimant was only able to prove that his expulsion was due to members of the 
revolutionary guard ‘in light of other circumstances’,70 namely that affidavits of other witnesses 
mentioned the Revolutionary Guard and it was not disputed that the Hilton Hotel, where he had 
been taken, was taken over by the Revolutionary Guard that had expelled a different revolutionary 
group the day before. Members of the Revolutionary Guard were identified only by their red 
armbands. 
 
The ILC, though recognising the possibility that an insurrectional movement may itself be held 
responsible for violations of IHL, did not address the question of attribution of conduct to an 
insurrectional movement in the ARS that are only concerned with the responsibility of states.71 
The question then arise was to whether it is appropriate to apply Article ARS by analogy in order 
to identify the agents of an insurrectional movement. Zegveld has argued that the ASR may be 
applied to ‘de facto governments or other large, well-organized armed opposition groups’, but 
contends that separate rules of attribution should be formulated with respect to less organised 
groups based on ‘actual control over individuals, rather than the existence of a defined state-like 
structure’. 72 However it is questionable whether it is appropriate to apply separate rules of 
attribution to armed groups depending on their level of organisation. The result would be that a 
less organised movement may be held to a stricter standard than states. Further, it is not clear how 
Zegveld’s alternative set of rules based on control standard would differ from a rule analogous to 
Article 8 ASR. 
 
There is no clear answer to the question how members of an insurrectional movement should be 
identified, particularly in the embryonic stages of revolution. In the embryonic stages a 
revolutionary leader of what may in due course become an ‘insurrectional movement’ may issue a 
general ‘call to arms’ or make inflammatory statements against the Government and its supporters. 
Supporters of a movement who respond to a call to arms or are incited by inflammatory statements 
to commit violent acts may have a significant impact on the overall success of the overall 
 
69 Ibid. 
70 Yeager (1987) §41. 
71 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §16. Explaining that the issue is beyond its mandate. 
72 Zegveld (2002), p.155. Also Caron (1998) p.150; Kleffner (2009), p.261; Verhoeven (2015) p.300. 
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movement, but they are unlikely to wear a uniform or enjoy any formal status within the 
movement.  
 
In Tehran Hostages the ICJ held that the inflammatory statements of Ayatollah Khomeini were not 
an authorisation to militant students to storm the US embassy.73 Yet, inflammatory proclamations 
may be decisive in spurring supporters of a movement to act against the government, or to use 
threats or acts of violence against a particular group of people generally, thus facilitating the 
ultimate downfall of the pre-existing government or the establishment of a new state. As Judge 
Brower notes in his dissenting judgment in Short, the fact that general inflammatory statements 
cannot amount to authorisation to carry out a specific act, ‘does not... compel the Award’s 
conclusion that such statements also cannot be seen to have caused the more general, less 
cataclysmic and rather complete exodus of Americans from Iran’.74   
 
The Islamic Revolution was punctuated by a series of proclamations made by the Ayatollah 
Khomeini from exile in France and then later after his return to Iran on 1 February 1979. He 
condemned the United States’ support for the Shah and called upon the Iranian people to work 
together to overthrow the Pahlavi dynasty.75 The day after the Shah left Iran, on 16 January 1979, 
the Ayatollah declared, 
 
The U.S. administration and the President have become enemies of the Iranian people. The 
presence of their military bases and advisers have impoverished our country. The United States 
has become an accessory and has backed the massacre of our people by the Shah's ignoble regime. 
It is now up to the American people to exert pressure on their government.76 
 
For Judge Brower, there was a clear relationship between the Ayatollah’s proclamations, the 
success of the revolution, and the injury or loss caused to United States’ citizens in Iran at the 
time. He states,  
 
 
73 Tehran Hostages, pp.29-30 §59. 
74 Ibid. 
75 For excerpts from Ayatollah Khomeini’s proclamations see Short v Iran (1987), dissenting judgment of Judge 
Brower, §§6-13. 
76 Ibid. §10. 
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It seems to me reasonable to conclude that there was a cause and effect relationship 
between these successive statements by the leader of the ultimately successful Islamic 
Revolution in Iran and the events that befell Americans almost universally in that country 
from the beginning of November 1978. The record here is replete with evidence of threats, 
attacks, firebombings and virtually every form of overt assault on the persons and property 
of Americans in Iran during that period. If plotted on a graph the rising curve of such anti-
American violence would track precisely the growing intensity of Khomeini's verbal 
attacks on America and its citizens and the accompanying climax of the Revolution. 
Indeed, the essential facts are conceded, or at least not disputed.77 
 
However, Judge Brower’s assessment of the Iranian Revolution that tally’s the ‘rising curve’ in 
violence with the growing intensity of Khomeini’s verbal attacks may be reasonable on the facts 
of that case, but it does not provide a precise formula for attribution of conduct. 
 
Difficulties in identifying the organs or agents of an insurrectional movement are further 
highlighted by the Final Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in East Timor. According to the Final Report, 
The Commission in no way seeks to minimise violations committed by the Resistance. In the early 
stages of the conflict many senior figures in the political and military leadership of the Resistance 
behaved with extreme brutality not only towards their political opponents but also towards 
ordinary civilians. However, during the 1980s and 1990s, both the quantitative and the qualitative 
evidence confirm that the number of killings and disappearances attributed to the Resistance 
declined sharply. In addition, for a number of reasons the Commission has often found it difficult 
to be sure that the Resistance always bears institutional responsibility for the unlawful killings and 
disappearances attributed to it. Because East Timorese society became so heavily militarised during 
this period, the status of many of the civilians who were killed by Fretilin/Falintil was often 
ambiguous. Further complicating the attribution of responsibility is the fact that victims included 
people who were forcibly put at risk by the Indonesian security forces. Moreover, particularly 
during armed attacks, it is also not always clear from the available information that a particular 
victim was specifically targeted. Finally, in at least some cases, particularly but not only in 1999, 




for their actions, that the Falintil High Command did not institutionally condone violations 
committed by its personnel.78  
The requirement that the claimant should prove that the perpetrators of their injury were acting 
under the direction and control of the insurrectional movement sits uneasily with idea that a 
revolution can be the sum of acts of individual supporters of a charismatic figure, a movement or 
an opposition party who respond to a call to arms but are not instructed to carry out a specific 
task and do not act under the control of the figure, movement or party.  
 
Yet, despite the evidential difficulties experienced by claimants in the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, it 
is necessary to impose criteria to identify a movement’s organ or agent. This is highlighted by the 
ILC in its commentary that at the least a movement should have the attributes identified by Article 
1 APII. Without rules of attribution specific to an insurrectional movement, Article 8 ARS is a 
helpful analogue. For if any or all acts of any or all persons during a revolution were attributable 
to the state pursuant to Article 10 ARS there is a risk that the exceptional status of Article 10 would 
be diluted and the importance of the notion that the conduct is carried out on behalf of the 
movement would be lost.  
 
7.5 Establishment of ‘Governments of National Reconciliation’ 
According to the Commentary, the requirements of Article 10(1) will only be fulfilled if there is 
‘real and substantial continuity between the former insurrectional movement and the new 
Government it has succeeded in forming’.79 The question then arises as to what constitutes ‘real 
and substantial continuity’?  
 
The Commentary does not expand on the definition of ‘real and substantial continuity’. However, 
the Commentary does state that Article 10(1) ‘should not be pressed too far in the case of 
Governments of national reconciliation, formed following an agreement between the existing 
authorities and the leaders of an insurrectional movement’.80 It is not clear whether the exclusion 
of any and all governments of national reconciliation should be absolute or whether the issue is a 
question of degree that should be addressed on a case-by-case basis. The distinction is important 
as governments of national reconciliation are not uniform in structure.  
 
78 Chega! Final Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation Commission in East Timor 
(2005).  
79 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §7. 
80 Ibid. 
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The Commentary does not cite any authority upon which the suggested exclusion of governments 
of national reconciliation is based. Instead, the Commentary merely reiterates the real and 
substantial continuity requirement, advising that,  
The State should not be made responsible for the conduct of a violent opposition 
movement merely because, in the interests of an overall peace settlement, elements of the 
opposition are drawn into a reconstructed Government. Thus, the criterion of application 
of paragraph 1 is that of a real and substantial continuity between the former insurrectional 
movement and the new Government it has succeeded in forming. 81 
 
The ILC’s purported justification for the exclusion prompts two observations. First, it is not clear 
what the phrase ‘should not be pressed too far’ means. Either a new government will satisfy the 
real and substantial continuity requirement, or it will not. Second, the Commentary asserts that 
governments of national reconciliation should be excluded from the scope of Article 10(1) if that 
exclusion is in the interests of an overall peace settlement. This implies a value judgement that 
considers responsibility for violations of international law as an obstacle to peace and post-conflict 
stability.82 This value judgement is analogous to the justification for the use of amnesty in peace 
agreements to shield persons from criminal prosecution for crimes committed during an armed 
conflict, in the hope that the removal of fear or threat of prosecution will encourage the parties to 
the negotiating table. However, from the victim’s perspective this entrenches impunity and leaves 
victim states and individuals without a legal basis upon which to pursue reparation.83 
 
7.5.1 Governments of national reconciliation and the real and substantial continuity 
requirement 
The reference by the ILC to ‘real and substantial continuity’ to conclude its explanation for the 
proposed exclusion of governments of national reconciliation has been understood to imply that 
there can be no continuity between an insurrectional movement and a government of national 
reconciliation.84 In its 1998 report the ILC suggests that Article 10 ‘should only apply in the narrow 
case where the opposition movement actually defeated and replaced the Government of the State 
 
81 Ibid. 
82 D’Aspremont (2009) p.437. 
83 Fletcher (2016) p.512. See section 7.6 below. 
84 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §7. Ryngaert (2015) p.175.  
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concerned’.85 However, this interpretation of ‘real and substantial continuity’ is not justified, and 
is a rather more definitive statement than that eventually adopted.  
 
The use of the phrase ‘should not be pressed too far’ suggests that Article 10 may apply to some 
but not all governments of national reconciliation. If this is correct, then it may be argued that this 
exception to Article 10 qualifies rather than abrogates the position adopted by the ILC in its 1975 
report that:  
 
The principle that it is legitimate to attribute to a government resulting from a successful 
revolution the injurious acts committed earlier by the revolutionaries must also apply... to 
the case of a coalition government formed following an agreement between the ‘legitimate’ 
authorities and the leaders of the revolutionary movement.86 
 
Indeed, it appears to have been the intention of Special Rapporteur Crawford to qualify the ILC’s 
early position.87 Addressing the issue of the rule’s application to coalition governments in a 
footnote to his draft commentary Special Rapporteur Crawford recommended, in terms strikingly 
similar to those adopted by the ILC in its Commentary to Article 10, that: 
 
It is doubtful how far this principle should be pressed in cases of governments of national 
reconciliation. A State should not be made responsible for the acts of a violent opposition 
movement merely because, in the interests of an overall peace settlement, elements of the 
opposition are drawn into a reconstructed government. In this respect the commentary needs 
some qualification.88 
 
However, this statement does not provide any guidance as to the threshold for attribution in such 
cases.  
 
An indication of what is meant by the term ‘elements’ and the type of government Crawford had 
in mind may be drawn from his book (2013) in which he posits that Article 10 would not apply to 
the government created by the Lomé Accord, agreed between the Government of Sierra Leone 
 
85 ILC Report (1998), p.85 §416. 
86 ILC Report (1975), Commentary to draft article 15, p.104 §17. 
87 Crawford, First Report (1998), p.52, fn.347. 
88 Ibid. [Emphasis added] Crawford appears to distinguish governments of national reconciliation from coalition 
governments. However, it is not clear on what basis this distinction is made. 
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and the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) in 1999.89 The Lomé Accord did not 
provide each party with a substantial share of control of government. The Lomé Accord 
‘recognizing the right of the people of Sierra Leone to live in peace, and desirous of finding a 
transitional mechanism to incorporate the RUF/SL into governance within the spirit and letter of 
the Constitution’90 paves the way for members of the RUF/SL to take political office and for the 
movement to transform itself into a political party.91 The RUF was initially guaranteed a seat in 
government but remained in the minority. Four out of eighteen cabinet ministries were allocated 
to the RUF, one of those ministries being ‘senior cabinet appointments such as finance, foreign 
affairs and justice’.92 Corporal Sankoh, leader of the RUF, was appointed Vice President93 and 
Chairman of the Board of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National 
Reconstruction and Development that oversaw the exploitation of the country’s gold, diamonds 
and other natural resources.94 The RUF/SL failed to win any seats in the 2002 general election, the 
first election following the signing of the Lomé Accord.95 
 
Some further guidance as to whether a coalition government, and therefore a government of 
national reconciliation, may satisfy the real and substantial continuity requirement was drawn by 
Ago from arbitral decisions of the late 19th and early 20th century following a number of 
insurrections in South and Central American States.96  
 
7.5.2 Case Law of Arbitral Tribunals of Late 19th and Early 20th Century 
The McCord Case97 concerned the ill treatment of a US consular official by members of the 
insurrectional movement that later became part of the provisional coalition government of Peru 
following the civil war brought to an end in 1885 by agreement between the then Head of State, 
General Iglesias and leader of the insurrectional movement, General Caceres.98 According to the 
 
89 Crawford (2013) p.176, fn.56. 
90 Lomé Accord 1999, Part II. 
91 Ibid., Article III. 
92 Article V(3) Lomé Accord 1999. In practice RUF representatives were appointed to Trade and Industry, Energy 
and Power, Lands, Housing and Country Planning and the Environment. The new Minister for Tourism and 
Culture was appointed from the ranks of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) allied to the RUF.  
93 Ibid. Article V. 
94 Ibid. Article VII. 
95 Sierra Leone news, May 2002. Available at: http://www.sierra-leone.org/Archives/slnews0502.html  
96 Ago, Fourth Report (1972), p.149, §209.  
97 McCord Case (1886-1888) pp.985-990. 
98 Ibid. Also, Akehurst (1969) p.60. 
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terms of the agreement, the parties formed a provisional coalition government and that 
government then held a general election. General Caceres was elected President. The defendant 
State (Peru) had initially denied responsibility for the ill treatment of the US consular official on 
the ground that, ‘as the acts complained of were committed by “a chief in arms against the 
government then recognized as legitimate by all nations,” responsibility therefor, if any existed, 
did not rest upon the Peruvian nation’.99 The United States contended that Peru was responsible 
because the Government and the insurrectional movement, led by General Caceres, had joined 
together at the end of the conflict to form a provision coalition government to which the existing 
government was successor. In response Peru amended its position, accepting that the conduct was 
that of a ‘legitimate authority’, but disputed liability on the ground that conduct was lawful.100 
 
The McCord case was cited by Special Rapporteur Ago in his 1972 report in support for his 
contention that where the insurgents are integrated into the framework of the pre-existing 
government,  
 
...the State apparatus which results is in reality the continuation of both the organizations 
which confronted each other during the civil war. In that case there is therefore nothing 
surprising in the attribution to the State of the acts not only of members of its preceding 
organization but also of members of the organization that grew up during the insurrection 
and is subsequently united with the preceding organization.101  
 
The question then arises as to where the line should be drawn between what the ILC Commentary 
refers to as ‘a government of national reconciliation’ and a coalition government for the purposes 
of the application of Article 10(1)?  
In his study on state responsibility for the conduct of the Ian Smith government of Southern 
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) Akehurst has suggested that the findings of the Italian-Venezuelan 
Commission in the Guastini Case,102 ‘may indicate that even appointment to very high office does 
not render a State liable unless there is a coalition government in law as well as in fact’.103 In that 
case the Italian Commission had submitted that Venezuela was liable for the return of license fees 
 
99 Ibid, p.987. 
100 Ibid, p.989. 
101 Ago, Fourth Report (1972), p.146 §199. See also ILC Report (1975), Commentary to draft article 15, p.104 §17. 
102 Guastini Case (1903).  
103 Akehurst (1969) p.60 fn.3. 
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paid by the claimant to the insurrectional movement because, in the face of its inability to suppress 
the revolution, Venezuela had offered ministerial positions to the civil and military leadership of 
the insurrectional movement, headed by José Manuel Hernández.104 At the time of the arbitration 
Hernández’s political party had ‘members in cabinet, in Congress, among the high officials of the 
customs, and even among the presidents of the States’.105 Some of those officials had ‘governed’ 
uninterrupted by the change of government, first in the name of the revolution, and second, as 
part of the official government authorities.106 On this basis, the Italian Commissioner invoked ‘a 
special responsibility for the period of the Hernandez and Matos revolutions, the latter being a 
continuation of the former, whose adherents were its mainstay’.107 The Umpire rejected the Italian 
Commissioner’s submission that Venezuela was responsible for the conduct of the rebels. 
However, the decision did not turn on the composition of the post-revolution government, but 
on whether the licence fees would have been payable to the legitimate authorities had they been 
in control of the area at the time. As stated previously with respect to questions of state 
responsibility for the conduct of armed groups exercising elements of the governmental authority 
through the collection of taxes, provided that the taxes are in fact used for a public purpose, the 
collection of those taxes will be considered legally valid.108 The state will not, therefore, be 
permitted to request payment of those taxes again, nor will it be liable to repay those taxes to the 
payee.109 Therefore, the finding that Venezuela was not liable to re-pay the license fees should not 
be interpreted as a rejection of the plea by the Italian Commissioner that ‘no distinction should be 
drawn between revolutions wholly or partially successful’.110 That point was not determinative of 
the issue in the case. Had the issue been whether Venezuela was responsible for the destruction 
of property or personal injury caused by the insurrectional movement, the decision may well have 
been different. However, this is speculation. 
Nevertheless, there is some support for the proposition that, for the purposes of attribution under 
Article 10(1) ARS, one or two public appointments of former leaders of an insurrectional 
movement will not constitute ‘a new government’. In the Case of Hugh Divine,111 the arbitral tribunal 
 




108 Santa Clara Estates (1903) p.458; Guastini Case (1903); MacLoed v US (1913); US v Rice (1819). See chapter 6,6.4.2. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Guastini Case (1903) p.568.  
111 Case of Hugh Divine (1875). 
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rejected the submission that Mexico should be responsible for the destruction of property by 
rebels in circumstances where the rebel commander, General Carvajal, had been pardoned and 
was later instated as the civil and military governor of Tamaulipas and other Mexican states and as 
Major-General of the Mexican army. The claimant sought damages on the basis that Mexico ‘was 
bound to make good the loss of the property in question, the circumstances of whose destruction 
rendered it “a national affront”’.112 The Umpire concluded that the destruction of the property 
was due to the acts of rebels and ‘for this reason alone... the Mexican Government cannot be called 
upon to make compensation for the damage done’.113  
 
At first glance this case may seem to support the exclusion of governments of national 
reconciliation from the ambit of Article 10. However, rather than supporting the argument, this 
case undermines it. On its facts it cannot be said that the General Carvajal had become part of a 
coalition government at the end of the rebellion. The correct interpretation of the case is that 
‘public appointments that do not amount to a coalition government do not make a State liable’.114 As 
a corollary it may be inferred that a state would be liable where public appointments do amount to 
a coalition government.115  
 
Applying the doctrine of real and substantial continuity to these cases, it may be concluded that 
the real and substantial continuity requirement will not be satisfied if only a couple of key figures 
of a former insurrectional movement are absorbed into the government. A government 
composition that could fall short of the requirement is that considered by the agreement between 
the government of Colombia and the FARC in the Peace Accord of 24 November 2016. 
According to the terms of the Colombia-FARC Peace Accord the FARC, transformed into a 
political party, is guaranteed 10 congressional seats between 2018 and 2026.116  
 
However, it is arguable that the requirement of real and substantial continuity is satisfied in the 
case of the CPN-M led government, established following Constituent Assembly elections in 
Nepal in 2008, and resulting from the terms of the Kathmandu CPA between the Government of 
 
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid., p.2981. 
114 Akehurst (1969) p.60 [Emphasis added]. 
115 Akehurst argues that if a State is liable for the acts of successful insurgents, ‘it is only logical that it should be 
liable if the rebels and de jure government get together to form a coalition government’. (1969) p.60.  
116 Colombia-FARC Peace Accord 2016, pp.70-71. 
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Nepal and the Maoists in 2006.117 The power-share achieved by the CPN-M according to the terms 
of the Kathmandu CPA was more than the assimilation of ‘mere elements’ of the party into 
government, the CPN-M securing the largest allocation of cabinet positions in multi-party 
coalition government, and largest allocation of seats in the legislature.118  
 
7.5.3 Formation of a New Government Resulting from Efforts of a Number of Insurrectional 
Movements 
The question remains as to whether and what conduct is attributable following the formation of a 
new government as the result of efforts of a number of insurrectional movements, even if only 
one of those groups forms the new government.119 Libya is a recent example of the overthrow of 
a government and Head of State as a result of the efforts of a number of different insurgent groups. 
The downfall of Libyan President Gaddafi resulted in the formation of a new interim government 
by the NTC. The insurgency was conducted by a number of different insurgent groups not all of 
whom were aligned to the NTC.120 Further, the conflict in Syria saw the formation of a coalition 
of insurgent groups, some under the umbrella of the Supreme Military Council, that nevertheless 
maintained independent command structures and agendas.121 If this insurgency had successfully 
established a new government that result would have been due to the efforts of all of these groups 
and not just one.  
 
Despite a lack of judicial consideration of the issue, Crawford remains doubtful as to whether the 
acts of all insurrectional movements that contribute to the downfall of a government should be 
attributable to the state pursuant to Article 10(1), referring to the ‘exceptional character’ of 
attribution pursuant to the rule.122 This is understandable given Special Rapporteur Crawford’s 
position, adopted by the ILC, that ‘real and substantial continuity’ is necessary in order for 
responsibility to be attributed to the state. If it is right that governments of national reconciliation 
do not, or do not necessarily, pass this threshold, then it must equally be so for a new government 
created following a successful insurrection conducted by multiple groups.  
 
117 See further Annex One, OHCHR, ‘Nepal Conflict Report’, October 2012, pp.228-229; Ramesh, ‘Nepal rejoices 
as peace deal ends civil war’, The Guardian, 23 November 2006.  
118 Articles 3.2 & 3.3, Kathmandu CPA 2006. 
119 Dumberry (2006) p.612; Crawford (2013) p.179. 
120 United States Institute for Peace, ‘Special report: Stakeholders of Libya’s February 17 Revolution’ (2012), p6. 
121 BBC News, ‘Syria crisis: Guide to armed and political opposition’ 13 December 2013. The Supreme Military 
Council supports the political opposition coalition the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition 
Forces. At the time of writing the Syrian conflict is not concluded. 
122 Crawford (2013) p.179. 
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However, the words ‘real and substantial continuity’ suggest a variable standard that, in cases where 
an insurrection results in the formation of a coalition government the application of Article 10(1) 
will depend upon the extent to which each group secures a foothold in government. If the conduct 
of insurrectional movements that come together to form coalition government is not covered by 
Article 10(1), then the exclusion of coalition governments per se would open up another potential 
gap in the law of state responsibility.123 Coalition governments, or governments installed as the 
result of the efforts of multiple insurrectional movements, may take many forms. On the one hand 
each insurgent group may have a significant stake in the government, an equal share of power. For 
example, the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement  (Liberia CPA) between the Government of 
Liberia, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), Movement for Democracy 
in Liberia (MODEL) and other ‘Political Parties’124 established the National Transitional 
Legislative Assembly as a branch National Transitional Government, in which the parties to the 
agreement were allocated an equal number of seats in the legislature.125 Ministries of State were 
allocated between the parties, with the former government, LURD and MODEL taking charge of 
five of the more important ministries each and the Political Parties and ‘civil society’ sharing the 
remaining six ministries.126 In these circumstances it may be possible to identify real and substantial 
continuity from the organisational structure of each movement to that of the government. On the 
other hand, the majority of the new government may be formed out of one dominating 
insurrectional movement, whilst others may have some representation in the form of one or two 
representatives. In the latter case, only the majority party would pass the ‘real and substantial 
continuity’ test. 
 
This analysis of the case law of the arbitral tribunals of the late 19th and early 20th centuries shows 
some support for the proposition that a government of national reconciliation, or coalition 
government, may satisfy the real and substantial continuity requirement. Power-sharing 
agreements and the resulting allocation of power between the pre-existing government and the 
insurrectional movement can vary considerably. With this variety of national reconciliation and 
 
123 In addition to that opened up by the exclusion of governments of national reconciliation. 
124 Liberia CPA 2003.  
125 Ibid., Article XXIV. The seats were allocated as follows: GOL, LURD and MODEL 12 seats, ‘Political Parties’ 
18 seats, Civil Society and Special Interest Groups 7 seats, Counties 15 seats. 
126 Ibid, article XXVI and annex 4 with GOL, LURD and MODEL each receiving 5 ministries including those most 
central to government i.e. Ministry of National Defence (GOL), Ministry of Finance (LURD) and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MODEL). 
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power-sharing agreements in mind, it may be more realistic to consider the application of Article 
10(1) to governments of national reconciliation dependant on the circumstances of each case and 
how power is allocated and shared.  
 
The following section considers the policy-based argument that, notwithstanding a government of 
national reconciliation’s satisfaction of the real and substantial continuity requirement, 
nevertheless the exclusion of such a government from the operation of Article 10(1) is justified on 
the basis that in these circumstances state responsibility could act as a ‘disincentive’ to peace.127 
 
7.5.4 Policy-based justification: interests in peace vs interests in responsibility 
Special Rapporteur Crawford raised his concern that Article 10(1) should not apply to 
governments of national reconciliation in his first report to the ILC 1998.128 As observed above, 
Crawford contended that the ILC’s 1975 draft commentary needed some ‘qualification with 
respect to governments of national reconciliation, stating that it is ‘doubtful how far [Article 10(1)] 
should be pressed’ in these cases.129 For Crawford, 
 
...it would be unwise and unrealistic to attribute to the State the conduct of the 
insurrectional movement prior to the agreement... otherwise existing Governments which 
had been neither overthrown nor replaced and had shown a spirit of conciliation by 
incorporating elements of insurrectional movements in the Government would be too 
heavily penalized: they would in fact pay for their policy of reconciliation by being required 
to shoulder the full responsibility for the acts committed by the insurrectional movements 
during the insurrection.130 
 
Special Rapporteur Crawford offers a policy-based justification for the exclusion of governments 
of national reconciliation from the operation of Article 10 that implies two related presumptions: 
first, that the attribution of conduct of a successful insurrectional movement, thereby engaging 
state responsibility for that conduct, can be an obstacle to peace; and second, that the interests in 
 
127 Crawford (2013) p.176. 
128 Crawford, First Report (1998), p.52, fn.347. 
129 Ibid. 
130 ILC Report (1998), p.249 §55. 
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attaining peace outweighs interests in state responsibility. If applied to governments of national 
reconciliation, Article 10(1) ‘could act as a disincentive’.131  
 
However, as I will show, the argument that to attribute the acts of an insurrectional movement to 
the state in the event of national reconciliation would be too heavy a penalty on the state is not 
convincing.  
 
The supposed incentives for peace and reconciliation provided by the exclusion of governments 
of national reconciliation from the scope of Article 10(1) may be three-fold. First, the 
insurrectional movement, in the knowledge that the state would not bear responsibility for its 
conduct, is likely to consider a political solution to the conflict as an attractive alternative to 
fighting on and risking potential defeat.132 Second, the government is likely to be loath to accept 
the prospect of the state being responsible for the acts of an insurrectional movement it has been 
fighting to suppress. After all, should the government succeed in defeating the movement in its 
entirety the state would bear none. Non-attribution of the insurrectional movement’s conduct to 
the state may act as an incentive to negotiate a peaceful settlement and offer concessions to the 
armed opposition, rather than subject the state to ‘continuous strife’.133 Third, it may be seen to be 
in the ‘best interests’ of both sides to grant the other reprieve for their wrongdoing so that their 
own unlawful activities may be absolved.134  
 
There is no doubt that the most effective way to prevent the commission of human rights 
violations and war crimes during an armed conflict is to bring that armed conflict to an end. In 
this regard, a state has two options available to it. Either it can seek a military victory, or it can 
negotiate a peace agreement with the opposing party or parties to the conflict.135 For Akehurst, 
writing in 1969, a state must be free to exercise its discretion to negotiate a settlement ‘particularly 
since this removes the danger of their own subjects suffering losses as a result of fighting’.136 This 
discretion will ‘almost certainly include some sort of amnesty’, and states should not question the 
 
131 Crawford (2013) p.176. 
132 D’Aspremont (2009) p.436. 
133 Ryngaert (2015) p.175. 
134 Cahin (2010a) p.250. 
135 E.g. Akehurst (1969) p.58. 
136 Ibid. 
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exercise of this discretion, ‘particularly since this removes the danger of their own subjects 
suffering losses as a result of fighting’.137  
 
However, Akehurst’s support for the use of amnesty did not translate into support for the 
exclusion of governments of national reconciliation from the operation of the rule provided by 
Article 10(1) ARS. According to Akehurst, ‘[s]ince a State is liable for the acts of successful 
revolutionaries, it is only logical that it should be liable if the rebels and the de jure government 
get together to form a coalition government’.138 
Moreover, the argument in favour of excluding governments of national reconciliation from the 
scope of Article 10(1) is undermined by a number of conceptual and practical problems.  
First, the exclusion of governments of national reconciliation implies a value judgement based on 
the way in which power is achieved, one that the ILC sought to avoid by refusing to distinguish 
between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ insurrectional movements. If an insurrectional movement 
achieves power through ‘legitimate’ means, i.e. the negotiation of a peace agreement, the state’s 
responsibility will not be engaged for the acts of that movement committed during its struggle. 
However, if the insurrectional movement succeeds in usurping the pre-existing government by 
force, the state’s responsibility will be engaged.  
 
Second, the exclusion of governments of national reconciliation from the scope of Article 10(1) 
puts the parties on an unequal footing that may threaten long-term political stability. There is no 
suggestion that the state would not be responsible for the conduct of the pre-existing government. 
The conduct of the pre-existing government, a state organ, will be attributable to the state pursuant 
to Article 4 ARS. Therefore, the state may face claims for reparations with regard to any 
internationally wrongful acts committed by its pre-existing government, but not the acts of the 
(former) insurrectional movement. This unequal treatment can only serve to undermine 
reconciliation rather than promote it. The legitimacy of the former government that continues to 
exist as part of the new government of national reconciliation may be damaged by claims of 
responsibility for violations of IHL and IHRL committed against members of the insurrectional 
movement and civilians during the conflict, while the former insurrectional movement, now 
transformed into a political party, may be untarnished by its previous conduct.139  
 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid, p.60. 
139 Eatwell (2018a) p.394. 
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Third, the exclusion unfairly discriminates between the victims of the former and the victims of 
the latter. The state would only have a legal obligation to provide reparation for injury incurred at 
the hands of the pre-existing government.  
 
Fourth, the victims of internationally wrongful acts committed by the insurrectional movement 
must rely on the state to carry out its duty to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes under 
international law, and to provide an effective remedy.140 However, despite a general consensus in 
IHRL and ICL that rejects the use of amnesties that cover such acts,141 amnesties under domestic 
law continue to be a common ingredient to peace agreements.142  
 
In practice, the assimilation of the perpetrators of war crimes and human rights violations into 
government can entrench impunity.143 Even where a peace agreement does not provide for 
amnesty, power-sharing deals can have the same effect. As the Centre for Humanitarian dialogue 
has observed:  
 
[T]he most active proponents and perpetrators of war are relatively unchallenged by law 
in most peace agreements. When justice mechanisms are adopted, the overwhelming trend 
is towards strategies of co-existence, forgiveness and reconciliation instead of legal 
accountability.144  
 
With regard to the cases of Kenya and the DRC, Davis argues that ‘[t]he power-sharing deals 
enabled elites to entrench their power within the political and security institutions, and then 
fundamentally undermine justice efforts in the implementation phase’.145 This raises the question 
whether, when combined, the exclusion of governments of national reconciliation from Article 10 
and the use of such amnesties will result in impunity and non-responsibility going ‘hand in hand’?146 
 
 
140 Davis (2013ab); Eatwell (2018a) p.395. 
141 IACtHR Case of Barrios Altos v Peru, (2001); ICTY Furundzija, §§154-156; SCSL Kallon & Kamara (Jurisdiction, 
Lomé Accord Amnesty, Appeals Chamber) (2004). 
142 Mallinder (2008) pp.123-151 & (2017), pp.10-11. 
143 Davis (2013ab). 
144 Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue ‘Charting the roads to peace: Facts, figures and trends in conflict resolution’, 
Mediation Data Trends Report (2007), p.15. 
145 Ibid.  
146 Cahin (2010b) p.250. 
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Fifth, non-attribution may serve to undermine efforts to persuade insurrectional movements to 
comply with international law.147 Even if the insurrectional movement is mindful of the rules of 
state responsibility, excluding the application of Article 10 to governments of national 
reconciliation ‘could be interpreted as meaning that the manner in which the insurgency is carried 
out... is of no importance and may give the impression that the rebels have a blank check as to 
means of warfare to which it can resort’.148 The exclusion of governments of national reconciliation 
from the operation of Article 10(1) may legitimise the use of violence, criminality, war crimes and 
the abuse of human rights, to achieve political ends.  
 
7.5.5 Exception to Article 10(1) for insurrectional movements democratically elected to 
government? 
D’Aspremont argues that Article 10 ‘rests neither on sound precedential nor systemic grounds... 
this provision rather constitutes the outcome of a political choice to lessen impunity and promote 
accountability in case of violation of international law by non-state actors’.149 For d’Aspremont, 
the exclusion of governments of national reconciliation from the scope of Article 10 is not 
justified. Such an exclusion ‘should be limited to hypotheses where such a national reconciliation or power-
sharing agreement leads to national democratic elections which eventually bring the rebels to power’.150 He claims 
that state responsibility may ‘dent the stability of the regime in transition and, more fundamentally, 
undermine stability’.151 Thus, the interests of democracy and peace are weighed against the interests 
of state responsibility in much the same way that peace is weighed against justice in the debate 
concerning the provision of amnesty. According to d’Aspremont, attributing the conduct of the 
insurrectional movement to the state following democratic elections, may result in a ‘disastrous 
political fallout’ for the state.152  
 
 
147 D’Aspremont (2009) p.437. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid. p.427. 
150 Ibid. [Original emphasis] The issue of effect of elections on the operation of Article 10(1) was raised by 
Commissoner Hafner and acknowledged, but not discussed, by Special Rapporteur Crawford in his first report to 
the ILC. Crawford found that ‘elections created a new situation with an interruption of the causal link with the 
earlier situation’. And that ‘[a]lthough it was a very interesting point of doctrine... recommended not going further 
than the existing text... which was based on the current practice and many precedents’. See Crawford, First Report, 




Democracy is not a panacea for political or politicised violence, a point acknowledged by 
d’Aspremont.153 Nevertheless, d’Aspremont posits that ‘it is however hard to deny that democracy 
remains the most efficient tool to bring to power effective governments as it endows them with 
the necessary internal and external legitimacy (and effectivité) without which stability, and hence 
peace, are inconceivable’.154 However, d’Aspremont’s argument the exclusion of an insurrectional 
movement that achieves power by democratic election from Article 10(1) is problematic for two 
reasons. First, even if an insurrectional movement ultimately achieves power by democratic and 
peaceful means, in most cases it would not have been in the position to do so had it not engaged 
in an armed struggle against the government.155 The exclusion of the acts of an insurrectional 
movement democratically elected to government from Article 10(1) may ‘offer an enticement for 
democratic settlement of civil wars’,156 but it also conveys a message that legitimises the use of violence 
and brutality and the possible disregard of international law to achieve political ends. 
 
Second, the suggestion that in certain situations responsibility must yield to an interest in ensuring 
the new government is democratically elected because responsibility may ‘dent the stability of the 
regime and, more fundamentally, undermine stability’157 invites impunity. The fact that a 
government is democratically elected will offer little comfort to victims who are left to rely upon 
the state to comply with its duty to prosecute the perpetrators of crimes under international law 
and to provide victims with an effective remedy. There is no guarantee that the new government 
will prosecute and punish individuals for crimes committed as part of the struggle, particularly if 
those individuals hold high office. For example, Charles Taylor, as leader of the National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (NPFL), became the dominant power in the Liberian civil war (1989-1996). Taylor 
was elected President of Liberia in July 1997.158 The elections were held according to the terms of 
the Abuja II Accord 1996.159 Charles Taylor and the NPFL have been implicated in the 
commission of gross human rights violations and war crimes that include the deliberate killing of 
civilians throughout the conflict, torture and the recruitment of child soldiers.160 However, Taylor 
 
153 Ibid, p.439. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Verhoeven (2015) p.289. 
156 D’Aspremont (2009) p.439. [Original emphasis] 
157 Ibid. 
158 For a comprehensive analysis of the Liberia’s problematic peace process see Sesay (1996). 
159 Kieh ‘Peace agreements and the termination of civil wars: Lessons from Liberia’, 19 August 2011, African Centre 
for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes.  
160 The Abuja II Accord was the 13th peace agreement signed by the parties to the Liberian conflict between 1990 
and 1996. The NPFL refused to be party to the first two accords but denounced and undermined subsequent peace 
accords on the ground that the agreement did not install Taylor as the leader of the proposed transitional 
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has not been prosecuted for any crimes allegedly committed during the Liberian civil war,161 and 
no steps were taken during his presidency to investigate and prosecute any crimes or human rights 
violations committed during the conflict, or to provide reparation to the victims of the conflict. 
To the contrary, Taylor’s presidency was marred by continued reports of the commission by 
government forces of torture and rape of civilians suspected of supporting an armed incursion 
against the Taylor administration.162  
 
A Truth and Reconciliation Commission was provided for later by the Liberia CPA 2003, and 
created in 2005 under the presidency of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. The Final Report of the 
Commission concluded that ‘[a]ll warring factions are responsible for the commission of gross 
human rights violations in Liberia, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, IHRL, IHL, 
ICL, domestic criminal laws’.163 The list of 12 ‘significant violator groups’ identified as responsible 
for the commission of ‘egregious’ crimes and human rights violations provided in the Final Report 
includes the NPFL, and the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the state’s armed forces.164 The focus 
of the Final Report is on individual criminal responsibility and not the state’s responsibility for 
acts committed by its organs or agents in violation of international law. This is the case with respect 
to human rights violations and war crimes committed by the AFL, as much as it is with respect to 
the acts of the various armed groups that participated in the conflict.165 The Final Report 
recommended the prosecution of individuals for such crimes as ‘desirable’ as well as the institution 
of ‘appropriate mechanisms to promote the ends of justice, peace and security, foster genuine 
 
government. The peace agreements that preceded Abuja II were: Banjul I Peace Accord, September 1990; Banjul II 
Peace Accord, October 1990; Bamako Accord, November 1990; Banjul III Accord, December 1990; Lomé Peace 
Accord, February 1991; Monrovia Peace Accord, April 1991; Yamoussoukro Peace Accords, October 1991; Geneva 
Peace Accords, July 1993; Cotonou Peace Accord, 1993; Akosombo Peace Accord, September 1994; Accra Peace 
Accord, December 1994; Abuja I Peace Accord, August 1995. See Kieh (2011).  
161 Charles Taylor has been prosecuted and convicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone for aiding and abetting 
war crimes between 1996 and 2002 in Sierra Leone. See SCSL Charles Taylor (Trial Chamber) (2012). 
162 Amnesty International, ‘Liberia: War in Lofa County does not justify Killing, Torture and Abduction’, 1 May 
2001. In 2008 Charles Taylor’s son, ‘Chucky’ Taylor, was convicted by a US court for torture committed in Liberia, 
as head of the Anti-Terrorist Unit, on or about April 1999 and on or about 18 July 2003 and sentenced to 97 years’ 
imprisonment. 
163 TRC Liberia, Final Report, Vol.1 (2009) p.11. The list of 12 ‘significant violator groups’ identified as responsible 
for the commission of ‘egregious’ crimes and human rights violations provided in the Final Report includes the 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia, the armed group led by Charles Taylor, and the Armed Forces of Liberia, the 
State’s armed forces. See p.74. 
164 Ibid. p.74. 
165 The report identifies a total of 26 ‘armed groups, rebel groups or warring factions and the financiers, leaders, 
commanders, combatants and advisors etc. associated with them are responsible for committing ‘egregious’ 
domestic crimes, ‘gross’ violations of human rights and ‘serious’ humanitarian law violations including economic 
crime in Liberia between January 1979 and October 14, 2003’. See pp.74-75. 
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national reconciliation and combat impunity’.166 In 2013, a decade after the agreement of the 
Liberia CPA 2003 and Charles Taylor’s resignation from the presidency, Liberia implemented the 
‘National Palava Hut’, a restorative justice programme recommended by the TRC aimed at 
consolidating a lasting peace. However, Liberia has not taken any steps to institute the prosecution 
of individuals for the crimes as identified by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, or to 
implement legislation necessary to provide victims with effective remedy.167  
 
The HRCttee and NGOs vested in Liberia have focused on Liberia’s obligations under ICCPR to 
investigate, prosecute and punish individuals suspected of committing war crimes and committed 
during the conflicts that occurred between 1993 and 2003,168 and ‘to end impunity for civil-war era 
crimes’.169 It is interesting that neither the NGOs campaigning for an end to impunity for civil-war 
era crimes, nor the HRCttee have cited Article 10(1) or Liberia’s responsibility for the conduct of 
the NPFL committed during the conflict before Charles Taylor became President in 1997. 
Moreover, there is no mention of Liberia’s responsibility for the conduct of the AFL.  
 
The focus on individual responsibility at the expense of state responsibility for the wrongful 
conduct of its organs or agents has not been confined to cases of conflicts concluded by political 
settlement. Even in cases that fall squarely within Article 10(1), where the insurrectional movement 
has successfully overthrown the pre-existing government in its entirety and replaced it with a new 
government, questions of state responsibility, other than the duty to prosecute and to provide 
reparation to victims, have been largely ignored.170 For example, Security Council resolution 2009 
(2011) adopted following the establishment of the NTC in Libya after the fall of President Gaddafi 
in 2011, welcomes the statements of the NTC ‘appealing for unity, national reconciliation and 
justice’,171 and encourages the NTC to ‘put an end to impunity’ but makes no express reference to 
state responsibility.172  
 
 
166 TRC Liberia, Final Report, pp.11 & 76. 
167 HRCttee, ‘Concluding Observations on the initial report of Liberia’ (2018) §10. Also, Submission of 76 non-
governmental organisations, ‘Liberia’s Compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Report of Civil Society Organizations in Reply to the List of Issues Regarding Impunity for Past Human Rights 
Violations (arts. 2, 6, 7 and 14) for the 123rd Session of the Human Rights Committee’ (2018).  
168 Ibid.  
169 Ibid.  
170 Fletcher (2016) p.511.  
171 Security Council Resolution 2009 (2011) §4. 
172 Ibid, §5(b). 
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However, just as the state should not shield the individual, the individual should not be used to 
shield the state from responsibility.173 The exclusion of governments of national reconciliation, or 
democratically elected governments, from the scope of Article 10 denies victims an important 
avenue to pursue legal redress, namely by pursuing legal action against the state for the conduct of 
members of its new government.174 
 
7.5.6 Trends towards responsibility in international law and practice  
The idea that responsibility is an obstacle to peace has been invoked in the ‘peace v justice’ debate 
to justify the use of amnesty as a tool of reconciliation incorporated into peace agreements.175 The 
provision of amnesty from criminal liability is a common part of the panoply of instruments of 
conflict resolution and reconciliation: in Uganda, amnesty for ‘any crime committed in the cause 
of the war or armed rebellion’ was used in order to encourage rebels to lay down their arms;176 in 
South Africa civil and criminal amnesty was granted on condition of full confession,177 including 
for international crimes and gross human rights violations;178 and Afghanistan enacted the National 
Reconciliation, General Amnesty and National Stability Act 2008, which grants amnesty for any 
crimes committed by members of armed groups of the opposition on condition that the individual 
withdraws from opposition and joins the National Compromise, respects the Constitution and 
other laws of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.179 
 
Despite the continued use of amnesty, the trend in international law is in favour of responsibility, 
albeit focused on individual criminal responsibility. There is no general prohibition of the use of 
amnesties in customary international law or treaty law.180 However, in practice, it is now more 
common for amnesties to exclude war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and gross human 
 
173 See also Fletcher (2016). Fletcher approaches the issue through the question of State responsibility for 
international crimes committed by the State authorities rather than the attribution of conduct of a successful 
insurrectional movement pursuant to Article 10, ARS. 
174 See section 7.6 below. 
175 E.g. Section 1(b) Esquipulas II Accords 1987; Article 19 Cotonou Agreement 1993.; Article 3(c) Quadripartite 
Agreement 1994; Article VI Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Annex 7 to Dayton Accords 1995 
Article IX Lomé Accord 1999. 
176 Sections 2 to 3 Amnesty Act, Uganda (2000); Akhavan (2005) p.414; King (2010) p.578. 
177 Section 20(c) Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (South Africa).  
178 South African Constitutional Court, Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and Ors v The President of South Africa 
(1996). 
179 Articles 1-4 National Reconciliation, General Amnesty and National Stability Law, 2008 (Afghanistan). 
180 Mallinder (2008) pp.123-151; Freeman (2009) pp.32-36 & pp.52-53. Article 5 Genocide Convention is 
understood to prohibit the use of amnesty. This prohibition is framed within the obligation to prosecute. 
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rights violations.181 Where amnesties do not exclude such acts, the jurisprudence of both 
domestic182 and international criminal tribunals,183 and regional human rights courts and 
commissions184 have generally supported the principle that amnesties over international crimes and 
non-derogable human rights lack legal effect in international law.185 The United Nations has 
adopted the same approach. With specific regard to Croatia186 and Sierra Leone187 the Security 
Council, and, generally, the General Assembly have declared that amnesties should not cover 
international crimes.188 The UN Secretary-General has declared that: 
 
United Nations-endorsed peace agreements can never promise amnesties for genocide, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity or gross violations of human rights.189 
 
It was once considered that the granting amnesty that shields a person from criminal prosecution 
and/or civil action amounted to the endorsement of the wrongful act, such that the state thus 
assumed responsibility for that act. 190 The now accepted position is that the state that grants 
amnesty over international crimes may be responsible for its failure to investigate, prosecute and 
punish violations of international law,191 and for the expropriation of the right of action.192 This 
principle has developed from the law governing state responsibility for injuries to aliens, according 
to which a state that grants general or individual amnesty to persons responsible for the unlawful 
seizure of a foreigner’s property will be responsible for its government’s own action of depriving 
 
181 E.g. Article 3(c), Quadripartite Agreement 1971; Article VI, Annex 7, Dayton Accords 1995; Global and 
Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2002 §8; Colombia-FARC Peace Accord 
2016. 
182 E.g. Chile Appeal Court Videla Case (1994); Argentina Supreme Court Simón (Julio Héctor) (2005).  Cf. Uganda 
High Court Kwoyelo alias Latoni v Uganda (2011); South African Constitutional Court Azanian Peoples Organisation 
(AZAPO) and Ors v The President of the Republic of South Africa (1996).  
183 Furundzija (ICTY) §§154-156; Kallon & Kamara (SCSL). See further Naqvi (2003). 
184 E.g. IACtHR Barrios Altos v Peru (2001); ECtHR Abdulsamet Yaman v Turkey (2004), §55; ACiHPR Zimbabwe 
Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe (2002) §211. 
185 E.g. IACtHR Barrios Altos v Peru (2001) p.17. 
186 Security Council Resolution 1120 (1997), §7. 
187 Security Council Resolution 1315 (2000) §2. 
188 Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone (2002) §22.  
189 UN Secretary-General, Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies (2004). 
190 Cotesworth & Powell (1875) p.2085; Bovallins and Hedlund Cases (1903); Case of the ‘Montijo’ (1874) p.1438. 
191 E.g. IACiHR Hugo Leonardo de los Santos Mendoza et al v Uruguay (1992).  
192 Case of the ‘Montijo’ (1874) p.1438. Also Akehurst (1969) p.56. 
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‘foreigners of the possibility of obtaining compensation’.193 In the event that a state deprives 
foreigners of ‘all means of action, by passing a law of amnesty, its international responsibility would 
be involved and it would be answerable for any damage which the revolutionaries or rebels might 
have caused to the foreigners in question’.194   The ILC adopted a similar position, observing that 
the grant of amnesty did not amount to a ratification of the wrongful act, but was a breach of the 
obligation to punish the wrongful act. For the ILC, 
 
Some writers... see the grant of a pardon to such insurgents as a kind of ratification of their 
acts by the State. It may, of course, happen that the State in granting an amnesty, is 
breaching an international obligation to punish which it ought to have fulfilled, but that 
does not mean that it is endorsing the acts of others. In such a case, it is the breach which 
will be attributed to it as a source of responsibility, and not the acts committed by the 
organs of the insurrectional movement.195 
 
IHRL has since developed the principle that a state that grants amnesty will be responsible for the 
failure to punish rights-violating conduct in accordance with its obligation to take appropriate 
measures to ensure, without discrimination, the enjoyment of human rights of persons within the 
state’s jurisdiction, and the separate obligation to provide an effective remedy.196 According to the 
HRCttee,  
 
There may be circumstances in which a failure to ensure Convention rights as required by article 
2 would give rise to violations by State Parties of those rights, as a result of the State Parties’ 
permitting or failing to take appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, 
investigate or redress the harm caused by such acts by private persons or entities.197 
 
 
193 Conclusion 9, Report to the Council of the League of Nations on the Questions which Appear Ripe for 
International Regulation, Annex to Questionnaire 4, Report of the Sub-Committee, M. Guerrero, Rapporteur, 20 
April 1927, republished in Rosenne (1972) p.131.  
194 Ibid., p128. 
195 ILC Report (1975), p.98 §26. Brownlie notes that ‘[t]his statement seems to go too far if it is intended to suggest 
that ratification cannot be inferred in any circumstances’ (1983) p.177 [Original emphasis]. 
196 E.g. Article 2(3)(a) ICCPR provides that:  Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure 
that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, 
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity. See also HRCttee, 
General Comment no.31, p.3 & p.6 §16. 
197 Ibid. 
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In order to fulfil their obligation to take appropriate measures to investigate or redress harm, states 
are urged to implement reparations schemes for victims. For example, the HRCttee’s concluding 
observations on the initial report of Liberia (2018) recommends that Liberia ‘[d]evelop and 
implement a comprehensive reparations scheme for all victims of gross human rights violations 
and war crimes’.198 
 
The majority of cases that concern the use of amnesty have been brought before the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACiHR) and IACtHR.199 These cases concern the use 
of amnesties that covered violations committed by state officials or persons associated with the 
state in situations other than internal armed conflict. However, there is little reason to suggest that 
the principles advanced should not be applied to violations committed by insurrectional groups 
that also enjoy amnesty in situations of national reconciliation, or otherwise. 
 
In Hugo Leonardo de los Santos Mendoza et al v Uruguay200 the IACiHR held that the amnesty law of 22 
December 1986201 violated the claimants’ rights to a fair trial202 and to judicial protection pursuant 
to article 1 of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man and articles 1, 8, and 25 
of the ACHR. This is in spite of the fact that the law was approved by a democratically elected 
parliament and referendum, and was ‘part of a legislative program for national pacification’.203 In 
Loaya Tamayo v Peru204 the state had submitted that a general amnesty granted to the military, police 
 
198 HRCttee, ‘Concluding Observations on the initial report of Liberia’ (2018) §11(c). 
199 Cases in the ECtHR have not been directly concerned with amnesty, but have recognised the duty of a State to 
investigate allegations of alleged violations including torture and arbitrary killings. E.g. Abdulsamet Yaman v Turkey, 
(2004) (commenting the use of amnesty for torture). The African Commission has held that amnesty laws are 
incompatible with a state’s human rights obligations. E.g. Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe (2002) 
(legality of clemency law). 
200 IACiHR Hugo Leonardo de los Santos Mendoza et al v Uruguay (1992). 
201 Ley no 15.848 (1986) (Uruguay). 
202 Although the right to fair trial is often interpreted as applying to an accused person, in Uruguay the victim has 
the right to be a party to criminal proceedings. This context the Commission held that it covers the right of a victim 
to participate in criminal proceedings ‘which is the appropriate means to investigate the commission of the crimes 
denounced, determine criminal liability and impose punishment on those responsible, their accomplices and those 
accessories after the fact’. [IACiHR Hugo Leonardo de los Santos Mendoza et al v Uruguay (1992) §40] 
203 IACiHR Hugo Leonardo de los Santos Mendoza et al v Uruguay (1992, §22 (submissions of Uruguay). The Commission 
declared that the domestic legality of the legislation was not relevant to its considerations of whether the law 
violated the State’s obligations under international law. On this point see also IACiHR Gustavo Carranza v Argentina, 
(1997) §63; IACtHR Loayza Tamayo v Peru – Reparations (1998). In IACiHR Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Romero y Galdámez 
et al v El Salvador (2000) the Commission said [at §130]: 
...a state cannot rely on the existence of provisions of internal law to elude carrying out its obligation to 
investigate human rights violations, place on trial the persons responsible, and prevent impunity. 
204 IACtHR Loayza Tamayo v Peru - Reparations (1998). 
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and civilian personnel as part of the ‘pacification process’ precluded the prosecution of individuals 
who had unlawfully detained and tortured the victim.205 The IACtHR held, 
 
Under the American Convention, every person subject to the jurisdiction of a State Party is 
guaranteed the right to recourse to a competent court for the protection of his fundamental rights. 
States, therefore, have the obligation to prevent human rights violations, investigate them, identify 
and punish their intellectual authors and accessories after the fact, and may not invoke existing 
provisions of domestic law, such as the Amnesty Law in this case, to avoid complying with their 
obligations under international law. In the Court’s judgment, the Amnesty Law enacted by Peru 
precludes the obligation to investigate and prevents access to justice. For these reasons, Peru’s 
argument that it cannot comply with the duty to investigate the facts that gave rise to the present 
Case must be rejected.206 
 
There is some support in South African constitutional law for the principle that the provision of 
amnesty that is conditional upon the perpetrator’s full disclosure of his or her involvement in acts 
constituting gross violations of human rights within a truth and reconciliation mechanism will not 
violate the state’s obligation to prosecute and punish that act. In AZAPO v President of South Africa207 
the South African Constitutional Court held that section 20(7) of the Promotion of National Unity 
and Reconciliation Act 1995 was not a blanket amnesty, and was therefore not unconstitutional, 
as it was provided for on condition of full disclosure by the perpetrator. The Act permits the 
Committee on Amnesty to grant amnesty to a perpetrator of an unlawful act associated with a 
political objective and committed prior to 6 December 1993. International law was given short 
shrift in this case, except in so far as the Court determined that international law does not 
prohibited amnesty, rather it encourages it.208 Despite the support for prosecution over amnesty 
in international human rights tribunals, the South African approach, combining amnesty with a 
truth and reconciliation commission, is considered to be a viable alternative to prosecution and a 
valid means of achieving ‘the right to know and understand the past, and aims at reconciliation 
rather than retribution’.209 
 
205 Ibid, §167. 
206 Ibid, §168. 
207 South African Constitutional Court Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and Ors v The President of South Africa 
(1996). 
208 Ibid, §30 referring to article 6(5) APII that encourages the uses of amnesty at the end of a non-international 
armed conflict. 
209 Dugard (1999). 
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State responsibility for the failure to provide an effective remedy for harm caused by private 
persons or entities is preserved by the without prejudice clause provided by Article 10(3).210 Thus, 
even if Article 10(1) is not applied to a government of national reconciliation, the state will be 
responsible for any protection from criminal prosecution or civil action provided to members of 
an insurrectional movement, or indeed state officials, in a peace agreement.  
 
However, the question remains whether the state’s obligation to prosecute and punish gross 
human rights violations and war crimes is sufficient to plug any gap in responsibility caused by the 




7.6 The case for the application of Article 10(1) to ‘governments of national 
reconciliation’ 
Invoking the state’s responsibility under international law for the conduct of members of the 
insurrectional movement that now makes up the new government will provide transitional justice 
with ‘a legal basis to pursue remedies advocates have argued need to be secured to ensure victims 
a full measure of justice and post-conflict societies a sustainable peace’.211 State responsibility 
engages the state’s obligation to make reparation for the harmful consequences that flow from the 
violation of international law.212 This obligation goes beyond the requirement that a state should 
prosecute and punish individuals for their crimes. Reparation may be provided by the 
implementation of restorative justice mechanisms, rehabilitation programmes, the reconstruction 
of destroyed infrastructure, and the resettlement of internally displaced persons, as well as the 
provision of compensation. Invoking the state’s responsibility provides victims with an additional 
recourse to remedy that does not rely upon the state or the international community to take the 
initiative to investigate and prosecute individuals for crimes committed during the armed conflict. 
The ARS are concerned with the state’s obligation to provide reparation to ‘another State, to 
several States and or to the international community as a whole’.213 However, establishing state 
responsibility with respect to obligations owed to individuals is also important.  The ARS do not 
exclude the possibility that, ‘where a primary obligation is owed to a non-State entity, it may be 
 
210 See section 7.2 above, fn.42. 
211 Fletcher (2016) p.512. 
212 ARS, Article 31. 
213 ARS, Article 33(1). 
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that some procedure is available whereby that entity may invoke the responsibility on its own 
account without the intermediation of the State’.214   In such cases, the success of any claim against 
the state for injury caused by the conduct of members of an insurrectional movement now in 
government will depend on whether the claimant can show that the conduct is attributable to the 
state. Thus, state responsibility provides the legal foundation upon which victims can directly 
initiate civil claims against the state within the municipal courts215 and, if necessary, appeal to the 
applicable international human rights mechanisms. 
 
As the above consideration of Liberia’s failure to investigate and prosecute violations of human 
rights and war crimes committed by the AFL, NPFL, and other armed groups during the civil war 
shows, the provision of an effective remedy is by no means guaranteed. Remedies provided by 
IHRL and ICL frameworks offer individual victims retribution, compensation or other measures 
of just satisfaction. However, such remedies do not address the institutional and collective nature 
of conflict-related internationally wrongful acts.216 As the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of 
truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, Pablo de Grieff has explained, gross 
human rights violations and serious violations of IHL ‘presuppose systemic abuses of (state) power 
that have a specific pattern and rest on a degree of organizational set-up’.217 Article 30 ARS 
provides that a state responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation: ‘(b) to 
offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require’. 
Guarantees of non-repetition focus on prevention rather than reparation,218 and may form an 
important part of the process of post-conflict reconstruction. Measures may include inter alia 
‘reforming institutions, disbanding unofficial armed groups, repealing emergency legislation 
incompatible with basic rights, vetting the security forces and the judiciary, protecting human 
rights defenders and training security forces in human rights’.219 These institutional, legal and 




214 ARS, Article 33, Commentary, §4. Gaeta (2011). 
215 See generally Tomuschat (2014). 
216 Also, Eatwell (2018a) p.399-400. 
217 Ibid. 
218 ARS, Article 30, Commentary, §9. 
219 Report of Pablo de Grieff, Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of 
Non-Recurrence’, 7 September 2015, §23. For arguments concerning State responsibility for ‘State crimes’ and the 
importance of guarantees of non-repetition see Fletcher (2016) p.512. 
220 Ibid, §25. 
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A power-sharing agreement cannot achieve the same results as the engagement of state 
responsibility. For example, the failure to implement effective demobilisation and reintegration 
programmes for members of armed groups in the DRC following the signing of the Global 
Agreement 2002 ‘contributed to the normalisation of human rights violations within the culture 
of the army, in violation of the Military Code’.221 Moreover, the failure to ensure the independence 
of the judiciary and to reform the law enforcement sector meant that there was no effective check 
on state power and corruption.222  In practice, the provision of amnesty in the Global Agreement, 
albeit in accordance with international standards, and executive interference in the judiciary 
resulted in the absence of ‘any serious attempts’ to prosecute the perpetrators of serious conflict-
related crimes, such that alleged perpetrators enjoyed a blanket amnesty.223 For Gérard Prunier, 
‘the whole exercise, necessary as it was to stop major organised violence, reeked of rewards for 
crime coupled with pork barrel politics’.224  
 
Ultimately, invoking the state’s responsibility for the commission of gross human rights violations 
and other serious breaches of international law committed by the parties that make up the new 
government can contribute to the process of reconciliation. Generally, an internal armed conflict 
may erupt against a background of authoritarianism, corruption, the suppression and violation of 
human rights, economic depression, social and economic inequality, or extreme poverty, but the 
catalyst for conflict is likely to differ in each case. For example, Liberia under the presidency 
Samuel Doe, who governed during the 1980s and at the outbreak of conflict in 1990, ‘was 
characterised by sustained levels of political violence, dramatic economic decline precipitated by 
widespread corruption, a lack of progress in political reform, and purges of real and imagined 
enemies… Politically, the regime’s brutality was demonstrated by the persistent haste with which 
those implicated in anti-government plots were eliminated’.225 With respect to the ‘Arab Spring’, it 
has been observed that ‘the recent crisis in North Africa has been explained away by the global 
food price crisis and the support given by the West to the regimes that have now been displaced 
by anxieties over political Islam, whereas the evidence seems to suggest that the real driver for the 
insurgencies in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya has been the contempt and repressiveness with which 
the Mubarak, Ben Ali and Qadhafi regimes treated the people over whom they ruled’.226 Against 
 
221 Davis (2013b) p.293. 
222 Ibid, p.294. 
223 Ibid, p.300. 
224 Prunier (2009) p.277. 
225 Sesay (1996) p.22. See also, TRC Liberia, Final Report. Vol.1, p.9.  
226 Joffé (2011) p.508. 
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this background, a state that acknowledges responsibility and seeks to ensure reparation for victims 
of the pre-existing government and the insurrectional movement now joined together in coalition 
projects an image of integrity, accountability, and respect for its citizens rather than one of 
contempt and impunity.  
 
7.7 Conclusion  
The ILC has presented Article 10(1) ARS as a long-standing and uncontroversial rule of attribution 
that provides that the state will be responsible for the wrongful acts of an insurrectional movement 
that succeeds in establishing a new government or state. However, the ILC’s suggested limitation 
on the scope of Article 10(1) by the exclusion of governments of national reconciliation is 
problematic. The ILC did not make clear whether it intended for this exclusion to apply to all 
governments of national reconciliation in all their forms or whether this exclusion should be a 
matter of degree, dependent upon the extent to which the former insurrectional movement shares 
executive power with the pre-existing government. Moreover, as argued in this chapter, the ILC’s 
concern that the attribution of responsibility in these circumstances would prevent the negotiation 
of a peace is not persuasive on a number of grounds. Not least, the exclusion discriminates 
between the victims of the former government and victims of the insurrectional movement. The 
state would only be under a legal obligation to provide reparation to the victims of the former 
government. 
 
A state is not entirely absolved of responsibility in the event of a peace accord and establishment 
of a government of national reconciliation. The state remains responsible for the prosecution and 
punishment of gross human rights violations, war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. 
However, the state’s responsibility to prosecute and punish the unlawful acts, whether committed 
by state or non-state actors, does not have the gravitas of direct attribution of the unlawful acts of 
a movement that now governs the state, nor does it serve to deter insurrectional movements from 
violating international law in order to achieve their goals. The focus on the state’s obligation to 
provide an effective remedy allows the state apparatus to distance itself from its involvement in 
violations of international law and detracts from the interests of victims, and injured states, in the 
engagement of the state’s responsibility for those violations and the state’s consequent obligation 
to provide reparation.  
 
How Article 10(1) should be applied to situations where more than one insurrectional movement 
has participated in a conflict that brings to an end the pre-existing government is an issue that is 
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yet to be resolved. I suggest that each situation should be looked at on a case-by-case basis: whether 
or not Article 10(1) applies will depend upon how executive power is shared between the groups. 
I recognise that this does not resolve uncertainty. Insurrections and their resolution can and do 
take many different forms. However, an overly restrictive approach to the application of Article 
10(1) risks the rule, if not already, becoming obsolete. 
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Chapter 8. Successful ‘Insurrectional or Other Movement’: Establishment of a New State  
 
8.1  Introduction 
This chapter considers the second rule of attribution provided by Article 10 ARS, namely the 
attribution of conduct of an ‘insurrectional or other movement’ that succeeds in establishing a new 
state to that state. The rule is considered by scholars to be well established and uncontroversial.1 
Yet, by contrast with the principle provided by Article 10(1), authoritative support for Article 10(2) 
is extremely limited.2 Moreover, scholars have tended to misapply the few cases and incidents of 
state practice cited as early indications of the rule.3 As I will show, the case law provides support 
for the doctrine applied by municipal courts of the retroactive validation of the legal order of a 
state from the date that state came into existence as a matter of fact, once the state has been 
recognised as such by another state. However, it is questionable whether international law can 
retroactively bind a state such that conduct committed before the state in fact came into existence 
can engage that state’s international responsibility. Accordingly, it is argued that it is better to 
regard Article 10(2) as a rule of attribution of responsibility and not a rule of attribution of conduct. 
It is accepted that the scope of application of such a rule will be limited to the conduct of an 
insurrectional or other movement that is itself bound by IHL. Nevertheless, as a rule of attribution 
of responsibility, Article 10(2) would ensure that the responsibility of a new state can be engaged 
for serious violations of IHL committed by the movement that now makes up its organisation. 
Thus, conceived as a rule of attribution of responsibility, Article 10(2) can provide an important 
means of ensuring that a new state does not avoid responsibility for the unlawful acts committed 
by those who fought for its establishment, and as a consequence the obligation to provide 
reparation to the  victims of those unlawful acts. 
 
This chapter is divided into five parts. In section 8.2 the basic structure of Article 10(2), the rule’s 
intended application, the definition of ‘other movement’, and the application of the requirement 
of continuity between the organisational structures of the insurrectional or other movement and 
the new state as the theoretical basis for the rule are considered. In section 8.3 I consider situations 
not covered by Article 10(2). In section 8.4 I question the proposition that Article 10(2) reflects a 
 
1 Atlam (1987) pp.53-54; Quigley (1999) p.358; Zegveld (2002), pp.155-156; Dumberry (2006) p.608; Cahin (2010a) 
p.247; Crawford (2013) p.176. 
2 As recognised by Special Rapporteur Ago, Fourth Report (1972), p.134 §157.  
3 With exception of the case law of the French municipal courts that held that Algeria would be responsible for the 
conduct of the FLN before its independence. See below section 8.3.   
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rule of customary international law. I argue that case law and state practice concerning the principle 
of retroactive validation of the legal order of an entity recognised as a state, cited by scholars as 
expressions of the rule provided by Article 10(2), have been misapplied. This analysis gives rise to 
the question posed in section 8.5, whether Article 10(2) is a rule destined for desuetude. I contend 
that Article 10(2), as currently conceived by the ILC, can only function as a rule of attribution of 
conduct if it is accepted that customary international law can retroactively apply so as to bind a 
state before it has come into existence. However, there is no support in case law or state practice 
for the retrospective application of law in this way. I propose an alternative approach in section 
8.6 whereby Article 10(2) is applied as a rule of attribution of responsibility, rather than of conduct. 
I argue that it is only by conceiving Article 10(2) as a rule of attribution of responsibility that the 
rule will be an effective means of ensuring that a new state does not avoid responsibility for the 
unlawful means and methods used by persons or entities to secure the establishment of that state. 
 
8.2  Article 10(2) ARS 
According to Article 10(2), the conduct of an ‘insurrectional or other movement’, committed 
during its struggle against the authority of the predecessor state, will be attributable to the new 
state established by that movement.  The rule states, 
The conduct of a movement, insurrectional or other, which succeeds in establishing a 
new State in part of the territory of a pre-existing State or in a territory under its 
administration shall be considered an act of the new State under international law.  
A similar rule was adopted by the 1961 Harvard Draft Convention on International Responsibility 
of States for Injuries to Aliens.4 Article 18(1) provides that, 
 
In the event of a revolution or insurrection which brings about a change in the government 
of a State or the establishment of a new State, an act or omission of an organ, agency, official, 
or employee of a revolutionary or insurrectionary group is, for the purposes of this 




4  Reproduced in Sohn & Baxter (1961). 
5 Ibid, p.576 [Emphasis added]. 
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In the event that the insurrectional or other movement succeeds in establishing a new state, only 
the internationally wrongful acts of the successful revolutionary movement would be attributable 
to the new state.6 The question of responsibility for the conduct of the predecessor state would be 
a matter of state succession.7  
 
8.2.1 Definition of ‘Other Movement’ 
Article 10(2) refers to an insurrectional ‘or other’ movement that succeeds in establishing a new 
state.8 The ILC explains that this is in recognition of ‘a greater variety’ of movements whose acts 
may result in the creation of a new state.9 The Commentary refers to ‘other revolutionary 
movement’,10 which is understood to imply the inclusion of national liberation movements in the 
definition of the term.11 ‘Revolutionary’ is not a legal term of art and may be understood to refer 
to any movement that seeks to establish a new state outside the constitutional framework of the 
predecessor state. As the Commentary states, the words ‘other movement’ ‘do not extend to 
encompass the actions of a group of citizens advocating secession or revolution where these are 
carried out within the framework of the predecessor State’.12  
 
Thus, the term ‘other movement’ would appear to refer only to a political party or other entity that 
acts outside the constitutional framework of the predecessor state. For example, should Catalonia 
successfully secede and declare independence from Spain, the ‘other movement’ may be the pro-
independence movement led by Catalan President, Carles Puigdemont.13 Similarly, the 
‘representatives of the people of Kosovo’14 acting outside the Constitutional Framework of 
Kosovo (formerly an Autonomous Province of Serbia within the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY) and then the FRY) that unilaterally declared independence from Serbia on 17 
 
6 Ago, Fourth report (1972), p.131 §157. 
7 Ibid; Article 11 ARS and Commentary §3. Any gap in responsibility caused by the non-attribution of the conduct 
of the organs of the extinct state may be filled by the adoption of the liabilities of the predecessor by the successor 
State: E.g. Lighthouses Arbitration, pp.196-200; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project p.81 §151. On the subject of state 
succession see generally Marek (1968); Craven (2007); Dumberry (2007). 
8 The definition of ‘insurrectional movement’ is discussed in chapter 7 with respect to Article 10(1) ARS. 
9 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §10. 
10 Ibid, §8. 
11 Cahin (2010b) p.251. 
12 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §10. 
13 Puigdemont and members of his cabinet have since been charged with offences of rebellion and sedition. 
14 Kosovo Advisory Opinion, pp.447-448, §109. The declaration of independence was made during a special session of 
the Assembly of Kosovo. However, the ICJ determined that the authors of the declaration were not acting in their 
capacity as the ‘Assembly of Kosovo’, one of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government established under the 
Constitutional Framework but were in fact acting ‘in a different capacity’, outside of the legal framework of the 
Government of Kosovo. See pp.444-448, §§102-109. 
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February 200815 would constitute an ‘other movement’ for the purposes of Article 10(2) from the 
date at which Kosovo is established as a new state.16 
 
However, confining the definition of ‘other movement’ to movements that operate outside the 
constitutional framework of the predecessor state in order to achieve their aims may define the 
term too narrowly. As the events leading up to and during the dissolution of the SFRY17 and the 
conduct of the government of the Republic of Serbia (a constituent republic of the SFRY) 
demonstrate, a ‘movement’ may succeed in dominating the organisational structures of a state by 
political means such that the organisational structures of the movement and the predecessor state 
appear to be one and the same. During the SFRY’s period of dissolution, Slobodan Milosevic used 
his position as the President of Serbia to lead a ‘Serbian nationalist movement’ and advocate for 
the establishment of a ‘Greater Serbia’ and to take over the organisation of the SFRY within the 
constitutional framework of the state.18 Upon its establishment, the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) 
adopted the organisational structures of the SFRY and claimed to be the continuing state of 
SFRY.19 In Croatia v Serbia Croatia argued that the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) and other armed 
forces under the control of the ‘Serbian nationalist movement’ that later proclaimed the 
establishment of the FRY committed genocide against the Croatian population of SFRY.20 Croatia 
submitted that the conduct in question was attributable to the FRY on the basis of Article 10(2) 
ARS.21 Serbia maintained that even if there was a ‘Serbian nationalist movement’ that succeeded 
in establishing the FRY in April 1992, that movement did not challenge the authority of the SFRY 
but instead was in fact in control of SFRY and of the JNA, and therefore did not constitute a 
 
15 Kosovo is not admitted as a Member of the United Nations. As at 19 December 2018 114 states had recognised 
Kosovo. See http://www.mfa-ks.net/en/politika/483/njohjet-ndrkombtare-t-republiks-s-kosovs/483  
16 The status of Kosovo remains unresolved.  
17 The dissolution of the SFRY saw the emergence of its six constituent Republics that were later recognised as new 
States: Croatia; Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); Bosnia and Herzegovina; Macedonia; and 
Slovenia. 
18 Croatia v Serbia, Memorial of the Republic of Croatia, pp.63-64, §2.105; Oeter (2011).  
19 Letter dated 6 May 1992 from the Charge d'affaires a.i. to the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, A/46/915, Annex II. This claim was rejected by a number of States, 
not least the other former Republics of the SFRY, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia. The Arbitration 
Commission of the Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia (Badinter Commission) was of the view that the FRY was a 
new state and could not be considered the sole successor to the SFRY: Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration 
Committee, Opinion 10 (1992) 31 ILM 1494, p.1525. However, the HRCttee considered that all the new 
independent Republics were successors to the SFRY with respect to the ICCPR: Comments of the HRCttee: 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), CCPR/ C/79/Add.16, 28 December 1992. Nevertheless, 
by overwhelming majority of 52-1 (17 abstentions) State Parties to the ICCPR voted to ban FRY from participation 
in the eighteenth meeting in New York in 1994, held to conduct the periodic election of the HRC’s members: 
CCPR/SP/SR.18, 8 December 1994. See also Tyagi (2008) pp.163-167.  
20 Croatia v Serbia, Memorial of the Republic of Croatia, p2 §1.03 & chpt.4. 
21 Ibid, pp.395-396, §§8.40-8.45. 
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‘movement’ within the meaning of Article 10(2) ARS.22 Therefore, even if it was proven that there 
was a ‘Serbian nationalist movement’, a necessary requirement of Article 10(2), the existence of an 
insurrectional or other movement that acted outside the framework of the pre-existing state and 
resulted in the creation of a new state, would not be satisfied and its conduct was not attributable 
to FRY.23 Serbia argued that SFRY existed as a subject of international law in 1991 and early 1992 
and one cannot assume continuity between the organs of SFRY and the organs of FRY.24 
 
Croatia did not dispute the fact that the organs of government and federal authorities of the SFRY 
had become the ‘de facto organs of the emerging FRY’ in the period between mid-1991 (when the 
SFRY ceased to function as a state and was in a process of dissolution) and 27 April 1992.25 In 
response to Serbia’s submission that for the purposes of Article 10(2) the ‘movement’ must act 
against the constituted authorities of the predecessor state, Croatia argued that the intention of the 
ILC was to distinguish movements that continue to struggle against the state from those covered by 
Article 10 ARS.26 In other words, the reference in the Commentary to movements struggling 
against the state’s authorities was in the context of describing the general rule that the conduct of 
unsuccessful insurrectional movements is not attributable to the state.27  
 
The ICJ did not decide the point, having concluded that Article 10(2) did not provide a basis for 
establishing jurisdiction.28 However, Croatia’s argument has some force. It would not be desirable 
for a political authority such as that led by President Milosevic to escape the reach of Article 10(2) 
simply because it managed to subsume the organs of the predecessor state by political machination. 
The underlying purpose of Article 10(2) is to ensure that responsibility for violations of 
international law committed by the organs or agents of a movement is not evaded merely because 
that movement has transformed into the organisation of a new state and therefore the movement 
as such no longer exists. In order to ensure responsibility, the definition of ‘other movement’ for 
the purposes of Article 10(2) should be broad, and not restricted so as to exclude movements that 
achieve control over the organs of the predecessor state through political means if that movement, 
 
22 Croatia v Serbia, Counter-Memorial submitted by the Republic of Serbia, Vol. I, December 2009, §§302-306. 
23 Ibid, §305.  
24 Ibid, §311(iv). 
25 Croatia v Serbia, Memorial of the Republic of Croatia, p.394 §8.40; Written Statement of the Republic of Croatia, 
p.27 §3.40. 
26 Croatia v Serbia, Verbatim Record 2014/10, p.42 §23 (Crawford). 
27 Ibid; ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §2. 
28 Croatia v Serbia, p.53 §105. See also section  
 215 
through those organs, commits violations of international law before the formal establishment of 
the new state. 
  
8.2.2 Continuity between the insurrectional or other movement and the new state 
Different rationales for Article 10(2) have been suggested.29 These include the theory of structural 
continuity; legitimacy of the struggle; resurrection of an ancient state; and continuity of a de facto 
government formed by insurgents during the insurgency.30 However it is the notion that the 
internationally wrongful acts of an insurrectional movement are attributed to the new state by 
reason of the structural continuity between the organisation of the movement and the organisation 
of the new state, the same rationale for Article 10(1) ARS, that has been adopted by the ILC31 and 
is most widely supported and accepted.32  
 
Special Rapporteur Ago justified the attribution of responsibility pursuant to Article 10(2) on a 
slightly different basis, namely the continuity between the ‘personality’ of the movement and of 
the new state, reasoning that,  
 
… the affirmation of the responsibility of the newly-formed State for any wrongful acts 
committed by the organs of the insurrectional movement which preceded it would be 
justified by virtue of the continuity which would exist between the personality of the 
insurrectional movement and that of the State to which it has given birth.33 
 
For Ago, the conduct of the insurrectional or other movement is attributed to the new state 
because the latter is the continuation of the former, ‘in a more stable and perfected form’.34 The 
new state will be responsible for conduct committed when the state existed it is ‘embryonic’ form, 
as an insurrectional or other movement:  
 
… the new State will in general appear at the international level as the continuation, in a 
more stable and more perfected form, of the insurrectional movement, whose true nature 
as an embryo State will then be revealed and whose structures and organization will have 
 
29 See Quigley (1999) p.357; Dumberry, (2006) pp.606-612. 
30 Dumberry (2006) pp.606-612. 
31 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §6. 
32 Ibid. 612; Atlam, (1987) pp.53-54; Crawford, First Report (1998), pp.51-52 §264; Zegveld (2002) p.156. 
33 Ago, Fourth Report (1972), p.131 §159. 
34 Ibid, §157. 
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become those of the newly emerged State. In that case, the attribution to such a State, as 
a potential source of responsibility, of acts which were formerly attributed to the 
insurrectional movement, because they had been committed by its organs, would be only 
natural. It would not be a question of attributing to a subject of international law the 
conduct of organs of another subject, but merely of continuing to attribute to the same 
subject—which would only have reached the final stage of its progressive evolution - the 
acts of its own organs.35  
 
Thus, Ago identifies two separate bases for state responsibility pursuant to Article 10(2): (i) the 
continuity between the ‘personality’ of one subject of international law, the insurrectional 
movement, and the new State; (ii) the continuity between the organisational structure of the 
insurrectional movement, and the organisational structure of the new state. The ILC does not 
adopt Ago’s ‘progressive evolution’ model. Instead the Commentary explains attribution to the 
new state on the basis of (ii), continuity between the organisation of the insurrectional or other 
movement, and the government of the new state. As the Commentary explains, ‘[e]ffectively the 
same entity which previously had the characteristics of an insurrectional or other movement has 
become the Government of the State it was struggling to establish’.36  
 
Article 10(2) is intended to apply to situations where a new state is constituted by secession or 
decolonization.37 The reference to ‘decolonization in part of the territory which was previously 
subject to the administration of the predecessor State’ is included ‘to take into account the differing 
legal status of different dependent territories’.38  Further, it is arguable that Article 10(2) would 
apply to the dissolution of a state that results in the creation of a number of new states on the 
territory of the predecessor state, and the extinction of the latter.39 However, the Commentary 
states clearly that Article 10(2) is not intended to apply to cases of annexation of part of a state’s 
territory by another state.40 
 
 
35 Ago, Fourth Report (1972), p.131 §157. 
36 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §6. 
37 Ibid, §8. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Dumberry (2006) p.617. Dumberry further posits that Article 10(2) should apply to the unification of States. 
However, the unification of States involves questions of State succession, not the attribution of conduct. For 
discussion of the exclusion of cases of annexation of part of a State’s territory to another State see section 8.3.2.3 
below. 
40 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §10. 
 217 
 
8.3 Situations not covered by Article 10(2) ARS 
 
8.3.1 Establishment of a new state on the whole of the territory of the predecessor State 
In his Fourth Report (1972) Special Rapporteur Ago suggests that Article 10(2) may apply where 
a successful revolution results in ‘the establishment of a new State within the same territorial 
boundaries of the pre-existing State’.41 The ILC was more equivocal. In its 1975 Report the ILC 
commented that some scholars had posited that change in the state apparatus resulting from 
revolution ‘might be so far-reaching as to alter the identity of the State itself’, but observed that ‘in 
these cases ‘political and philosophical considerations sometimes become more important than 
strictly legal ones’.42 These comments have been understood to support the application of Article 
10(2) to the exceptional cases ‘where the change in government in reality corresponds to a change 
in the identity of the State following a revolution or in a situation similar to the replacement of a 
racist regime like that of Ian Smith in Rhodesia by the national liberation movement which 
proclaimed the State of Zimbabwe’.43  
 
However, the assertion that changes in the organisational structures of a state by revolution can 
alter the identity of a state such that the predecessor state is extinguished and a new state 
established in its place is contrary to the principle that the state does not cease to exist as a result 
of changes, however radical, to its organisational structure.44 As the US-Mexican Claims 
Commission said in the Baxter’s Case, ‘[t]he State is the same, although the form of government is 
changed’.45  
 
In practice states that have undergone radical changes as a result of revolution have not claimed 
to have established new states. For example, the end of the Chinese imperial system in October 
1911 following a revolt against the Qing dynasty resulted in the end of authoritarian imperial rule 
and the establishment of the Republic of China.46 Following a second revolution in 1949, the 
Republic was transformed into the People’s Republic of China, a Communist state.47 However, 
 
41 Ago, Fourth Report (1972), p.151 §213. 
42 ILC Report (1975), p.101 §7. 
43 Cahin (2010a), p.250. 
44 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §5. Also, Chen (1951) p.97; Marek (1968) p.24; Jennings & Watts (1992) pp.204-
205 §57. 
45 Baxter’s Case (1871) p.2934. 
46 US Department of State, Office of the Historian, ‘Milestones: 1899-1913. The Chinese Revolution of 1911.’  
47 Ibid, ‘Milestones: 1945-1952. The Chinese Revolution of 1949.’  
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the People’s Republic of China never claimed discontinuity with the Chinese Empire.48 A similar 
example is that of  the Russian Revolutions of 1917 that resulted in the abdication of Tsar Nicholas 
II and the end of the autocratic Tsarist system49 and civil war, resulting in the creation of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1922. The USSR was, like the Tsarist Russian Empire, governed 
by a central authority. However, the political identity of that authority, that of Marxist-Leninism, 
was completely different to the autocratic monarchy that had previously governed the Empire. 
Nevertheless, it was generally accepted that despite these fundamental changes to government and 
the identity of the state, from absolute monarchy to communist state, the USSR was a continuation 
of the Russian Empire.50 These cases would fall within the scope of Article 10(1) ARS. 
 
8.3.2 Annexation of part of the territory of one State to another State 
According to the Commentary, Article 10(2) does not apply where the insurrectional or other 
movement succeeds in bringing about union with another state. This would constitute a case of 
succession and is therefore beyond the scope of the articles.51 Therefore, these circumstances may 
give rise to a gap in responsibility as, in the event the insurrectional or other movement ceases to 
exist because it has been dissolved or subsumed into the organisational structures of the annexing 
state as a result of the union, responsibility for the conduct of the insurrectional or other 
movement will die with it.52 
 
The exclusion of cases where part of the territory of one state has acceded or is annexed to another 
state may be explained as an application of the notion of continuity between the organisational 
structures of the movement and the organisational structures of the new state. The Commentary 
explains, ‘article 10 focuses on the continuity of the movement concerned and the eventual new 
Government or State, as the case may be’.53 In cases of accession of territory there will be a break 
in continuity between the organisational structure of the movement and the other state as the 
former are either absorbed into or dissolved by the organisational structure of latter. Thus, the 
 
48 Hsiung (1972) p.36; Crawford (2008) p.679. 
49 In 1905 the Tsar issued the October Manifesto that established the Duma, or legislature, as a small concession to 
the Tsar’s opposition. However, the Tsar maintained the right to veto any legislation and to dissolve the Duma in 
the event of disagreement. 
50 Agency of Canadian Car and Foundry Co. Ltd v American Can. Co. (US Circuit Court of Appeals) (1919); The Russian 
Roubles (Attempted Counterfeiting) Case (Japan Supreme Court) (1919); Lowinsky v Receiver in Bankruptcy of the Egyptische-
Turksche Handwerksigarettenfabriek (Holland, District Court of Amsterdam) (1932); Lazard Bros. v Midland Bank [1932] 
AC 289, pp306-307 (Lord Wright). See also Mullerson (1993) p.476. 
51 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §10. 
52 Dumberry (2006) pp.619-620. 
53 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §10. 
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exclusion is based on the ‘rather technical’ basis that the insurrectional or other movement has not 
established a new state but has been annexed to an already existing state.54  
 
Whatever the basis for the exclusion, the result is that there is no subject of international law to 
which any internationally wrongful acts committed by the insurrectional or other movement in its 
struggle to achieve union with the other state will be attributable.55 For Dumberry, fairness requires 
that the now enlarged state should provide compensation to the victims of any internationally 
wrongful acts committed by the insurrectional or other movement.56 For the same reason, 
Dumberry suggests that the principles of Article 10(2) should also apply to cases of ‘total 
incorporation’ of one state into another, for example the incorporation of the German Democratic 
Republic into the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990.57 However the latter case involves the 
question whether one state should accept responsibility for the internationally wrongful acts 
committed by another state. Cases such as this are better approached according to principles of 
international law governing state succession, not attribution of conduct.    
 
8.4 Questioning the customary status of Article 10(2) 
Special Rapporteur Ago acknowledged that a number of scholars did not distinguish between the 
two situations addressed in Article 10 ARS, namely that where an insurrection results in the 
establishment of a new government and that where an insurrection results in the creation of a new 
state on part of the pre-existing state’s territory.58 Indeed, there is a distinct lack of case law or 
examples of state practice supporting the existence of the rule provided by Article 10(2). The 
scarcity of judicial precedent and state practice is evident in the ILC Commentary on Article 10. 
Contrary to the Commentary’s assertion that ‘[a]rbitral decisions, together with State practice and 
literature, indicate a general acceptance of the two positive attribution rules in article 10’,59  no 
authority is cited in direct support of Article 10(2).  This is surprising given that since the creation 
of the United Nations, and before and during the period of the ILC’s study on State responsibility, 
80 former colonies (otherwise described as ‘non-self-governing territories’) or Trust Territories60 
 
54 Dumberry (2006) pp.619-620. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid, p.620. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ago, Fourth Report (1972), p.150 §210. 
59 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, §12. 
60 Trust Territories are territories placed under the supervision of the United Nations International Trusteeship 
System created according to chapter XII of the UN Charter, 1945. Pursuant to article 77 of the UN Charter, the 
Trustee System applied to: Territories under mandates established by the League of Nations after the First World 
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have achieved independence.61 Of that number, nearly half emerged during the 1960s.62 The rest, 
with the exception of Timor-Leste that achieved independence in 2002,63 achieved independence 
with the dissolution of the USSR and the SFRY, before the adoption of the ARS by the General 
Assembly in 2001.  However, with exception of Croatia’s pleadings in Croatia v Serbia, none of 
these cases appear to have given rise to the application of the rule provided by Article 10(2), or 
the suggested application of that rule. This lack of authoritative support for Article 10(2) has led 
one scholar to conclude that the rule ‘seems to be more doctrinal construction than one based on 
actual state practice’.64 Nevertheless, scholars have generally considered the rule provided by 
Article 10(2) to be uncontroversial.65  
 
Some limited support for the rule provided by Article 10(2) has been drawn from the interpretation 
by the French municipal courts of Article 18 of the Déclaration de Principes Relative à la 
Coopération Économique et Financière, which formed part of the Evian Accords 1962 between 
Algeria and France at the end of the civil war in Algeria and the establishment of Algeria as an 
independent state. Article 18 of the Déclaration provides that, 
 
L’Algérie assume les obligations et bénéficie des droits contractés en son nom ou en celui 
des établissements publics algériens par les authorités françaises compétences.66 
 
In response to a request for an official interpretation by the French courts, the French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs declared that article 18 provided that Algeria should not be held responsible for 
the acts and measures taken by France that were ‘specifically directed against the rebellion of the 
 
War; Territories detached from ‘enemy States’ as a result of the Second World War; and Territories voluntarily 
placed under the System by States responsible for their administration. United Nations, ‘International Trusteeship 
System’.  
61 See United Nations, Committee of 24 (Special Committee on Decolonization), ‘Trust and Non-Self-Governing 
Territories (1945-1999)’.    
62 During the 1960s 37 former trust and non-self-governing territories established new States: Botswana, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville) now Republic of Congo, Cyprus, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guyana, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Yemen, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Upper Volta now Burkina Faso, and Zaire now the 
Democratic Republic of Congo.  
63 United Nations, Committee of 24 (Special Committee on Decolonization), ‘Trust and Non-Self-Governing 
Territories (1945-1999)’. 
64 Dumberry (2006) p.612. 
65 Atlam (1987) pp.53-54; Quigley (1999) p.358; Zegveld (2002) pp.155-156; Dumberry (2006) p.608; Cahin (2010a) 
p.247; Crawford (2013) p.176.  
66 Translation: ‘Algeria shall assume the obligations and enjoy the rights contracted for on its behalf or on behalf of 
Algerian public institutions by the competent French authorities’.  
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Front de Libération Nationale (Algeria) (FLN).67 This interpretation has been applied by the 
French courts to support the principle that Algeria is responsible for acts attributable to the FLN 
committed during the insurgency and its struggle for independence from France. For example in 
Perriquet68 the Conseil d’Etat, in refusing a claim for compensation for damage caused by the FLN 
during the insurgency, held that whilst Algeria was not responsible for injury caused by measures 
taken by the French authorities directed towards the suppression of the insurrection, Algeria was 
responsible for damage attributable to the insurrectional movement.69 Similarly in Grillo70 the 
Conseil d’Etat refused to annul the decisions of lower courts refusing compensation to the 
appellant for damage caused by the FLN during the insurgency, stating that the acts were 
attributable to a foreign state, and therefore France’s responsibility was not engaged.71  
 
However, as Algeria was not a party to proceedings it is unlikely that the French municipal courts 
decision would have had any legal consequences for Algeria. Therefore, the decisions are of limited 
assistance to the determination whether Article 10(2) is a rule of customary international law. 
 
There is support for the principle that a new state should be responsible for the conduct of its 
organs from the date that state in fact came to exist, rather than from the date of a state’s 
recognition as a state. However, this principle has been expressed in terms of the ‘retroactive 
validation of the legal order’ of a state in statu nascendi,72 rather than in terms of the attribution of 
conduct of the insurrectional or other movement that succeeded in forming a state to that new 
state. Some scholars have cited retroactive validation of a legal order in support of the existence 
of the rule provided by Article 10(2).73 However, there is an important distinction between the 
retroactive validation of a legal order of a state in statu nascendi and the attribution of conduct of an 
insurrectional or other movement to the new state. As will be discussed further below, the former 
 
67 Dumberry (2006) p.614; Cahin (2010a) p.250; Crawford (2013) p.178. 
68 Conseil d’Etat, Perriquet 1995).  
69 Ibid: ‘...que si l’application de cette règle générale n’a pas pour effet de mettre à la charge de l’Etat algérien la 
reparation des dommages cause par les mesures prises spécialement et directement par les authorites francaises en 
vue de faire échec aux mouvements insurrectionnels, l’indemnisation des dommage imputables à des éléments 
insurrectionnel intéresse l’Etat algérien’. See also Hespel [1980]; Consort Hovelque [1984]; Grillo [1999]. 
70 Conseil d’Etat, Grillo (1999). 
71 Ibid: ‘que le préjudice subi par les requérants, qui trouve son orgine directe dans le fait d’un Etat étranger, ne 
saurait engager la responsibilité de l’Etat français sur le fondement du principle de l’égalité devant les charges 
publiques’. 
72 E.g. Crawford (2007) p.654 & (2013) pp.135-136. 
73 Crawford (2013) pp.176-179 & (2007) p.654. For Dumberry the authorities ‘to some extent’ support the principle 
provided by Article 10(2): Dumberry (2006) p.613. 
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rule does not require the attribution of conduct of one entity to another. The rule of retroactive 
validation, that has been described as ‘a rule of convenience rather than principle’,74 is based on 
the notion that ‘the principle of effectiveness dictates acceptance, for some legal purposes at least, 
of continuity before and after statehood is firmly established’.75 The US Supreme Court, the courts 
of England and Wales and the US International Claims Commission have tended to treat the legal 
order of the new state as valid from the date it in fact was established.76 The retroactive validation 
of a legal order of a state is reliant upon recognition of that state by another state or states. The 
act of recognition is the conferment upon an already existing state of the right to act in the 
international sphere.77  
 
A rule of attribution of conduct of an insurrectional or other movement to a state is just that - it 
provides the circumstances in which the conduct of a person or entity is attributable to the state. 
A rule of attribution does not create international obligations of the state, retroactively or 
otherwise. As the ILC has stressed in an early draft of its commentary to Article 10 ARS,  
 
…it should be made clear that the article under consideration relates only to the attribution 
of certain acts to the State. It in no way seeks to define at the same time the international 
responsibility which might possibly derive from this attribution or to determine the 
amount of compensation due.78  
 
Support for the retroactive validation of the acts of an insurrectional or other movement that 
achieves statehood, from the date of a declaration of independence rather than the point of its 
recognition as a state, may be found in the obiter dictum of the US Supreme Court in Williams v 
Bruffy.79 In that case, one that concerns the responsibility of the Union for acts committed by the 
Confederate authorities during the civil war, the United States Supreme Court said, 
  
 
74 Jennings & Watts (1992), p.161 §48. Also, Jones (1935) p.55. Cf. Chen (1951) pp.177-178. 
75 Crawford (2013), p.136. Also, Chen (1951), p.177. 
76 E.g. Williams v Bruffy (1877) pp.185-186; Luther v Sagor [1921] 3 KB 532, pp.543-544 (Banks LJ); Socony Vacuum Oil 
Company Claim [1955] 21 ILR 55; Lazard Bros. v Midland Bank [1932] AC 289, p.297 (Lord Wright). See also Jennings 
& Watts (1992) p.161 §48. 
77 Cf. Chen (1951), pp.30-31 who argues that the existence of a State and its international personality cannot be 
separated: ‘To say that a State ‘exists’, but is not a subject of international law, is a contradiction in terms’. 
78 ILC Report (1975), p.102 §8. 
79 Williams v Bruffy (1877) pp.185-186. 
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The other kind of de facto governments to which the doctrines cited relate is such as exists where a 
portion of the inhabitants of a country have separated themselves from the parent state and 
established an independent government. The validity of its acts, both against the parent state and 
its citizens or subjects, depends entirely upon its ultimate success. If it fail to establish itself 
permanently, all such acts perish with it. If it succeed and becomes recognized, its acts from the 
commencement of its existence are upheld as those of an independent nation. Such was the case 
of the state governments under the old confederation on their separation from the British Crown. 
Having made good their declaration of independence, everything they did from that date was as 
valid as if their independence had been at once acknowledged. Confiscations, therefore, of enemy’s 
property made by them were sustained as if made by an independent nation. But if they had failed 
in securing their independence, and the authority of the King had been reestablished in this 
country, no one would contend that their acts against him, or his loyal subjects, could have been 
upheld as resting upon any legal foundation.  
 
In the Socony Vacuum Oil Company Claim80 the US International Claims Commission cited with 
approval the above extract from Williams v Buffy (in part), reflecting that following its secession 
from the British Crown in 1776 the new state of the United States of America was responsible for 
internationally wrongful acts committed by the revolutionaries from the date of declaration of 
independence.81 In that case the claimant sought damages from Yugoslavia regarding the 
expropriation of property by the ‘Independent State of Croatia’ sometime between 1941 and 1945. 
The United States and Yugoslavia had, pursuant to an Agreement dated 19 July 1948, agreed to 
the ‘full settlement and discharge of all claims of nationals of the United States against the 
Government of Yugoslavia on account of the nationalization and other taking by Yugoslavia of 
property’.82 The Commission found that rather than being an established state, Croatia was a 
puppet state, controlled by Italy and Germany, which had never successfully seceded from 
Yugoslavia nor did it enjoy de facto control over the territory.83  
 
To this rather limited list of authorities may be added the legal opinion of Law Officers of the 
British Crown in 1863 concerning responsibility for losses suffered by British citizens during 
American Civil War. According to that opinion, in the hypothetical situation that the Confederate 
 
80 Socony Vacuum Oil Company Claim [1955]. 
81 Ibid.  
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid, pp.57-60. 
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states were to succeed in establishing a new state, Britain could claim compensation from the new 
‘Sovereign Government’ for losses suffered by British citizens during the Civil War.84   
 
According to the dicta of the US Supreme Court in Williams v Buffy and the US International Claims 
Commission in Socony Vacuum Oil Company Claim the conduct of the state governments would be 
attributable to the new independent state from the date of the declaration of that state’s independence from 
the predecessor state, provided that the new state is in due course recognised as a state by other states: 
‘Having made good their declaration of independence, everything they did from that date was as 
valid as if their independence had been at once acknowledged’.85 Therefore, the concern of the US 
Supreme Court, and of the US International Claims Commission, is not whether or not the 
conduct of an insurrectional or other movement is attributable to the new state, but the legal 
consequences of recognition and the notion that once statehood is firmly established the 
‘retroactive validation’ of the legal status of a state in statu nascendi is justified.86 Underlying this 
notion of the retroactive validation of the legal status of a state in statu nascendi once statehood is 
achieved is the principle of effectiveness. As Crawford explains,  
 
States not infrequently first appear as independent belligerent entities under a political 
authority which may be called, and function effectively as, a provisional government. Once 
statehood is firmly established, it is justifiable, both legally and practically, to assume the 
retroactive validation of the legal order during a period prior to general recognition as a 
state, when some degree of effective government existed.87 
 
Applying the doctrine of retroactive validation of the legal order of a political authority that has 
established a degree of effective government or effective control over territory before achieving 
statehood to successful insurgents, Crawford states in his study, The Creation of States in International 
Law, that it is ‘well established that legal rights and liabilities of successful insurgent governments 
continue to bind the State so formed’,88 and posits that this rule is now affirmed as a rule of 
attribution provided by Article 10(2) ARS.89 However, Crawford apparently misinterprets Article 
10(2) ARS. As stated above, the doctrine of retroactive validation of a legal order of a recognised 
 
84 Ago, Fourth Report (1972), §204 fn.467 cited in Croatia v Serbia, Counter-Memorial of Serbia, §290. 
85 Socony Vacuum Oil Company Claim [1955]. 
86 Crawford (2007) p.654 & (2013) pp.135-136. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid, p.658. 
89 Ibid, p.659. 
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state is different from the attribution of conduct of the insurrectional or other movement, before 
it succeeded in forming a new state in fact, to that state. Special Rapporteur Ago explained that 
the premise of the rule was ‘not … a question of attributing to a subject of international law the 
conduct of organs of another subject, but merely of continuing to attribute to the same subject - 
which would only have reached the final stage of its progressive evolution - the acts of its own 
organs’.90 Article 10(2) is not drafted as a rule of attribution of rights and liabilities, but as rule of 
attribution of conduct.  
 
In Croatia v Serbia Serbia argued that Article 10(2) ‘does not represent customary international law’ 
in 1991-1992, the period relevant to that case.91 Drawing on Special Rapporteur Ago’s Fourth 
Report in which the Special Rapporteur introduced Article 10(2),92 and on Dumberry’s survey of 
state practice, Serbia contended that, 
 
… the rule contained in Article 10, para. 2 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility is 
not supported by State practice, which is almost non-existent. Nor is there evidence of 
States’ opinio juris in this regard. It is therefore submitted that said rule does not reflect 
international custom.93   
 
The Court affirmed its previous conclusion that the FRY, the new state that emerged following 
the dissolution of the SFRY in April 1992, was only bound by the obligations of the Genocide 
Convention from that date.94  Thus, ‘even if the acts prior to 27 April 1992 on which Croatia relies 
were attributable to a “movement”, within the meaning of Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles, and 
became attributable to the FRY by operation of the principle set out in that Article, they cannot 
have involved a violation of the provisions of the Genocide Convention but, at most, only of the 
customary international law prohibition of genocide’.95 Accordingly, the ICJ did not find it 
necessary to consider whether Article 10(2) constitutes an expression of customary international 
law as it was in 1991-1992 or thereafter.96 
 
90 Ago, Fourth Report (1972), p.131 §157. 
91 Croatia v Serbia, Counter-Memorial of Serbia, §284 & §286. 
92 Ago, Fourth Report, ILC Ybk 1972, Vol.II, §§200-209. 
93 Croatia v Serbia, Counter-Memorial of Serbia, §293. The Court did not decide the point on the ground that it did 
not have jurisdiction. See section 8.2.1 above. 
94 Croatia v Serbia, Preliminary Objections, pp.454-455 §117. 
95 Croatia v Serbia, p.53 §105. 
96 Ibid.  
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The limited examples of case law and state practice supporting the existence of Article 10(2) lead 
one to suspect that had the ICJ considered the question whether Article 10(2) is an expression of 
customary international law, it is likely that the Court would have answered the question in the 
negative. Nevertheless, the approach of the ICJ in Croatia v Serbia reveals a greater challenge to 
Article 10(2) than the question of its status as customary international law. This is the question 
whether Article 10(2) works as a rule of attribution of conduct for the purposes of engaging a 
state’s international responsibility at all. If this is answered in the negative, and contrary to the 
stated purpose of Article 10 in the ILC Commentary, a new state can and will avoid responsibility 
for unlawful conduct committed its organs in their effort to establish that state. 
 
8.5 A rule destined for desuetude? 
Article 10(2) is a rule of attribution that is the product of a notion of fairness, justice, and equity. 
The rule is representative of a view of what ought to happen when an insurrectional or other 
movement succeeds in establishing a new state. As Special Rapporteur Ago reasoned, ‘the 
attribution to such a State, as a potential source of responsibility, of acts which were formerly 
attributed to the insurrectional movement, because they had been committed by its organs, would 
be only natural’.97 There should be no gap in the law of responsibility that would allow a new state 
to avoid responsibility, and therefore the obligation to provide reparation, for internationally 
wrongful acts committed by its founders. 
 
However, the ICJ’s judgment in Croatia v Serbia exposes a fundamental flaw in Article 10(2),98 thus 
far not addressed by scholarship. According to the ILC, ‘for the purpose of attributing acts [of an 
insurrectional movement] to the State, no distinction is made between the acts of organs of the 
insurrectional movement according to whether they preceded or followed the acquisition by the 
movement of effective power over a given region’.99 The ILC’s commentary to Article 2 ARS 
states that,100 ‘for responsibility to attach to the act of the State, the conduct must constitute  a 
breach of an international obligation in force for that State at that time’.101 The Commentary further 
 
97 Ago, Fourth Report (1972), p.131 §157. 
98 See Croatia v Serbia, p.52 §104.  
99 ILC Report (1975), p.100 §2. 
100 Article 2 ARS provides the two elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State for the purposes of 
establishing State responsibility, namely (a) that the act is attributable to the State and (b) that the act constitutes a 
breach of an international obligation of that State. 
101 ARS, Article 2, Commentary, §1. 
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elaborates that Article 2(b) refers to a breach of ‘an international obligation of that State’ rather 
than to an international norm or rule as ‘[w]hat matters for these purposes is not simply the 
existence of a rule but its application in the specific case to the responsible State’.102 Further, Article 
13 ARS applies the inter-temporal rule of international law and a guarantee against the 
retrospective application of international law in matters of state responsibility. Article 13 ARS 
provides that ‘an act of a State does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless 
the State is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs’.103 
  
As a general rule, a treaty does not bind a party with retroactive effect, i.e. with respect to any act 
or omission that took place before the treaty came into force for that state.104 In circumstances 
where a new state is created that new state will only be bound by international law from the date 
of that state’s accession to a treaty, or, where applicable, the date of its succession to the 
international obligations of the predecessor state,105 unless the provisions of the treaty provide for 
its retroactive effect.106 Thus, in its assessment in Croatia v Serbia of whether Article 10(2) could 
provide a means of bringing acts occurring before the establishment of the FRY (Serbia and 
Montenegro) in April 1992 within the Court’s jurisdiction, the ICJ observed that, 
 
… even if Article 10 (2) of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility could be regarded as 
declaratory of customary international law at the relevant time, that Article is concerned 
only with the attribution of acts to a new State; it does not create obligations binding upon 
either the new State or the movement that succeeded in establishing that new State. Nor 
does it affect the principle stated in Article 13 of the said Articles that: “An act of a State 
does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless the State is bound by the 
obligation in question at the time the act occurs.”107  
 
 
102 Ibid., §13. 
103 Article 13 ARS. 
104 Article 28 VCLT; Jennings & Watts (1996) p.1249 §620. 
105 Ambatielos (Greece v United Kingdom) p.40; Croatia v Serbia, Preliminary Objections, pp.454-455, §117; Croatia v Serbia, 
pp.49-51, §§95-100. See also, Müllerson (1998), pp.26-32. 
106 E.g. Mavromattis Palestinian Concessions (PCIJ); Ambatielos (Greece v United Kingdom), p.40. Provisions of a treaty the 
reflect customary international law may be applied to events that occurred before the treaty came into force insofar 
as they are ‘a convenient expression of the customary rules’: Jennings & Watts (1996) p.1249 §620, fn.6; e.g. ECtHR 
Golder v United Kingdom, §29. 
107 Croatia v Serbia, p.52 §104. Also, Croatia v Serbia, Declaration of Judge Xue, p.382 §3. 
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The ICJ concluded that even if the acts complained of were attributable to Serbia pursuant to 
Article 10(2), ‘they cannot have involved violations of the Genocide Convention, but, at most, 
only the customary international law prohibition of genocide’.108  
 
The ICJ’s analysis in Croatia v Serbia gives rise to a further question whether a new state’s obligations 
under customary international law can be applied retroactively to conduct that occurred before the 
state came into existence?109  
 
It is generally accepted that a new state will be bound by principles of customary international 
law.110 Judge Weeramantry observed in his separate opinion in Bosnia Genocide (judgment of 1996), 
principles of customary international law ‘continue to be applicable to both sovereign and subjects, 
irrespective of changes in sovereignty, for the new sovereign, equally with the old, is subject to 
customary international law’.111 However, it is questionable whether, under accepted principles of 
international law, a new state will be responsible for conduct that has occurred before it came into 
existence. According Marek, 
 
The rights and duties of the new State will initially be derived exclusively from customary 
international law. The new State will not be internationally responsible from what has taken place 
on its territory prior to its birth… On the other hand, an old State will continue to bear its 
international rights and duties both customary and conventional... It may be held internationally 
responsible for what has occurred in its territory.112 
 
It may then be questioned whether Article 10(2) provides an exception to the requirement that a 
state must be bound by the international obligation at the time the act was committed? For in 
order for the conduct of an insurrectional or other movement to engage the responsibility of the 
new state, customary international law must be considered to retroactively bind that new state 
from the point at which that movement took form. As stated above, the authorities that appear to 
support the rule provided by Article 10(2) are at most expressions of the principle that once a new 
 
108 Ibid., p53, §105. 
109 The ICJ did not address this question in as any jurisdiction it possessed in that particular case derived from article 
IX of the Genocide Convention that does not afford a basis for the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim of 
violations of the prohibition of genocide under customary international law. See Croatia v Serbia, pp.47-48, §§88-89. 
110 Jenks (1952) p.107; Marek (1968) p1. 
111 Bosnia Genocide, Preliminary Objections, Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, p.648. 
112 Marek (1968) p.1. 
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state has been recognised the retroactive validation of its legal order, and of the rights and 
obligations created by the acts of that state before its recognition, is justified. However, the 
authorities only support retroactive validation to the date the new state was proclaimed or 
established in fact, not the date at which the movement whose struggles led to the formation of 
that state came into being. The retroactive validation of a state’s legal order does not result in the 
retroactive application of international law to that state. Rather, it is an acceptance of the law-
making capacity of that state so as to ensure that the legal rights and duties created by the acts of 
that state may be effectively implemented and enforced.113 Non-recognition of a new state denies 
that state any law-making faculty and the ability to create legal title, and therefore deprives the acts 
of that state of any validity within international law.114 In circumstances where a movement claims 
to have established a new state on part of the territory of the predecessor state, the practice of 
non-recognition ensures the continuity of the predecessor state to legal title over the territory.  
 
It follows from the above analysis that there is no authoritative support for the notion that 
customary international law can bind a state with respect to acts committed by armed groups 
before that state in fact came into existence. Therefore, as much as it is desirable that a new state 
should be international responsible for the conduct of the insurrectional or other movement 
whose agitations led to that state’s formation, it is questionable whether Article 10(2) can operate 
as a rule of attribution of conduct. 
 
8.6  An alternative approach: A rule of attribution of responsibility  
The notion that a new state, established by an insurrectional or other movement, is a potential 
source of responsibility for the acts of that insurrectional or other movement that violate 
international law should not be dismissed altogether. As an alternative to invoking Article 10(2) as 
a rule of attribution of conduct, the question of the new state’s responsibility for violations of 
international law committed by the insurrectional or other movement may be approached as one 
of attribution of responsibility. This may be what Ago had in mind when he explained the 
justification for Article 10(2) according to the ‘continuity which would exist between the 
personality of the insurrectional movement and that of the State to which it has given birth’.115  
 
 
113 For discussion of the effect of recognition of the validity of acts of a government declared ‘illegal’ by the UN 
Security Council. The application of Article 9 ARS to the conduct of armed opposition groups is considered in 
chapter 6 of this thesis. 
114 Marek (1968) p.560. 
115 Ago, Fourth Report (1972), p.131 §159. See section 8.2.2 above. 
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A rule of attribution of responsibility would be narrow in its application, both in terms of the 
persons or entities to which any such rule would apply and in terms of the nature of international 
obligations. This is because the category of non-state actors bound by international law, and the 
extent to which they are so bound is limited. It is generally accepted that IHL may bind certain 
armed groups.116 As the ILC Commentary recognises, ‘[a] further possibility is that the 
insurrectional movement may itself be held responsible for its own conduct under international 
law, for example, for a breach of IHL committed by its forces’.117 However, the notion that armed 
groups hold obligations under IHRL is controversial, albeit that there is a growing acceptance of 
the notion that entities that exercise effective power and authority over territory may hold certain 
obligations under IHRL.118 Nevertheless, a rule that provides for the attribution of responsibility 
for violations of international law committed by the insurrectional movement that succeeds in 
establishing a new state would ensure against impunity and require the new state to provide 
reparation to victims of its founders unlawful acts.  
 
As with Article 10(1), this rule is based on the continuity between the organisational structures of 
the insurrectional movement and the organisational structures of the new state. The proposed rule 
of attribution of responsibility is different to a rule of succession of one subject of international 
law to the rights and obligations of another subject of international law. The insurrectional 
movement does not transform into a subject of international law (the new state). On the 
establishment of the new state, the insurrectional movement transforms in to the organisational 
structure, the organs, of that state. 
 
8.7 Conclusion 
The rule provided by Article 10(2) has been described as ‘uncontroversial’. This is in spite of a lack 
of authority supporting the existence of the rule. As I have shown, the authorities and practice 
support the retroactive validation of the legal order of a state, once that state has been recognised, 
from the date of the declaration of independence by that state, but not the attribution of conduct 
of the insurrectional or other movement committed before that declaration of the new state.  
 
116 See e.g. Nicaragua, §§218-219 in which the Court states that the acts of the contras are ‘governed by the law 
applicable to [non-international armed conflicts]’; SCSL Kallon & Kamara, Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty 
(2004) §45; Sam Hinga Norman, Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment), (2004), §22; Article 3 Common to GCs and ICRC 
Commentary of 2016, §505; Rule 139, ICRC Customary IHL Study, updated 6 June 2016; Report of the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General (2005) §§157-158 & 172. 
There is disagreement as to why armed groups are so bound. See Sivakumaran (2006); Kleffner (2011); Murray 
(2015). 
117 ARS, Article 10, Commentary, p.52 §16. 
118 Rodley (1993); Tomuschat (2004) p.588. See also, Bellal (2016). 
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Moreover, the ICJ’s conclusion that Article 10(2) cannot be applied to the question of Serbia’s 
responsibility for acts of genocide committed before the state’s proclamation as a new, 
independent state on 27 April 1992, reveals a fundamental flaw in the operation of Article 10(2). 
The effective operation of the rule relies upon the retroactive application of customary 
international law so as to bind a new state with respect to conduct committed before that state 
came into existence.  However, there is no support in case law or doctrine for such a rule.  
 
Thus, rather than applying Article 10(2) as a rule of attribution of conduct it should be applied as 
a rule of attribution of responsibility. The scope of application of the rule will be limited, given 
that it is only generally accepted that armed groups in situations of armed conflict may be bound 
by IHL. Nevertheless, the application of Article 10(2) as a rule of attribution of responsibility 
would ensure that responsibility for gross violations of IHL commissioned by a successful 







Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
The attribution of conduct of non-state actors to a state is one of the more controversial aspects 
of the law of international responsibility. The orthodox view is that state responsibility for ‘private’ 
conduct is extremely limited. As argued in chapter 2, the high threshold tests required to identify 
a state’s de facto organs and agents mean that a state that provides substantial financial, military and 
other support to an armed group will not be directly responsible for the conduct of that armed 
group, even if that group uses the state’s support to commit war crimes, genocide, crimes against 
humanity and other violations of international law. In light of the practical and evidential 
difficulties that are likely to arise when seeking to prove conduct was committed on the 
instructions of or under the effective control of the state, it is doubtful that the law of state 
responsibility, as currently understood, is sufficient to ensure that states do not evade their 
international obligations by delegating the conduct of war, terrorism or other violations of the 
state’s international obligations to a proxy.  
 
The question of a state’s responsibility should take into account a state’s primary obligations to 
prevent certain unlawful acts. However, as argued in chapter 4, the failure to prevent the 
commission of unlawful acts is legally and conceptually distinct from complicit conduct – 
deliberate acts that contribute to the harm itself. Thus, although overlapping primary and 
secondary rules of international law can provide a comprehensive legal framework that regulates 
state complicity in violations of IHL and certain rights-violating conduct, outside of situations of 
armed conflict a normative gap in responsibility exists between a state’s primary obligations to 
prevent certain acts and a state’s direct responsibility for violations of international law committed 
by armed groups acting on the instructions of, or under the effective control of, the state. A states 
is able to exploit this gap, thereby undermining the integrity of international law, and evading 
responsibility for complicity in terrorism and international crimes committed by its proxy outside 
of the state’s jurisdiction. 
 
But adopting a flexible approach to the rules of attribution and applying the ‘overall control’ test 
to cases of unlawful purpose shared by the state and armed group would not be an appropriate or 
effective means of addressing state complicity in the unlawful acts of armed groups. The 
requirement of proof of a common plan to commit unlawful acts means that the test introduces a 
new criterion to the attribution of the conduct of a state’s agents – proof of the state’s intention. 
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In practice one evidentially unattainable threshold, effective control, is replaced with another, 
intent to achieve a specific outcome. 
 
Thus, in chapter 5 I argued that this gap in responsibility may be addressed by a general rule of 
derivative responsibility for complicity. Lex specialis rules of derivative responsibility that have been 
progressively developed in IHL, IHRL and primary obligations pursuant to international 
instruments that govern the transfer of arms support holding a state to a stricter standard when 
the beneficiary of that state’s aid or assistance is an armed group. In such cases it is sufficient to 
show that the state knew, or should have known, that its support would be used to commit 
unlawful acts. 
 
In Part II I considered the scope and content of Articles 9 and 10 ARS, two rules that provide an 
exception to the control-agency paradigm that underlies the principles that govern the 
identification of a state’s organs or agents. As explained in chapter 6, references to Article 9 in the 
ILC Commentary to Articles 5 and 10 ARS that suggest the rule would cover the conduct 
committed by any armed group in any exercise of “governmental authority” are misleading. There 
is no case law or state practice that supports the attribution of any conduct of an armed opposition 
group to the state pursuant to Article 9. Article 9 only covers conduct committed in the exercise 
of governmental authority with the acquiescence of the state. Moreover, arguments that Article 9 
provides a basis for attribution of cross-border armed attacks by an armed group to the 
‘harbouring’ state are firmly rejected.  A state’s inability to control the area in which the armed 
group is operating will not amount to ‘acquiescence’.  
 
Articles 10(1) and (2), the subjects of chapters 7 and 8, are two rules of attribution that are heavily 
influenced by principles of equity and justice. Described as ‘uncontroversial’ by most scholars, 
these rules provide a potential basis upon which the normative gap in responsibility that would 
otherwise exist: namely, in circumstances where that armed group succeeds in its efforts to become 
the government of the state, or to establish a new state. However, the potential of Article 10(1) to 
ensure that armed groups that achieve power by force do not avoid responsibility for the unlawful 
acts committed in the pursuit that goal is significantly hampered by the ILC’s suggestion that the 
rule should not be pressed too far in cases of ‘governments of national reconciliation’. As argued 
in chapter 7, this suggested limitation on the scope of Article 10(1) is problematic. Not least, the 
exclusion discriminates between the victims of the former government and victims of the 
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insurrectional movement. The move in international law is, and should continue to be, towards 
responsibility not away from it. 
 
The approach of the ICJ to the question of the applicability of Article 10(2) to the question of 
Serbia’s responsibility for acts of genocide committed before the state’s proclamation as a new, 
independent state, reveals a fundamental flaw in the rule. The effective application of the rule relies 
on the acceptance, as a matter of principle, that customary international law may retroactively bind 
a new state with respect to conduct committed before that state in fact existed. However, there is 
no support in case law or doctrine for such a rule. Thus, in chapter 8 it is argued that Article 10(2) 
should be conceived as rule of attribution of responsibility. The scope of application of this rule 
will be limited. Nevertheless, such a rule would ensure that responsibility for gross violations of 
IHL commissioned by the successful insurrectional or other movement is not extinguished by 
virtue of the establishment of a new state. Otherwise, Article 10(2) will, if it has not already, swiftly 
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